ML20078S340

Proposed Tech Specs Re Supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys

ML20078S340
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	12/14/1994
From:	NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20078S338	List: B15028, Application for Amend to License NPF-49,revising TS Re Supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys ML20078S340
References
NUDOCS 9412280242
Download: ML20078S340 (13)

Text

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Docket No. 50-423 B15028 9

, Attachment 2 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Marked Up Pages

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i December 1994 9412280242 941214 PDR ADOCK 05000423 P PDR

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COnAIMMDIT LEAKAGE f

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ,

< 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

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a. An overall integrated Bukage rate of less than or squal to L.,

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. -4EiD by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at P., l

' o.GS*/, 53.27 psia (38.57 psig) .

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b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations and valves subject to Type 8 and C tasts, when pressurized to P.

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c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.042 L. for all /-1 l penetrations that are SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY bypass leakage ( l paths when pressurized to P.. y APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:  !

With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L., or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L., or the combined bypass i leakage rate exceeding 0.042 L., restore the overall integrated leakage rate '

e to less than 0.75 L., the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L., and the combir.54 bypass leakagc te e atu a ve b.

SURVEILtANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall M demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the critoria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 (Total Time Method) and/or ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 (Mass Po

a. Three Type A tests (overall Integrated Containment Leskage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 i 10 month intervals durinq shutdown St a pressure not less than P., 53.27 psia (38.57 psig) c uring each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L , the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Comission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L., a Type A test shall be perfonned at least every 18 months untti two

' consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L. at which time the above test l schedule av be resumeds Amendment No. #, N, 89, MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/46-2 shy \

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gavt1LLANCE REQUIRINDITS (Continued)

J within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory -

2) Verifying,f analysis o representative carbon sample obtained in accord a

ance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2. March 1978,* meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Raoulatory Guide 1.52. Revi-  !

sion 2, March 1970,* for a methyl lodido penetration of less l than 0.1785; and f

3)

Verifyingasystemflowrateof7600cfmto9800cfmdurin!980.

system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-

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c'. V>r every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, wit.hin 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory *

- Position C.6.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2, March 1978,* for a methyl todida penetration of less than 0.1755: .

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the co .

Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfs, 2)

VerifyingthatthesystemstartsonaSafetyInjectiontest signal, c

• i-reduces a negative pressure of

'3) Verifying that each syst inch Water Gauge in the Auxiliary Ireater than or equal toutidings. at 24'4' elevation within @ s signal, and_4 '

4)

Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 15 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. 4 cpeakv hn oy %%I tv o*9 4 ugu pysssae WW emw i n h As%, uWp 24" elt%h un M%'m A w<eic4 ne sucmds; shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in

• ANSI M510-1980 Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1978.

AmendmentNo.F,77,87 R LLSTONE - IMIT 3 3/46-39 ox %c'

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garrAllBIENT SYSTDt$

. SASES r s/s.s.s art 0NDARY CONTAINMENT S/4.8.8.1 SUPPLEMENTARY [fAK CottttT10N AND RELEASE SYSTEM

'hackaround veseIM The OPERABILITY of the Supplemen ry Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) ensures that radioactive mater als that leak from the primary contain-ment into the secondary containment 11owingaDesignBasisAccident(D8A) are filtered out and adsorbed prior o any release to the environment. The -

design of the SLCRS is to achieve ' negative pressure within the secondary i containment boundary within Q/ seconds of a )RA.

\90 In order to ensure a neontive pressure in all areas within the secondary containment boundary under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location (i.e., 24'6 elevation to the auxiliary building) is 0.4 inches water gauge.

. The secondary containment boundary is comprised of the containment enclosure

~~ building and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve building (partially), l engineered safety features buildin (partially)lishs,th< the SLCRS works inhydrogen re.

(partially) and auxiliary building . To accomp l

conjunction with the Auxiliary But ding Filter (ABF) system (see Sec.

tion 3/4.7.g). The SLCRS and the ABF fans and filtration untts are located in l the auxiliary buildiag. The SLCRS is described in the Millstone Unit No. 3 FSAR, Section 8.2.3.

Ann 11 cable Safety Analyses The SLCRS design basis is established by the consequences nf the limiting DBA, which .is a LOCA. The accident analysis assumes that only one train of the SLCRS and one train of the auxiliary building filter system is functional due to a' single failure that disables the other train. The accider.t analysis accounts for the reduction of the airborne radioactive asterial provided by the remaining one train of this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the containment is determined for a LOC 4. ,

The SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS starts on a SIS signal. The modeled SLCRS actuation in the safety analysis (the Millstone 3 FSARChapter15,Section15.6)isbaseduponaworst-caseresponsetime

- followinganSIinitiatedatthelimitingsetpoint. One train of the SLCRS in to unction with the ABF system is capabia of drawin a negative ressure I inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24 6" elevation within L econds after a LOCA. This time includes diesel generator st rtup and

('t uencing time, system silartup time, and time for the system to attsin the i required negative pressurn after starting.

k iso S msirtT A' Amendment No. 87 NILLSTONE - 18117 3 33/454 Ny i

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BASES V4.s.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY ttAX cotttCTION AND REttASE Siurve111ance Reouirements 5

continuous hours in a 31-day period is suffic moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency wa

. developed in consideration of the known reliab

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b. c. e. and f These surveillances verify that the required ANSI SLCRS filter te' s wrformed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.

shall be used in place of ANSI N510-Ig75 referenced in Regula The surveillances include testing HEPA filter 4510-1980 Guide 1.52. Revision 2.

