ML19332C841

LER 89-007-00:on 891027,Train a Safety Injection Signal Generated During Installation of Mod in Containment High Pressure Circuit.Caused by Inadequate Installation Procedure.Procedure changed.W/891122 Ltr

ML19332C841
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	11/22/1989
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-89-145 LER-89-007-01, LER-89-7-1, VPNPD-89-610, NUDOCS 8911290065
Download: ML19332C841 (4)

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' VPNPD-89-610 .10 CFR 50.73 1;. ' g-NRC-89 145 '

November.22, 1989 i.

, Document Control Desk .

, U.-S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION-

' Mail' Station P1-137 LWashington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

DOCKET 50-301' .

-LICENSEE EVENT-REPORT- 89-007-00 UNANTICIPATED SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL POINT ~ BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2  ;

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. Enclosed-is. Licensee Event Report 89-007-00 for Point Beach

! Nuclear. Plant, UnitL2. This-report is provided.in accordance

with 10 CFR

50.73(a)(2)(iv), "Any eventfor condition that

- resulted.in the manual or automatic actuation:of any Engineered -7

Safety. Feature!-inc)uding.the Reactor Protection System."

This report describes the generation ~of a. safety injection signal-during installation of a: modification in'the containment high pressure logic circuitry for Unit 2. Unit 2 was in-refueling shutdown with the core unloaded. Therefore, the Engineered Safety? Features had been placed in a condition which precluded safety injection pump operation;

.If additional information is needed,'please do not hesitate to

-contact us.

Very truly yours,

$U()tQ C.fW. Fay Vice President 1

Nuclear Power

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On October 27, 1989,.an A train safety injection (SI) signal was generated during installation of a modification in the containment high pressure 2-out-of-3 logic circuit for Unit 2. The unit was in refueling shutdown with the core unloaded. Therefore, the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) had been placed in a condition which precluded safety injection pump operation.

During the modification, the logic relays were deenergized, thus -

fulfilling the 2 out of 3 logic. This logic signal was blocked from

-the SI master relay by having the three associated logic test switches in the TEST position. The test switches were replaced as part of the modification. However, the new test switches were not placed in the TEST position after installation, resulting in the SI signal generation when DC power to the channel was restored.

All equipment performed as designed during this event.

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010 12 0F D mv ,r-.-, A wme s ammm EVENT DESCRIPTION On October 27, 1989, at 1346 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.12153e-4 months <br />, a safety injection (SI) signal was generated during-installation of a modification in the con-tainment high pressure 2-out-of-3 logic circuit. At the time, Unit 2

.was in a refueling shutdown with the core unloaded. Therefore,-the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) had been placed in a condition which precluded safety injection pump operation.

The NRC was notified at 1532 hours0.0177 days <br />0.426 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82926e-4 months <br />, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

The installation procedure for this modification required that the i matrix test switches be placed in the TEST position. The procedure '

required that DC power be removed from the circuit, and subsequently AC power be removed. . Removing AC power _deenergized the logic matrix relays, thus fulfilling the 2-out-of-3 logic for safety injection initiation. The test switches were then replaced with switches ,

having more contacts than the old switches. The new circuit-was

-wired to the matrix relays and test switches. After installation was complete on the.A train, DC power was restored to the-A train, and the safety injection signal occurred.

t L AF inspection of the circuit revealed that the new test switches I were turned to their normal position rather than_the TEST position, l resulting in the safety injection signal when DC power was restored.

i BACKGROUND  !

In accordance with the commitment made in LER 88-008 for Unit 1,

-we initiated a. modification because of a concern with a steam line break inside containment with a stuck open feedwater regulating valve. This modification will trip -the condensate pumps and the heater drain tank pumps-when containment pressure reached a HI i

setpoint with a maximum value of 6 psi.

l' The new circuit was being installed on the same logic relays and I test switches that provide the containment pressure HI signal to l

initiate safety injection. The test switches were being replaced with models having more contacts in order to accommodate the new circuit. The test switches are wired such that when placed in the TEST position, they prevent the output of the 2-out-of-3 logic relays from energizing the safety injection master relay. In the NORMAL position, if DC power is available and the logic matrix is I

fulfilled, the safety iny ction master relay is energized.

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'CAUSE- i The cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate '

' installation procedure in,that'it did not specifically instruct the.

installer to rotate the new test switches to the TEST position.

after installation.

GENERIC IMPLICATION .

No generic implications were identified.

REPORTABILITY This report is filed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), "An event or condition that resulted in manual.or automatic actuation of any

Engineered Safety: Feature, including the Reactor Protection System."

SAFETY ASSESSMENT -

At the time of the event, the core was unloaded.

The modification was under the control of an approved installatier procedure.

t-Operators analyzed the event promptly and responded appropriately.

The SI was reset in approximately 15 minutes.

All. systems required to operate responded as designed. The health p and safety of plant personnel and the general public were not L

compromised by this event.

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS-

The procedure was changed for the replacement of B train test switches to instruct the installer to rotate each test switch to the

! TEST position after installation. The remainder of the installation procedure was completed without problem.

SIMILAR OCCURRENCES l

No similar occurrences are known to have occurred at PBNP.

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