ML20006E400

LER 90-001-00:on 900108,Train s Low Steam Line Pressure Blocking Switch Placed in Blocked Position,Causing Actuation of Safety Injection & ESF Sys.Caused by Lack of Instructions.Training Program modified.W/900212 Ltr

ML20006E400
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	02/12/1990
From:	Ayala C, Vaughn G HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001-01, LER-90-1-1, ST-HL-AE-3372, NUDOCS 9002230059
Download: ML20006E400 (5)

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eif Houston Lighting de Power .

v' > . February 12,.'1990 ST-HL-AE- 3372 File No.: .G26 (.

, 10CFRSO.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington', DC 20555 s

7 South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit.2 Docket No. STN 50-499

' Licensee Event Report 90-001,Regarding

.An. Unplanned Engineered Safety Features

- Actuation During the Performance of A Surve111ance Test

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!. . Pursuant'to-.10CFR50.73,-Houston Lighting & Power Corpany:(HL&P) submits L -the. attached Licensee. Event Report (LER 90-001) regarding an unplanned Engineered Safety Features actuation during the performance of,a surveillance

i. test. 'This event'did'not have any adverse' impact'on the-health.and safety of the public. j a

1f you should have any questions on this-matter, please contact ,

p 'Mr. C.'A. Ayala'at (512):972-8628-or myself at (512) 972-7921.

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C.E.Jous% -

" .G.E.Vaughn-h a Vice-President 1

Nuclear Operations- i LGEV/BEM/n1 l .

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Attachment:

LER 90-101.(South Texas, Unit 2)

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NL.LER90001.U2- ,A Subsidiary of Houston Industries Incorporated

,',# 9002230059 900212 .

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ST-HL AE- 3372- i

. Houston Lighting & Ppwer Company File No.: C26'

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Regional Administrator, Region.IV Rufus S. Scott j Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associate General Counsel 611 Ryan. Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Houston Lighting & Power Company Arlington, TX' 76011 'P. O. Box 61867 i Houston, TX" 77208  ;

, George Dick, Project Manager U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO L Washington, DC 20555- Records Center '

1100 circle 75 Parkway '

-J. I. Tapia Atlanta, CA 30339-3064 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U. S.' Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Joseph' M. Hendrie Commission 50 Be11 port Lane P. O. Box'910 Be11 port, NY 11713 ,

Bay City, TX 77414 D. K. Lacker J. R. Newman, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Control Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Texas Department of Health 4

1615 L Street, N.W. 1100 West 49th Street

, Washington, DC' 20036- Austin, TX 78704 D. E. Ward /R. P. Verret Central Power & Light Company P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 J. C. Lanier ,

Director of Ceneration City of Austin. Electric Utility

-721-Barton Springs Road Austin, TX. 78704 R. J. Costo11o/M. T. Hardt City Public Service Board P.~0. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 f

Revised 12/15/89 L4/NRC/ -

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M I1 asRC Form MS U $. NVCLE A 4 $_EiUL2,* 1RY C0amsemeOss

. .. APPROVED OMA 8s0 3100 010E LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ''*'8**"

F ACILITY NAa4E til .

DOCKET NUMMR (2) PAGE G South Texas, Unit 2 - o ;s ;o ;o ;o;4;9;9 i joplo g3 h '"~ An Unplanned Engineered Safety Features Actuation During The Performance of a i Rurun411nnin To n t-EVENT DATE 198 LER NUtdSER le) REPORT DATE 171 OTHE R F ACILITIES INVOLVED 101 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR '"$, $ f

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NJ.ME TE LEPMONE NUMSER ARE A COOE I Charles Ayala - Supervising Licensing Engineer

, 51112 91 7121-181 612 18 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRISED IN THis REPORT (13 SYSTEM COMPONENT REPORTA LE CAU5E COMPONENT REPORTA F4 > s CAUSE ' M(( AC. SY SV E M M AN( AC.