- properties performance,f o the activated charcoal (general u operations).

A ensures that each SLCRS train responds $reperly.

'Ihe automatic startu The 18-month frequency is based on the need to perform th the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the i potential unplanned transient if the surveillance was performed l with t power. The surveillance verifies that the SLCRS starts on a $

It also includes systems that are not the part automatic functions of the safety-related toflowisolateo postaccident configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation system through the secondary containment to the accident condition.

• The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates.

• Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates. 4

• Charging pump / reactor plant component -

filtar fan starts.

Hydrogen recombiner ventilation system aligns to the post D(p[

configuration.

• The engineered safety features building ventilation sys posteccident configuration. 1 Amendment No. 87 63/46-6 N1LL5 TONE - UNIT 3 eier .

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s/4.8.8.1 SUPPLBEiiiARY LEAK totttCTION AND RtttAtt/ s si (Continued) at a pressure

.With the SLCR$ in post acc en id t configuration the n seconds from the time 4

in the secondary containment boundary is achieved Time delays of l

of simulated emergency diesel eenerator. breaker c' osure.this surveillance. The time dampers and logic delays must 6e accounted for . econds, with a loss of.

to achieve the required negative pressure isThe surveillance verifies that one train  ;

offsite power coincident with.a SIS. i d

of SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system willmuy. produce y  ;

'to the outside atmosphere in the secondary containment boundary.4 For the l

.. purpose of this surveillance, pressure measurements will be made al l i- elevation in the auxiliary building.

adequate and representative of the entire secondary containment due to the I large cross-section of the air passages which interconnect the variousInl but dings within the boundary. l areas inside the secondary containment boundary under m  !

conditions is 0.4 inc $eswatergauge. It is recognized that there will be an occasional meteorological condition under,which slightly positive pressure may exist at some localized portions of the boundary (e.g., the upper elevations on the downwindsideofabuilding). For example, a very low outside temperature

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combined with a moderate wind speed could cause a slightly positive pressure at the upper elevations of the containment enclosure building on the leeward face. The' probability of occurrence of meteorological conditions which could l

result in such a positive differential pressure condition in the voper levels of the enclosure building has been estimated to be less than 25 of the time.

l The with theprobabilitfility proba of extreme low temperature, combined w portion of the boundary affected, combined with the low p 4

overall effect on the design basts dose calculations is insignificant.

2/4.8.s.2 Stt0NDARY CONTAINMENT SOUNDARY

• SECONDARY CONTAINNENT BOUNDARY ensures that the relea saterials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses.This restr ction, in conjunction with operation of the supplementary Le the $1TE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR part 100 during accident conditions.

Amendment No. 87 NILLSTONE - 19117 3 53/48-7 ,

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Docket No.--50-423 B15028 t

Attachment 3' Millstone' Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Retyped Pages l

December 1994 j

, CONTAllelENT SYSTEMS I l

I CONTA1101ENT LEAKARE LIMITING ColWITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L ,

0.65% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at P ,

53.27 psia (38.57 psig);

A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L, for all penetrations b.

and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P,;

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c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.042 L, for all penetrations that are SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY bypass leakage paths when pressurized to P .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L., or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L., or the cc,mbined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.042 L., restore the overall integrated leakage rate ,

to less than 0.75 L., the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L., and the combined bypass leakage rate to less than 0.042 L, prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS ,

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 (Total Time Method) and/or ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 (Mass Point Method):  ;

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 i 10 month intervals during shutdown at a pressure not less thar. P,, 53.27 psia (38.57 psig) during each 10-year service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice  ;

inspection;

b. If any periodic Type A test falls to meet 0.75 L., the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L., a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L, at which time the above test l schedule may be resumed; NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. J7, 77, pp, 0301

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C0EAIMIEN SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2) Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accord-ance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revi-sion 2, March 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175%; and

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfm during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,*

meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,* for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175%:

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6.25 inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9800 cfs, ,

2) Verifying that the system starts on a Safety Injection test signal,

3) Verifying that each system produces a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.1 inch Water Gauge in the Auxiliary Building at 24'6' elevation within 60 seconds after a start signal, and a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.4 inch Water Gauge in the Auxiliary Building at 24'6' elevation within the next 120 seconds,

4) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 50 i5 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.

• ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.

