ML19208D349

Forwards RA Gasser 790522 Ltr,Pr Davis 770629 Ltr to RA Gasser & Asbury Park Press 790511 Article Re Adequacy of Safety Sys at Facility

ML19208D349
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/29/1979
From:	Hughes W HOUSE OF REP.
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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ML19208D346	List: ML19208D349
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NUDOCS 7909280278
Download: ML19208D349 (6)

Text

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. WILLIAM J. hdGHE5 aw%%,

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May 29, 1979 [

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Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman I-Nuclear Regulatory Commission F Washington, D. C. 20555 ..

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

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I have recently been contacted by one of my ccustituents, a Freeholder in Ocean County, New Jersey, with respect to the adequacy of safety systems at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating ..

Station. - _

I am enclosing, for your use and information, p.

a copy of the correspondence I received. I would '

very much appreciate your looking into the =atters raised in Mr. Gasser's letter, and providing me with ,'.

~

any thoughts or observations you might have on this .,__

E matter. .. .

With kind personal regards.

Since y, illiam Hu ' es ~"-~~

Member of Congress WJH:ecs h. .. ..

Enclosure . . - . .

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THE BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS Ocean County Toms River, New Jersey Robert A. Gasser 08753 244 2121 Freeho! ' Eat.420

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AIay 22,1979 Congressman William J. Hughes Cannon House Office Building #327 Washngton, D. C. 2051v

Dear Congressman Hughes:

This letter will confirm our conversation of Friday concerning the failure o'f JCP&L Co. to install a safety device, namely a recircula-ting pump trip, required of it by the N. R. C. The entire episode began approximately two years ago when then Assemblyman Peter Shapiro

" leaked" the results of a study being done for the D. E. P. by a Mr. P. R.

Ihvis who ' stated in his advance re-findings that the possibility of an accident at Oyster Creek was 100 to 1. Not particularly encouraged by the poor odds, I took it upon myself to write to Mr. Davis and ask him for his findings and conclusions. After much effort, I finally received a letter from Air. Davis which stated that the odds were actually 1,000 to L based upon the installatioa at the plant of the recirculating pump trip.

I naively assumed that that would be installed under the supervision of the N. F.. C. or by the D. E. P. for whom the study was made. Shortly after the 3-11ile accident, I read a report in the newspaper by Dr. Glen Paulson of the D.E. P. in which he stated that he was satisfied with the safety of Oyster Creek in reliance upon a study made by the D.E.P. of its safety. I was disturbed by that statement and wrote to air. Paulson citing to him the findings of Alr. Davis and questioned the installation of the recirculation pump trip. To date I have not received a reply from air.

Pauison although I have followed up that letter in the last week or two.

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Congressman William J. Hughes Page 2 May 22,1979 Within the month. Oyster Creek has been shut down with a severe problem in its cooling devise. In speaking with a reporter from the Asbury Park Press who covered that well-publicized event in the Asbury Park Press dated May 11. 1979, it was determined that the recirculating pump trip had not, in fact, been installed nor had the procedures ordered by the N.R.C. and agreed to in the Spring of 1978 by G. P. U. been implemented and put into effect.

I attach to this letter my notes to substantiate this event and would hope that you would seek, on behalf of my constituents, an answer from the N. R. C.of why they did not see fit to require and insure that G. P.U. would, in fact, actually installthis device so that the odds could be 1,000 to I instead of 100 to 1.

Your continued help in this regard is greatly appreciated by me, 8,erely, I'* Y c.'

ROBERT A. GASSER RAG:rdv 1034 7

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. .. 'l-P. R. Davis 1935 Sabin Driva Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 Robert A. Gasser, Freeholder Board of Chosen Freeholders Ocean County Toms River, New Jersey 08753 Dear Mr. Gasser This is in response to your letter to me dated May 17, 1977 in which you ask a number of questions related to the safety of nuclear power, specifically regarding my accident analycis of the Oyster Creek 31 ant. I appreciate your interest in this matter. I hope I can clear up

_ome of the confusion that undoubtedly exis relative to my Oyster Creek analysis.

My rough first draf t report, which was unfortunately " leaked" to the public by Assemblyman Shapiro, did contain a preliminary conclusion stating that the odds of a s cre meltdown accident in the Oyster Creek reactor,were 100 to 1 over its remaining 30 year operating life. This first draft was given a very restricted distribution for technical review and comment to knowledgeable people in the nuclear field (not all of whom were associated with the pro-nuclear establishment). The purpose of this distribution was to obtain input from appropriate individuals and organizations relative t2 the validity of the analysis. Due to the limited' time I had available to' do the study and the limited resources which could be supplied by the state, Dr. Glenn Paulsen (the Assistant Commissioner for Science in the New Jersey Department of Environmental Prctection) and I agreed that. such a pee. review would be mandatory to help assure that all relevant and definitive technical information had

':een included in the study. We do not knew how Mr. Shapiro obtained a copy of the report, given the extremely limited circulation of the first draft.

