ML20043C740

LER 90-007-00:on 900430,discovered That All Three Trains of ESFAS Placed in Test & Incapable of Actuating for Approx 35 Minutes.Caused by Inadequate Prerequisite Conditions in Maint Procedure.Procedure Being modified.W/900530 Ltr

ML20043C740
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/30/1990
From:	Ayala C, Vaughn G HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-007-01, LER-90-7-1, ST-HL-AE-3500, NUDOCS 9006060124
Download: ML20043C740 (5)

Text

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The Light company Houston Li ting & Power South Texas Project Electric Generating Station . l P. O. Bos 289 Wadsworth, Tesas 77483 May'30, 1990 ST.HL AE 3500 File No G26 -

10CFR50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Attention: Document Control Desk  !

Washington, DC 20555  ;

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit 1 Docket No, STN 50 498 Licensee Event Report 90 007 Regarding A Technical Soecification Violation Due to an Inadeaunte Procedure Pursuant.to-10CFR50,73 Houston Lighting 6' Power Company (HIAP) submits the attached Licensee Event Report (LER 90 007) regarding a Technical Specification violation due to an inadequate procedure, This event did not have any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.

If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. C A, Ayala at (512) 972-8628 or myself at (512) 972-7921, i -

y G. E. Vaughn l

Vice President Nuclear Generation BEM/n1

Attachment:

LER 90-007 (South Texas, Unit 1) l

'A1/LER007U1.LO1 9006060124 900530 A Subsidiary of Houston Industries incorporated 1 622 PDR ADOCK0500g}8 j[/

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Houston' Lighting & Power Company South Texas Project Electric Generating Station ST-HL-AE-3500 File No.: G26 Page 2 cc:

Regional Administrator, Region IV Rufus S. Scott Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associate General Counsel 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Houston Lighting & Power Company Arlington, TX 76011 P. O. Box 61867 Houston, TX 77208 George Dick, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission INPO Washington, DC 20555 Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway J. I. Tapia Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie Commission 50 Bellport Lane P. O. Box 910 Bellport, NY 11713 Bay City, TX 77414 D. K. Lacker J. R. Newman, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Control Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Texas Department of Health 1615 L Street, N.W. 1100 West 49th Street Washington, DC 20036 Austin, TX 78704 D. E. Ward /R. P. Verret Central Power & Light Company P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 J. C. Lanier Director of Generation City of Austin Electric Utility 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt City Public Service Board P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 Revised 12/15/89 A1/008.N14

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LICENSEE i. VENT REPORT (LER) * * *'a 's "5 '"

8 ACILITY saAast til DOCEET peutIDER (25 raus a South Texas, Unit 1 o is ] o lo l o j 4 ;9 l8 i jorl0 l 3 TITLE 441 A Technical Specification Violation Due to an Inadequate Procedure tvtNT DAf t 153 LER NutdBER 14) REPORT DATE th OTHE R F ACILITill INVOLVt0 IBl MONTH DAY Yle.R Yl&R bi7m (8/f,$ MONTM OAV YEAR 'acissiv hauts DOCKE T NUwetRcs.

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On April 30, 1990, Unit 1 was in Mode 6 for a refueling outage. At approximately 1505 hours0.0174 days <br />0.418 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.726525e-4 months <br />, a plant operator discovered that all three trains of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) had been placed in test and had been incapable of actuating for approximately 35 minutes. This disabled the automatic actuation of containment ventilation isolation which is required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.2 during core alterations which were in progress at the time. Two of the trains were immediately returned to operation. The cause of this event was inadequate prerequisite conditions in a maintenance procedure which did not identify that - :

the procedure could not be performed during core alterations. Also, the procedure did not positively control manipulation of the ESFAS test switches.

A contributing factor was a miscommunication between a plant operator and a maintenance technician. The ESFAS normalization procedure is being modified to identify that it cannot bo performed during core alterations and to positively control ESFAS test switch manipulation. A training bulletin will be issued to operations personnel regarding this event emphasizing proper communications.

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. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION A eRovf o on.e o sino-oio.

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0 l 0l 7 0l0 0 l2 or 0l3 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On April 30, 1990, Unit 1 was in Mode 6 for a refueling outage. At approximately 1505 hours0.0174 days <br />0.418 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.726525e-4 months <br />, a plant operator discovered that all three trains of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESPAS) were in test'and ,

incapable of actuating. This disabled the automatic actuation of containment l ventilation isolation which is required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.2 during core alterations which were in progress at the time. Two of the trains were returned to operation. The NRC was notified of this Technical Specification violation at 1150 hours0.0133 days <br />0.319 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.37575e-4 months <br /> on May 1, 1990.

On April 30, 1990, an HL4P maintenance technician was preparing to perform a procedure which normalizes inputs to the ESFAS to simulate normal plant operation prior to performing response time testing. The prerequisite conditions in the procedure stated that it could be performed in Modes 5 and 6, but did not specify that it could not be performed during core alterations since it disabled automatic actuation of containment ventilation isolation.

Approval to perform the procedure was granted by the 16C maintenance manager and the shift supervisor. The possibility of a Technical Specification violation was not noticed. The prerequisite conditions also required the technician to verify that all three trains of ESPAS were in test. The technician discussed the step with a licensed plant operator. The operator stated that he did not have a problem with the procedure step but that he wanted the technician to check with the System Engineer who was supervising modification work on the system. He did not give the technician permission to manipulate the switches. However, the technician believed that he had been

. given permission to place all three trains of ESEAS in test once he had checked with the System Engineer. At approximately 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> he manipulated I

the switches to place Trains A and B in test. Train C was already in test to j support another activity.

CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of this event was an inadequate procedure. The ESPAS system

! normalization procedure did not properly identify the prerequisite requircraent l that core alterations could not be performed coincident with the procedure.

The procedure also did not positively control the manipulation and restoration of the test switches. Plant procedures which govern procedure development require that procedures be reviewed against Technical Specification requirements during initial writing and during biennial reviews. No other Technical Specification violations have been identified which could be attributed to inadequate specification of prerequisite requirements.

l A contributing factor was a miscommunication between the maintenance technician and the licensed plant operator.

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010 0l3 0F 0 l3 ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Performance of core alterations with automatic actuation of containment ,

ventilation disabled is a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.2 which I reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). During this event, automatic containment ventilation isolation was disabled for approximately 35 minutes; l however, no incidents occurred which would have required it to operate. Had a refueling accident occurred, plant procedures would have required the control room operators to stop containment purge and supply thereby terminating any release.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The following corrective actions are being taken as a result of this event:

1. The procedure for normalization of inputs to ESFAS will be modified to identify its affect on containment ventilation isolation and to specify tha+; it canno;; be performed during core alterations. Steps ,

will also be added to positively control manipulation of the ESFAS I test switches. This action will be completed by July 15, 1990.

2. A training bulletin will be issued to operations and maintenance l personnel describing this event and emphasizing the importance of I proper communications. This action will be completed by l June 15, 1990, i 1

3. A bulletin will be issued to personnel responsible for preparation of plant procedures describing this event and emphasizing the need '

to ensure that procedure prerequisite requirements are correct.

This action will be completed by July 15, 1990.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

There have been no previous events reported regarding disabling of an Engineered Safety Feature by a maintenance technician due to an inadequate procedure.

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