ML17309A180

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Updates & Suppls 810415 Submittal Re SEP Topic II-1.C, Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Transportation,Industrial & Military Activities.
ML17309A180
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/20/1981
From: Maier J
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-02-01.C, TASK-2-1.C, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8108310479
Download: ML17309A180 (29)


Text

REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8108310479 DOC. DATE i 81/08/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKEiT ¹ FACILC50'44 Robert AUTH',NAME'UTHOR AFFILIATION Emma't Ginna Nuclear Planti Unit ii Rochester G 05000244 ivIA IERr J ~ E ~ Rochester Gas L Electric Corps RECIP ~ NAMEI RECIPIENT AFF ILiIATION CRUTCHFIELOPD, Operating, Reactors Branch 5

SUBJECT:

-. Updates 8 supp;ls 810415 submittal re SEP Topic II isC'P.

"Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Tr ansportationi Industrial S Military Activities,"

O'ISTRISOTION COOEi: ASSES SEP Topi cs COPIES RECEIVES:LiTR L ENCLi J SIZEi'ITLEi:

NOTES: 1 copy;SEP Sect; Ldr,, 05000244 RECIPIENT RECIPIENT COPIES ID- CODE/NAMEI LTTR ENCL" ID CODE/NAME LTTR~ ENCL<

ACTION!. ORB ¹5 BC'. 04 7 12'OPIES 7 INTERNALi: A/0: MATLLQUALi13 1 1 CONT SYS A 07 1 1 HYD/GEO, BR 10. 2' I 0 6ii 2 2' OR ASSESS BR 11= 1 1 EG F I 01 1 SEP BR 3 3 EXTERNALi, ACRS 14 16 16 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC" PDR<

02'TIS 1 NSIC, 05 1 1 1 1 gyp S 1981 89 TOTAL NUvIBER OF COPIES REQUIREDR LVTR ENCL 3

l

)

4 0

1

$ fj ll

"~P'r I' W II )p ~ f J 0 gr~q f' ~

~

'I Il p l II tl(4jft<g "4' f f

q, 1 r 1

~r ~ <g;, s p 4 ri iw I'I

'1 1

1* I 8'~ t 4 l '- e d

n ~

1 k j k C I

) 7 j'

t gzzzztl (g (zzz rm:"-

2" If k'-'" (

>~ IIIigrZ(~~ZZ I fil4/8 ZEiZIZ ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E. MA IER 'TEI.EPHONC V I CK PRES I OEIIT ARL'A CODE Tls 546-2700 August 20, 1981

o. liUQ 28 1981~ 3 Director of Nuclear, Reactor Regulation VISI NIICLEAg REGIII ggg)

Attention: Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief COMMJQJpg Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

SEP Topic II-1.C, "Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Transportation, Industrial, and Military Activities" R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Crutchfield:

This letter will serve to update and supplement our April 15, 1981 'submittal relative to this SEP topic. The following additional information should be added where noted:

After paragraph 5 of the "Description," the following paragraph should be added:

"The potential effect of the gas line service to the Ginna house heating boiler was discussed during the Ginna Fire Protection review. This 4-inch gas line comes into the plant underground until the east end of the screenhouse.

it penetrates the ground surface at This routing ensures separation from all other safety-related structures and systems. At this point, a metering station and a gas shutoff valve are lo'cated (the gas meter was relocated as a result of the Fire Protection review, item 3.1.13). The gas line is buried underground again after the gas meter regu-lator station, and enters the building through the basement wall under the house heating boiler area. The gas pipe is of welded steel construction up to the boiler. There is continuous ventilation of the areas that the gas line passes through within the building. The gas line service to the boiler and the boiler controls were reviewed and compared to NFPA-85, as requested in the staff's Fire Protection SER, dated February 14, 1979 (item 3.1.46). This installation was accepted by the NRC in Supplement No. 2 to the Fire Protection SER, issued on February 6, 1981. Based on the resolution of all gas line items during the Fire Protection review, it can be concluded that,no safety hazard results from the existence of the gas line on the plant site."

o~

PDR8310479 R ADOCK 810820-,h 0800024'4 )

PD~

S I

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC RP. SHEET NO.

