ML20211J316
| ML20211J316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1999 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211J306 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909030117 | |
| Download: ML20211J316 (5) | |
Text
p geog t.,e
,1 i?*4 -
UNITED STATE 3
/l, j.
NUCLEAR REGULATOR / OOMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055W1
/j
.g SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 225 ND 102TO FACILITY OPERATING A
LICENSE NOS. DPR-66 AND NPF-73 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION. UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-334 AND 50-412
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 24,1998, as supplemented June 15, June 17, and July 7,1999, the Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos.1 and 2 (BVPS-1 and BVPS 2), Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revisa the TS requirements for the axial flux difference (AFD) monitor, quadrant power tilt ratio (OPTR) monitor, rod position deviation monitor, and rod insertion limit (RIL) monitor. The changes would (1) relocate requirements for the AFD monitor and the OPTR monitor to the Licensing Requirements Manual (LRM); (2) delete requirements l
. for the rod position deviation monitor and RIL monitor from the TSs; (3) modify Unit 1 sun /eillance requirements (SR) 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 by incorporating the Unit 2 wording to provide surveillances more consistent with the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO); (4) change Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.2, SR 4.1.3.5, SR 4.1.3.6 and Unit 2 SR 4.1.3.5 from 24-hour surveillance frequencies to 12-hour frequencies; and (5) delete Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.3. The June 15, June 17, and July 7,1999, letters provided clarifying information and final versions of the revised TS pages, and did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination or expand the amendment beyond the scope of the initial notice.
2.0 EVALUATION The licensee proposed the following changes in its December 24,1998, license amendment request. The NRC staff's evaluations of the proposed changes are as follows:
9909030117 990830 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P
(
,4
, 2.1 Relocatation of Requirements for the AFD monitor and the OPTR monitor to the LRM 2.1.1 AFD Monitor The axial flux difference (AFD) is a measure of the axial power distribution skewing to either the top or bottom half of the core. The AFD is sensitive to many core parameters such as control bank positio.ns, core power level, axial burnup, axial xenon distribution, and, to a lesser extent, reactor coolant temperature and boron concentration. The allowed range of AFD is used in the nuclear design process to confirm that operation within these limits produces core peaking factors and axial power distributions that meet safety analysis requirements.
TS limits on AFD were established in order to ensure core peaking factors are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis. These requirements are addressed in the TSs via LCOs and SRs which require that the indicated AFD be maintained within the target band i
specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR), and that the AFD is verified to be within limits on a routine basis using the operable excore channels. Additionally, there is an AFD monitor / alarm, which does not perform any protective functions, to aid the operator in maintaining AFD within limits. This monitor / alarm is not relied upon for these surveillances.
However, there are TS requirements to perform the AFD verifications more frequently during periods when this monitor is not operable.
The licensee has proposed revision of SR 4.2.1.1 to remove requirements based on operability of the AFD monitor alarm, and revision of the associated bases to remove discussion of the alarm operation. The requireinents removed from the SR, and the associated bases j
discussion, will be placed in the Licensing Requirements Manual (LRM). Specifically, the j
requirements removed from the SR are:
a.
Monitoring the indicated AFD at least once-per-hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after restoring the AFD monitor to operable status, b.
Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each operable excore channel at least once-per-hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD monitor alarm is inoperable, in lieu of the nemat once-per-7-day frequency.
The normal surveillance, which verifies that the AFD is within limits during power operation above 15 % rated thermal power (RTP) for each operable excore channel, is retained within the TS with its current minimum frequency of once-per-7-days.
The AFD monitor alarm is provided as an operator aid for maintaining AFD within established limits. It performs no protective functions assumed in a safety analysis. This change relocates requirements associated with the AFD monitor alarm to the LRM, but leaves the TS AFD limits, and AFD surveillance requirements unchanged. The LRM was developed and issued by the licensee to control and maintain those items removed from the TSs. Changes to the LRM are controlled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The current requirements for the AFD monitor alarm in SR 4.2.1.1 and the associated bases are not being changed in their relocation to the LRM. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431," Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," Revision 1, dated April 1995, as modified by the
,.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff approved Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Technical Specification Task Force, Change 110, Revision 2 (TSTF-110, Rev. 2). Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that relocation of the AFD monitor alarm requirements in SR 4.2.1.1 and the associated bases discussions of the alarm operation to the LRM is acceptable.
