ML18011B098

LER 95-013-00:on 951009,Tech Spec Violation Due to Not Performing off-site Verification.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Individuals counseled.W/960104 Ltr

ML18011B098
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/04/1996
From:	Donahue J, Hamby M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-003, HNP-96-3, LER-95-013-01, LER-95-13-1, NUDOCS 9601180365
Download: ML18011B098 (6)

Text

A.J. SUVK X J REGULRTOZ ZNFORMBTZON DZSTRZBUTZONOZSTEM (RZDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9601180365 DOC.DATE: 95/01/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HAMBYFM~ R Carolina Power & Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power 6 Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-013-00:on 951009,Tech Spec violation due to not performing off-site verification. Caused by cognitive personnel error.Idividuals counseled.W/950104 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 Q

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 ~ 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEOD SPD RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 'ILE 01 1 1 D EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCEFJ H 2 2 0 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 E

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Carolina Power R Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant

'Ct Box 165 New Hill NC 2T562 JAN -4 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-96-003 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 V

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns a failure to complete required action to verify off-site power within one hour when an Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable.

Sincerely, J. W. onahue General Manager Harris Plant Enclosure c: Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

Mr. D. J. Roberts (NRC - HNP) 9601180365 950i04 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR

l. SO>11 &gap State Road 1134 New Hill NC i((

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 CC: Ms. D. B. Alexander Mr. W. R. Campbell (BNP)

Mr. J. M. Collins Mr. J. P. Cowan Mr. G. Davis Ms. S. D. Floyd Mr. H. W. Habermeyer, Jr.

Ms. T. A. Head (GLS File)

Mr. G. D. Hicks (BNP)

Mr. M. D. Hill Mr. R. M. Krich (RNP)

Mr. C. W. Martin (BNP)

Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. J. P. McKone Mr. J. W. Moyer (RNP)

Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)

Mr. W. R. Robinson Mr. G. A. Rolfson Mr. C. T. Sawyer Mr. R. S. Stancil Mr. J. P. Thompson (BNP)

Mr. T. D. Walt HNP Real Time Training INPO Nuclear Records (Letter Number HO-960051)

NLS File: HI/A-2D (L. M. Randall)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4 95) EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORYINFORMATIO)

COLLECTION REGUEST: 50 0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INT THE i!CENSING PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROIN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATIONAND RECORDS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (T4) F33)

U.S. NUClEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO)L WASHINGTON, OC 20555()001. ANO TO TH (See reverse for required number of PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)504)104), OFF(CE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET WASHINGTOIL OC 20503.

digits/characters for each block)

FACILITYNAME (t) DOCKET NUMBER l2) PAOE (3)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹ 1 050000400 1 OF 3 TITLE (4)

Technica) Specification Violation due to not performing Off-Site Power Verification as required by action statement.

EVENT DATE 5 LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 FACILITY OOCKETNUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH OAY YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER NAME'ACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 09 95 95 013 00 01 04 96 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR  %: Check ono o r more 11 MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) x 50.73(a)(2)(l) 50.73(a)(2)(vill)

POWER 20.2203 e 1 20.2203 a 3 I 50.73 e 2 Ii 50,73a 2 x LEVEL (10) 0o/ 20.2203(a) (2) (I) 20.2203(a)(3)(ll) 50.73(a)(2)(lli) 73.71

'Av?.';:pl~)>;iv,"))')i(v.';j:):)>'.;,ejjpg5 20.2203 a 2 il 20.2203 a 4 50.73 a 2 iv OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) (III) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a) (2) (lv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Mickey R. Hamby, Manager - CAPIOEF (919) 362-2204 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 REPORTABI.E REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH OAY YEAR YES . SUBMISSION (If yes. Complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten linos) (16)

Train "A"of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System was declared inoperable and placed under clearance to allo maintenance on the "A"ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge check valve. The Senior Control Operator (SCO) was notifie that the ESW train was inoperable. The SCO incorrectly decided that declaring the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable was not required and therefore did not perform a verification of off-site power within one hour as required when an EDG is inoperable. Following identification of the missed action statement requirement by other Operations personnel, the surveillance was completed. The SCO's determination that off-site power did not require verification was based on informal discussions among Operations personnel. This was a cognitive, personnel error. The corrective action was to counsel the involved individual on the importance of completing required Technical Specification actions.

