ML18016A600

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Forwards Response to NRC 971215 RAI Re Plant Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions. with Twelve Oversize Design Configuration Drawings
ML18016A600
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/28/1998
From: Scarola J
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18016A601 List:
References
GL-96-06, GL-96-6, HNP-98-097, HNP-98-97, TAC-M96818, NUDOCS 9810050081
Download: ML18016A600 (7)
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Text

CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDE)

ACCESSION NBR:9810050081 FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris DOC.DATE: 98/09/28 Nuclear Power NOTARXZED: NO Plant, Unit 1, Carolina DOCKET 05000400 I

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCAROLA,J. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Records Management Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forwards response to NRC 971215 RAI re plant response to GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions." With eleven oversize design configuration drawings.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A072D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL ( SIZE: I6 TITLE: GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equip Oprblty & ontain.Integ. during Design t

V NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPXES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL , ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/WETZEL,B. 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 FLANDERS,S 1 INTERN TER Ol 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DSSA S SB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1-EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 D

0 NOTE TO ALGi "RIDSM RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELF US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 9 ENCL 9

Carolina Power & Light Company James Scarola PO Box 165 Vice President New Hill NC 27562 Harris Nuclear Plant SERIAL: HNP-98-097 SEP 28 1998 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATION REGARDING GENERIC LETTER 96-06 RESPONSE (TAC NO. M96818)

Dear Sir or Madam:

By letter dated December 15, 1997, the NRC requested that Carolina Power 8c Light Company (CPkL) respond to a request for additional information regarding the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) response to Genetic Letter 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions." This letter requested that the information be provided within 30 days of the end of the next refueling outage. The next HNP refueling outage is currently scheduled to commence October 24, 1998.

A written response providing the requested information is enclosed. Questions regarding this matter may be referred to Mr. J. H. Eads at (919) 362-2646.

Sincerely, AEC/aec Enclosures (2) c: (w/o Enclosure 2)

Mr. J. B. Brady (NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HNP)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region Il)

(w/ Enclosure 2)

Mr. S. C. Flanders (NRR Project Manager, HNP) 9810050081 980928 PDR ADOCK 05000400 p PDR 5813 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC Tel 919 362-2502 Fax 919 362-2095

~

Enclosure 1 to SERIAL: HNP-98-097 Page 1 of 4 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATION REGARDING GENERIC LETTER 96-06 RESPONSE (TAC NO. M96818)

Re uested Information:

In your January 28, 1997 submittal, you identified six pipes penetrating the containment and susceptible to thermally induced pressurization which would not overpressurize based on an evaluation of the containment valves. You also identified two additional pipe lines, associated with penetration M-74 and M-91, for which evaluation would be performed later. For all of these lines, tinal engineeiing analysis would be provided by the end of the next refueling outage. For these eight pipe lines please provide:

1. Summai~es of your evaluations desciibing the methods of analysis, assumptions used in the analysis, and results of the analysis.
2. Fabi~cation drawings of the piping sections evaluated.
3. Discuss how the ci~teiia used for the evaluations meet the licensing basis criteiia for the Shearon Harris facility.
4. Provide the completion schedule for any required modifications.

Containment penetrations M-42, M-74, M-76B, M-78B, M-78C, M-78D and M-88 would not oveiyressuiize based on evaluations of the containment valve configurations and review of allowable stresses associated with these penetrations. Penetration M-91 required a modification to prevent the possibility for overpressurization. Summaries of the evaluations for each of the penetrations are provided below. For each of these penetrations, the maximum component temperature used in the evaluations for both Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) scenaiios is 260 'F. The containment isolation valves are assumed to be leak tight unless otherwise noted. This is conservative with respect to overpressui~zation since leakage would tend to relieve pressure in the penetrations. The temperature increase in the containment and Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) is used to establish the final temperature and pressure in each of the penetrations being reviewed. The pressure in the penetration is then used to evaluate the stress in the penetration. The applied stress is compared to the faulted allowable stress to determine acceptability.