2.1.2 OPTR Monitor The Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (OPTR) is a measure of the radial power distribution within the core. The OPTR limit ensures that the gross radial power distribution remains consistent with the design values used in the safety analysis. The power density at any point in the core must
{
be limited so that the fuel design criteria are maintained. Together,1.CO 3.2.3," Axial Flux i
Difference", LCO 3.2.4, " Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio", and LCO 3.1.3.6, " Control Rod Insertion Limits", provide limits on process variables that characterize and control the three dimensional
)
power distribution of the reactor core. Control of these variables ensures that the core operates within the fuel design criteria and that power distribution remains wahin the bounds used in the safety analysis.
t Precise radial power distribution measurements are made during startup testing, after refueling, and periodically during power operation. The TS limit on OPTR is addressed via an LCO and SRs which require that the OPTR be maintained within its limit, and that this is verified on a routine basis using the moveable incore detectors. Additionally, there is a OPTR monitor / alarm, which does not perform any protective functions, to aid the operator in maintaining OPTR within the TS limit. Although this monitor / alarm is not relied upon for the TS required OPTR surveillances, there are TSs requirements to perform the OPTR verification more frequently during periods when this monitor is not operable.
The licensee has proposed revision of SR 4.2.4 to remove requirements associated with the OPTR monitor alarm, and revision of the associated bases to remove discussion of alarm operability. The requirements removed from the SR, and the associated bases discussion, will be placed in the LRM. Specifically, the SR is modified to remove the requirement to calculate OPTR and verify that it is within limits within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter, when the OPTR alarm is inoperable. The TS requirements to maintain OPTR less than or equal to 1.02 when reactor power is greater than 50 % RTP, and the associated action statements are unchanged. Additionally, the normal surveillance, which verifies that the OPTR is within limits, is retained within the TSs with its current minimum frequency of once-per-7-days.
The OPTR monitor alarm is provided as an operator aid for maintaining OPTR within established limits. It performs no protective functions assumed in a safety analysis. This change relocates requirements associated with the OPTR monitor alarm to the LRM, but leaves the TS OPTR limit, and OPTR surveillance requirements unchanged. Tht. LRM was developed and issued by the licensee to control and maintain those items removed from the TSs.
Changes to the LRM are controked in accoidance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The current requirements for the OPTR monitor alarm in SR 4.2.4 and the associated bases are not being changed in their relocation to the LRM. The 7-day surveillance frequency for verifying that OPTR is within limits takes into account other information and alarms available to the operator in the control room. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431," Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," Revision 1, dated April 1995, as modified by the NRC staff approved NEl TSTF-110, Rev. 2. Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that relocation
,,. of the OPTR monitor alarm requirements in SR 4.2.4 and the associated bases discussions of
{
alarm operability to the LRM is acceptable.
2.2 Deletion of rod position deviation monitor and rod inspection limit (RIL) monitor requirements The operability, including position indication, of the shutdown and control rods is an initial assumption in all safety analyses that assume rod insertion upon reactor trip. Maximum rod misalignment is an initial assumption in the safety analysis that directly affects core power distributions and assumptions of available shutdown margin (SDM). Rod position indication,is required to assess operability and misalignment.
{
Mechanical or electrical failures may cause a controi rod to become inoperable or to become misaligned from its group which, in turn, may cause increased power peaking, due to the i
asymmetric reactivity distribution and a reduction in the total available rod worth for reactor shutdown. T serefore, control rod alignment and operability are related to core operation in j
design povver peaking limits and the core design requirement of a minimum SDM. Limits on control rod alignment and operability are contained in the TSs, and all rod positions are i
monitored and controlled during power operation to ensure that the power distribution and reactivity limits defined by the design power peaking and SDM limits are preserved.
The axial position of shutdown rods and control rods are determined by two separate and
)
independent systems: the Group Demand Position Indication System, and the Individual Analog Rod Position Indication (ARPI) System. The Group Demand Position Indication System counts i
the pulses from the Rod Control System that moves the rods. Individual rods in a group all receive the same cignal to move and should, therefore, all be at the same position indicated by the group step counter for that group. This indication system is considered to be highly precise
( 1 step, or 5/8 inch). If a rod does not move one step for each demand pulse, the step counter will still count the pulse and incorrectly reflect the position of the rod. The ARPI system, on the other hand, uses a linear variable transformer (installed in BVPS-1) or a series of coils spaced along the hollow upper end of the control rod tube (installed in BVPS-2) to detect the position of the control rod extension shaft and display the position of the individual control rod.
NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," is based on an ARPI system which uses the series of coils, such as installed in BVPS-2, and assumes that the normalindication accuracy of the ARPI system is 6 steps ( 3.75 inches), and the maximum uncertainty is 12 steps (17.5 inches). With an indicated deviation of 12 steps between the group step counter and ARPI system, the maximum deviation between actual rod position and the demand position could be 24 steps, or 15 inches. The licensing basis safety analysis assumes a i 24 step rod misalignment.
Control and shutdown rod position accuracy is essential during power operations. Power peaking, ejected rod worth, or SDM limits may be violated in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), with control or shutdown rods operating outside of their limits undetected.
Therefore, the acceptance criteria for rod position indication is that rod positions must be known with sufficient accuracy in order to verify the core is operating within established core physics parameters, and that the alignment limits are preserved. These requirements are addressed in the TSs via LCOs and SRs which require that: the position indication systems are operable; the rods are properly aligned with their group; the rod positions are within the limits established in
the COLR; and that these are verified on a routine basis (Proposed changes to make these surveillance intervals 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> are discussed in Section 2.4 of this safety evaluation report).
The surveillances associated with these TSs rely solely upon the Group Demand Position Indication System indications and the ARPI system indications; the Rod Position Deviation Monitor and the RlL monitor are not used in satisfying these surveillance requirements.
The licensee has proposed changes to the BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 TSs to remove requirements for the Rod Position Deviation Monitor and the Rll monitor which are consistent with the NRC staff approved NEl TSTF-110, Rev. 2 changes to NUREG-1431. The underlying assumptions for the NRC staff's approval of TSTF-110, Rev. 2, changes are that indications of the rod positions available to the operators are sufficiently accurate and that surveillance frequencies are appropriate to ensure adequate protection of core physics parameters and, hence, the monitors are not required. To apply the TSTF-110, Rev 2 changes to the existing BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 custom TSs, the installed rod position indication system hardware must then either be the same as, or have performance characteristics comparable to, the systems on which NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," is based.
Additionally, the surveillance intervals must be consistent with NUREG-1431 as modified by TSTF-110, Rev. 2.
2.2.1 Rod Position Deviation Monitor s -
The licensee's proposed changes would:
a.
Revise SR 4.1.3.1.2 to remove requirements for verification of group position once-per-4-hours during periods when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable.
The remaining surveillance verifies that the position of each fulllength rod is within 12 steps of the associated group demand counter at least once-per-12 hours.
b.
Revise TS 3.1.3.2 (Unit 1 only) to remove the automatic rod position deviation monitor from shutdown and control rod position indication system operability requirements. Additionally, Action Statement requirements to check indicated positions ever/ 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the automatic rod position deviation monitor is inoperable are deleted. The remaining TS LCO specifies operability requirements, and associated action statements, for the shutdown and control rod position indication system, which is comprised of the group demand position indicators and the individual analog rod position indicators.
c.
Delete SR 4.1.3.2.3 (Unit 1 only).
d.
Revise SR 4.1.3.2 (Unit 2 only) to remove requirements for comparison of Demand Position Indication System readings with Digital Rod Position Indication System readings once-per-4-hours during periods when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable. The remaining surveillance determines that the Digital Rod Position Indication System is operable by verifying that the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least once-per-12-hours.
6 Revise TS Bases 3/4.1.3 to remove discussion of the rod position deviation e.
monitor.
Requirements that are in the existing TSs, but do not meet the guidance set forth in 10 CFR 50.36 for inclusion in the TSs, can be removed. The rod position deviation monitor / alarm is provided as an aid to alert the operator if any rod deviates from the bank position by more than i 12 steps. It does not indicate conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; it is not a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis; it performs no protective functions assumed in a safety analysis to mitigate a design basis accident or transient; and, there is no operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment which shows it to be significant to public health and safety.
Therefore, the rod position deviation monitor / alarm requirements specified in TS 3/4.1.3 do not meet any of the four criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) regarding items for which a limiting condition for operation must be established. In its application for this amendment, the licensee noted that the operability requirement for the rod position deviation monitor was added to the Unit 1 TS 3.1.3.2 LCO by Amendment No. 51 to License No. DPR-66, and that inclusion of this operability requirement was inconsistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications at the time (NUREG 0452, Rev. 4). As part of the review for the change proposed in the licensee's December 24,1998, letter, the NRC staff reviewed documentation associated with Amendment No. 51 to the BVPS-1 license, as well as correspondence to and from the licensee associated with Amendment Nos. 52,57,68, and 141. All of these amendments were related to the BVPS-1 ARPI system.
