ML18009A668

LER 90-018-00:on 900823,loss of Component Cooling Water Inventory Occurred.Caused by Lifted Reactor Coolant Drain Tank HX Valve Caused by Incorrect Relief Valve Setpoint. Inlet Isolation Valve Administratively closed.W/900924 Ltr

ML18009A668
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/24/1990
From:	Randy Patterson, Richey R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-900140-(), HO-900140-(0), LER-90-018, LER-90-18, NUDOCS 9010030064
Download: ML18009A668 (10)

Text

t ACCELERATED DI UTION DEMONSTPATION SYSTEM REGULATORZ INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION lQLTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9010030064 DOC.DATE: 90/09/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION PATTERSON,R. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RICHEY,R.B. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 90-018-00:on 900823,loss of CCW inventory due to lifted reactor coolant drain tank HX valve due to setpoint error.

W/9 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

i SIZE:

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BECKER,D 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2.

AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 '2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 -

1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D, 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/DST/SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 G &H'-E 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 FILE 01

~0'GN2 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGSG BRYCEFJ.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYSFG 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK.

ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33

Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P. 0. Box 165 New Hill, N. C. 27562 iaEP 2 4 3990 Letter Number.'HO-900140 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NOo 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 90-018"00 Gentlemen.'n accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG"1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, R. B. Richey Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAP:msb Enclosure cc.'r. R. A. Becker (NRR)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC RII)

Mr. J. E. Tedrow (NRC SHNPP) 9010030064 900924 PDR ADOCH, 05000400 S PNU 0."-

MEM/LER-90-018/1/OS1

NAC rORM 366 UJL NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)9) APPROVED OMB NOi 3)504)104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMAT D BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOADS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PB30), v.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMBER I2) PA E 3 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 4 P 0 1 OF P 5 Loss of CCW Inventory Due to L'ifted Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger Valve Caused by Incorrect Relief Valve Set Point EVENT DATE (5) L'ER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOI.VED (SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL ASVISrON MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBERIS)

~y< NUMSSR NUMBER N A 0 5 0 0 0 P 8 2 3 9 P 9 P P 1 8 0 P P 9 2 4 9 P 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE RLOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR lit /Choco one Or more of the /orrery'no/ Ill)

MODE (5) 20.402 (5) 20.405 I c) 50.73 le) 12) I ix) 73 71(li)

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Raymond Patterson AREA CODE Regulatory Compliance Technician 9 19 3 62 2 8 P5 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC. REPORTABLE MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TVRER TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS gg~KPg@xg

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED I'141 MONTH

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X NO ABSTRACT /Limit to /400 tpecer, i.e., epproximeteiy fifteen tinofe.rpece typewri tNn tinct/ IISI At 0357 on August 23, 1990, during the performance of the quarterly operability valve test for the Component Cooling Water System (CCW) isolation valves serving the Excess Letdown and Reactor Coolant Drain Tank hent exchangers inside containment, a relief valve lifted, The header pressure remained above the valvels reset point CCW inventory was lost at nn estimated 17 gpm rate with a total loss of 300 to 350 gallons relieved into the containment sump.

Operations personnel received a low CCW surge tank level alarm and Initiated makeup to the surge tank from the Demtneraltzed Water System to maintain normal tank levels The operators secured one of the two CCW pumps which reduced the pressure and allowed the relief valve to reset.

It was determined that the cause of the event was the lineup of two CCW pumps In service during testing with the containment header isolated on the discharge side, resulting In high pressure in the header, This system alignment could exist following nn accident with a single failure of the containment Isolation valve on the header Inlet (fails open) and has been identified as a safety concern.

This potential single failure would require operator action to terminate the loss of CCW inventory, A design revtew of the CCW system found only one safety valve subJect to lifting with both CCW pumps operating. The On-Site Nuclear Safety Untt is reviewing other plant support systems for similar design deficiencies.

The inlet isolation valve is administratively being matntained closed. A Plant Change Request hns been initiated to tncrense the design pressure rating of the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank heat exchanger.

