ML20038D083
| ML20038D083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1981 |
| From: | LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038D069 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112160046 | |
| Download: ML20038D083 (36) | |
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f PERMAIENT E.MS.RGENCY RESPONSr. FACILITII:.S OSSIGN CRITERIA AND DESCRIPTION SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 i LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY J
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t DECEMBER 1981 J 8112160046 81111T PDR ADOCK 05000322-F PDR i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 1.1 Purpose 1 1.2 General Criteria 1 1.3 General Description 1 2.0 TECBNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 2 2.1 Function 2 2.2 Location 3 2.3 Staffing and Training 3 2.4 Size 4 2.5 S*m eture 4 2.6 Habitability S 2.7 Communications 8 2.o Instrumentation, Data System Equipment, and Power Supplies 8 2.9 Technical Data and Data System 10 2.10 Records Availability and Management 12 i 3.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER 13 3.1 Locaticn 13 3.2- Habitanility 13 3.3 Communications 14 l 4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 14 l
4.1 Functional Criteria 14 4.2 Location, Structure, and Habitability 16 4.3 Staffing and Training 16 4.4 Size 16 4.5 Radiological Monitoring 17 ,
4.6 Communications 17 4.7 Instrumentation, Data System tquipment, and Power Supplies 19 4.6 Technical Data and Data System 20 4.9 Records Availability and Management 21 5.0 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM 22 5.1 Function 22 5.2 Location 23 5.3 Size 23 5.u Stafring 24 5.5 Display Considerations 24 5.6 Design Considerations 2d
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT *D)
FlGURES
- 1. Site Arrangement Plan
- 2. TSC Ground Floor Plan
- 3. TSC First Floor Plan
- 4. Data Acquisition and Display Flow Cnart S. EOF. Location
- 6. EOF Floor Plan
- 7. SPDS Location - Main Control Room ATTACHMENTS
- 1. ERF Data Set 11
e 1 1.0 INTRODOLM ON 1.1 Purpose This document has been prepared in response to NUREs-0737, Item III A.1.2, Upgrade Licensee Emergency Response Facilities and referenced NUREG-0696.. The emergency response systems and facilities described in this conceptual design docianent are beiz.g provided by the Long. Island Lighting. Company (LILCO) for improved emergency response to accidents at the Shoreham Huclear Power Station. The permanent facilities are described. The temporary facilities were described in the previous submittal and, in accordance with our letter SNRC-613 dated August 28,- 1981, are no longer..under development.
1.2 General Criteria Emergency response facilities (ERF) shall be provided for use by plant management, technical and engineering support personnel, and representatives from Federal, State, and local regulatory and response agencies in an emergency. These 1acilities shall be used for assessment of plant status and potential offsite impact in support of the control room command and control function. In addition, these facilities should also be used in conjunction with implementation of onsite and offsite emergency plans. As
, required by its intended function, each functional unit or the
.ERF shall be provided with as-built drawings of general plangt arrangements and piping, instrumentation, and electrical systema.
1.3 General Description The ERF will consist of four functional units.
- 2. Operational Support Center (OSC)
[ 3. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 84 . Safety Parameter. Display System (SPDS)
The permanent TSC will be a new structure located adjacent to a new office building annex, separate from, but witnin nannal 2 minute walking time from the main control room. A new computer system is being purchased to process the data and provide the. .,
required displays. It will be located in the TSC and have a seismic subsystem to drive the SPDS.
Ihe OSC will be located within the existing office and service building.
The EOF will be located approximately 19 miles from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, in an existing LILCO training facility in 1.
. i Hauppauge, L.I., New York. The training facility is being modified and will contain displays driven by the new computer system and the radiological computer.
2.0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 2.1 Function 2.1.1 Functional Criteria The onsite TSC shall provide the following functions:
. Provide pir.nt management and techn'ical support to plant operations personnel during e:nergency conditions.
. Relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to reactor system manipulations.
. Prevent congestion in the control room.
. Perform EOF functions for the Alert Emergency class and for the Site Area Emergency class and General Emergency class until the EOF is functional.
The TSC shall be the emergency operations work area fcr designated technical,,. engineering, and senior licensee management personnel; any other licensee -designated personnel required to provide the needed technical support; and a small staff of NRC personnel. .
! The TSC shall have facilities to support the plant management and l technical personnel who will be assigned there during an emergency and will be the primary onsite communications center for the plant during the emergency. TSC personnel shall use the TSC data system to analyze the plant steady-state and dynamic behavior prior.to and throughout the course of an accident. The results .of this analysis will be used to provide guidance to the control room operating personnel in the management of abnormal conditions and in accident mitigation. TSC personnel will also use the environmental and radiological information available from -
the TSC data system to perform the necessary functions of the EOF when this facility is not operational. The TSC also may be used to provide technical support during recovery operations following an emergency. '
The TSC facilities may be'used by designated operating personnel for normal daily operations as well as for. training.and emergency l drills. Use'of the TSC facility during normal operation shall be limited to activities that will not degrade TSC preparedness to react to abnormal conditions or reduce TSC systems reliability.
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f O 8 2.1.2 Functional Description
'Ihe TSC provices the facilities from which station management and technical support personnel will function during emergency situations and . recovery operations. Upon activation, the TSC succeeds the main control room as the emergency response command post and functions in this capacity until the EOF is appropriately staffed and activated. The activation of the TSC is accomplished within 60 minutes of the declaration of an alert, site . area, or general e:nergency.
2.2 Location -
2.2.1 Criteria The TSC shall be as close as possible to the control room, preferably located within the same building. The walking time from the TSC to the control room shall not exceed 2 minutes.
There should be no major security ~ barriers between these two facilities otner than access control stations for the TSC and the Control room.
.2.2.2 Description The TSC is a separate structure located on the west side of the plant, adjacent to the office building annex (OBA), and within the security perimeter as shown on Figure 1. This location has been determined to. be within a ncaninal 2 minute- walk from the main control room via an indoor. corridor to allow for face-to-face meetings between operating and support personnel. Access.
control stations at the main control room' and the TSC constitute the only barriers ^between the two areas.
2.3 Staffino and Training 2.3.1 Criteria Upon declaration of an alert, site area, or general emergency, designated personnel shall report directly to the TSC and achieve full functional operat2on within 60 minutes. Activation of the
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TSC shall ensure that only designated operating personnel are in the control room during the emergency and that needed technical support will be provided without obstructing actual plant manipulations or overcrowding the control roan.