The staff found in its review of the historical documentation that the inclusion of the operability requirements for the rod position deviation monitor in the TS LCO was done as part of an effort to address significant performance problems the licensee had experienced with the BVPS-1 ARPI system; specifically, inaccuracy and thermal drift which resulted in indicated rod positions which were outside of the TS required 212 step accuracy. In light of these problems, the addition of the operability requirement, in conjunction with the already existing requirement for surveillance at 4-hour intervals when the rod deviation monitor is inoperable, was intended to ensure timely protection of the core physics parameters in the event of rod misalignment outside of a i 12 step band. Further review of the historical documents revealed that, around the time that Amendment 51 to the BVPS-1 license was issued, the licensee had installed custom meter faces, utilized plant computer algorithm compensation, and implemented a program for hot zero-power calibration in order to achieve the required
- 12 step accuracy. In order to further evaluate the applicability of the TSTF-110, Rev. 2, changes to BVPS-1, the NRC staff requested that the licensee provide additionalinformation regarding any equipment modifications that have been installed on BVPS-1 since Amendment 51 was issued to address the accuracy and thermal drift problems previously encountered. The current BVPS-2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report provides sufficient information for the NRC staff to determine that the BVPS-2 Individual Rod Position Indication System is the same system that NUREG-1431,
" Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," is based on and, hence, no additional information for BVPS-2 was required. The requested information was provided in the licensee's letter dated June 15,1999.
During 1997/1998, DLC replaced a part of the BVPS-1 ARPI system with a Combustion Engineering Rod Position Indication (CERPI) system. This modification installed programmable logic controllers (PLCs) on BVPS-1 to replace the electronic processing equipment of the ARPI
,. ' *,,.. system. The PLC algorithms correct for detector non-linearity, as well as compensate for detector temperature effects such as those due to power level or average coolant temperature changes. The PLCs have been demonstrated to accurately compensate for the inherent sensor non-linearity and thermal drift characteristics to provide consistent and accurate rod position indication.
Because the detector design has remained unchanged, short-term temperature effects in, mediately following rod movement are still present. However, since rods are moved as a bank, this thermal transient affects all rods in the bank in relatively the same manner; thus, the ability to detect a rod out of bank situation is not materially impaired. This short-term detector characteristic is addressed in the BVPS-1 TSs by the allowance for a 1-hour soak following rod movement.
The installation of the CERPI modification resulted in an average maximum deviation of 6 steps, and a steady-state absolute maximum individual rod position indication deviation of 10 steps from the demand position. NUREG-1431 is based on a system which provides normal indication accuracy of
- 6 steps, and a maximum uncertainty of
- 12 steps. Thus, the performance characteristics of the BVPS-1 CERPI system are consistent with those of the system upon which NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants,"
is based.
Considering that rod motion is limited and infrequent during steady state power operations, verification that individual rod positions are within alignment limits at a frequency of once-per-12-hours provides a history that allows the operator to detect a rod that is beginning to deviate from its expected position. This specified frequency takes into account other rod position information that is continuously available to the operator in the control room so that, during actual rod motion, deviations can be immediately detected. The specified 12-hour surveillance intervalis consistent with NUREG-1431 as modified by TSTF-110, Rev. 2.
Therefore, since the rod position indication systems provide accurate steady state information on rod positions; the operators routinely verify rod positions are within limits; rod motion when the units are at power is limited and infrequent; short-term thermal effects on the BVPS-1 rod position indication system detectors do not impair the operators ability to detect a rod out of bank situation; and, the rod position deviation monitor serves no protective function, the NRC staff has concluded that removal of the rod position deviation monitor alarm from the TSs and revision of the associated Bases is acceptable. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 as modified by the NRC staff approved NEl TSTF-110, Rev. 2.