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l On Janu ry 8, 1990, Unit 2 was in Mode S. A functional test of the H

Solid State Protection System Train R was being performed to satisfy Technical l Specifications. At 0202 hours0.00234 days <br />0.0561 hours <br />3.339947e-4 weeks <br />7.6861e-5 months <br />, as required by the test procedures, a Hot .

i License trainee, under the direction of a licensed' operator, placed the l Train S " Low Steam Line Pressure" blocking handswitch in the " Block" position and released it. The spring return action of the handswitch caused it to pass through the neutral position to the " Unblock" position. This causedia low steam line pressure actuation of the Safety Injection System. The Engineered l-Safety Features equipment which was not disabled for the outage actuated as

expected. No unexpected transients were observed. This characteristic of the spring return switches was identified during the pre-license Control Room E Design Review; however, required training of operators in this characteristic was not implemented. Hot License and requalification training will be modified to include instruction on manipulation of spring return switches. A memorandum has been issued to operations personnel-regarding this event.

Other training requirements identified during the Control Room Design Review L will be reviewed to ensure that they were incorporated in the training ,

program. A further assessment of the use of spring return switches will be performed.

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sus w wa s w. umanc um sarenin j DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On ' January 8, 1990, Unit 2 was in Mode 5. A functional test of the. Solid i State Protection System Train R was being performed to satisfy Technical 1 Specification requirements by-a Hot License Trainee under the direction of a.

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l licensed operator. The test requires the actuation of various manual block l switches.. At 0202 hours0.00234 days <br />0.0561 hours <br />3.339947e-4 weeks <br />7.6861e-5 months <br />, as required by the test procedure, the trainee-placed the. Train S " Low Steam.Line Pressure" hcndswitch in the " Block" I position and. released it. The spring-return action of the handswitch caused 1 l it to pass ~through the neutral position to the " Unblock" position. Since the j unit was in Mode 5, no steam line pressure was present and a low system line j pressure actuation of the Safety Injection System occurred. Standby Diesel' Generators 21 and 23 started as expected. The remaining major Engineered Safety Features equipment was disabled for the outage and did not actuate.

This actuation did not result in any unexpected transients. The NRC was notified at 0313 hours0.00362 days <br />0.0869 hours <br />5.175265e-4 weeks <br />1.190965e-4 months <br />.

The potential for-accidental actuation of spring return switches in this manner was identified in the pre-license Control Room Design Review. The review concluded that after a quick release of certain spring return switches-manufactured by Micro Switch and General Electric, the switches may go past the center position and make up the contas.s for the opposite position. The resolution oflthis finding was to provide training to ensure that operators do not use a quick release technique. However,-no specific training was  :

provided. Switches which exhibit the same characteristics are installed on the plant simulator.

CAUSE OF EVENT .

The-cause of this event was the failure to provide adequate prerequisite instruction in the manipulation of spring return switches during licensed operator training. The training Job Task Analysis did not identify the potential for misoperation of the switches. .A contributing factor was that no program existed to ensure that procedural and training modifications were completed which were identified during the Control Room' Design Review.

Hardware changes were controlled by the design change control process, b'

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Unplanred actuation of an Engineered Safet:> Features is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The plant uu in Mode 5 at the time of this event. All safety related equipment which was in service actuated as required. The safety injection pumps were removed f rom service; therefore, no injection to the Reactor Coolant System occurred.

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The'following corrective actions are being taken as'a result of this b event l'

'1. A memorandum has been issued to operations personnel diccussing this event'and emphasizing the use of positive control when manipulating-spring return type switches..

2. This event will be reviewed with the current Hot License Class prior ,

to their returning to control room training. This action will be completed by March 24, 1990.

3 .- The Hot License training program will be modified to include an  !

objective for proper operation of. spring return switches. The program  !

modification will include information from-this erent and will be a -l prerequisite to control room training. This action will be completed ,

by November 15, 1990. 1

'4.- A discussion'of this event will be included in lessons learned i training for' licensed operators during requalification to emnhasize j

the consequences'of using the quick release method when operating l control switches. This action will be completed by May 26, 1990. j 1

5. Training and procedural modifications identified during the Centrol Room Design Review will be reviewed to ensure that they were incorporated into plant procedures and1 training. This act4on will be

!. completed by May 1, 1990. ll t

6. A survey of licensed operators will be performed to identify other '

additional knowledge items which operators may feel should be included k' in.the Job Task Analysis. This action will be completed by May 26, 1990.

7. 'n addition to the above corrective actions, a further assessment of the use of spring return switches and the feasibility of replacement will be performed. This action will be completed by September 15, 1990.

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L ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

There have been no previous events reported regarding spurious actuations

.of Engineered Safety Features due to misoperation of a spring return switch.

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