The licensee-designated TSC staff shall consist of sufficient technical, engineering, and senior designated licensee officials to 1.rovide the ~ needed . support to the control room during e.nergency conditions. Consultants.also may be designated by the licensee. to , augment utility resources in the TSC. A senior designated licensee official shall coordinate activities in the TSC and interface with the control room, the OSC, and the EOF.
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. i The level of staffing of the TSC may vary according to the severity of the emergency condition.. The statfing ior each emergency class anall be fu.s.ly detailed in the licensee's emergency plan.
For the TSC to zunction. effectively, TSC staff personnel must be aware of their responsibilities during an accident.' Tne licensee shall, theretore, develop training programs for these personnel.
! In addition, to maintain proficiency, the TSC stati shall oart4.cipate in TSC activation drills that shall be conducted periodically in accordance with the licensee *s emergency plan.
Operating procedures and staff training in the use of data systems and instrumentation shall contain guidance on the limitations of instrument readings including whether the information can be relied upon following such events as accidents resulting from earthquakes or the release of radiation.
l 2.3.2 D_escription The staffing, training, and procedures will meet the above criteria. Detailed descriptions are provided in the Shoreham Emergency Plan.
2.4 Size 2.4.1 Criter_ia -
Tne TSC working space shall be sized for a minunum of 25 persons, including 20 persons designated by the licensee -and five NRC personnel. ~
2.4.2
Description:
The TSC is a two story structure with a total floor area of apprnnmately 9,000 square ieet. The TSC provides adequate working . space and conference facilities for a mininana of 25 persons on the. first floor and 20. persons on .the ground floor. A separate computer room is provided to house both the F.RF computer and the SPDS computer. Additionally, ample space is allocated for the functional. displays of TSC data, plant records, and historical data. . The TSC. also provides private office space and -
rest rocsa facilities within the building boundaries (see Figures 2 and 3) .
2.5 Structure ,
2.5.1 Criteria The TSC complex must be able to withstand the most adverse conditions reasonably expected during the design life of the plant including adequate capabilities for eartnquakes, high winds (other than tornado), and floods. .The TSC need not meet Sesamic Category I criteria.
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2.5.2 pescription The TSC structure is designed as a Seismic Category I structure.
Additionally, the TSC structure has- been designed for winds associated with the design basis tornado and wave forcos associated with the probable maximum hurricane.
The TSC structure is.a two story, reinforced concrete structure.
The intermediate floor slab and roof slab are ,of a reinforced concrete construction supported on steel framing.
2.6 Habitability 2.6.1 Criteria Fermanent ventilation systems, including. paruculate and charcoal filters, anall be provided. The TSC shall have the saine radiological habitability as. the control room under accident conditions, and the TSC ventilation system shall function in a saanner comparable to the control room ventilation system. The ventilation system need not be seismic, Category I qualified, redundant, instrumented in the control room, or automatically activatea to fulfill. its role. The TSC ventilation system shall consist of a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filters as a minimum.
'Itle TSC shall have the same radiological habitability as the control room.under accident conditions. TSC personnei shall be protected frosa radiological hazards including direct radiatica and airborne contaminants. In accordance with General Desityn l
Criterion 19 and Standard Review Plan 6.4. Tamits of 5 Rem whole body, 30 Resa thyroid, shall not be exceeded for the duration of the accident considering ma jor sources or radiation. An additimal limit of 30. Rem beta (or 75 Rem beta with special clothing and eye protection) also applies.
Monitoring shall be provided for both direct radiation a.nd airborne radioactive contaminants. The monitors shculd provide warning if the radiation levels in the support center are reaching levels approaching the design, limits. .The licensee should designate action levels to define when protective measures -
l should be taxen (such as using breathing apparatus and potassium iodine tablets, or evacuation to the control rooms.
2.6.2 Description _
The TSC area air-conditioning. system provides ventilation, cooling, and control of relative humidity. The air-conditioning equipment is designed to:
- 1. Provide temperature,and humidity control and to control tne air movessent for personnel comfort and equipaent performance.
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- 2. Maintain a positive pressure above atmospheric pressure to prevent air leakage into tne TSC during emergency operation.
- 3. Have. the capability of passing outside air to the TSC and recirculating inside air, through a special tilter train containing charcoal filters during emergency operation.
- 4. Have the capability of operating during. nor:aal, shutdown, and emergency conditions.
The TSC area is served by 100 percent capacity air-conditioning unit. The unit consists of a filter-mixing box. assembly, cooling coils, supply fan, condensing, and damper sections. The unit discharges air into a distribution duct work systen to serve various rooms in the TSC. The supply air is cooled by three 50 percent chilled water (glycol) retrigeration system units.
The return air is drawn through return air plenmas and registers and is exhauste'd by three exhaust fans. Both the supply and r exhaust fans are equipped with 100 percent standby motors.
During emergency operation, the normal air intake to the TSC is closed. Sufficient makeup airfiow is drawn in through an emergency air intake to maintain the TSC building pressurized at 1/8-in. W.G., to preclude any outside air leakage into the TSC.
To filter tne TSC-makeup airflow during emergency operation, one 100 percent capacity charcoal filter. train rated at 99.95 percent minimum efficiency is provided.
The TSC hvaC system is nonseismic and nonsafety related. Tae
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system is not connected to the emergency Dua, . but does receivo highly-reliable power.by virtue of two independent power feeds to the TSC. electrical. bus. ,
An' independent, self-contained, seismically designed air-conditioning unit connected. to the- plant emergency bus is provided in the SPDS computer room to control the temperature and humidity at all times. The TSC area HVAC system is also equipped with fire dampers and area smoke detectors.for personnel and equipment protection. Ventilation air .for the SPDS computer room "
is provided through the TSC INAC unit during normal and emergency modes of operation.
The TSC meets the radiological habitability criteria, as tollows: ,
. 1. Eighteen inches of _ concrete shielding is provided to protect TSC p9rsonnel from post accident radiation sources.outside.the.TSC.-
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- 2. The TSC atmosphere is filtered through a charcoal-HEPA filter. A 39 percent efficiency . credit is taken for filtration based upon , adherence to the guidelines 6.
established in Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.52, as follows: ,
- a. A ncminal 4 in. thickness of carbon is required (e.g. , two 2 in. cells in series) .