Penetration M-42 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pum Dischar e 3": This penetration has a spring-to-close diaphragm valve outside and a spi~ng-to-close globe valve inside that isolate the penetration. The normal flow path is from inside containment through the penetration. Pressure

~ Enclosure 1 to SERIAL: P-98-097 Page 2 of 4 increase in the penetration would tend to seat the globe valve. Calculations show the maximum acceptable pressure for the piping in this penetration to be 9220 psi. Based on input from the diaphragm vendor, the maximum design pressure for the diaphragm valve is 300 psig at 150 'F.

As pressure increases above this maximum design pressure, the valve would relieve by one of three relief mechanisms. In the first relief scenario, the diaphragm valve could open slightly as line pressure increases above that required to open the valve (403 psig), which is well below the pressure allowed for pipe stress. The containment isolation function of the penetration would not be degraded in this case since the leakage of the isolated fluid from the penetration does not create a leak path from inside containment to outside containment. The second relief possibility is leakage between the valve body and the diaphragm which forms the gasket between the valve body and the bonnet. Since the diaphragm is a soft mateiial compared to the valve and pipe, this is the most likely leak path. This leakage would not degrade the containment isolation function since the leakage of the isolated fluid from the penetration does not create a leak path from inside containment to the outside. The third relief mechanism would be a rupture of the valve diaphragm. A rupture would relieve the excess pressure into the valve bonnet. The bonnet provides a secondary pressure boundary which would contain the leak. Ruptuiing the diaphragm and leakage into the valve bonnet does not prevent the valve from performing its containment isolation function. Any of these three relief mechanisms would prevent the penetration from ovequessurizing while still maintaining the containment isolation function. Therefore, this penetration is considered acceptable.

Penetration M-74 Containment Sum Pum Dischar e 3": The potential for overpressurization of this penetration exists when the line is operating and the isolation valves get an isolation signal.

The initial line pressure is assumed to be the normal operating pressure of 45 psig. The isolation valves are assumed to be leak tight, and it is conservatively assumed that the heat transfer coefficient is equal on both sides of the penetration. The maximum pressure during the accident conditions has been calculated to be 5212 psig. Since this is above the design pressure rating of 60 psig for the piping, a stress analysis review was conducted. This review determined the resulting stresses are within the faulted allowable limits. Therefore, this penetration is considered acceptable.

Penetration M-76iB Accumulator to Refuelin Water Stora e Tank 3/4": The potential for overpressuiization of this penetration exists when the line is isolated (its normal configuration).

The initial line pressure is assumed to be 0 psig since it is used for testing and pressure is bled off the line after testing. The isolation valves are assumed to be leak tight, and it is conservatively assumed that the heat transfer coefficient is equal on both sides of the penetration. The maximum pressure during the accident conditions has been calculated to be 9890 psig. Since this is above the design pressure rating of 2485 psig for the piping, a stress analysis review was conducted.

This evaluation determined the resulting stresses are within the faulted allowable limits for the piping. Therefore, this penetration is considered acceptable.

Penetrations M-78B Pressui~zer Li uid Sam le 3/8" 8 Pressui~zer Steam Sam le 3/8":

Solenoid operated Target Rock globe valves isolate these penetrations. Normal flow is from inside containment through the penetrations with flow over the valve seats. Pressure under the

ft Enclosure 1 to SERIAL: P-98-097 Page 3 of 4 seatof the inside valve will tend to open it. The main disc will liftwhen the back pressure (under the seat) generates sufficient opening force to balance the sum of the closing forces. Using vendor data, the pressure to open the valve is calculated to be 2878 psig. The leak path would be out of the penetration into the piping in containment. The containment isolation function would not be degraded since the leakage of the isolated fluid from the penetrations does not create a leak path from inside containment to the outside. Since the pressure to open the valves is above the design pressure of 2485 psig for the piping, stress analyses reviews were conducted. These evaluations determined the resulting stresses are within the faulted allowable limits for the piping.

Therefore, these penetrations are considered acceptable.

Penetration M- 8D Accumulator Sam le 3/8": SolenoidoperatedTargetRockglobevalves isolate this penetration. Normal flow is from outside containment through the penetration with flow over the valve seats. Pressure under the seat of the inside valve will tend to open it. The main disc will liftwhen the back pressure (under the seat) generates sufficient opening force to balance the sum of the closing forces. Using vendor data, the pressure to open the valve is calculated to be 666.5 psig. The leak path would be out of the penetration into the piping in containment. The containment isolation function would not be degraded since the leakage of the isolated fluid from the penetration does not create a leak path from inside containment to the outside. Since the pressure to open the valve is less than the design pressure of 700 psig for the piping, no further review is required. Therefore, this penetration is considered acceptable.