NIgLSTONE-UNIT 3 3/4 6-39 Amendment No. 7, 57, 77,

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. C0E A1101ENT SYSTEMS i

j. BASES 3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAI! MENT 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RD. EASE SYSTEM

Backaround The OPERABILITY of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) ensures that radioactive materials that leak from the primary contain-ment into the secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered out and adsorbed prior to any release.to the environment. The design of the SLCRS is to achieve the required negative pressure within the secondary containment boundary within 180 seconds of a DBA.

In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas within the secondary containment boundary under most meteorological conditions, the negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location (i.e., 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building) is 0.4 inches water gauge.

The secondary containment boundary is comprised of the containment enclosure building and all contiguous buildings (main steam valve building (partially),

engineered safety features buildin (partially), hydrogen recombiner building (partially) and auxiliary building . To accomplish this, the SLCRS works in conjunction with the Auxiliary But ding Filter (ABF) system (see Sec-tion 3/4.7.9). The SLCRS and the ABF fans and filtration units are located in the auxiliary building. The SLCRS is described in the Millstone Unit No. 3 FSAR, Section 6.2.3.

I Anolicable Safety Analyses The SLCRS design basis is established by the consequences of the limiting DBA, which is a LOCA. The accident analysis assumes that only one train of the SLCRS and one train of the auxiliary building filter system is functional due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction of the airborne radioactive material provided by the remaining one train of this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the containment is determined for a LOCA.

The SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS starts on a SIS signal. The modeled SLCRS actuation in the safety analysis (the Millstone 3

FSAR Chapter 15, Section 15.6) is based upon a worst-case response time  ;

following an SI initiated at the limiting setpoint. One train of the SLCRS in  :

conjunction with the ABF system is capable of drawing a negative pressure >

(0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation) within l 180 seconds after a LOCA. This is achieved as follows: a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.1 inch water gauge within 60 seconds and a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.4 inch water gauge within the-next 120 seconds. This time includes diesel generator startup and sequencing i time, system startup time, and time for the system to attain the required negative pressure after starting.

MILLSTONE - LMIT 3 B 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 57, 029!

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. CONTAll0 LENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYS'idi (Continued)

Surveillance Reauirements A

Cumulative operation of the SLCRS with heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and con-trols. This test is performed on a STAGGERED TEST. BASIS once per 31-days.

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b. c. e. and f These surveillances verify that the required SLCRS filter testing is performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. The surveillances include testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations).

d The automatic startup ensures that each SLCRS train responds proparly.

The 18-month frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance was performed with the reactor at power. The surveillance verifies that the SLCRS starts on a SIS test signal.

It also includes the automatic functions to isolate the other ventilation systems that are not part of the safety-related postaccident operating configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation systems that flow through the secondary containment to the accident condition. l

• The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates.  !

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• Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates. i

• Charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump area cooling l subsystem aligns and discharges to the auxiliary building filters and a '

filter fan starts.

• The engineered safety features building ventilation system aligns to the

, postaccident configuration.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. E ,

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.J a*' CONTAINGENT SYSTENS BASES ,

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, 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued) )

i With the SLCRS in postaccident configuration, the required negative pressure  ;

in the secondary containment boundary is achieved in 170 seconds from the time l of simulated emergency diesel generator breaker closure. Time delays of

. dampers and logic delays must be accounted for in this surveillance. The time to achieve the required negative pressure is 180 seconds, with a loss-of-offsite power coincident with a SIS. The surveillance verifies that one train l of SLCRS in conjunction with the ABF system will produce a negative pressure of 0.4 inches water gauge at the auxiliary building 24'6" elevation relative l to the outside atmosphere in the secondary containment boundary. This is i achieved as follows: a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.1 inch {

water gauge within 60 seconds and a negative pressure of greater than or equal  :

to 0.4 inches water gauge within the next 120 seconds. For the purpose of this surveillance, pressure measurements will be made at the 24'6" elevation in the auxiliary building. This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the entire secondary containment due to the large cross-i section of the air passages which interconnect the various buildings within the boundary. In order to ensure a negative pressure in all areas inside the i secondary containment boundary under most meteorological conditions, the i negative pressure acceptance criteria at the measured location is 0.4 inches water gauge. It is recognized that there will be an occasional meteorological condition under which slightly positive pressure may exist at some localized i

portions of the boundary (e.g., the upper elevations on the down wind side of a building). For example, a very low outside temperature combined with a moderate wind speed could cause a slightly positive pressure at the upper elevations of the containment enclosure building on the leeward face. The i

, probability of occurrence of meteorological conditions which could result in such a positive differential pressure condition in the upper levels of the enclosure building has been estimated to be less than 2% of the time.

The probability of wind speed within the necessary moderate band, combined i with the probability of extreme low temperature, combined with the small portion of the boundary affected, combined with the low probability of

airborne radioactive material migrating to the upper levels ensure that the overall effect on the design basis dose calculations is insignificant.

3/4.6.6.2 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY ensures that the release of radioactive I' i materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those

leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the Supplementary Leak i Collection and Release System, and Auxiliary Building Filter System will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

NIL.LSTONE m - UNIT 3 53/46-7 Amendment No. p ,

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