- b. Carbon <;ella snall be 99.95 percent efficient tested agtinst halogenared hydrocarbcn refrigerant
. in accordance with Section.12 or ANSI-N510.
- c. Carbon portion of the filter shall.be tested in accordance with ANSI-N509 for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175 percent at 70 percent relative humidity..
d.. HEPA filters rhall be ' tested in accordance with ANSI-N510- to at least 99.35 percent in an in placie DOP test.
- e. Periodic filter testing .will be performed once every 18 months.
Based upon these design provisions, the above habitasility criteria are met.. Dose calculation methodology is as follows:
Regulatory . Guide 1.3 identifies the technique that is to be utilized to evaluate the integrated dose. The TSC Integrated dose analysis was done based on a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) release.from the primary containment at a rate of 0.5 percent volume per day,10 gph emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage-into the secondary containment, and main steam line isolation valve -(MSIV) leakage corresponding to a Technical . Specification value of -11.5 scfh per valve. All releases are discharged via the reactor building standby ventilation system (RBSVS). Doses are calculated based upon ground leirel release atmospheric dispersion factors (X/Q*s).
'Ihe thyroid doses are computed.using the conversion factors
, given in TID-14844 and treathing rate of 3.47x10-* m2/sec (1.25 ma /hr). The gamma doses are computed based on a finite cloud model in the TSC plus a semi-infinite cloud surround 1Lg --
j the , building which has 18 inches of concrete shielding all around. The beta doses are based on the semi-infinite cloud model suggested by the NRC, Regulatory Guide 1 3.
A portable, , dedicated continuous airborne monitor, with an iodine
- cartridge and a particulate tilter is provided w;t. thin the TSC to l ponitor airborne activity levels. This monitor includes variable
! < setpoints with audible and visual alarms to alert personnel to increasing airborne activity. This monitor is sensitive to radiolodine concentrations.as low as 10-7 4Ci/tc. In addition, three portable, dedicated area monitors are provided within the TSC to provide continuous measuring of direct radiation levels.
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I These monitors also include variable setpoints with audible and '
visual alarms. The locations presently planned for these airborne and area monitors are shown on Figures 2 and 3.
Procedures under development will provide for . set-up and operability verification of these monitors upon TSC activation, check for proper settings of alarm.setpoints, and implementation of_ protective measures as required upon alarm activation.
2.7 communications 2.7.1 Criteria The TSC shall be the primary onsite ccammunications center for the nuclear power plant.during an emergency. .It shall have reliable !
voice communications to the control room, . the OSC, the EOF, ano the NRC. The primary function of this voice connunication system will be plant management comsnunications and the 2nsmediate exchange of information of plant status and operations.
Provis11ons -for communications with State and local operations centers shall also be provided in the TSC to provide early notification and reconsnendations to offsite authorities prior to activation of the EOF.
2.7.2 Description Tne TSC is equipped with reliable primary and backup consnunication systems consisting of Bell telephones, dedicated telephones, and ,UHF. and VHF radio systems to appropriate plant locations, outside agencies, and to other ERP locations.
The consnunication systems are described in the Emergency Plan.
2.8 Instrinnentation, Data System Eouipment. and Power Supplies 2.8.1 Criteria Equipnent shall be providcd to gather, store, and display data needed in the TSC to analyze plant conditions. The data system equipment shall perform these functions independent of actions in the control room and. without degrading or interfering with centrol room and plant functions. Wnen signals to the TSC are. -
received from sensors providing signals to safety system equipment or. displays, syitable isolatirn shall be provided to ensure that the TSC systems will not degrade performance. of the safety system equipment or displays. The TSC electrical _
equipment lead shall not degrade the capability or reliability of any satety-related power source. '1he. total TSC system shall be designed to achieve an operational unavailability goal of 0.01 during all plant operating conditions above cold snutdown.
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o a 2.8.2 Description Wherever available, existing plant instrunent loops are tapped to provide input . signals to the ERP data acquisition system. Each loop is isolated / interfaced as required to preserve the electrical independence and/or reliability of the instrument icop. The instrument loops being tapped are not attected by open or short. circuits in the ERF data- acquisition system. In addition, Class .1E instrument loops are protected against a 2,000 V (minimum) impressed voltage from the data acquisition system.
The data system equipment was selected so as to meet the total TSC data system unavailanility of 0.01 or better during all plant operating conditions above cold shutdown. A separate computer system is provided to support the.EtF. A nonseismic computer is being provided to support data displays in the TSC and the EOF.
The nonselsmic computer also supports the.nonseismic functions of the SPDS (i.e., those. in .the TSC and EOF) . A seismically qualified ccarputer is. provided to support the seismically qualified portion of the SPDS located in the main control room.
i The seismically qualified computer has a separate data input through a seismically qualified portion of the data acquisition system. The seismic and nonseismic computers aro dedicated to the ERP and the data in these comouters .is continuously available at any terminal or display device associated with the ERF.
Radiological and meteorological data are transferred from the redundant radiological monitoring computers .to .the. nonseismic computer through a high speed data link. RaCLlological parameters, which are displayed as SPDS parameters, will also be inputed directly to the seismic and nonseismic computers by way of the. data acquisition system. See Attachment 1 for a listing of the. permanent ERF data set.
The main ac power requirements for the TSC are met from a double-ended substation located in the OBA. These transformers receive power from two 4.% XV lines via ducts originating tram separate transformers in the 69 kV switchyard.
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Ac power to the SPDS computer and computer room air conditioning equipment, which must withstand an earthquake, are from plant emergency buses through two Class 1E breakers in series.
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2.9 Technical Data and Data System 2.9.1 Criteria The TSC data system shall receive, store, process, and display infomation acquired from different areas of the plant as needed to perform the TSC function. The data system shall provide access to accurate and reliable information sufficient to determine: ,
. Plant steady-state operating conditions prior to the accident,
. . Transient conditions producing the initiating event, and
. Plant systems dynamic behavior throughout the course of the accident.
The data set available to the TSC data system must be complete enough to permit accurate , assessment of the accident without interference with tne control room emergency operation. As a minimum, the set of Type A, B, C, D, and E variables specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 1 anali ne available for display and printout in the TSC. The time resolution of data acquisition shall be sufficient to provide data witncut loss of information during transient conditions.
Data storage and recall capability shall De provided for tJe TSC data set, at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of pre-event data and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of post-event data shall be recorded. Capability to record at least 2 weeks of, additional post-event data with reduced tame resolution shall be provided. Archival data storage and the capability to transfer data between active memory and archival data storage' without interrupting TSC data acquisition- and displays shall De provided for all TSC data.