August 20, 1981 Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief These above-referenced documents will be added as references to the" safety assessment for this SEP Topic II-l.C.

2. The following discussion should be added into the present first paragraph on page 4, following the phrase ". . . at least 23 miles or more from the plant "The possibility of damage to the service water intake structure was also considered. Section III-B.27 of RG&E's "Technical Supplement Accompanying Application for a Full-Term Operating License," August 1972 discusses the design of the intake system. As noted in this report, the intake system is completely submerged below the surface of the lake. A ten-foot reinforced concrete lined tunnel, driven through bedrock, extends 3100 feet northerly from the shoreline. The tunnel rises vertically and connects to a reinforced concrete inlet section. The occurrence of historical low water level will result in a depth of water of 30 feet at the inlet and with 15 feet of cover over the inlet structure. This is sufficient, to prevent damage from any boating which might pass in the vicinity of the structure.

Further, plugging of inlet water flow by a single large piece of material is prevented by the design of the in/et structure, in that water enters on a full 360'ircle.

Another design feature at Ginna to ensure continued avail-ability of essential service water is that service water intake can be directly drawn from the discharge canal, which is located on the plant site, protected from any potential lake- boating. Thus, lake navigation is not considered to be a hazard to the plant."

This referenced document will be added as a reference to the safety assessment for this SEP Topic II-1.C.

3. The following sentence should be added at the top of the present page 5, after the words ". . . and training space described above."

"There is also a slow-speed low altitude military training route (SR-826) which passes about 6 miles west of the plant."

An updated assessment of this SEP Topic, including all changes noted in this letter, is included as an Attachment.

Very truly yours, Attachment

Attachment:

SEP ~To ic II-l.C Potential Hazards Due To T~rans ortation, Institutional, Industrial and Militar Facilities, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant

~Pur ose The safety objective of this topic is to ensure that the Ginna Nuclear Plant is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to potential accidents which may occur as the result of activities at nearby industrial, institutional, transportation, and military facilities. The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance of SRP's 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 3.5.1.6, as well as Regulatory Guide 1.91, Rev. 1.

There is little industrial activity in the vicinity of the Ginna plant. Wayne County, where Ginna is located, is primarily a rural area. Typical industries for Wayne County are shown in Table 2.5-1 of the FSAR, reproduced here as Table 1. The nearest concentration of industrial activity is located in the town of Webster, about 6 miles from the site, and consists primarily of light manufacturing (Xerox copiers). No industrial development is expected to occur in the vicinity of the Ginna site.

The nearest transportation routes -to the plant: are Lake Road and u

U.S. Route 104, which pass about 1700 feet and 3 1/2 miles, respectively, from the plant at their closest point of approach.

s

0 E

g 1' II J t J

The guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1, was utilized to evaluate the consequences of postulated explosions on Lake Road. Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1, has been specifically identified by the NRC's Regulatory Requirements Review Committee as needing consideration for backfit on operating reactors. The highway separation distances at Ginna exceed the minimum distance criteria given in the Regulatory Guide and, therefore, provide reasonable assurance that transportation accidents resulting in explosions of truck-size shipments of hazardous materials will not have an adverse effect on the safe operation of the plant.

It is important to note that no hazardous cargo would be expected to be transported along Lake Road. This road is used primarily for local traffic, such as that relating to the apple processing plants.

No industry using large quantities of explosives is located along

'I this route. Any large quantities of hazardous material would be shipped via U.S. Route 104 which, at 3 1/2 miles from the plant site, is sufficiently distant not to be of concern.

