ML20058M884

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Clarification of Ref Points for Setting Uptravel & Downtravel Stops on Refueling Platform Hoists
ML20058M884
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/01/1990
From:
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20058M881 List:
References
NUDOCS 9008130109
Download: ML20058M884 (3)


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- . , - g RErufLING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.6 The refueling platform shall be OPERABLE and used for handling fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel.

APPLLCABILITY: During handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel.

ACTION:

'With the requirements for refueling platform OPERABILITY not satisfied suspend use of any inoperable refueling platform equipment from operations involving the handling of control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor l pressure vessel after placing the load in,a safe condition.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

l-4.9.6 Each refueling platform + ,eae-+e hoist used for handling of control rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel shall be demon-strated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to the start of such operations with that '

i - hoist by: 3

a. Demonstrating operation of the overload cutoff when the load exceeds <

1200 poends for the fuel grapple hoist and 1050 pounds for all other

- hoists, i,

b. Demonstrating operation of the uptravel stop when fuel grapple hoist d ptrayp ,a { { ram 9 mount g and monorail aupi g hpsts uptravel q

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' c. Demonstrating op ration of the downtraveT u off whenAfuel grapple hoist downtravel reaches 52 feet 3 inches a below the top of the platform tracks and when w theframe mounted i.v;;Q top of and

'fhCmonora/4IFr#f f Trd,'.,FS,1 puxiligry hoists reach f 85 feet er ess l

d. Demonstrat ng operation of the slack cable cutoff when the load is l 1ess than 50 1 10 pounds for the fuel grapple hoist.
e. Demonstrating operation of the loaded interlock when the load exceeds $35 pounds for the fuel grapple hoist and 450 pounds for all other =re rf hoists. -

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brly & pkt d dadmed o{ #t fuel andy or contvol rod' h udhin 6 &af 6sches or yak ,

l, b.e low %e +op of the rej[fs e hh f yoNorm +YoOC )

TERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 9-8 1 l

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h y eu SVL Sk OV1h tthtN he m koskS yl" g'omtha am#s where k be!/ h//e wh in REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 REFUELING PLATFORM The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that (1) the refueling platfora will be used for handling control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pr&ssure vessel, (2) each esame=amd hoist has sufficient load capacity for handling fuel

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assemblies and control rods, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel ,

are protected from excessive liftin J Qngaged during lif ting operations. g force in the event they are inadvertently 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - $ PENT FUEL $TORAGE POOL The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel as',embly over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the evsnt this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that

, conte .ned in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in j the storage facks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consMent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.8 and 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and WATER LEVEL -5 PENT FUEL 5TORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth 'l l

1s available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released j i

from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. This minimum water depth is 1

consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis. I 3/4.9.10 CONTROL R0D REMOVAL I These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or
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control rod drives will be performed under conditions that limit the probability 1 i of inadvertent criticality. The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod 6re more stringent since the SHUTDOWN MARGIN specific: tion provides for the core to remain suberitical with only one control rod fully withdrawn.

3/4.9.11 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION 1 I

The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling mode loop be OPERABLE or that an alternate method capable of decay t. eat removal be demonstrated and that an alternate method of coolant mixing be in operation ensures that 1) suf-ficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the l

water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140'F as required during REFUELING, l

and 2) sufficient coolant circulation would be available through the reactor core to assure accurate temperature indication and to distribute and prevent stratification of the poison in the event it becomes necessary to actuate the i l standby liquid control system.

! The requirement to have two shutdown cooling mode loops OPERABLE when there is less than 20 feet 6 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and i

20 feet 6 inches of water above the reactor vessel flange, a large heat sink is l available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay ,.

t..at removal or emergency procedures to cool the core,

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FERMI - UNIT 2 8 3/4 9-2 )

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