Letter Sequence Other |
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Results
Other: 05000266/LER-1979-010-01, /01T-0 on 790620:plant Safeguards Actuation Circuitry Review Indicated Need for Circuitry Changes.Caused by Changes in IEEE Std Since Plant Design.Mods to Four Applicable Safeguard Circuits Will Be Performed, ML19210C482, ML19242D259, ML19253A712, ML19253B006, ML19257A367, ML19257B511, ML19289C679, ML19310A971, ML19323H481, ML19345H544, ML20010E141, ML20027A527, ML20038C635, ML20039A258, ML20040F029, ML20065R665
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MONTHYEARML20027A5271978-11-28028 November 1978
Discusses Possible Dangers of LOCA in Containment Purging During Normal Plant Oper.Requests Either Commitment to Limit Purging or Justification for Continuing.W/Encl ANO 7812080207
Project stage: Other
ML19289C6791979-01-16016 January 1979
Responds to Re Purging During Normal Operation. Need for Purging Has Been Limited,But It Is Essential That Capability of in-containment Activities at Power Be Maintained
Project stage: Other
05000266/LER-1979-010-01, /01T-0 on 790620:plant Safeguards Actuation Circuitry Review Indicated Need for Circuitry Changes.Caused by Changes in IEEE Std Since Plant Design.Mods to Four Applicable Safeguard Circuits Will Be Performed1979-07-0303 July 1979
/01T-0 on 790620:plant Safeguards Actuation Circuitry Review Indicated Need for Circuitry Changes.Caused by Changes in IEEE Std Since Plant Design.Mods to Four Applicable Safeguard Circuits Will Be Performed
Project stage: Other
ML19253A7121979-08-0808 August 1979
Confirms Action Taken as Result of 790803 Telcon Re Util Request to Leave Containment Purge Values Closed Above Cold Shutdown Condition.Proposal Acceptable on one-time Basis
Project stage: Other
ML19242D2591979-08-10010 August 1979
Appreciates Prompt Approval of Request to Purge Containment. Approval Reduced Personnel Inconvenience & man-rem Exposure. Will Pursue Review of Containment Purge Sys
Project stage: Other
ML19253B0061979-09-0606 September 1979
Discusses Containment Purge Valve Operations.Notifies of Potential Mods to Ensure That Valves Will Close Against Containment Pressure Transients.Consultants Will Conduct Studies & Analyses of Potential Mods
Project stage: Other
ML19323H4811979-09-30030 September 1979
Technical Evaluation of Electrical Instrumentation & Control Design Aspects of Override Containment Purge Valve Isolation & Other Engineered Safety Feature Signals for Point Beach Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2
Project stage: Other
ML19210C4821979-11-0101 November 1979
Responds to Re Guidelines for Operability of Containment Purging & Venting Valves During Normal Operations.Evaluation Will Consider Consultant Studies of Potential Mods to Valves
Project stage: Other
ML19257A3671979-11-19019 November 1979
Forwards Interim Position on Containment Purging & Venting During Normal Operation Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability.Commitment to Comply W/Encl Position Should Be Submitted within 45 Days
Project stage: Other
ML19310A9711979-12-27027 December 1979
Requests Preliminary Evaluation of Licensee Response to NRC 791023 Interim Position for Containment Purge & Vent Valve Operation Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability, Generic Item B-24.Evaluation Form Encl
Project stage: Other
ML19257B5111980-01-0909 January 1980
Provides Commitments Sought in NRC .Forwards to Bechtel Re Purge Valve Capability Verification.Nrc Guidelines Will Be Considered During Evaluation of Mods for Improved Purge Valve Reliability
Project stage: Other
ML19257C8081980-01-11011 January 1980
Forwards Safety Evaluation to Be Substituted for Encl in Ltr Per Agreement Reached at 791213 Meeting Re Containment Purge
Project stage: Approval
ML19257C8101980-01-11011 January 1980
Safety Evaluation Approving Electrical,Instrumentation & Control Design Aspects of Override of Containment Purge Valve Isolation,Except Radiation Monitors Used to Initiate Containment Purge Isolation
Project stage: Approval
ML19323H4781980-05-22022 May 1980
Forwards Safety Evaluation Supporting Design Aspects of Containment Purge Valve Isolation Override & Other Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals Except Radiation Monitors Which Initiate Containment Purge Isolation
Project stage: Approval
ML19345H5441981-05-0707 May 1981
Documents Basis for Containment Isolation Pressure Setpoint Reported in Item II.E.4.2 of NUREG-0737 Response Per NRC 810414 Telcon.Present 5 Psig Setpoint Considered Realistic & Appropriate
Project stage: Other
ML20008F4471981-07-21021 July 1981
IE Info Notice 81-21, Potential Loss of Direct Access to Ultimate Heat Sink. Provides Addl Info to IE Bulletin 81-03
Project stage: Request
ML20038C6351981-07-31031 July 1981
Srp,Revision 2 to Section 6.2.4, Containment Isolation Sys
Project stage: Other
ML20010E1411981-08-28028 August 1981
Proposed Tech Spec Revision Pages 15.3.6-2,15.3.6-3, 15.4.4-12,15.4.4-15 & 15.4.4-15a Re Testing of Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust Sys Isolation Valves
Project stage: Other
ML20010E1361981-08-28028 August 1981
Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27 Submitted as Tech Spec Change Request 68 to Incorporate Addl Restrictions Re Use & Testing of Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust Sys Isolation Valves,Per NRC Request
Project stage: Request
ML20033C0321981-11-23023 November 1981
Second Discovery Progress Rept for Period Ending 811122,per ASLB 811113 Memorandum Order.Licensee 811027 Responses to Wi Environ Decade 811023 Interrogatories Are Not Fully Responsive.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence
Project stage: Request
ML20039B0181981-11-24024 November 1981
