ML18022A968

LER 95-007-00:on 950901,inadvertent Start of Turbine Driven AFW Pump/Unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Inadequate Test Procedures.Revised Appropriate procedures.W/950928 Ltr

ML18022A968
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/28/1995
From:	Donahue J, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-950704, LER-95-007-01, LER-95-7-1, NUDOCS 9510050206
Download: ML18022A968 (6)

Text

~ PRIORITY le (ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9510050206 DOC.DATE: 95/09/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 P AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power & Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-007-00:on 950901,inadvertant start of turbine driven AFW pump/unplanned ESF actuation occurred due to inadequate test procedures. Revised appropriate procedures.W/950928 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 E013pSRB- 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD8 (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27

Carolina Power 8 Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 2 8 1995 Letter Number: HO-950704 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 95-007-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns an inadvertant Auxiliary Feedwater Pump start which constitutes an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation. The report also includes an additional surveillance test deficiency that was identified during the investigation.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue General Manager Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

Mr. S. A. Elrod (NRC - SHNPP) 951005020b 950928 PDR ADOCK 05000400 PDR S

State Road 1134 New Hill NC gyp'

NRC FORH 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 4/30/98 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY.

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) FORWARD CQSENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQSISSION. WASHINGTON.

OC 20555-0001. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DXKET NUHBER (2) PAGE (3)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant-Unit ¹1 1 of3 TITLE (4) Inadvertant start of the Turbine Driven AFW pump/unplanned ESF actuation and identification of an additional related test deficienc .

EVENT DATE 5 LER NUHBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (B SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAHE DOCKET NU%ER HONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NU%ER NU%ER MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 09 01 95 95 -- 007 00 09 28 95 FACILITY NAHE DOCKET NU%ER 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBHIlTED PURSUANT TO THE RE IREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or mor e) (11)

HOOE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract and in Text.

below 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAHE TELEPHONE NU%ER (Include Area Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER CAUSE 5YSTEH COHPONENT HANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED HDNTH DAY YEAR YES HIS SION

( If yes. complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).

SUB DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. i.e.. approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 1, 1995, during the performance of surveillance testing on the 1A-SA 6.9kV Safety Bus, a signal was generated that caused the steam supply valve (1MS-70) for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump to stroke open. This caused the TDAFW Pump to inadvertantly start and provide AFW flow to the Steam Generators, prior to being secured by Operations personnel in the main control room. This test procedure had been performed on previous occasions during plant shutdown periods, but during these shutdown periods steam was not available in the steam generators. This condition constitutes an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. The cause of this event was inadequate test procedures. Corrective actions will include revising the appropriate procedures.

During the investigation of this event, on September 5, 1995, an additional TDAFW Pump test deficiency was identified related to the performance of the Trip Actuating Device Operational Test. This test is specified in Technical Specification Table 4.3-2 as a monthly requirement, but had only been adequately tested on an 18-month frequency. This condition was also caused by a procedural deficiency and corrective actions will include revisions to the applicable test procedures.

LER's94-001, 95-001 & 95-003 are similar reports that have been submitted.

NRC FORN 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORNTION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD CONENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINTE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NNAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSION.

WASHINGTON. OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRMECT (3150-0104) . OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹I 05000/400 NUMBER NUMBER 2OF3 95 TEXT (Ifnore space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On September 1, 1995, the plant was in Mode-1 at approximately 75 percent power. At approximately 1335, during the performance of the Under Voltage Calibration Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST-E0034) on the 1A-SA 6.9 KV Safety Bus, the steam supply valve (1MS-70) for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (TDAFW) Pump, unexpectedly opened, resulting in a start of the TDAFW Pump.

This condition constitutes an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation. The maintenance electricians had completed performing the calibrations on each of the 6.9kV bus 1A-SA undervoltage relays, 27-1-SA, 27-2-SA, and 27-3-SA in accordance with MST-E0034. Upon completion of the relay calibrations, the procedure required performance of an undervoltage relay logic test as the Post-Maintenance Test (PMT).

