ML20010G002

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Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-324/81-14 & 50-325/81-14.Corrective Actions:Procedure Revised to Darken Excessive Number of Lighted Alarms on Control Room Panels 2-A-1 Through 2-A-7
ML20010G002
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/26/1981
From: Dietz C
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
BSEP-81-1590, NUDOCS 8109150214
Download: ML20010G002 (3)


Text

I .s DESIGUATED ORIGIliAIl

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p ,(ri k Certified E7 --

n- 1 c:- _ y Brumn ii ! Ste.m E l ec t r ic Pl ant P. O. liox 1:3429

. South; ort , NC 284nt-0429 .

Augi ,t. 26, 1981 FILE- B03-13314 , o[ff f "

SERIAL: B SEP/ 61 - 1590 9 fil U Lf f h )0 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director -

Si.'* 1*II931 A U. S. Nucloar Regulatory Commission i u.s.

geumo.,

Region II, Suite 3100 'g

, ,, f 101 Marietta Street 'I.W. 9) N '!

Atlanta, GA 30303 g f('

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 & 2 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 RESPONSE TO INFRACTIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) has received IE Inspection Report 50-324/81-14 and 50-325/81-14 and finds that it does not contain any information of a proprietary nature.

The report identified two item (s) that appear to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. These items and Carolina Power & Light Company's response to each are addressed in the following text:

Violatten A: (Severity Level V)

Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained. Operating procedurc OI-5-A, Status of Annunciators in Alarm, requires annunciators in alarm to be recorded in a log.

Contrary to the above, on Ju.ly 6, 1981, alarming annunciators on control room alarm pancis 2-A-1 through 2-A-7, were not listed in the log. Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 Control Operators were not maintaining the Icg as required.

Carolina Power & T,ight Compagv's Respo_nse Carolina Power & Light Company acknowledges that this was a violation of technical specifications. This violation was the result of Operations personnel not adhering to an approved plant procedure due to its extreme administrative requirements which detracted the operators from their normal functions and also due to an intarpretation problem in administering the procedure.

A coordinated ef fort has been under way during the past year to darken (place in ppl a nonalarming condition) annunciators not required to be alarming to redi ce the Mg b

8109150214 810826 -

PDR ADOCK 05000324 O PDR u .

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly 2 August 26, 1981 excessive nucher of lighted a' arms on each unit. The reasons for ar.nunciation falls into several categories: 1) actual alarms due to component or system probicas, 2) alarms rest i t ing from maintenance or testing being performed en a corscrant or system,.3) alarms which indicate the status of a component or syster but which do not indicate problems , 4) probleau with the annuncia',r circuitry or logic. .To help correct problems created by excessive annunciators being lighted, two programs were initiated. The major e f fort is to have Engineering, with Operations assistance, evaluate all lighted annunciators and ,

modify them if required to assure that a lighted annunciator is required to be lighted. The second portion of tbc program was the devalopment of a procedure to maintain an up-to-date status of all lighted annunciators such that operators had an available reference to identify why an alarm was lighted. Failure to follow this procedure led to this violation.

To correct this problem, the Manager-Operations meet with the Shift Operating Supervisors and the Shif t Foremen to ciscuss the requirement t'c at approved procedures must be followed and that they cannot be arbitrarily ignored. Also discussed was the need to initiate procedure revisions when problems are en-countered with compliance or technical merit. Implementation of the current procedure has been resumed by al! shifts while it is being revised. The revised procedure will be more clearly written and will be administrative 1y functional.

This procedure will be revised and implemented by September 30, 1981.

Violation B (Severity Level V) -

Technical Specification 3.0.4 requires that entry into an Operational Condition or other specified applicability state not be made unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the Action Statements. Technical Specification 3.5.3.2, requires that two independent Low Pressure Cociant Injection (LPCI) subsyr.tems of the residual heat removal system sl:all be operable with each subystem comprised of:

1. Two pumps -
2. An operable flow path capable of taking suction from the suppressicn pool and transferring the water in the reactor pressure vessel.

Contrary to the above, on June 29, 1981, as a result of an operator error, the reactor modo switch was taken out of the refueling mode, placed in startup,' and control rod withdrawal commenced with the A-loop Rhi, torus suction valve (F020A) shut.

Carolina Power & Light Company's Response Carolina Power & Light Company acknowledges that this was a violation of technical specifications. This event was initially reported in LER 2-81-59.

At approximately 0430 while establishing a standby readiness lineup for A loop of RHR in preparation for a reactor startup, the breaker for the torus suction valve, F020A tripped. Two Auxiliary Operators were sent to manually open the valve. The Auxiliary Operators were not able to break the valve disk of f of its seat, so another Auxiliary Operator was sent to assist with a manual valve operator. At 0528, prior to receiving word on the status of the F020A valve, a normal reactor startup was commenced. Shortly after the commencement of the

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c er Mr. Jamn:, P. O'ficilly 3 August 26, 1981 startup, the Shif t Operating Supervisor epu stioned the position of the F020A valve d; ring a revi%: of the control panol . The st.artup was secured with seven rods withdrawn and t.hu Auxiliary Operators ' ansigned to opon the valve were centacted the Conti,1toRoom deterninn theF020A that the actuelvalve valv. position. At 0534, word was received in broken ofi was still shut met s :. il l could not he its seat., The seven withdrawn control rods were ircediately inserted and the modo switch was taken to the refuel posit ion.

  • An investigat.lon of this event has determined that. the main cause was personnel error with slow communications being a minot cause. The Control Operator assumed that sutficient time had elapsed to open ti c F020A valve and thus initiated a reactor startup. He also initiiled the step on the startup procedure requiring the valve to be open as complete. To correct these problems the following , ctions have been or wil.1 be taken:

1.

A meeting was held with senior plant management and those personnel involved specifications technical to discuss theand series of events that the seriousness ledviolation.

of that to this violation of 2.

Appropriate this event. disciplinary action was taken with the individuals involved in The Shif t Foreman and the Control Operator involved with this event were was completed. removed from duties requiring a license until the inver cigation Following the investigation and the meeting described in L.

above, the personnel were returned tc normal duty.

3.

Each' Shift Operating Supervisor reviewed this event with their respective shifts with emphasis on ensuring that items are verified complete prior to signing them of f, and that all b1c ;ks are completed or an explanation docu-taented requiringand the an approval signatura obtained prior to initiation of any event documentation.

4. The Shift Foreman Operators - the discussed with all Auxiliary Operators and Control need to maintain effective communications and co report problems to the Control Rcom in an expedited manner.

5.

GP-1 (plant startup procedure) will be reviewed and revised as required to

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better define startup prerequisites. This icem will be completed by September 30, 1981.

! i i

Very truly yours, i l.

i i

C. R. Dietz, General Nanager Brunswick Steam Electric

, RMP/mcg

. f

! cc: Mr. R. A. Hartfield f

[tr. V. Stello, Jr.

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