Requests That Util Remit Class III Fee for Unit 1 & Class I Fee for Unit 2 to Cover Review of 810828 Application for Tech Spec Changes Re Containment Purge Valve Operability
Project stage: Approval
ML20033A9071981-11-24024 November 1981
Advises of Significant Error in 811117 Telcon Transcript
Project stage: Request
ML20039A2581981-12-0707 December 1981
Requests That NRC Reconsider Requirement of Class III Approval Fee During Final Review Re Tech Spec Change Request 68.Changes to Tech Specs Result of NRC Request.No Approval Fee for Amend Review Necessary
Project stage: Other
ML20040F0291982-01-28028 January 1982
Proposed Tech Spec 15.3.6 Re Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust Valves
Project stage: Other
ML20040F0221982-01-28028 January 1982
Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,consisting of Tech Spec Change Request 68 Re Containment Purge Valve Operability
Project stage: Request
ML20065R6651982-10-22022 October 1982
Provides Results of Confirmatory Analysis Demonstrating That Unacceptable Radioactive Release from Containment Would Not Take Place as Result of Small Break LOCA in Which Operator Action Required.Radioactive Release Negligible
Project stage: Other
1980-01-11
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Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Valves The containment purge supply and exhaust valves shall be locked closed and may not be opened unless the reactor is in the cold shutdown or refueling shutdown condition.
Basis The Reactor Coolant System conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and hence there would be no pressure buildup in the containment if the Reactor Coolant System ruptures.
The shutdown conditions of the reactor are selected based on the type of activities that are being carried out.
When the reactor head is not to be removed, the specified cold shutdown margin of 1s AK/K precludes criticality under any occurance. During refueling the reactor is subcritical by 10%
AK/K. This precludes criticality under any circumstances even though fuel is being moved or control rods withdrawn. Positive reactivity addition by rod motion from an initial 10% AK/K subcritical reactor condition precludes criticality because the reactor would be substantially subcritical even if all control rods were completely withdrawn.
Positive reactivity changes by boron dilution may be required or small fluctuations may cccur during preparation for, recovery from, or during refueling but maintaining the boron concentration greater than 1800 ppm precludes criticality under any circumstances.
Should continuous dilution occur, the time intervals for this incident are discussed in Section 14.1.5 of the ETDSAR.
Regarding internal pressure limitations, the containment design pressure of 60 psig would not be exceeded if the internal pressure before a major loss-of-coolant accident were as much as 6 psig.
The containment is designed to withstand an internal vacuum of 2.0 psig.
8202080224 820128 PDR ADOCK 0S000266 15.3.6-2 P
PDR
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/'
The containment purge supply and exhaust valves are required to be locked closed during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing from the full open position during a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. Maintaining these valves locked closed during plant cperation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system in the event of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. The containment purge supply and exhaust valves will be locked closed by providing locking devices on the control board operators for these valves.
t i
l References (1)
FSAR - Section 14.3.4 (2)
FSAR - Section 5.5.2 l
15.3.6-3
e 9
TABLE 15.4.1-2 (CONTINUED) l Test Frequency 14.
Refueling System Interlocks Functioning Each refueling shutdown 15.
Service Water System Functioning Each refueling shutdown 16.
Primary System Leakage Evaluate Monthly (6) 17.
Diesel Fuel Supply Fuel inventory Daily 18.
Turbine Stop and Governor Valves Functioning Monthly (6) 19.
Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Visual and magnetic Every five years Inspection (5) particle or liquid penetrant 20.
Boric Acid System Storage Tank Daily Temperature 21.
Boric Acid System Visual observation Daily of piping temperatures 0
(all > 145 F) 22.
Boric Acid Piping Heat Electrical circuit Monthly Tracing operability 23.
PCRV Block Valves Complete Valve Cycle Quarterly (6) 24.
Integrity of Post Accident Evaluate Yearly Recovery Systems Outside Containment 25.
Containment Purge Supply Verify valves are Monthly (9) and Exhaust Isolation Valves locked closed (1)
A radicchemical analysis for this purpose shall consist of a quantitative measurement of each radionuclide with half life of >30 minutes such that et least 95% of total activity of primary coolant is. accounted for.
(2)
E determination will be started when the gross activity analysis of a filtered cample indicates >10 uc/cc and will be redetermined if the primary coolant gross radioactivity of a filtered sample increases by more than 10 uc/cc.
(3)
Drcp tests shall be conducted at rated reactor coolant flow.
Rods shall be dropped under both cold and hot conditionJ, but cold drop tests need not be 4
timed.
(4)
Drop tests will be conducted in the hot condition for rods on which maintenance was performed.
(5)
As accessible without disassembly of rotor.
(6)
Not required during periods of refueling shutdown.
(7)
At least once per week during periods of refueling shutdown.
(8)
At least three times per week (with maximum time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> between samples) during periods of refueling shutdown.
(9)
Not required during periods of cold or refueling shutdown.
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