ML19320C591

Forwards IE Circular 80-14, Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water Sys & Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel. No Written Response Required

ML19320C591
Person / Time
Site:	07001220, 07001308, 07001309
Issue date:	06/24/1980
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Van Hoomissen J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 8007170422
Download: ML19320C591 (1)

Text

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CENTRAL FILES IJUN 2 4 G60 Docket No. 70-1308 Docket No. 70-1309 Docket No. 70-1220 General Electric Company ATTN:

Mr. J. E. Van Hoomissen Manager, Spent Fuel Services Operation 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14 is forwarded to you for information.

If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.

Sincerely, James G. Keppler Director

Enclosure:

IE Circular No. 80-14 cc w/ encl:

Mr. E. E. Voiland, Manager Morris Operation Mr. D. M. Dawson, Manager, Licensing and Transportation Central Files PDR Local PDR NSIC Mr. Dean Hansell, Office of Assistant Attorney General Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety RIII RIII

()L Davis /np LKe p er 6/24/80 80 0 717 O h22.

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I SSINS.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005050074 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

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June 24, 1980

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..x J IE Circular No. 80-14 RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.

On March 17, 1980, a licensee informed the NRC resident inspector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to be radioactively contaminated.

A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination.

After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the temporary DW line (still connected to the DW header) wa inadvertently left submerged in the fuel pool.

Since the DW header pressure at the point of supply was relatively ig.: (a DV booster pump had been secured), a siphoning action occurred, vesulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.

On March 17, 1980, while performing routine secondary system chemical analyses, thelicenseediscoveredthatthedemineralizedwatertapin_ghechemistrylab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).

It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemistry laboratory supply tap had been used to make five (5) pots of coffee.

The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three (23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were whole-body counted.

All involved individuals showed no intake greater than an equivalent 0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis performed by the licensee's radiation consultant, based on the maximum concentration of radioactivity found in the coffee, indicated that the resultant 50 year dose commitment to an individual drinking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.

Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area.

This DW supply tap was tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a similar event in the future.

It is recommended that you review your facilities use of demineralized water (DW) via temporary connections and give attention to the following:

1.

Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materials are not inadvertently introduced into your facility's DW system via the improper use of temporary connections.

A temporary cross connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adequate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prohibited.

IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 2.

In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be established to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.

3.

Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption should be prohibited.

The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.

4.

Examine potable and demineralized water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to. allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons could cause situations described above.

No written response to this Circular is required.

Your review of this matter to determine its applicability to your facility and any corrective and preven-tive actions taken or planned, as appropriate, will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

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IE Circular No. 80-14 Enclosure June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.

Issue 80-13 Grid f' rap Damaga in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Assemblics OLs and cps 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor May Fall Out of Place When OLs and cps Mounted Below Horizontal Axis 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor OL or CP 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualification OLs and cps of Equipment 80-09 Problems With Plant Intern 81 4/28/80 All holders of a power Communications Systems reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification 4/18/80 All General Electric Inconsistency - RPS Response BWR's holding a power Time reactor OL 80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a power Oil System reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Thcrapy Categories G and G1 Sources 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a power Lubricating Oil Addition and reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a power Devices on Safety-Related reactor OL or CP Equipment 60-03 Protection from Toxic Gas 3/6/80 All holders of a Hazards power reactor OL 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff 2/1/80 All holders of Reactor Work Hours OLs, including research and test reactors, and cps

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