ML18012A448

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LER 96-022-00:on 961122,wiring Discrepancy Was Found in Auxiliary Building Ventilation Sys Circuitry.Caused by Personnel Error.Training on This Event Will Also Be Performed for Appropriate maintenance.W/961220 Ltr
ML18012A448
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/23/1996
From: Donahue J, Verrilli M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-210, LER-96-022, LER-96-22, NUDOCS 9612270151
Download: ML18012A448 (6)


Text

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")ACCESSION NBR :9612270151 DOC.DATE: 96/12/23 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power & Light Co.

DONAHUEFJ.W. Carolina Power 6 Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-022-00:on 961122,wiring discrepancy was found in auxiliary building ventilation sys circuitry. Caused by personnel error. Training on this event will also be performed for appropriate maintenance.W/961220 ltr.

T DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR X ENCL i SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 G 0

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 Y

INTERNAL: ACRS I AEO~P~g+DRAB 2 2 I AEOD/SPD/RRAB 2 ~~ ILE CENTER 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB I eeeeNRR/DE/EEEB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 D RES/DET/EIB 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 0

EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCEFJ H 1 1  !

NOAC MURPHYFG ~ A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 C NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 E

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Carolina Power & light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-96-210 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-022-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a wiring discrepancy found in the Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation System.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 96i2270i5i 9hi223 PDR ADQCK 05000400 S PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk / HNP-96-210 Page 2 of 2 cc: Mr. R. T. Biggerstaff Ms. P. B. Brannan Mr. H. K. Chernoff (RNP)

Mr. B. H. Clark Mr. J. M. Collins Mr. G. W. Davis Ms. S. F. Flynn Mr. H. W. Habermeyer Mr. M. D. Hill Mr. W. J. Hindman Ms. C. W. Hobbs (HEEC)

Ms. W. C. Langston Mr. C. W. Martin (BNP)

Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. J. W. McKay Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)

Mr. W. R. Robinson Mr. G. A. Rolfson

=

Mr. R. F. Saunders Mr. R. S. Stancil Mr. C. N. Sweely Mr. M. A. Turkall Mr. J. P. Thompson (BNP)

Mr. T. D. Walt Mr. R. L. Warden (RNP)

HNP Real Time Training INPO Harris Licensing File Nuclear Records

NRC FORM 366 U.S. LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ROVED BY OMB No. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 500 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE IHCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO )NDUSTRT.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT4) F33L US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of WASHINGTON, DC 20555()00). AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.

0104L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.

digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF 3 TITLE (4)

Wiring discrepancy found in Reactor Auxiliary Buiding Ventilation System circuitry.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH OAY YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 22 96 96 022 0 12 23 96 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR B: (Check one o r more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2) (v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a) (3)(i) 50.73(a)(2) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

POWER 100'j LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a) (3) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a) (2) (ii) 20.2203(a) (4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) (iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract be low or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a) (2) (iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2) (vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPKONE NUMBER (IiC(vdc Arcs Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH OAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 22, 1996, with the plant operating in'Mode 1 at 100% power, a wiring lead was found incorrectly terminated in the Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation System. This lead was landed on the wrong relay terminal on August 27, 1996 during installation of a plant modification. The incorrect wiring configuration did not result in any plant transients, alarms or actuations, but did provide a parallel power supply source to two relays which are required to deenergize following a safety injection signal. With the lead landed in the wrong location, the parallel power source would become energized upon receipt of a certain main control room alarm. On November 12, 1996, this alarm occurred resulting in energizing the two relays. With these relays energized from the parallel power supply source, twenty-six A-train dampers that isolate the non-safety related portions of the RAB Ventilation system from the safety-related portion, would not have closed to perform their safety function following a safety injection signal. The relays remained energized until the wiring discrepancy was discovered and corrected on November 22, 1996. The corresponding B-train dampers were operable throughout this period and would have performed the safety related isolation function.

This event was caused by personnel error on the part of the maintenance technician that incorrectly terminated the wiring lead and the quality control technician that verified the work to be correct.

