ML19318A624

LER 80-048/03L-0:on 800520,one of Two Flow Paths from Refueling Chemical Addition Tank to RWST Was Isolated to Perform Maint on Leaking Drain Valve.Caused by Leak Through Valve Packing & Valve Seat Requiring Removal of Drain Valve

ML19318A624
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	06/18/1980
From:	Cartwright W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19318A621	List: ML19318A620 ML19318A624
References
LER-80-048-03L, LER-80-48-3L, NUDOCS 8006230509
Download: ML19318A624 (2)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LI CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1 (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/5/2/0/8/0/ (8) /0/6/1/8/8/0 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / In order to perform maintenance on a leaking drain valve, one of two flow paths /

/0/3/ / from the Refueling Chemical Addition Tank to the RWST was isolated. This is /

/0/4/ / contrary to T.S. 3.6.2.3 and is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. The /

/0/5/ / Train A flow path was isolated. Since the Train B flow path was operable, and /

/0/6/ / the Train A flow path was returned to operable status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the public /

/0/7/ / health and safety were not affected. /

/0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /S/B/ (11) /E/ (12) /B/ (13) /V/A/L/V/E/X/ (14) LE/ (15) /_P/ (16)

SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/0/ /-/ /0/4/8/ /\/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/B/ (18) /Z/ (19) /2/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) LY/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /V/0/8/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / A drain valve leak through the valve packing and by the valve seat required /

/1/1/ / removal of the drain valve for maintenance. The drain valve seat was lapped, /

/1/2/ / the packing adjusted, and the valve was reinstalled. No further corrective /

/1/3/ / actions are required. /

/1/4/ / /

FACILITY METHOD OF A R O M R STA M DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) DISCOVERY

/A/ (31) / OPERATOR OBSERVATION /

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

-/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) l

,/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS TYPE OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

DESCRIPTION 1

/1/9/ /Z/ (42)' / NA /  !

PUBLICITY. l ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8006230 GCp{ NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA \ ////./////////

NAME OF_ PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151 _

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.. ; i' Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Statica, Unit #1

Attachment:

Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-338 Report No. LER 80-048/03L-0 Description of Event A piping connection between the refuelirg water chemical addition tank and the refueling water storage tank allows sodium hydroxide solu-tion to flow, by gravity, from the refueling water chemical addition tank to the refueling water storage tank. The flow line splits into two branch lines down stream of the refueling chemical addition tank which recombine prior to-entering the refueling water storage tank. Each branch line is isolated by a motor operated valve which opens after a 5 minute time delay following a quench spray pump start or a containment depressurization signal. One valve receives a Train A signal and the other receives a Train B signal for complete redundancy. On May 20, 1980, during 100% pcwer operation, the Train A motor operated valve, MOV-QS-102A, was electrically isolated while in the closed position and a manual isolation valve,1-QS-34, on the same branch line was closed in order to remove a leaking drain valve for maintenance. This action degraded the reliability of the refueling water chemical addition system and is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence Since the Train B flow path was operable, and the Train A flow path was returned to operable status in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

A drain valve leak through the valve packing and by the valve seat required removal of the drain valve for maintenance. In order to remove the valve the Train A flow path had to be isolated.

Immediate Corrective Action The drain valve was removed, the valve seat lapped and the packing adjusted. 'The valve was reinstalled and the normal Train A flow path restored to operable status. .The Train A flow path was inoperable for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Scheduled Corrective Action No scheduled corrective actions are required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence No actions to prevent recurrence are required.

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