Folicwing my completion of the first draf t, two sets of information were obtained which subsequently led me to conclude that the odds of a core melt accident in Oyster Creek were icwer than those quoted in the first draf t. First, it was pointed out by GPU Corporation (the company

.. which controls Jersey Central Power and Light, the owner / operator of Oyster Creek) that I had neglected to account for the fact that the Oyster Creek plant contains certain pressure relief capability substantially greater than that included in the Peach Bottom reactor used as the basis for boiling water reactor risks in the Rasmussen Study (WASH-1400).

Since I had used the WASH-1400 results as the basis for the Oyster Creek accident probabilities (with modifications which I believed appropriate),

my result, according to GPU, was not valid. I have since verified that indeed the Oyster Creek plant does have substantially greater, pressure relief capacity than the WASH-1400 analysis assumed.

greater pressure relief capacity would act as an effective FurthermoYe N hTI B , g p {-

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feature, reducing the probability of a core melt accident. Sc ., p

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~ Mr. Robert A. Gasser June 27, 1977 Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a letter to GPU requiring than an automatic recirculating pump switch be installed on the Oyster Creek plant. This feature, which was included in the Peach Bottom reactor analy7ed in WASH-1400, would also effectively reduce the core melt probability in Oyster Creek after its installation. It is my understanding that GPU has cormitted to install this device next spring.

The net result of these two considerations was to reduce the core melt probability in Oyster Creek to a value of about 1 in 30,000 per year, which is the conclusion in the final draft of my report. (This would ue equivalent tn a core melt probability of about 1 in 1,000 over the remaining 30 year life of the plant if,the annual probability remains constant.) These two changes, plus other less significant ones, are fully explained in the final draft of my report, which I believe you have previously received directly from Dr. Paulson.

I agree completely with your belief th'at the state should provide surveillance activities for nuclear plants within its borders. The NRC does a reasonable job in this area, but they are spread quite thin. I have believed for some years that nuclear power can be made safe only if continuous, competent, and objective surveillance is supplied for all aspects of the industry. Some of this is underway at present, but more can and should be done. Recent proposed intentions by NRC to upgrade and intensify their nuclear power plant surveillance activities are gratifying in this regard, but I believe the states should augment and supplement some of these activities. -

Regarding the article you enclosed dealing with alleged shortcomings of the Rasmussen Study, I cannot make a substantive evaluation since the allegations are very general and not supported with specific technical detail. I can assure that the study has been carefully scrutinized by over 100 groups and individuals throughout the country. I myself directed a very extensive review of the Study for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and although we found many errors and emissions, we could find very few deficiencies which would tend to'significantly alter the final result. (Some of these deficiencies would tend to lower the risks . ) It is easy to find problems and questionable analyses in the Study, but these shortcomings must be shown to be quantitativel, significant before the end results can be claimed invalid.

If you have further questions on the report, or on information contained in this letter, do not hesitate to contact me.

. Sincerely, W O c< L P. R. Davis -

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. , . .u a a e c ri. Mity 11,1970**

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1 M { k '* Prea $taff Wnter sfrJtTMnett TsNes to two of raer fine Dut !! 13 designed to power on y ?ne emer:e-rec:ren!atam pumps beten usq cm eco* ey em emW systen manca was w densers. . acuvated by the operstoes. /

cf t!.cLQ;Yos,:crTOWil?Cret nuclest- Onertting rbat indacate records ar p.ishale.

'd the NTX'. workmg on an ea- One nue! car s.afety expert $6 eses e -

t?.3t the n :ml s.5tdown on *.:ay sad t!!e y Gif*erent protdern, dectded to raqua:v (hster Crect mesent is a gW cram!c .

r.v.;ur; d on in de bel of reac'er coolio.t tants taie Oystee Creelt to inenrporate as the meannesses ar.herent in the re!atic~*

2:er - may hase been ac -avstcJ by a.rtomatic feature known as a "reciren!ati:n twae t the nue! car po cr me.stry and ?"

puttto st*p

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4 W J .c;i=3 :n mame the piar.t ufer, May *e ****9a?. !te Witcr btj in* ne ic  !::re, part of the automatse m.fe+y Rahrrt Ivi!.arif. * %o cugned frem t! .

eLacuitry, wou4 turn c,t! powcr to the Dve N':cl*2r 1(c::W.uory Acency us!! . .t

• a:le the renetar vessel, necessary to cJol the ' purops in certain rituations.

