ML19338E447

LER 80-010/03L-0:on 800827,during Normal Operation,After Redundant Containment Spray Pump Recirculation Phase Suction Valve Maint,Operability Test Was Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Failure to Fully Comprehend Maint Procedures

ML19338E447
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/18/1980
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19338E444	List: ML19338E443 ML19338E447
References
LER-80-010-03L, LER-80-10-3L, NUDOCS 8010020482
Download: ML19338E447 (3)

Text

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(% NRC FLRM 366 ,, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

>V(7 77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT y

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIKED INFORMATION)

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7 8 60 61 DOCK ET NUM8ER 6d 69 EVENT OATE 14 75 REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h lo l2l l During normal operation personnel cleaned stems and adjusted packings l l o 13 l 1 on redundant containment spray pump recirculation phase suction valves. I i o i ; l As these are redundant valves , operability testing should have been donq 10 i s l i following adjustment of one v51ve prior to adjusting the other. Both l 101811 valves operated properly following maintenance. No significant l 1

l O ; q l occurrence took place. All fan coolers were available. l 10181 I l SCoE C0OE SU8 CODE COMPONENT CODE SI.,8 C DE SU E g l S l 10B l@ W@ l Cl@ lV l A lL lV lE lX l@ l 9E l@ [20Aj @

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_ SEQUENTI-L OCCU A R E NCE REPORT REVIS80N L EVENTYEAR REPOR T NO. COOE TYPE NO.

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l i j o l l Personnel error. A lack of communication develooed between Maintenance i m iforeman and workers; workers did not clearly understand testino of one l

,,i2, [ valve had to be done be fore working on the other. The eersonnel I g l involved have been counseled on the importance of clear, meanincful I i,i,iicommunications. l 7 8 9 80 STA $  % POWER OTHER STATUS C15 0 RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION FT'TT]

l E l@ ' l 0 l 8 l 0' l@l N/A j l A l@l Supervisory review of facility I

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• 5 Pe rat. tons 80 Activity ColTENT RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE l1 l 6 l [_Z_j @D OF RELEASE l Z l@l N/A l lN/A l 7 8 9 to 13 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUM8ER TYPE DESCRIPTION l 1 l 7 l l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l Z l@l N/A i l

PERSONN E L INJURt ES NUM8ER DESCRIPTION 11 la8 l9 l 0 l 0 l0 l@l12N/A l 7 11 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 7

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g ISSUElN/A @ DESCRIPTION l llllllllllll12 7 8 9 10 68 69 80 *.

NAME OF PREPARER C' N' IOY PHONE:- 011 8010 020 %E

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 80-010/0lL-0 Wisconsin Electr!c Power Company Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Docket No. 50-266 On August 27, 1980, at 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, it was deter-mined that maintenance had been performed on two redundant valves consecutively without first performing appropriate operability testing. Failure to do the testing occurred because of a misunderstanding on the part of Maintenance personnel. This event is an observed inadequacy in admini-strative controls which threatened to reduce the degree of redtndancy of the engineered safety feature system and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.B.3.

Containment spray pumps 1P14A&B are provided a suction path from the containment sump (via the residual heat removal pump) through motor-operated valves 871A&B, respectively; this providing a source of water (for contain-ment spray if required) during the recirculation phase of an accident.

Both 871A&B valves were identified as having minor packing leaks. A maintenance request was geqarated for packing adjustment or replacement, whichever was needed to resolve the leakage problem.

At about 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> on August 27, IT-05, Inservice Testing of Spray Pumps and Eductor Supply Check Valves, was performed on Train "B" prior to the performance of any maintenance.

At approximately 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> on August 27, Maintenance personnel were instructed by Operations personnel to perform repairs on MOV-871A only and prior to undertaking repairs on MOV-871B, Operations was to have been notified, thus allowing the performance of IT-05 on Train "A".

Due to a communications problem among Maintenance personnel, both MOV-871A&B were maintained without Operations being notified and without IT-05 for Train "A" being performed.

Upon being notified maintenance was done on both valves, the appropriate portions of IT-120, Inservice Testing of Safety Injection, Residual Heat Removal, and Spray Valves, were immediately performed verifying the operability of both valves.

The recirculation phase of containment spray, if needed, is not initiated until the refueling water storage tank is empty, approximately 30 minutes following the start of an accident. Had an accident occurred, sufficient time during the emptying of the refueling water storage tank would .

have been available to ensure the operability of 871A&B.

In addition, Section 6.3 of the FFDSAR states four containment cooling units have sufficient heat removal capability to maintain post-accident containment pressure less than the design value assuming the core residual heat is released to the containment. All four cooling fans were available while valve raaintenance took place.

Because the maintenance performed was of a minor na ture , verbal communications were relied on. Had major maintenance been required, such as repacking, more stringent administrative controls would have been employed such us the

" red tag" procedure. The personnel involved have been counseled on the importance of clear, precise communication required during minor maintenance activities. Circulation of copies of this report among plant personnel will also help prevent similar incidents from occurring.

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