Penetration M-88 Li uid Sam leReturn from Post-Accident am lin Skid 1": Solenoid operated Target Rock globe valves isolate this penetration. Normal flow is from outside containment through the penetration with flow over the valve seats. Pressure under the seat of the outside valve will tend to open it. The main disc will liftwhen the back pressure (under the seat) generates sufficient opening force to balance the sum of the closing forces. Using vendor data, the pressure to open the valve is calculated to be124 psig. The leak path would be out of the penetration away from containment. The containment isolation function would not be degraded since the leakage of the isolated fluid from the penetration does not create a leak path from inside containment to the outside. Since the pressure to open the valve is above the design pressure of 100 psig for the piping, a stress analysis review was conducted. This evaluation determined the resulting stresses are within the faulted allowable limits for the piping. Therefore, this penetration is considered acceptable.

Penetration M-91 Containment Fan Coil Service Water Outlet'2": The potential for overpressuiization of this penetration exists when the line is operating and the isolation valves get an isolation signal. The initial line pressure is assumed to be the normal operating pressure of 100 psig. The isolation valves are assumed to be leak tight, and it is conservatively assumed that the heat transfer coefficient is equal on both sides of the penetration. The maximum pressure duiing the accident conditions has been calculated to be 8996 psig. Since this penetration could overpressurize ifexposed to 8996 psig, a modification was required to prevent the possibility for overpressui~zation. The modification was implemented by adding a relief valve to the piping for the penetration. The relief valve set pressure is 300 psig, which is above the system design pressure of 225 psig. Since the relief valve set pressure is above the design pressure, a stress

Enclosure 1 to SERIAL: P-98-097

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Page4of4 analysis was conducted. This evaluation determined the resulting stresses are within the faulted allowable limits for the piping. Therefore, with the addition of the modification, this penetration is considered acceptable.

~Res once 2:

Enclosure 2 contains the design configuration drawings of the piping sections for the containment penetrations evaluated in Response 1. The drawings listed below are included in Enclosure 2.

Penetration Inside Containment Drawin Outside Containment Drawin M-42 CAR-2165-G-129, Rev. 11 CAR-2165-G-182, Rev. 10 M-74 CAR-2165-G-180 S01, Rev. 14 CAR-2165-G-181, Rev. 10 M-76B CAR-2165-G-154, Rev. 15 CAR-2165-G-152, Rev. 21 M-78B CAR-2166-G-551 S02, Rev. 0 CAR-2166-G-551 S01, Rev. 9 M-78C same as Penetration M-78B same as Penetration M-78B M-78D same as Penetration M-78B same as Penetration M-78B M-88 CAR-2165-G-180 S02, Rev. 11 CAR-2165-G-125 S01, Rev. 12 M-91 CAR-2165-G-095, Rev. 10 CAR-2165-G-099, Rev. 15 Res onse3:

The penetrations were analyzed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, 1974 Edition, Subsection NC-3652. Section 3.9 of the HNP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) states, "The design rules and associated design stress limits applied in the design of ASME Code Class 2 and 3 components are in accordance with the ASME Code,Section III, Subsections NC and ND, respectively." For those penetrations discussed in this report that could experience pressures greater than the respective design ratings, or where the pressure required to open the isolation valves is greater than the respective design ratings, stress analysis reviews were conducted. Ifthe resultant stresses were evaluated to be less than the ASME Code faulted allowables (for accident conditions), then the piping penetrations were dispositioned as acceptable. The loading conditions which are required to be analyzed are defined in Section 3.9 of the HNP FSAR.

Res onse4:

Only one modification was required for the eight containment penetrations described in this repoit. A relief valve was added to penetration M-91 in May 1997. That modification is discussed in Response 1. No fuither modifications are required.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO SERIAL: HNP-98-097 DESIGN CONFIGURATION DRAWINGS

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