Highway accidents on Lake Road involving certain hazardous chem-icals could theoretically exceed toxicity limits in the plant control room assuming an optimum set of spill parameters and atmospheric dispersion conditions. However, the highway separation distances and the lack of any indication of frequent shipment of hazardous chemicals past the plant (since shipment would be along U.S. Route 104), provide reasonable assurance that the likelihood of a hazardous chemical spill affecting the operation of the plant is low. However it cannot be precisely determined what the proba-bility of a hazardous chemical accident would be, because detailed

1 i'

information on the size, type, and frequency of hazardous chemical shipments past the plant is not. available. Although it is con-sidered that the probability of a hazardous chemical transportation accident affecting plant operation is low, we believe that the possibility of such an accident should be one of the factors considered in the final evaluation of the adequacy of the control room habitability systems for the Ginna Plant. This matter will be evaluated further under NUREG-0737, item III.D.3.4, "Control Room Habitability".

The nearest railroad to the plant is the Ontario Midland railroad about 3 1/2 miles to the south. Comparing this distance with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.91, it is apparent that potential railroad accidents involving hazardous materials are not considered to be a credible risk to the safe operation of the plant.

The nearest large pipelines'to the plant are a 12" gas line located about'six,miles southwest of the plant, and a 16" gas line located about 10~ mile's so'uth of the plant. These pipelines are far enough removed to assure that pipeline accidents will not affect the safety of the nuclear plant. Figure 3 shows a portion of the residential gas lines serving homes along Lake Road, as well as the house heating boiler at the Ginna plant itself.

There are no gas or oil production fields, underground storage facilities, or refineries in the vicinity of the plant.

The potential effect of the gas line service to the Ginna house heating boiler was discussed during the Ginna Fire Protection review. This 4-inch gas line comes into the plant underground

l A 'I 3 I

I '

ak V

until it penetrates the ground surface at the east end of the screenhouse. I This routing e'nsures separation from",all, other I~

ll Jt safety-related'tructures and systems. At this point, a metering station and a gas shutoff valve are located (the gas meter was relocated as a result of the Fire Protection review, item 3.1.13).

The gas line is buried underground again after the gas meter regulator station, and enters the building through the basement wall under the house heating boiler area. The gas pipe is of welded steel construction up to the boiler. There is continuous ventilation of the areas that the gas line passes through within the building. The gas line service to the boiler and the boiler controls were reviewed and compared to NFPA-85, as requested in the staff's Fire Protection SER, dated February 14, 1979 (item 3.1.46). This installation was accepted by the NRC in Supplement No. 2 to the Fire Protection SER, issued on February 6, 1981.

Based on the resolution of all gas line items during the Fire Protection review, it can be concluded that no safety hazard results from the existence of the gas line on the plant site.

There are no large commercial harbors along the southern shore of Lake Ontario near the plant. Some freight is shipped through Rochester harbor about 20 miles to the west. Major shipping lanes in the lake are located well off-shore, at least 23 miles or more, from the plant. 7 The possibility of damage to the service water intake structure was also considered. Section III-B.27 of RG&E's "Technical Supplement Accompanying Application for a Full-Term Operating License," August 1972 discusses the design of the intake system. As noted in this report, the intake

system is completely submerged below the surface of the lake. A t

ten-foot reinforced concret'e lined tunnel,,driven, through bedrock, extends 3100 feet northerly from the shoreline. The tunnel rises vertically and connects,to a reinforced .concrete inlet section.

The occurrence of historical low water level will result in a depth of water of 30 feet at the inlet and with 15 feet, of cover over the inlet structure. This is sufficient to prevent damage from any boating which might pass in the vicinity of the structure.

Further, plugging of inlet water flow by a single large piece of material is prevented by the design of the inlet structure, in that water enters on a full 360'ircle. 13 Another design feature at Ginna to ensure continued availability of essential service water is that, service water intake can be directly drawn from the discharge canal, which is located on the plant site, protected from any potential lake boating. Thus, lake navigation is not considered to be a hazard to the plant.