A sufficient number of data display and printout devices shall be provided in the Tsc to allow. all personnel to perform their assigned tasks with unhindered access to data. Trend information display and time history display capability is needed in the TSC
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to give personnel .a dynamic view of the plant status during abnormal operating conditions. .
The SPDS shall also be displayed in the TSC.
2.9.2 Description Tne data acquisition (mu tiplex systemy selected 1or the Shoreham ERF receives information. from the .various instruments which comprise the data set (see Attachment .1) and .provides the data obtained to both the seismic and nonseismic computers. Figure 4 shows a flow chart of data acquisition and display. The nonseismic scaiputer will store, process, and display this 10.
information, which includes the radiation monitoring system computer information via the high speed data link, for the TSC.
The data set consists of all of the Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, BWR parameters implemented in the plant. A listing of the parameters comprising the EEP data set is included as Attachment 1...The accuracies of the multiplex system and the computers associated with the ERF exceed the accuracy of the instruments used to display the data for normal plant operation within the control room.
The time resolution .of each parameter is commensurate with the transient perfcrmance of the variable being measured and the resolution required to record and display the transient performance of the parameter accurately.
The TSC portion of..the- ERF (including the data acquisition system, nonseismic computer, and all display and printout devices) is designed to comply with an overall unavailability goal of 0.01. .
The nonseismic cceputer. is designed to provide data storage capability for the ERF data set. A minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of pre--
event data and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of post-event data will be recorded. The sample frequency will be chosen to be consistent with the use of the data. Capacity .to record at least 2 weeks of additionkl post-event data with reduced time resolution is also provided.
Archival data storage and the capability to transfer data between active memory and- archival data storage without interrupting ERP data acquisition and displays is pronded for all ERF data.
Three CRT consoles with interactive keyboards and a line printer are provided in the TSC for use of the personnel assigned tot work there. One CRT console is dedicated to the SPDS displays. The other two consoles and the line printer are available for general use within the TSC. The CRT dedicated to the SPDS displays duplicates the SPDS display presentation of the control room'SPDS console.
The 'nonseismic computer contains an X-Y trending functice which simulates a three pen strip chart 9 corder. Tnis function will display both historical and c urent parameter values as a
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function or time, as well as computer point values that are function- of other parameter values related to time. It is possible to freeze trends in time for analysis, then reinitialize, as well as expand and contract time bases and scale _
ranges. Any computer point or parameter shall be selectable for current trending.
Historical trending consists of the display of values selected by the operator from a list of 25 parameters. Any parameter .is assignable to the list from any operator *s console. Data is collected at the assigned scan period and stored for the last .8 11.
hot rs. Trending is selectable for any time interval during the*
last 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
A directory is provided which lists the parameter available for trending. The directory contains a list of each trend identification number, the computer point number of the parameter, and its description. An operator is able to display the. directory on any selected device and step through the directory in the order listed and display each trend automatically.
2.10 Records hvailability and Management 2.10.1 Criteria 6 The TSC shall have a complete and up-to-date repository of plant records and procedures at the disposal ot TSC personnel to aid in their technical analysis and evaluation of emergency conditions.
In particular, up-to-date as-built drawings of the plant systems are needed to diagnose sensor data, evaluate data inconsistencies, and identify and counteract iaulty plant system eleseents .
The TSC personnel shall have ready access to up-to-date records, operational specifications, and procedures that include but are not limited to
. Plant technical specifications,
. Plant operating procedures,
. Emergency operating procedures, e Final Safety Analysis Report,
. Plant operating' records,
. Plant operations reactor satety committee records and reports, .
. Records needed to perform the functions of the EOF when '
it is not operational, and up-to-date, as-built, schematics, and diagrams showing:
. Conditions,. of plant structures and systems down to the component level and
. In plant locations of these systems.
All ot the above records shall be available in the TSC in current fcra when this facility is ' fully impl e nted. These records will be updated as necessary to ensure currency and completeness. The 12.
method of storage and presentation of the TSC records shall ensure ease of access under emergency conditions.
2.10.2 Descrintion
'Ite above criteria will .be . met.
3.0 OPERATIO'ML1, SUPPORT CENTER 3.1 Location 3.4.1 Critezia The OSC shall, provide a location where licensee-operation support personnel will assemble in an emergency. The OSC shall also provide a location where plant logistic support can be coordinated during an emergency and will restrict control room access to those support personnel specifically requested my the shift supervisor.
3.1.2 Description The general office area of the office and service building is designated as the OSC for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Staticn.
'Ihe oftice and service building is adjacent to the control room building. Taking into account the time to clear any acceras control security check points, the transit time between the control room and OSC is less than 2 minutes.
3.2 Habitability ,
3.2.1 Criteria No specific habitability criteria are established for the OSC.
If the-OSC habitability is not comparable to that of the control roca, the licensee's emergency plan shall include procedures for evacuation of,OSC personnel in the event of a large radioactive release. These procedures anall also include provisions for the performance of the OSC functions by essential support personne.1 from other onsite locations.
3.2.2 Description The evacuation of OSC personnel and the performance of OSC functions from other onsite. locations, li required due to loss of _
OSC habitability resulting from a large radioactive release, will be included in the Emergency Plan.
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3.3 Communications 3.3.1 Criteria The OSC shall have direct enmrmmications with the control room and with the TSC so that the personnel reporting to the OSC can be assigned to auties in support of emergency operations. 'Ihe OSC ccommunications system shall consist of one dedicated telepbone extension to the control room, one cedicated telephone extension to tne TSC, and one dial telephone capable of reaching ons;.te and offsite locations, as. a min 2 mum. Direct vo:ce interccanmunications and/or reliable direct radio cosamunicaticna may be used to supplement these telephone consuunication links.
i 3.3.2 Description Reliable communications to and from the OSC are provided as described in the Emergency Plan.
4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 4.1 Functional Criteria Tne EOF is a licensee controlled and operated offsite support conter. The E.OF shall have facilities for:
. Management of overall licensee emergency response,
. . Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment,
. Determination of reccmunended public protective actions, and
. Coordination of energency response activ- ties with Federal, State, and local agencies.