2.2.2 RIL monitor The insertion limits of the shutdown and control rods are initial assumptions in all safety i
analyses that assume rod insertion upon reactor trip. The insertion limits directly affect core power and fuel burnup distributions as well as assumptions of available SDM, and initial reactivity insertion rate. TS limits on control rod insertion have been established, and all rods are monitored and controlled during power operation to ensure that the power distribution and reactivity limits defined by the design power peaking and SDM limits are preserved. The i
surveillances associated with these TSs rely solely upon the Group Demand Position Indication l
1 J
,,. System indications; the Rod insertion Limit Monitor is not used in satisfying these surveillance requirements.
The licensee's proposed changes would:
Revise SR 4.1.3.6 (Unit 1)and remove the requirement to verify that deviations a.
between indicated positions are within limits once-per-4-hours during periods when the Rll monitor is inoperable. The wording is also changed so that the BVPS-1 SR and the BVPS-2 SR are consistent with each other, and consistent with the LCO. Additionally, the surveillance frequency is changed from once-per-24-hours to once-per-12-hours. The remaining surveillance verifies that the position of each control bank is within the insertion limits of the COLR at least once-per-12-hours.
b.
Revise TS 4.1.3.6 (Unit 2) to remove the requirement to verify individual rod positions once-per-4-hours during periods when the RIL monitor is inoperable. The remaining surveillance verifies that the position of each control bank is within the t
insertion limits of the COLR at least once-per-12-hours, c.
Revise TS Bases 3/4.1.3 to remove discussion of the Rll monitor.
The Rll monitor / alarm is provided as an aid to alert the operator if the control banks are outside the limits of the COLR. It performs no protective functions assumed in a safety analysis. The 1
Group Demand Position Indication systems installed in both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 are the same J
type as that which NUREG-1431 is based on. Hence, there is no concern regarding the accuracy of the indications. Considering that rod motion is limited and infrequent during steady-state power operations, verification that banks are within their COLR limits once-per hours allows the operator to detect a bank that is approaching the insertion limits. This specified frequency takes into account other rod position information that is continuously available to the operator in the control room so that, during actual rod motion, deviations can be immediately detected.
1 Therefore, since the rod position indication systems provide accurate information on rod positions; the operators routinely verify rod positions are within limits; and, the Rll monitor serves no protective function, the NRC staff has concluded that removal of the RIL monitor alarm from the TSs and revision of the associated Bases is acceptable. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants,"
Revision 1, dated April 1995, as modified by the NRC staff approved NEl TSTF-110, Rev. 2.
2.3 Modification of Wording The licensee has preposed modification of the BVPS-1 SR 4.1.3.5 and SR 4.1.3.6 wording to incorporate the Unit 2 wording and provide surveillances more consistent with the LCOs.
References to the group demand counters and analog rod position indicators are removed such that the modified SRs require that the shutdown, and control bank rods be verified to be within the limits of the COLR. Since these SRs will still be satisfied by comparison of the indications of the group demand counters and analog rod position indicators, this is an editorial change only and does not materially alter any TS requirement. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that this change is acceptable.
I
]
- m 9
2.4 Revision of SR Frequencies
)
The licensee has proposed revision of the frequencies for BVPS-1 SR 4.1.3.2.2, SR 4.1.3.5, and SR 4.1.3.6 and BVPS-2 SR 4.1.3.5 from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. These changes result in verification that rod positions and power distributions are within their TS and COLR limits on a -
shiftly rather than daily basis. These frequency changes support the changes discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this safety evaluation, and are consistent with NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications - Westinghouse Plants," Revision 1, dated April 1995,. as modified by -
the NRC staff approved NEl TSTF-110, Rev. 2. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that these changes are acceptable.
2.5 Deletion of BVPS-1 SR 4.1.3.2.3 The licensee has proposed deletion of BVPS-1 SR 4.1.3.2.3, which requires verification that the automatic rod deviation monitor is operable once-per-7-days, and that deviation between the group domand counters and analog rod position indicators is checked manually for each rod once-per-24-hours. Since the TS LCO and SR requirements for the rod position deviation monitor are being removed, revision of this SR to reflect that change, and a change to revise the frequency to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, results in a SR which is identical to that of SR 4.1.3.2.2.a.
Therefore, since SR 4.1.3.2.2.a is being retained in the BVPS-1 TS with a 12-hour frequency, the NRC staff concludes that deletion of BVPS-1 SR 4.1.3.2.3 is acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
)
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located v/ithin the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no I
significant increase'in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released c'fsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 4155). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
2 I
i
- .e,
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, Principal Contributor: D, Collins Date: August 30, 1999