The closest airport to the plant is the Williamson Flying Club Airport, a small privately-owned general aviation facility located approximately ten miles ESE. Monroe County Airport, in Rochester, New York, located about 25 miles southwest of the plant, is the nearest airport with scheduled commercial air service. Low altitude federal airways V2 and V2N pass about 10 miles south and 2 1/2 miles southwest of the plant, respectively.

An Air Force Restricted Area R-5203 is located about eight miles north of the plant site. Whenever flight activity is conducted by the Air Force within R-5203, radar surveillance is maintained by the 21st NORAD Region, the 108th Tactical Control Group, or

b k possibly the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center. Pilots rely upon on-board navigational equipment to maintain their presence within the specified limits of the restricted area.

Pilots can also be advised if their, aircrafts stray beyond their limits by the radar surveillance unit covering the area at the time. The restricted area is used daily for military flight training which includes high-speed interceptor training maneuvers, operational flight checks, and air-to-air refueling. The current altitude ranges from 2,000 to 50,000 feet. above the surface. 5 A portion of the Detroit, Sectional Aeronautical Chart, reproduced as Figure 1, shows the airports, air routes, and training space described above. There is also a slow-speed low altitude military training route (SR-826) which passes about 6 miles west of the plant.

The Williamson Flying Club Airport has one paved runway. This runway, designated 10-28 and thus oriented in an almost east-west direction, is 3377 feet long and 40 feet wide. The main runway is equipped with low intensity runway lights. The airport has instrument approach capability to runway 28 from the Rochester VORTAC. Figure 2 shows the instrument flight path. There is no control tower at this airport. The airport is used for general aviation activities such as business and pleasure flying, and for agricultural spraying operations. There are currently about 5,000 operations per year at the facility, and about 30 based aircraft, including part-time based .crop dusters. The great majority of the aircraft are single-engine propeller airplanes which typically weigh on the order of 1500 to 3600 pounds. 8

t tl l

I A f 3>

1 ll l'1 I

The low altitude federal airways, V2 and V2N, serve about 19 flights per day. Almost all flights use V2, with V2N being used only occassionally. At most, 10% of airline traffic would use 9

V2N. The width of these airways are eight miles.

Evaluation Based on distance from the reactor, it has been determined that truck and seaway traffic, railway transportation, and large gas and oil pipelines are not of concern to the Ginna safety-related equipment, with respect to the potential for detonation of explosives. With respect to hazardous chemical shipments and the potential effect on control room habitability, the Ginna plant will be further evaluated through NUREG-0737, item III.D.3.4.

Aircraft hazards to Ginna were reviewed against the criteria in SRP 3.5.1.6. Acceptance criterion II.2 states that, for military air space, a minimum distance of five miles is adequate for low level training routes, except those associated with unusual activities, such as practice bombing. Air Force Restricted Area R-5203 is about eight miles from at its closest boundary, and no unusual activities such as practice bombing take place. The slow-speed low altitude military training route SR-826 is about 6 miles from the plant. Therefore, this criterion is met.Section III.2 of SRP 3.5.1.6 states that the probability of an aircraft crash into the plant should be less than about 10

-7 per year.

This probability can be evaluated using the relationship:

J h

r l!

J I"

PFA = C x N x A/w where:

inflight crash rate per mile for aircraft using

-9 airway (assumed to be 3 x 10 )

width of airway (plus twice the distance from the airway edge to the site when the site is outside the airway) in miles, N number of flights per year along the airway, and effective area of plant in square miles = 30 acres /

0.5 miles 2 For airway V2, P

FA

= (3x 10

-9 x (19 x 365)

) x-.05 = 5.1x 10

-8 20 where W = 20 is derived from an air width of 8 miles + twice the six-mile distance from the airway edge to the site.