When the EOF 1s activated, it shall be staffed-by licensee, Federal, State, local and other emergency personnel designated by the. Emergency. Plan to perform these functions. It shall be the location where the licensee provides overall man,.gement of '
licensee resources in response to an emergency having actual or potential environmental . consequences.. A designated senior licensee official shall manage licensee activities in the EOF to support the designated official in the TSC and the senior reactor _
operator designated the shiit supervisor in the control rooms.
Facilities shall be provided in the EOF for the acquisition, display, and evaluation of all radiological, meteorological, and plant system data pertinent to datermine offsite protective measures. These iacilities will be used to evaluate the magnitude and eff ects' of actual or potential radioactive releases frosa. the plant and to determin,e offsite dose projections.
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Facilitic-s used in performing essential EOF functions must be located within the EOF complex. However, supplemental calculations and analytical support of EOF evaluations may he provided from.fac112 ties outside the EOF. The licensee also, may use the EOF as the post-accident r.ecovery managment center.
The licensee shall .use the EOF to- coordinate its emerger:cy response activities with those of Federal, State, and local !
agencies, including the NRC. Licensee personnel in the EOF wil.Y use the evaluations of offsite effects to maxe protective action. l recorsnendations for the public to State and local emergency response agencies.
State and local, agencies chall be responsible for implementing emergency response. actions involving the general pubile. The State and local agencies may operate from the 80F or frces their own control centers at other locations, dependent upon the site-specific provisions of the emergency plan at each plant.
Colocation of offsite authorities at the EOF for the purpose of effaite dose estimation is encouraged.
At the licensee's option, the EOF may be a location for information dissemination to the public via the Lews media by designated, spokespersons in accordance with. the licensee *s emergency plan. Provisions to allow periodic briefings of, a press pool at the EOF should also be made. Actual use of this provision would depend on specific accident conditions and the emergency plan of the licensee.
The licensee shall provide normal industrial security for the EOF cc:aplex during normal operating conditions. This protecticn is required to ensure EOF activation readiness for an emergency by the exclusion of unauthorized persons.
After the EOF is. activated, security protection shall be upgraded to restrict access to those personnel assigned to this facility.
Any location provided in the EOF for news media briefings shall be outaide of the controlled access area.
Tc maintiain a proper level of readiness, the EOF shall be -
activated periodically for training and for emergency preparedness exercises as specified in the licensee *s esmergency plan. The EOF facility may be used by designateu licensee personnel for normal daily operations as well as for training and exercises. Use of the EOF during normal operations shall be _
limited to activities. that will not degrade EOF activation, operations, or reliability.
15..
l - - - . . _ _ ._. . _ . . - _ . . - _ -._ - -. _
4.2 Location, Structure, and Habitability l
4.2.1 Criteria l The location of the EOF shall be within 20 miles of the TSC and shall be so located and/or protected as to allow uninterrupted functioning during radiation releases for which it would be necessary to reconenend protective actions for the public to offsite officials. The EOF structure must be well engineered for the design life of the plant. For EOF's located beyond 10 miles of the TSC, no special habitability protection is required.
4.2.2 Description The EOF is ~ located approximately 1fr . miles from the Shorpham Nuclear Power Station TSC at an existing LILCO Training Center in Bauppauge, Long Island, N.Y. Figure S shows the location of the EOF relative to the plant site. Tne major portion of the route between Shoreham and the EOF is via six-lane Interstate Highway 495 (Long Island Expressway) . The LILCO Training Center. was built in accordance with the New York State Building Code.
Nor'341 industrial grade fire and security detection is provided.
4.3 Staffino and Traininci 4.3.1 Criteria The EOF shall be staffed to provide the overall management of
- licensee resources.and the continuous evaluation and coordination i of licensee activities during and after an accident. Upon EOF activation, designated personnel shall report directly to the EOF to achieve full.. functional operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The EOF stalf shall include personnel to manage-tne' licensee's onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, to perform radiological evaluations, and to interface with offsite officials. .to maintain proficiency, the EOF staff shall participate in EOF l activation drills, wnich shall be conducted periodically and which shall include, operation of all facilities that will be used to perform the EOF functions.
j 4.3.2 Description
EOF staff assignments.and training are described in the Shoreham Emergency Plan.
4.4 Size 4.4.1t Criteria The EOF building,shall be.large.enough to provide working space j for assigned EOF personnel, including State and local agency i
personnel,, up .to the maximum staffing levels specified in tne Emergency Plan. As a d nimum, the BOF . working space shall be 16.
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sized for 35 persons, with approximately 75 sq ft/ person, ,
including separate office space for at lease five.NRC personnel. -
Space shall also be provided for stora'ge of' EOF data system 't. l equipment, comununications equipment, ana' plant records. _
4.4.2 Description
,, [ , ,
s s Figure 6 shows the lay,out of the EOF an inclemented at the LILCO - i Training Center. Suf f acient working space is provided among the '
staff offic'es and the various designated wort areas to acccennodate in excess of,35. persons.. This 15cludes. space for a separate work area for NRC personnel. A separate costputer display room is provided,which will. provides secure storage of and
- emergency. access to . EOF data transmissions and display equipment.
An EOF storage area, to include plant" records and emergency equipment, is provided in a location i:.nediately adjacent to the -
EOF work areas. -
4.5 Radiolcaical Monitoring 4.5.1 Criteria To ensure adequate radiological protection of 2ON personnel, radiation monitoring systems sh&ll be provided in the-EOF. These monitoring systems may be composed of installed monitors or dedicated, portable, monitoring equipment. These systems shall continuously indicate radiation dose _ rates .and airborne radioactivity concentrations inside the EOF while it is in use during an emergency. These monitoring systems shall include local alarms with trip levels set to pr9 vide early warning to EW personnel of. adverse conditions that may affect the nabitability of the EOF. Detectors to distinguish the p'resence or absence of radioiodines at- concentrations as low as'10-7 #Ci/cc shall be provided. . .
4.5.2 Description The distance of 19 miles between the EOF and the Shoreham site l assures. EOF habitability and virtually precludes the possibility of' significant . airborne radioactivity concentrations. Field -
! survey. teams, operating from the EOF, will detect and tracX any ~
airborne activity which could reach the EOF well before it would be picked up by an EOF airborne monitor.
4.6 Communications s_
4.6.1 Criteria ' ',
'2he EOF shall have reliable voice comununications facilities to the TSC, the control rocu, NRC, and State..'and; local,. emergency operations centers. The normal ccr.snunication path between the EOF and the control rocan will be through the TSC. The primarf functions of the EOF voice communications facilities will be:
17.
