ML20050C082

LER 82-010/01T-0:on 820310,determined That Existing Operating Procedures Required Necessary Safeguards Equipment to Be Operable Prior to Bringing Reactor Critical But Did Not Establish Specific Requirements in Hot Shutdown

ML20050C082
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	03/24/1982
From:	Matthew Smith CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20050C077	List: ML20050C076 ML20050C082
References
LER-82-010-01T, LER-82-10-1T, NUDOCS 8204080113
Download: ML20050C082 (2)

Text

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. ATTACHMENT Docket No. 50247 Consolidated Edison Co. of NY, Inc.

LER 82-010/01T-0 Indian Point Unit No. 2 On March 10, 1982, Consolidated Edison determined that a non-conservatism existed in the plant operating procedures related to the steam line break accident analyses. This event is reportable under the requirement of Technical Specification 6.9.1.7.1.f.

The steam line break- accident analyses for Indian Point 1 Unit 2 are presented in Section 14.2.5 of the FSAR. The analyses assume that the unit is initially at hot shutdown conditions which results in'the greatest effect on the reactor core and Reactor Coolant System.

As part of the steam line break analyses, certain minimum engineered safeguards are assumed to operate to mitigate and terminate the transient. Existing plant procedures required the necessary safeguards equipment to be operable prior to bringing the reactor critical but did not establish specific operability requirements for this equipment when the reactor coolant system temperature was above 3500F and the reactor not critical. There-fore, the plant could be in a hot shutdown conditions with less than the minimum complement of engineered safeguards-equipment available to mitigate the effects of a concurrent steam line break.

In order to clarify requirements for engineered safeguards equipment, the operating procedures have been revised to require une nucessary seguc .a equipwea to mitigace a steam line u ; e s.

transient be available and operable when the Reactor Coolant f

System temperature is above 3500F.

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