For airway V2N (assuming 10% of the 19 flights),

P FA

= (3 x 10

-9 x (2 x 365) x

)

.05 = 1.4 x 10 -8 8

Since these values are below 1 x 10 , it is apparent that commercial air traffic over Ginna is not of concern.

Section III.3 of SRP 3.5.1.6 states that the probability of an aircraft crashing into the site should be estimated for cases where either of the following apply:

a. An airport within five miles of the site.

t ll II

b. An airport with projected operations greater than 500d 2 movements per year is located within ten miles of the site, or an airport within projected operations greater than 1000d 2 movements per year is located beyond ten miles from the site, where "d" is the number of miles from the site.

The only airport potentially of concern is the Williamson Flying Club Airport. This airport is about 10 miles from the site, with expected operations of 5000 per year. This is substantially 2 =

fewer than the 500d 2 = 500 (10) 50,000 movements per year which would be of concern. There is therefore no need to evaluate the probability, of an aircraft crash from this airport.

Conclusions R.E. Ginna site meets a I'he current regulatory criteria for "Potential"'Hazards

' Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial fl i i(

and Military Facilities", except possibly for the consideration of hazardous chemical highway transportation accidents on Lake Road. Although this latter issue is not expected to be of concern, since hazardous materials would be expected to be transported along U.S. Route 104, which is 3 1/2 miles from the site, the issue will be further considered in the evaluation of Control Room Habitability as part of, the NUREG-0737 item III.D.3.4 review.

Since the only potential deviation from current regulatory criteria is to be addressed outside of'the SEP, it is considered that SEP Topic II-1.C is complete for Ginna, and no additional evaluation will be required for this topic within the SEP.

I'I ll

'\

10 References

1. Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Robert Emmett Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1 Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Sections 2.2 and 2.5.
2. Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1, Environmental Report, Volume 1, Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan, Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 3.5.1.6, September 1975.
4. Code of Federal Regulations, Section. 10, Part 100 (10 CFR
5. Sterling Power Project Nuclear Unit No. 1 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Addendum,,Rochester Gas and Electric, Volume l

1, Sections 2.1 and 2.2. ',

N

6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.91, Rev. 1, February 1978.
7. Conversation with Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Station, Rochester, New York, 4/8/81.
8. Conversation with Vern Tyrrell, manager of the Williamson Flying Club Airport, 4/7/81.
9. Conversation with FAA controller, Monroe County Airport, 4/ 8/ 81.
10. Fire Protection SER, Dennis L. Ziemann to Leon D. White, Jr.,

February 14, 1979.

11. Fire Protection SER, Supplement No. 2, Dennis M. Crutchfield to John E. Maier, February 6, 1981.

11

12. Letter, Dennis M.. Crutchfield, NRC, to John E. Maier, RG&E, SEP Topics II-3.A, II-3.B, II-3.B.1, II-3.C, dated April 10, 1981.
13. Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, "Technical Supplement Accompanying Application for a Full Term Operating License,"

August 1972.

II II I J C II I II IS

'I I'I

7~pi~ I FSAQ TABLE 2.5-1 TYPICAL INDUSTRIES IN WAYNE COUNTY Com an and Product Distance from Site Direction from Site National Distillers L Chemical Corp.

(Kordite Div.), Macedon Polyethclene Products '4-1/2 mi. South Duffy-llott Co., Inc. Williamson Baby Foods 8-1/2 mi. Southeast Garlock, Inc. Palmyra Mechanical Packings 15 mi. Southeast Bloomer Bros. Co. Newark.

Foldi'ng Paper Boxes '19 mi. Southeast Jackson Perkins Co. Newark Nurserymen 19 mi. Southeast Sarah Coventry, Inc. Newark Direct-nail sales of costume jewelry 19 mi. Southeast National Biscuit Co. (Dromedary Co. Div,)

Lyons, Cake mixes, dates and peels 19 mi. Southeast General Electric Co., Clyde Electronic Equipment 27-1/2 mi. Southeast Comstock Foods Inc., Red Creek Canned Foods 31 mi. East Kenmore Machine Products, Inc.