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. EOF managessent ccsusunications with the designated senior l
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y licensee manager in charge of the TSC, i
. Comanunications , to manage licensee emergency response resources,
' . Cuan:unications to coordinate radiological monitoring,
. Communications to i:oordinate ofisite emergency response activities, and
. Ccannunications to disasuntnate ininmation and reccamended protective actions to responsible government agencies.
~
The EOF voice consnunications facilities shall include reliable prun.ery and backup means of commautication. Voice cosumanications
. viay include private telephones, commercial telephones, radio networks, and intercenununications systems as appropriate to accomplish the LOF functions during emergency conditlor.s.
Existing. Iicensee comanunications systems may De used 11 the
- i. -
systems can be demonstrated to be reliable under esmergency conditions and if they are adequate to meet the added AOF
. criteria. Tne- licensee shall provide a means for EOF telephone access to cocunercial telephone common-carrier services that bypass'es anf~1ocal telephone. switching. facilities that may be susceptible to los.s of power during emergencies. The . licensee s
shall ensure xtha.t spare commercial telephone lines to the plant
< are-available foyluse by the EOF during emergencies.
~
~
'The f4;F voice co(iray ens equipment shall include-
. ,' Botline telephone (located in the NRC office space) on
_N \ thelNRC. emergency notificationJaystem (ENS) to the NRC
{ Operations Ceriter;
. Dehicated telephone (located in the NRC office space) on
. the'MRC. health physica network (BPN) ;
.~ a
- s* . Dedicated ' telephones for manageaent conmounications with
. . direct accecs to the TSC and the control room; -
- s. -
. Dial telephones reserved for EOF use to provide access ,
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tolonsite and offsite locations;
~
J . Interccarounications systemis .between work areas of the
'* ., EOF, if naeded, for EOF functional performance or if the
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. Conssunications to State and local operations centers-and
. Communications to fac111 ties outside the EOF used to provide supplemental support for EOF evaluations.
The EOF comunication system shall also include designated telephones (in addition to the ENS and HPN telephones) for use Dy NRC . personnel. The licensee shall provide at least three dial telephone lines for such NRC use while the EOF is activated. The licensee shall also furnish the access f acilities and cables to the NRC for the ENS and HPN telephone;s..
Facsimile transmission capability retween the EOF, the TSC,.and the NRC Operations Cec. iter shall be provided.
4.6.2 Description The EOF. is equipped with reliable primary and bacxup communications systems. consisting of Bell telephones, dedicated telephones, and UHF and locations, outside agencies,VHF , andradio systems.to to other appropriate plant ERF locations.
The coumuinication systems are described in the Emergency Plan.
4 .'7 IIstrumentation,_ Data System Eouipment. and Power . Supplies 4.7.1 Criteria.
3quipment shall be provided to gather, store, and display data needed in the EOF- to analyze and exchange . information on plant condiciona with the design *ted senior licensee manager in charge of the TSC. The data system equipment shall perform these functions independent of actions in the control room and without degrading or interfering wiO1 control room or plant functions.
When signals to the EOF are received irose sensors providing i signals to safety system equipment or displays, suitable j isolation Mmil De provided to ensure that the EOF equipment will l not degrade performance of the safety system equipment or l displayH. '31e EOF electrical equipment load shall not degrade l the capability or reliability of any safety-related power source. "
Tne total LOF shall be designed to achieve an operational unavailability of 0.01 during all plant operating t:onditions aoove cold shutdown.
4.7.2 Description The instrumentation and data system equipment provided.for the EOF and for the j TSC are common equipment. The data acquisition system describ1Pd , in Section 2.8.2 is casnan to all elements of the ERF. Therefore, the description contained in Section 2.8.2 J
also applies to the EOF.
1 19.
\V i) 1 - . - . - _ __ ._- -
The EOF receives ac power through transformers connectea to a reliable 13.8 kV distribution system. The annual unavailabi.tity as calculated to be 0.0001 baed on historical outage data.
4.8 Technical Data and Data System 4.8.1 Criteria The EOF data system shall receive, store, process, and display information acquired from ditterent areas of the plant as needed to perform the EOF function. The data system shall support the i following functions:
. Assessment of environmental conditions,
. Coordination of radiological monitoring activities, and
. Implementation or ofrsite emergency plans.
As a minimun EOF data set, sensor data of the Type A, B, C, D, and E variables specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, and of. those meteorological variables specified in proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23 and in NDREG-0654, Revision 1, Appendix 2, shall be available for display in the EOF. All data that are available for display in the TSC, including data transmitted frca the plant to NRC, shall be part of the EOF data set.
The accuracy of data in the EOF must be consistent with the data accuracy needed to perform the i.OF functions. The time resolut.lon of data acquisition shall be sufficient to provide data without loss of information during transient conditions.
Data storage and recall capability shall be provided for the EOF data set. At least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of pre-event data and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of post-event data shall be recorded. Capability to record at least 2 weeks of additional . post-event data with reduced time resolution shall be provided. Archival data storage and the capability to tranafer data between active memory and archival cata storage without interrupting EOF data acquisition and display shall be provided for all EOF data. ~-
A sufficient number'of data display and printout devices shall be provided in the EOF to allow all personnel to perform their assigned tasks with unhindered access'to data. Trend information ,
display and t h history display capability is needed in.the EOF to give. personnel a dynamic view of plant systems, radiological ,
status, and environmental status during an emergency.
The SPDS shall also b'e displayed in the EOF.
20.
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4.0.2 Description The technical data and data systt:m described in section 2.9.2 is cononon to all elements of the ERF. Therefore, the description contained in Section 2.9.2 also applies to the EOF.
~
4.9 Records Availability and Marungement
~
4.9.1 Cr'teria i -
The EOF Ahall have ready . access to up-to-date plant records, urocedures, and emergency plans needed to exercise overall ,
management of licensee emergency response resource. The EOF records shall include, but shall not be limited to:
. Piant technical specifications,
. Plant operating procedures,
. Emergency operating procedures, a Final Safety Analysis Report,
. Up-to-date records related to licensee, State, and local emergency response plans,
. Otfsite population distribution data,
. Evacuation plans,
. Environs radiological monitoring records, and
. Licensee employee radiation exposure histories.
and up-to-date drawings, schematics, and diagrams showing:
. Conditions of plant structures and systems down to the component level.and
. In-plant locations of these systems. ..