The PMT was accomplished by pressing a local test push-button on Cubicle 10 of 6.9 KV bus 1A-SA.

Actuation of this relay by the operator caused the 1A-SA bus undervoltage test lockout relay 86T and the bus undervoltage lockout relay 86UV to actuate. The 86T and its associated relays, as designed, block the signals from the 86UV and its associated relays, except for the 86UVX signal to 1MS-70. Since this signal is not blocked, the logic for opening valve 1MS-70 on a bus undervoltage was satisfied and it stroked open.

When the unit is in Modes 1-4, opening 1MS-70 valve will cause the TDAFW Pump to start due to the availability of steam in the steam generators. The procedure did not contain information on the operator prerequisite sheet or in the procedure body to indicate that the TDAFW pump would start when this procedure was performed.

During the investigation of the above described condition, which was performed by an Event Review Team, an additional TDAFW Pump testing deficiency was identified. The monthly Trip Actuating Device Operational Test (TADOT) requirements for the 6.9kV safety busses apply to both the Motor Driven AFW pumps and the TDAFW pump. Since the originating signal for the Motor Driven AFW pumps is the respective train's 86UV relay, the performance of OST-1124 (Emergency Bus Undervoltage TADOT) has satisfied the requirement for the Motor Driven AFW pumps, via visual observation that the relays have rolled. It was believed that this test also satisfied the Technical Specification requirement for the TDAFW pump. However, since the function of the 86UVX relay, which must actuate to complete the circuit for the TDAFW Pump, was not fully understood, the test procedures did not contain guidance to verify the 86UVX relay's actuation. Hence there has been no monthly testing to verify its actuation during the TADOT for the TDAFW Pump. Since there are no local indications that the 86UVX relay has rolled to its actuate position, the only way to verify operability is to check the output of the 86UVX relay contacts. This output is an open demand signal to 1MS-70 on the 1A-SA safety bus and 1MS-72 on the 1B-SB safety bus. Although this feature was tested during each refueling outage (by OST-1823 and OST-1824), the monthly requirement for the TDAFW pump was never realized.

CAUSE:

The cause of both events was procedural deficiency. In the case of the unplanned TDAFW Pump start, adequate guidance was not contained in the test procedure to ensure that personnel were made aware of the signal generated to open 1MS-70. For the TADOT condition, the requirement to verify the operability of the open signal the TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (1MS-70 8c72), was never realized and subsequently was not included in the test procedure.

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISS ION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/3i/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORMARD COUNTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSION.

WASHINGTON. DC 205SS-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON OC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQjENT IAL REVISION NEER NUHBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit //1 05000/400 3 OF 3 00 TEXT (If more space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 36Q) (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The unplanned TDAFW Pump start caused no adverse affects to safe plant operation, nor did it render any additional safety components inoperable. AFW flow to the Steam Generators was secured by Operations personnel in the control room.

Although the TADOT testing of OST-1124 did not properly verify the presence of an open signal to TDAFW Steam Supply Valves 1MS-70 & 72, or the actuation of these valves on a monthly basis, the feature was satisfactorily tested during each refueling outage by deenergizing the safety bus during the performance of Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Testing (OST-1823 & 1824).

PREVIOUS SIMILAR LERs:

LER's94-001, 95-001 and 95-003 are cases of recent similar Technical Specification surveillance testing deficiencies. As a result of these LER's a comprehensive review of the implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements will be completed. The heightened level of awareness resulting from the previous LER's contributed to the identification of the TDAFW Pump TADOT deficiency.

There have been no previous LER's submitted related to an unplanned AFW'pump start with a similar root cause.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. Procedure revisions will be made to OST-1124, MST-E0034 and MST-E0044 to correct the surveillance testing deficiencies.

2. A comprehensive review of the implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements will be completed.

EIIS INFORMATION:

S stem Name/Code:

Auxiliary Feedwater System - BA Com onent Code:

TDAFW Pump - P Relay - RLY