Lyons Refrigerant Products 22 mi. Southeast Olney Ec Carpenter, Inc. Wolcott Canned Foods 27-1/2 mi.

C. W. Stuart h Co. Newark Nurserymen 19 mi. Southeast Francis Leggett Co., Sodus Canned Foods 12-1/2 mi. East The Waterman Food Products Co.

Food Processing 3-4 miles South Ontario Kraut Corp.

7 Railroad Ave.

Food Processing 3-4 miles South SW Victor Preserving Co.

Food Processing 3-4 miles South Ontario Cold Storage Food Processing 3-4 miles South SW Waterman Fruit Products Co.

Food Processing 3-4 miles South SW Ontario Food Products Food Processing 3-4 miles South SW Lyndan Products Co.

Food Processing 3-4 miles South SW

FIGURE 1

~

Detroit Sectional Aeronautica Ii.n3 p vtgtc~

hart I Rochester Vicinity I West Pv Solmcnv Pv tpcco

~I een OINt PEIRt

r O8 20QQ'O BUT GULL 1 ac 2 MOA NOT INCL FL T 80 08 HOURS OF USE 0800-2400 DAILY l 1 c v s os mr<i os bc easlsol OTHER TIMES BY NOTAM tat p Ip, pt,n lnis <<icmny CONTACT NEAREST FSS R GULJ 2 MOA Civ I I . I, I I CHVA04 yg~VNITE{)STATE ~

r rrr rr.rrrrrrSSrrSTSS rrrrr 8 r rr rrSS Srrrrrrr 4'rrrrrrrrrryrrr..

IA 246 R ESTR ICTED R-,5203 MoanplK \bstvfbonce ol os machos 6 evisssos tote level fn this vicinity re Cv

-:) 3 ROCHESTER 1RSA FREQ INFO ON ATIS v tvtenitov Beech RBn Welter QS IROCHESTER HARB R EActf Cliff FARtt pfla g H 'll rv vv hnl ', 29s- 3O ~,

f 3,.v Pv}tneyvitl ffey Ht ON vsP EC TPvs HIITC)t4'{M) 100 Wltttr)MSON SODUS ~4

'25 IZSO) 03f - 14 N Gr ece ~

20 I. 1'3 4{IS tt34 122.8 el)leaf / Ah ORtAC RIAC W Icott lt Clerkson Wf STf Of'I All 2 csea ROCKPO Un on Onter o I l{honI son 6)'SPE ,c' Hil FA RrcSWSRTHS R

880

{265 U&j 4

CERPOII lt'24 .

'v v t13 ece s pets W 821 e'SS .,B OE 7vi,7, I,, !4 2 *GPRg IPvlt 4IO 2I It

.SPE CTIEStf R N-" r North ROSE {Pvll III (EDGE DA 66P28 t22 M N ROE I:0 3A'TSI 0 l HESTE We) worth5h31 ~r ".,

s (400 c22 Rose 279" 465 7VORTA ROCHISI f R C1 669S4I 'l 2;95 77<

no A31.~ triZ r'"n t", ll ilpal o 282'v V'-2'e 100 Ch 31>RDC 1 CHURCHVIttX 758 72$ edoh v l fvlII e S BvI l95J e20

'(423)

FAIRPORT, C ter 660 Ip23t o' qE,A'~935rp,

~

- 122.rd PAIMYR CEY ergen O STER RCO ~ ,460 tt} 30 12 EY FAto v

/690 - 25 Clifto a nvs ~ , tvi edon B Sevenr Ita wctu c lf COV FREUDI F 672 Pelmyrag

'I S6J22 8 MAt4'7M>

ottsv btcto UC p I Gibson D. he 026 I tAKESTONE I .'875 acy 5VCAR

$ 20- 26 122 8 DIAMOND P.si C ANNE Ipvst 4 sf I I70 ttth"" lc $ 80 680 B 0 h t c z v cr n iteHold A 0 NIA Rosh ts l PP+f eN I of