These records shall either be stored and maintained in the EOF (such aa hard copy or microfiche) or shall be readily available via transmittal to the EOF from another records storage location.
The method of storage and presentation of the EOF records shall ,
ensure ease of access under emergency conditions. The records available to the EOF shall be completely updated as necessary to ensure currency and completeness.
4.9.2 Description The above criteria will be met.
21.
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- l 5.0 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTD1 5.1 Function 5.1.1 Criteria The purpose of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is to assist control room personnel in evaluating the eafety status of the plant. The SPDS is to provide a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representive of the safety status of the plant. The. primary function of the SPDS is to aid the operator in the rapid actection of abnormal operating conditions.
All data for display shall be validated where practicable on a realt h basis as part of the display to control room personnel.
The SPDS shall be capable of displaying pertinent information during steady state and transient conditions. The SPDS shall be capanle of presenting the magnitudes and the trends of parameters or derived varianles as recessary to allow rapid assessment of the current plant status by control room personnel.
A qualification program shall be established to demonstrate SPDS conformance to the functional criteria of this document.
5.1.2 Description A Idmited set of para:neters will be selected to represent the safety status of the plant. The SPDS provides, in the main control room, .two CRT displays l interactive). One CRT continuously displays a. sununary graphic representatiors of plant eatety status. The .second CRT is available for paging through
' additional levels of detailed information to the control room operator. . The sunenary and detailed graphic displays is designed with' oonsideration of both btenan factors and operational requirements.
hnere redundant . inputs to.a parameter are available, the inputs are compared to validate the data. If practicable, where redundant inputs are not available, data will be validated by
comparison with a derived parameter. The SPDS display indicates 1
those parameters for whicn successful validation did not occur.
Tne SPDS will be in continuous operation during normal and .
abnormal operating conditions. The seismic cWei er (SPDS) and the 'nonseismic computer (balance of emergency . response facilities) are interfaced with a high speed data link, allowing the nonseismic computer to drive the SPDS displays in the TSC and the BOF. -
22.
~ .. - .-
The seismic computer has the capability for parameter trending for recent and current values of the SPDS parameters against time.
The system vendor is required to perform validation and verification of the design of thn ERP data acquisition and processing functions. ,
5.2 Location
~
5.2.1 Criteria The SPDS shall be located in the cont.rol room with additional SPDS displays provided in the TSC and EOF. The SPDS shall be readily accessible and visible to the shift supervisor, control room senior reactor operator, shift technical advisor, and ac least one reactor operator from the nornal operating area.
5.2.2 Description SPDS displays are located in the EOF and the TSC. In the main control room, the-SPDS console is located behind the computer equ11 ment desk which is located behind the operator's desk (see Figure 7). From this position, any control room personnel watching .the SPDS displays will also be 1 acing the reacror control benchboard in the center of the station main control Doards.
5.3 Size ,
5.3.1 Criteria ..
The SPDS shall be of such size as to be compatible with the existing space in the control area. The SPDS display shall be readable from the emergency operating station of the control room senior reactor operator. It shall not interfere with normal movement or with full visual access to other control room operating. systems and displays.
5.3.2 Description The SPDS console is located as described in Section 5.2.2. When standing behind the SPDS console, control room personnel have an unobstructed view of the reactor control benchboard and an overall view of the station main control boards. The SPDS _
console does not restrict movement or access within t M mair.
control room.
23.
5.4 Statfina 5.4.1 Criteria The SPDS shall be ot such design that no operating personnel in addition to'the normal control room operating staff are required for its operation.
5.4.2 Description No additional personnel are required for operation of the SPDS in the main control room.
5.5 Display considerations 5.5.1 Criteria The display shall be responsive to transient and accident sequences and shall be aufficient to indicate the status of the plant. For each mode of plant operation, a single primary display format designed accort.ing to acceptable hiaman factors
- principles shall be displayed, from which plant safety status can be interred.
The important plant iunctions related to the primary display unile the plant is generating power shall include, but not be limited to:
. Reactivity control,
. . Reactor , core cooling and heat removal from primary gystem,
. Reactor coolant system integrity.
. . Radioactivity.. control, and
. Containment integrity. ,
5.5.2 Description The SPDS display in the main' control'Icom consists of a console containing two interactive color CRT's. One CRT displays a summary . graphic, keyed to current plant operating mode, representing plant safety status. The second CRT is available ._
l for paging through additional levels of graphics to provide l
detailed intormation to the control room operator. SPDS input parameters are chosen so as to provide a display which is responsive to the transient and accident sequences of the plant while being representative of the current safety status of the plant. .
- 24. .
i
The SPDS graphics consists of a three level hierarchy of interactive color graphic CRT displays.
The display is responsive to transient and accident sequences and is suf ficient to indicate the status of the plant. For each mode of plant operation (RUN, BOT STANDBY / START, REFUEL, and SHUTDOWN) I a " Level One" page is displayed listing the lamportant plant iunctions: *
. Reactivity control,
. Reactor core cooling and heat removal,
. Reactor coolant system integrity,
. Radioactivity control,
. .Containmen,t integrity, and
. Containment isolation.
Each tunction haa an indicator associated with it and a dedicated function Dutton cn the Operator's Console to access additional levels in the hierarchy.
Level Two in the hierarchy displays definite values for eacn channel (of each instrument / sensor signal) for the important parameters.in a Level One area.
Each Level Two display- has an alarm set point indicator. In adcrit.icia , .each display, has associated with it a. dedicated function button for. the purpose of accessing the Level Three display.
The Level '1 tree display is a representation of the loops, sensors, etc, displayed in Level Two, with alarm indicators and real time data superimposed on the graphics template.
l Graphical diagrams with real time data will be displayed for significant plant systems.
A limited expansion capability is available within the SPDS to allow for the future expansion of the SPDS or the incorporation of future state-of-the-art techniques.-
5.6 Des _ ion Considerations f
5.b.1 Criteria The total SPDS need not be Class 1E or meet the single failure criteria. The sensors and signal conditioners shall be designed and qualified to meet Class 1E . standards for those SPDS param2ters that are also.used by safety systems. Sensors and .
25.
l
signal conditioners ior those parameters of the SPDS identical to parameters specified within Regulatory Guide 1.97 shall be designed and qualified to the criterla stated in Regulatory Gu2de 1.97. The processing and display davices of the SPDS anall be of proven high quality and reliability. The display system shall not casly take adequate account of hi===n factors, but shall also be.sufficiently durable to function during and af ter earthquaxes.