Operations personnel subsequently gathered data which they believed verified that off-site power was available as required within the one hour period. This information consisted of log readings taken after the ESW train was declared inoperable. The data confirmed that both Station Auxiliary Transformers were energized by off-site power and that the breaker alignment from the switchyard to the Emergency Buses must have been as required. Based on this information, this event was initially determined to be not reportable. Following additional reviews, it was determined that the available information did not verify that power was available from two off-site transmission lines as described in the Technical Specification Bases. An inadequate review of the Technical Specification requirements caused this inappropriate act, which was a cognitive, personnel error. The corrective action was to counsel the involved individual on the importance of complete verification of Technical Specification requirements.

This event is being reported per I OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a Technical Specification violation.

NRC FORM 366 (4.95)

U.S. NUC(EAR REGU(ATORY COMMISSIO NRCTORM366A (4.95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEB)

TEXT CONTINUATION EAC(i)TY NAME (1) DOCKET (ER NUMBER (6) PAGE(3)

SEO E EVIS ON YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shee(on Harris Nuclear Plant. Unit 41 05000400 2 OF 3 95 - 013 00 TEXT Plvrorespese.s required. vse eddr)droeisopiesollVRC &rm666AI (17)

V 0 ( T On October 9, 1995, the plant was in Mode 3. At 1257, the Work Control Center personnel declared train "A"of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System (EIIS:Bl) inoperable and placed the system under clearance to allow maintenance on the "A" ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge check valve. Work Control Center personnel notified the Senior Control Operator (SCO) in the Main Control Room that the clearance was hung and that train "A"of the ESW System was inoperable. The SCO incorrectly determined that declaring the associated Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG (EIIS:EK) inoperable was not required based on previous discussion among Operations personnel. The off-site power verification, which is required by Technical Specification 3.8.l.l.b. 1 to be done within one hour ifan EDG becomes inoperable, was not performed. The SCO made this decision without notifying the Shift Supervisor Nuclear or other Operations management. At 1411, personnel in the Work Control Center inquired about the completion status of the off-site power verification. Following discussions with the Shift Supervisor - Nuclear and the Manager - Operations, the determination was made that off-site power verification was required and the surveillance was completed at 1443.

Subsequently, on October 17, 1995, Operations personnel gathered data which they believed verified that off-site power was available on October 9, 1995 as required within the one hour period aAer the diesel was made inoperable. This information consisted of log readings taken within one hour after the diesel was made inoperable. The data confirmed that both Station AuxiliaryTransformers were energized by off-site power and that the breaker alignment to the emergency buses from the switchyard must have been correct to result in the log readings. The off-site supply lines to the switchyard were not considered at that time. Based on this information, this event was initially determined to be not reportable. At 1530 on December 7, 1995, it was determined that the information available within the one hour period following the EDG's inoperability did not verify that power was available from two off-site transmission lines, as the observed voltage and current readings could occur with a single incoming transmission line. Specifically, breaker position was not verified as required by action statement 4.8.1.1.1.a. At that time, the October 9, 1995 event was determined to be reportable, as the required surveillance was not completed within one hour. Subsequently, transmission personnel verified there were no clearances on any of Harris Nuclear Plant's seven incoming transmission lines and the seven transmission lines were in-service to the switchyard.

QEPSR:

The SCO's determination on October 9, 1995, that off-site power did not require verification, based on informal discussions among Operations personnel, resulted in the initial inappropriate act. This was a cognitive, personnel error.

An inadequate review of the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements, including the bases section, caused the subsequent'nappropriate act on October 17, 1995. This inappropriate act was also a cognitive, personnel error.

( ( N The safety significance for this event was minimal. Off-site power verification is required within one hour ifan EDG is inoperable. In this instance, off-site power was being provided to the plant Class 1E buses as was verified by operator log readings. Actual switchyard breaker positions were not verified within one hour as required, however, transmission personnel subsequently verified that the seven transmission lines to the Harris Nuclear Plant's switchyard were in-service.

The complete surveillance procedure was completed within one hour and forty-six minutes.

NRC FORM 366A (4.95)

.v HROFORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO (4 95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME n) COCKET LER NUMBER (6) PACE 0)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~

Unit N1 05000400 3 OF 3 95 - 013 - 00 TEXT rifmore spsoeisseevded. vse edoFtiboslsopies ol iVRC Pozm 3664) l)TI V

A review of the LER database was conducted for similar events. No similar events were found.

0 TV C T D:

1. On October 9, 1995, the involved Operations individual was counseled on the importance of completin required Technical Specification actions.

2. On December 7, 1995, the involved Regulatory Affairs individual was counseled on the importance o complete verification of Technical Specification requirements.

@II~D BI - Essential Service Water System EK - Emergency Onsite Power Supply System NRC FORM 366A (4 95)