~c hnflohnc tcaclvc tnl I sh , I ~ I IPP SCI)ySERT IP~ Holte AttSVict b'tk& <<)ps 7 4804 - 20 6ev A Vlf s

HOPEWEtt

's 5 cr. Itofg{ANANDAlGUA .040 tt "; Ql!P tl 4'. 800. ~ )ZO, .7201 17 rt)ISv F h FAEP AV'v

~'pened vep

'VOII~

BATfMAN Icttt WEISS tpvtl c r led os v F RMsp~ 95,20. IOOO. 23 4>>o Chopin Rt Seneca ps3-r apt; 'q0 4'v

'VI in wood f AIRYIEIn '{Pvl), Cestle 8l 5S lion g Yark la'3)O I,B R .E seO l D'ttv{a 0 tb l 00 Fhnt 2'8r> .

5O Srtimdr l 22.1R

,GE IIIESEO KR Bee-NEERO{pvl) lt I ~ A ANDA IJA ctj vtsr

'a rttf Il SENE FAttS A

7 108.'2D Ij IO; GEE: y Brtstol.II 00 -".. Ct d y'C g 90- 'nfl ll 'I 3 O P,l It I Al 41 e . )4 84 elle c E o IIAI'ICAs R rr V 14 0 I  % A HTlf57 yr I Ohl II H Gorhe range srOID FORT e HetJ, rI63 G eseo rPARMTPCVS ~

'050 Pt "0 .

gp

-521 4 ~ vd oye Bello e y rp4C Pert i v Cents'}~ 4l er v fv'lite Rvshville Zg'r+

y

~ R rove)ehd lv,.RRIMACC f Aoms I,pcPp St Nl

v") cert'.

l:, 14 ccrc 7) 2290 ~ L L..

Rvicscsi.SOrinaS

'ddlese5

FXGURE 2 instrument Landing Path to WFC Airport WILUsN((SON-SQDUS YOR/DME RVfY 10 ~~21< IEAAI SODUS, le YORK 1 N(A 2200 No(r(

08ie (101 C..

Aho missed M~~ rsro pe) 849~

((AF) ot(trooch hoM(ny OOO~

'10 D(AE Arc IAF ROCHESTER 110.0 ROC Chen 37 0 A(s(

o 110i E(Ettt 425 AVSSED ARPROACH HoMiny (tottern C(knb(ny (e(t turn to 2200 I to R4B4 20 D(AE ond 2200

~ ~,' 2644.

I hold.

2i.8 Dst(E I

I st glt @ 00 E(ev i25 5-10 1300-1 1300-1 Vi 1300-1 6 1300-1%

875 ((F00 I 875 900.1(4 875 (t001H 875 9001%

CIRC UHG 1300.1 1300-1 % 1300-1 6 1300.2 875 9001) 875 (900 1 V 875 (900 1 12) 875 (t00.

Use Rochester, New York ott(meter settiny.

V D NA UR( Rwy 1028 Knots 80 (20 120 150 I 80 tninsSec

'Ijt'OR/DME RWY 10 SODUS, NEW YORK WILUAhkSCH+SODVS Si1

Sy w4 FIGURE 3 Small Gas Lines in the Vicinity of Ginna LAKE D/SC///PAVE C/AViYFl SCREE//

//OVSE gb ROBERT E. Gee+A STA 7/N/

IIJCAWAli CA'4AWA DETAILS.

cr4glv Aollrg grAcFltd Crh'VAIA9HCrrf

'tr41 I 4r.

REACrog CONTR///NE//T

+

VESTEE

/N rr 0 JN 4 7 I 0 4 e p4 DFF/CE E DC&'4'C y4 gheAP 4

'E rg rr re / t.r.

rzr Ic,444 'i rr

"<74ZZ