The SFDS as. used in the control room shall be designed to an operational pnavailability goal of 0.01. The cold shutdown unavailability goal for the SPDS during the cold shutdown and retueling moder. for the reactor shall be 0.2.
Technidal s:sec111 cations sha'11 be established to be consistent witn the unavailability design goal of the SPDS and with the compensatory measures provided during periods when the SPDS is inocerable. Operation or the plant with tne SPDS out of service is allowed provided that the control board is sufficiently human tactored to allow the operations statt to pertorm the satety status assessment task in a timely maruser.
5.6.2 Description All portions of the SPDS which interface with Class 1E signals, parameters, power sources, or equipment are fully qualified Class 1E components. As a asinimum, the qualification of SPDS signal conditioning components is equal to the qualification of the signal source being tappea to provide input to the S&DS.
The entire SPDS, froen signal source, data acquisition, computer,
' to the SPDS CRT console in the main ccntrol room is ' seismically qualifind.
The SPDS displays are designed to take into account human factors considerations.
The SPDS is designed .to. meet an operational unavailability of 0.01 for all plant operating modes above cold shutdown. The SPDS design also provides an operational unavailability of 0.2 during cold shutdown.
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TSC-FIRST FLOOR PLAN SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION-UNIT 1 i 1
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NON-CLASS IE FIELD SENSORS l LOCAL CLASS IE : NON-CLASS lE TO NON-CLASS IE MULTIPLEX INPUT ISOLATION _
CABINETS / RACKS (SEISMIC)
DEVICES A L (SEE NOTE 3) 7 '
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CABINETS / RACKS CABINET (SEISMIC) (SEISMIC)
[ (SEE IIOTE 2) t; z
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RADIATION MONITORING (SEE NOl p
SYSTEM C COMPUTERS METEORLOGICAL DATA NOTES:
- 1. CLASS lE RADIATION DETECTORS INPUTTING TO SPDS DISPLAYS
- 2. CLASS lE TO NON-CLASS lE ISOLATION
- 3. FIBER OPTIC TRANSMISSION LINK
- 4. HIGH SPEED INTERCOMPUTER DATA LINK 4
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- SPDS SUBSYSTEM CONTROL ROOM DISPLAYS EMERGENCY RESPCNSE FACILITIES COM.*JTER S1 STEM SEISMIC SUB SYSTE.M TSC SUBSYSTEM WULTIPLEX
OTE 31 DISPuYS OUTPUT CABINET
[SEE NOTE 3) r- - - - - - - W INCLUDING
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NON-SEISHIC SPDS DISPLAY SUBSYSTiN i
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L_______J FIG. 4 DATA ACOUISiTION AND DISPLAY FLOW CHART J SHOREHAM .NUCGAR POWER STATICN-UNIT 1 /
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/ o FIG. 6 EOF FLOOR PLAN SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION-UNIT 1 /
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BOP i COMMUNICATION I CONSOLE VENTILATION MAIN ' #"
CONTROL
% SPDS COMPUTER EOUIP. DESM ON DEMAND LOG TYPER l OPER ATOR'S 03" PROCESS RE ACTOR BLOG.
l COM PUTER VENTILATION j CONSOLE PANEL s PCS [ RMS
\ ALARM PRINTERj RMS
\ PRINTER DISPLAY (CRT)
REACTOR \
, CONTROL N l BOARD --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----.
I REACTOR WATER REACTOR CORE CLEAN-UP AND COOLING BOARD RECIRC. BOARD FIG. 7 SPDS LOCATION-MAIN CONTROL ROOM SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION- UNIT 1
o .= 0 ATTACHMENT 1 ERF Data Set
- 1. Control Rod Position s
- 2. tieutron Flux
- 3. Reactor Coolant Level
- 4. Reactor Vessel Pressure
- 5. MSIV Leaxage Control System Pressure
- 6. SRV Position
- 7. Prutary Containment Pressure
- 8. Suppression Chamber Pressure W. Drywell Hydrogen Concentration
- 10. Wetwell Hydrogen Concentration
- 11. Drywell Oxygen Concentration
- 12. Netwell Oxygen Concentration
- 13. Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position 14 Drywell Atmosphere Temperature
- 15. Primary Containment High Range Area Radiation
- 16. Drywell Drain Sumps Level
- 17. Containment Erfluent Radioactivity hoDle Gases
- 18. RBSVS Flow
- 19. Main Feedwater Flow
- 20. Condensate Storage Tank Level
- 21. Drywell Spray Flow
- 22. Suppression Chamber Spray Flow
- 23. Suppression Pool Water Temperature 24 Suppression Pool Water Level A1-1
- 27. Core Spray Flow
- 28. RHR System Flow
- 29. LPCI System Flow
- 30. RHR Heat Excnanger Outlet Temperaturc
- 31. Cooling Water Temoerature to ESF System Components
- 32. Cooling Water Flow to ESF System Components
- 35. SLCS Flow
- 36. High Radicactivity Liquid Tank Level
- 37. Emergency Ventilation Damper Position (Reactor Building)'
'38. Status of Standby Power and Other' Energy Sources Important to Saf ety
~
- 39. Radiation Exoosure Rates u0. Effluent Radioactivity Noble Gases' Station Vent
. 41. Station Vent Flow Rate
- 42. Effluent Radioactivity Halogens and Particulates
- 43. RBSVS Hign Range Area Radiation
- 44. Station Vent High Range Radiation
- 45. Wind Direction at 33 ft-4 6. - kind Direction at 150 ft
- 47. Wind Speed at 33 ft
- 48. Wind Speed at 150 ft
- 49. Temperature at 33 ft
- 50. Temperature aT Between 33 and 150 ft 4 _.
A1-2 s
+.
. . _ = _ - .
c .* t -
- 51. Low Range Containment Area Radiation J
- 52. RHR Service Water Discharge Radiation
- 53. RECLCW System Radiation 54 Control Vent Radiation
- 55. Control Room Atmosphere Radiation
- 56. Release Path Activity
- 57. Gaseous Effluent Flcw Rates
- 58. Main Steam Line Radiation NOTE:
The listing is for parameters, each parameter may have redundant and/or multiple channels.
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__ - . - . . - . -. -. . - - . - - - ---