ML20040F029

Proposed Tech Spec 15.3.6 Re Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust Valves

ML20040F029
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	01/28/1982
From:	WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20040F023	List: ML20040F022 ML20040F029
References
TAC-44877, TAC-44878, NUDOCS 8202080224
Download: ML20040F029 (3)

Text

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C. Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Valves The containment purge supply and exhaust valves shall be locked closed and may not be opened unless the reactor is in the cold shutdown or refueling shutdown condition.

Basis The Reactor Coolant System conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and hence there would be no pressure buildup in the containment if the Reactor Coolant System ruptures.

The shutdown conditions of the reactor are selected based on the type of activities that are being carried out. When the reactor head is not to be removed, the specified cold shutdown margin of 1s AK/K precludes criticality under any occurance. During refueling the reactor is subcritical by 10%

AK/K. This precludes criticality under any circumstances even though fuel is being moved or control rods withdrawn. Positive reactivity addition by rod motion from an initial 10% AK/K subcritical reactor condition precludes criticality because the reactor would be substantially subcritical even if all control rods were completely withdrawn. Positive reactivity changes by boron dilution may be required or small fluctuations may cccur during preparation for, recovery from, or during refueling but maintaining the boron concentration greater than 1800 ppm precludes criticality under any circumstances. Should continuous dilution occur, the time intervals for this incident are discussed in Section 14.1.5 of the ETDSAR.

Regarding internal pressure limitations, the containment design pressure of 60 psig would not be exceeded if the internal pressure before a major loss-of-coolant accident were as much as 6 psig. The containment is designed to withstand an internal vacuum of 2.0 psig.

8202080224 820128 PDR ADOCK 0S000266 15.3.6-2 P PDR

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The containment purge supply and exhaust valves are required to be locked closed during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing from the full open position during a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. Maintaining these valves locked closed during plant cperation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system in the event of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. The containment purge supply and exhaust valves will be locked closed by providing locking devices on the control board operators for these valves.

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l References (1) FSAR - Section 14.3.4 (2) FSAR - Section 5.5.2 l

15.3.6-3

e 9 TABLE 15.4.1-2 (CONTINUED) l l

Test Frequency

14. Refueling System Interlocks Functioning Each refueling shutdown l

15. Service Water System Functioning Each refueling shutdown

16. Primary System Leakage Evaluate Monthly (6)

17. Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel inventory Daily

18. Turbine Stop and Governor Valves Functioning Monthly (6)

19. Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Visual and magnetic Every five years Inspection (5) particle or liquid penetrant

20. Boric Acid System Storage Tank Daily Temperature

21. Boric Acid System Visual observation Daily of piping temperatures (all > 145 0F)

22. Boric Acid Piping Heat Electrical circuit Monthly Tracing operability

23. PCRV Block Valves Complete Valve Cycle Quarterly (6)

24. Integrity of Post Accident Evaluate Yearly Recovery Systems Outside Containment

25. Containment Purge Supply Verify valves are Monthly (9) and Exhaust Isolation Valves locked closed (1) A radicchemical analysis for this purpose shall consist of a quantitative measurement of each radionuclide with half life of >30 minutes such that et least 95% of total activity of primary coolant is. accounted for.

(2) E determination will be started when the gross activity analysis of a filtered cample indicates >10 uc/cc and will be redetermined if the primary coolant gross radioactivity of a filtered sample increases by more than 10 uc/cc.

(3) Drcp tests shall be conducted at rated reactor coolant flow. Rods shall be 4

dropped under both cold and hot conditionJ, but cold drop tests need not be timed.

(4) Drop tests will be conducted in the hot condition for rods on which maintenance was performed.

(5) As accessible without disassembly of rotor.

(6) Not required during periods of refueling shutdown.

(7) At least once per week during periods of refueling shutdown.

(8) At least three times per week (with maximum time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> between samples) during periods of refueling shutdown.

(9) Not required during periods of cold or refueling shutdown.

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