Immediate corrective actions included properly terminating the wiring lead and counseling the involved individuals.

Trainin on this event will also be erformed for a ro riate maintenance and ualit control, ersonnel.

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NRC fORM 366A, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUUITORY COMMISSION isas)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME II) DOCKET LER NUMBER IB) PAGE l3)

YEAR SEOUE TIAL REVISION NUMBER t

NUMBER Sheaion Harris Nuclear Plant ~

Unit //1 50400 2 OF 3 96 - 022 - 00 TEXT 0I moro spssais aqvvmr vso odkrinsl oopms o/ IYRC Pofm 36&9 ill)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On November 22, 1996, with the plant operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, a wiring lead from annunciator relay El(2/3151) was found incorrectly terminated in Auxiliary Relay Panel 2A-SA in the Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation System circuitry (EIIS Code:VF-RLY). This lead was incorrectly landed on terminal ¹2 of relay Gl(52X2/3177) instead of terminal ¹1 on August 27, 1996 during installation of a plant modification. The incorrect wiring configuration did not result in any plant transients, alarms, or actuation, but did allow a parallel power supply to the Gl and Jl(52X1/3177) relays. With the lead landed in the wrong location, the parallel power source would become energized upon receipt of a RAB Ventilation System alarm located in the main control room on the Auxiliary Equipment Panel (AEP-1).

This path remained deenergized during the time period that no alarm signal was present. However, on November 12, 1996, at approximately 1759 hours0.0204 days <br />0.489 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.692995e-4 months <br />, a clearance was placed on one of the twenty-seven A-train RAB Ventilation System dampers that isolate the non-safety related portions of the RAB Ventilation system from the safety-related portion following a safety injection signal. This caused the El annunciator relay to energize as expected, which providing a HVAC trouble alarm on AEP-1. This energized the parallel path to the G-1 and J-1 relays. With these two relays energized the other twenty-six A-train RAB dampers would not have closed to perform their safety function following a safety injection signal.

On November 22, 1996 the RAB normal exhaust fans were secured to allow un-related maintenance. Operations personnel observed that the A-train RAB isolation dampers did not shut as expected with all fans secured.

Investigation into this condition revealed the wiring discrepancy in ARP 2A-SA. At 1443 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.490615e-4 months <br />, the lead was landed correctly restoring the ability of the A-train RAB dampers to perform their safety function following a safety injection signal.

The period of time between November 12, 1996 (1759 hours0.0204 days <br />0.489 hours <br />0.00291 weeks <br />6.692995e-4 months <br />) and November 22, 1996 (1443 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.490615e-4 months <br />) when the lead was incorrectly landed and the relays were energized, exceeded the seven day allowed outage time for the RAB Emergency Exhaust System per Technical Specification 3.7.7.

CAUSE:

The cause of this event was personnel error on the part of the maintenance technician that incorrectly terminated the wiring lead in ARP 2A-SA and the quality control technician that verified the work to be correct. Proper self-checking techniques were not applied. Both individuals are experienced utility personnel and the work package that was being used provided adequate guidance.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The safety consequences associated with this event were minimal. The wiring discrepancy affected only the A-train RAB Ventilation System dampers. The B-train dampers were available to perform the safety function of isolating the non-safety related portion of the system from the safety-related portion.

This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B. as a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.7.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

There have been no previous similar personnel error events reported due to incorrectly landed leads which resulted in disabling a safety function and subsequent Technical Specification violation.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT BEPOBT (LEB)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME Il) BUCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE I3)

SEQUENTIAL BEY)SION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 0'1 50400 3 OF 3 96 - 022 - 00 TEXT Pl mors opssois roqvdod. vse odd'taml sopm of NRC &im 36@V )IT)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

The wiring discrepancy in ARP 2A-SA was discovered and corrected on November 22, 1996.

A review of other leads landed while installing the plant modification in August 1996 was performed during the event investigation. No other problems were identified.

3. The Maintenance and QC individuals involved were counseled following the event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. The involved individuals will provide training on this event to other appropriate Maintenance and QC personnel. This training will be completed by January 31, 1997.

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