.i.cle:r core cet"t ~ ~ -

- **-ks far the Um of Csemed emtu aster t:te f!ssiaa Decause the pum;s were not to neep ra:> Met e: 1.4 "~his e s pt 2N.A'r ex2ma r e a c "t tas beca nac. sht.tting their valves hecar.e unneces. of me aistervice beseg ocn ...a puo'ic ra tt,

. sary. JC1s1. never changed its procedsrs, N"AC ard the (auc; ear) ind.st y by centira.

sbi.t devt. d.mpped c.CO.,y313 l r e fts re ::113 'o , hawawr. aHi asr.;ttng the rubtae :r t - - pw -

li feet (3 bettvee3 vThus, when the reactor taut down May 2, p. ants a-e see because at tne mult pie uve-ene and two fed. oprTatars ebned the v31Ves. but, for us- of Iafety 5Diete.S.

W .g to restfrf:ory Macsd:y_ at as bion reastms, they shut not two. but four valns. . accanse L.acy a!!ow the piants to F-

.m2 *nce'M ut t'.'at'ain.70ft. punt oer-stars sete S cning a procedure written by S;ne the ff.h silve already had tees a'e s . - 4 safety sys: ems out of servic '

CNI die's prever.ted a pro 5iem 2st bs s' tut to a'!aw n

s!.atenance en that aurrp. tlus mthey ets:r,w re desp recedan.y.

3 tricadent ist- 0"te- N' p'a :ca "te piant smee it s .,s bust.  ; eft no nsy u ty for ce aater fre.n 'tu com

• Lt reevnt char.ces Itt tre purfs auto

~ decsers 'o get bactt into me enra. P w',;at an. . m W bee" "a ' .1 fk

• e ma:1c r. fety equt; ment may have inade cc" Only fne small (twunen o'amater) m 4 mnt mes at A , an nrwWu stsolete. vaWs &Ilowed witte to flew trito de corn, pm p as M m a e p

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&uuse the e;e=1fers fr.' lowed the otuieN Since steam was sn3 f!ouing from the top of 1."e -3:cd.;te eng*r. cars paesent at the the *eartor veasel, the water level a00arent. D

' "I '" N mecuni : peculated the over level in the ly drytvad until it reached eqt:ibbrtum. *mese sM be ccr .dered earsm;s."

rever Jr- ;v4 ;curr man it tLas in the 10- the fuel rg semewnere betweca oue and two feet aanve Pc-d ws wm eth m PAets shcid N dasicaed ta hante s.txt::ns .,.ae year ha'- y of e p* set. -

'"a-' # : Me's s'.sJ A e-e mts'ed by in-

. ILid the e'us Nes unenvered. he >me*tse that cf Ly 12;tomat.ca.!y.

cc: s 4 vc't ;'tve fPc"I a distor*cd ee's heat genc*atad by de raGsc3chve Mc3y "The opers: Ors sMud % sd had 2'

. f :r.e s :c.:wt inside 2e reactor.

• hey gom; on m.skte them could have esused them "lonitor the gc.; ment !cr the .rst -

.rcJ ea a ::-n *tch marned them of the to spint. rescasm; radioactive partaces and T. mutes or so," he suces:ed. ""up;s h3p-rnri dr.p. bMeeng the sarer ;evel us gases into the etwng e ater. pen too quickly for h.m:ns w ev

r.t .-:.1 seme M mmutes r.fter te of*;t* At about 2.M degees, the metal of the Perard reraded a !ctter sent 'o 2e L

• Pal f t: 9. fods would beg n to re.et chem:caJy with Atomic Energy Cammnen in %6 ty -

1 c.'.*ir to  : the t'teery advanced the water and steam croemd ' hem, reicating ttu:hty (on'rol vacubst 4ho w.s :tsc:r; hydregen, muen nke happened at the D.rce

w. :nc trcubie actuaJy started hacic The m.an erote. "! abou!d it.nx *sen P-otas-i.i ?: M.le IMand accent in March, -

d.m m : 1 ferrcJ sht:t.bm11 or ser Lwra.wn it5 mathrc of a remrase-siM n:~a " :n Se;tamber of :hst yt'ar. opera' Experts enently agee : hat no hy,.'.rt> reactnr *.-fny st t) *ul realize that J 102 mu. *: tr.c p:aat's two .soution ecn. gen bubble tout.1 have to- ref, howeve . due have 2 number of 'icir. misses suh 4 arn

. . .s 9 c-ol dm. tne reic'er. to the dt!!c ence bemen Three !.1Je 1.s. numner cf -eac ors cwrating. **en :.ca :)

"fe too large radiator.t;ke devices land's pre *sururd safer *cartar and Cyuer ti a Iarce number, sooner nr later, you sd

. v'i %1 --6 0 r;bes af 37ter, and are de. Creek's bonmg miter rescior. get a hat."