NRC Form 366 (64)9)

NRC FORE(388A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAYCOMMISSION (849) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500')04 EXPIRES: 8/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ESTIMATH%TIADEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFOAMATION COLLECTION REOUEST) 50A) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BfIANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, OC 20555, ANO TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315041(HI, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL cP$ REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NVMSER NVMSEll UNIT 1 TEXT //!mac SPEce /8 feyvl)ef/ us8 aA/R/888/HRC Rem JSSAB/ (IT) 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 9'0 018 0 002 OF 0 5 EVENT DESCRIPTION On August 23, 1990, the plant was operating at full power. Operations personnel were performing Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Operability Quarterly Surveillance Test OST-1216. Pump performance testing is conducted by isolating one CCW train from the nonessential header while the second CCW pump provides cooling water to the nonessential header (see Figure ' ~ 1 The CCW pump is tested on its respective train and then realigned to the nonessential header. The operators completed testing on the "A" then the "B" CCW pumps, and then realigned the "B" CCW pump to the nonessential header.

Valve stroke testing was performed while both pumps were still in operation serving the nonessential header.

At 0357 operators stroked valve 1CC-202, Letdown and Reactor Coolant Drain Tank heat exchangers CCW outlet isolation (see Figure 2). Shortly after this, a computer alarm was received indicating low CCW surge tank level at 40X.

Makeup to the surge tank from the Demineralized Water System was initiated to maintain normal surge tank level. Corrective action was begun using procedure AOP"14, Decreasing CCW Surge Tank Level. The CCW pump discharge header pressure was at 140 psig with both pumps in operation. At 0415, operations secured the "B" CCW pump and the discharge header pressure decreased to 113 psig. Data from the containment sump levels showed that sump leakage increased at an abnormal rate during the event and had returned to normal after securing the "B" CCW pump. Calculations indicate that the leakage rate was approximately 17 gpm and that 300 to 350 gallons of CCW inventory was drained to the containment sump. It was concluded that the relief valve on the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) heat exchanger (1CC-186) in containment had lifted causing the loss of CCW inventory.

CAUSE:

The cause of this event was the lineup .of two CCW pumps in service to the nonessential header during this test. The system is normally flow balanced with one CCW pump running. The additional flow from the second pump increased system pressure and stroking shut the outlet isolation valve dead-headed the line causing system pressure to exceed the relief valve set point. The higher header pressure prevented the relief valve from resetting when the isolation valve was reopened. Securing the "B" CCW pump decreased the system pressure below the valve set'oint allowing the valve to close. The procedure used to perform this test did not address securing one of the two CCW pumps.

N AC FomI 388A (889)

NRC FOR)I) 355A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

)54)9) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 14 E XP I R ES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATQPKURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP.530), U.S. NUCLEAR

'OMMENTS REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13)504)1041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER l2) LER NUMBER IS) PAGE 13)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR P~~) SEOUENTIAL NUMBER PP REVISION

-'.r~ NUMBE4 UNIT 1 o s o o o 400 90 0'1 8 0 0 030F 0 5 TEXT /// @X'P444 iI nqawat, u44 eddiO'One NRC FOnn 3554'4/112)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The identified safety concern is the potential for this type of event to occur during a loss of offsite power or loss of coolant accident. Both CCW pumps receive a signal to start from the load sequencers under these conditions. A single failure of the containment isolation valve (1CC"176) on the CCW header inlet (valve remains open) would result in loss of CCW inventory. This would be a potential problem because makeup to the CCW surge tank relies on nonsafety r'elated equipment.

This potential single failure would cause a low level CCW surge tank alarm on the main control board and would require operator action to terminate the loss of CCW inventory.

Design review of the CCW system has determined the RCDT heat exchanger relief valve to be the only valve of concern because of its lower elevation in the plant relative to other relief valves in the CCW system.

On-Site Nuclear Safety Unit is evaluating other plant support systems for any similar component des2.gn problems.

This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (V) as an event which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems which mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There have been no previous similar events reported.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. Caution tags have been placed on the main control board as an administrative control to maintain the inlet isolation valve to the RCDT heat exchanger shut.

2. A Plant Change Request has been initiated to increase the design pressure rating of the RCDT heat exchanger which would allow increasing the relief valve set point.

3. Operation Feedback Report 0 2667 was initiated for the Operation Procedure Group to revise OST-1216. The revision will allow only one CCW pump to be inservice while performing valve testing.

4. Engineering has completed a design review of the CCW system and found no other pressure rating design deficiencies.

5. On-Site Nuclear Safety Unit will continue a review of other plant support systems for comparable problems.

EIIS CODE INFORMATION:

CLOSED/COMPONENT COOLING WATER CC NRC Form 358A (54)9)

ED CIETL I' SUAGE Lr TANK 6TO FAHK 075 LC. ,. FE 7000 LC.

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