' :: co 4 stam covg fra.3 the hot But the raittatran relewd frem the sp'it *he pLitit W1 not he adowed to *r%2r*a

~~ ef me cactor 2 :d turn it back into rods at the sery least wou;d have me eased epenuers i.nni :Ss acesend or ;arar. NT

%: '?. the radiatiert th.st,?.out the piar.t, necessi.

tatm; an egenw cicanu;). 't cou;J pcssiblY say,y e ,y.rts .cc retteslet me mce'.

Tha :r-r Cows bac!c demi mto the reac- and att kcap t*e p tSt sl tut dawn Tita Fy

. r. = x.J same af the ce:.densers' u3ter is have resutted in the idease af abncr'r.al are saumed wi h tne pewr cc te.."-

arvd eto s:e: t aad vented outside the amounts of rManon from the plart.

' ir t. Should the ro s thven e hot er:our % to oce.g me:sures mg.

to keep a samr:ar m den: frJe L.t t's op rators had no scener ac'ivat* melt. exper's bei;ese t'. y rouid siump in a One measure already t:tett by JCFC .

.=1  :*.e et.n fea. seas m ".e't they recetved as molten mass to the bottom of the resctor and at rm anfi s :i.ded a breajt n the pipes even mett thrtnr:n the bottom of the steet wasaccordm; to r!envers to ivtall plasue ant rr.anseer Domid Ron.

over ^.e -ecnu.

c.a.y *a 2e ee. denser. and cor.erete strue'ures surroundin; : hem.

ation pii p vse cont-et:; to forc= t*e

~.. M :*e at rm 240maticaJr shuts off causag s .aasor sccet,

,= ri-;ee:g.r, mey mere loret'd to outw;L the The meldest on my 2 was euce Wed valves. cpeastor to 'hinst talce* Mt can: g tre a :.. : :c e;re:::r by / resetung is each tme by the iacit of one qi tuJ au%i3ry power Afthot.gi it uas nct mt.da s'i:;r uhy the

-r.2 era ; ? f :7 so .rd-d. transformers. Decause one of the trusfo-*n- remor operstar elesed fnur viiws instead c.

d..- +t 3r.s!yts shewed that 3 flow ers mas out of mee at me time of the ace 1- tso, P.scs assumed sor e respt'tm.bj.ty. c .r*-

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• etr .rr-t n 1 of te cast ree'I~.d.2tson Jent, two (mtwate* pumps *tuch norma'jy

c. ~ -* :rA ?ts rese*or w1s csurtne the.-would have surpFed mater to the reactar

.w wnre,.u. patld n enung. "We t .:y h2se era h.m a0"313 t

c. r . -ii. n, e.fr,,e.m7 ware i t. vel rertw s r'-

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' aj ';*s an (h.** Ort! alaf"t ?#'ITES A thed ; vre which us d v'*c4 in r;n o k iep **? problem from repeating 13 on e!cetrie.ty sufT' c'J by te tranif0 t".** nit ~t !rvi :he fact $st tre sr sc r Mr :*a 9t.*  ;:n hst year. r.

t hach %ns wo k'e2. faded lee 3use o( 33 s3?ct Cd lesci inth*.aters "I !Pe et***at -ar"1

-nc.3, :pe sters were :c;J to tr:au Jy pun:o grebicm. a*e ic1?M Pt f *:e reafter Vc 4e! EaJ. :n 3n

- one emer;;ency tesci pcrater s:;ried. e rNec $cc arud L'e ere ca ' "

Enr;tus.

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'his mce is sepanted fmt de c"e t -

a e trutar Weiri. Normady. r;;h 3r ;ct.st y c f'cCtre'faWs hp Opedi. A 4 ?er :es el .s f f;e same in the enre 2.d in tre annu;us.

, 248 #U3 alI I Mr's close't. 'he aster n !

c3re ein 'a:t wir*.eul af!cch?C "e .a- Ns bel Dus orcnnrs use1 to LN cma; s.tc.:.on "Ltd N.M s1 d.dn Iow.t resMe $at 'Pc c'te xa et A* lent".e 904 .aw 'ow" 4.J a-=st % < -t V8 5:" lh** t*3C Ite *1?er di l,*e ye gag D4s f 3 2 #w*l fryr f"at e-? t. 5,sg .5.n 3 me f ael. ' *y rs Ssco to 3e..cre e. vm W *J 2n t*IcC!r**:2rl *o cVeX egt !"*

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