Text

License Amendment Request - Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 2
	ML17059C963
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	02/28/2017
From:	Jim Barstow; Exelon Generation Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NMP2L2640, TSTF-542
	Download: ML17059C963 (214)
	v • d • e

Exelon Generation 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square. PA 19348 www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.90 NMP2L2640 February 28, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 NRC Docket No. 50-410

Subject:

License Amendment Request- Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requests an amendment to the Technical Specifications, Appendix A, of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2). The proposed amendment is consistent with NRG-approved Technical Specification Task Force 542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

The proposed amendment would revise the NMP2 Technical Specification (TS) by replacing the existing specifications related to Operation with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessels with revised requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.

Attachment 1 provides the Evaluation of Proposed Changes. Attachment 2 provides the Proposed TS Marked-Up Pages. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages.

Attachment 4 provides the Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Marked-Up Pages for information only.

The proposed changes have been reviewed by the NMP Plant Operations Review Committee in accordance with the requirements of the Exelon Quality Assurance Program.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Amendment Request Adopt TSTF-542, Revision 2 Docket No. 50-41 O February 28, 2017 Page2 Exelon requests approval of the proposed amendment by March 1, 2018. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented no later than the start of the NMP2 Spring 2018 refueling outage.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this request.

Exelon has concluded that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation,"

paragraph (b), Exelon is transmitting a copy of this application and its attachments to the designated State Officials.

Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Ron Reynolds at (610) 765-5247.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 2a1h day of February 2017.

Respectfully,

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James Barstow Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC Attachments:

1) Evaluation of Proposed Changes

2) Proposed Technical Specification Marked-Up Pages

3) Revised Technical Specification Pages

4) Proposed Technical Specification Bases Marked-Up Pages cc: USNRC Region I, Regional Administrator w/attachments USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, NMP w/attachments USNRC Project Manager, NMP w/attachments A. L. Peterson, NYSERDA w/attachments

ATTACHMENT 1 License Amendment Request Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-41 O EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES CONTENTS

SUBJECT:

Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation 2.2 Variations

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 REFERENCES

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 1 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requests an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS), Appendix A, of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2).

The proposed changes would replace the existing specifications related to Operation with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessels (OPDRVs) with revised specifications for Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.

2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation Exelon has reviewed the Safety Evaluation provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) on December 20, 2016 (Reference 1), as well as the information provided in TSTF-542 (Reference 2). Exelon has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-542 and the Safety Evaluation prepared by the NRC staff is applicable to NMP2, and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the NMP2 TS.

The following NMP2 TS are affected by the proposed changes:

1.1 Definitions 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (MCREV) System Instrumentation 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring-Logic 3.5 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System 3.5.2 ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.3 RCIC System 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System 3.7.2 Control Room Envelope Filtration (GREV) System 3.7.3 Control Room Envelope Air Conditioning (AC) System 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 2 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes An existing administrative error is being corrected with this change. In the NMP2 TS Section 3.3.7.1, Table 3.3.7.1-1, the Functions in the current NMP2 TS are numbered 1, 2, 2. The number scheme is being revised to 1, 2, 3. This TS Section is being changed to support TSTF-542 implementation.

2.2 Variations Exelon is proposing the following variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-542.

These variations do not affect the applicability of TSTF-542 or the NRG staff's Safety Evaluation to the proposed license amendment.

The NMP2 TS contain a Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Therefore, the Surveillance Requirement (SR) frequencies for Specification 3.5.2 are "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program."

The NMP2 TS include Amendment No. 150 (Reference 3) for TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation." The following changes have no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and are an acceptable variation:

SR 3.5.2.4 has been modified from; "Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve," to; "Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water."

SR 3.5.2.5 has been modified to retain the NOTE, "Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control."

The NMP2 TS Section 3.3.5.1 is modified to accommodate the existing NMP2 instrumentation configuration and is aligned to the BWR/6 Standard Technical Specifications (STS), without a setpoint control program. Changes to these instrumentation functions are justified by the discussion in Section 3.4.1 of the TSTF-542 justification. The following changes have no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and are acceptable variations:

In LCO 3.3.5.1, the following Required Actions are revised to include the applicable Functions from table 3.3.5.1-1. See the discussion below for each Function for clarification of each of these variations to Table 3.3.5.1-1.

o B.1 adds applicability for Functions 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, and 2.d.

o C.1 changes the applicability to Functions 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 1.i, 1.j, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h, and 2.i.

o E.1 changes the applicability to Functions 1.k, 1.1, and 2.j.

The Note 2 preceding the Surveillance Requirements is clarified to state actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The listing of specific Functions is no longer necessary due to implementation of TSTF-542. Note 2 is in the current approved NMP2 TS and was implemented during the original conversion to the Improved STS for NMP2. This Note is based on reliability analyses (References 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6-hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 3 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes

Table 3.3.5.1-1 does not contain the Notes c and d from the BWR/6 STS, therefore, relabeling these Notes is not required.

Table 3.3.5.1-1 Function 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection - A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems:

o The ECCS Instrumentation for NMP2 includes additional Functions 1.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3, and 1.d. Drywall Pressure-High (Boundary Isolation), to isolate Residual Heat Removal (RHR) boundary valves and ensure injection of water into the reactor vessel, as described in the current NMP2 TS Bases. The low pressure ECCS and associated Diesel generators (DGs) are initiated at Level 1 and certain RHR valves are closed at Level 3 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are available to prevent or minimize fuel damage. Certain RHR valves are closed upon receipt of the Drywall Pressure -

High (Boundary Isolation) Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The applicability of these Functions is modified and modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF. The TSTF-542 Functions 1.a and 1.b align to NMP2 Functions 1.b and 1.c, respectively.

o The TSTF-542 Function 1.c. LPCI Pump A Start - Time Delay Relay aligns with the NMP2 Function 1.f, and is clarified as (Normal Power). The existing Functions 1.e. LPCS Pump Start - Time Delay Relay (Normal Power), 1.g. LPCS Pump Start - Time Delay Relay (Emergency Power) and 1.h. LPCI Pump A Start - Time Delay Relay (Emergency Power) are retained to accommodate existing NMP2 instrumentation. The Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal and Emergency Power) are assumed to be operable in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation. The applicability of these Functions is modified and Modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF.

o The TSTF-542 Function 1.d. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) is modified to align with the NMP2 instrumentation for Injection Permissive using 1.i. LPCS Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) and 1.j. LPCI A and LPCS Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive).

Low differential pressure signals across the injection valves are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems maximum design pressure. The applicability of these Functions is modified and Modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF.

o The remaining TSTF-542 Functions 1.e through 1.g align to NMP2 Functions 1.k through 1.m.

Table 3.3.5.1-1 Function 2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems:

o The ECCS Instrumentation for NMP2 includes additional Functions 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3, and 2.d. Drywall Pressure-High (Boundary Isolation), to isolate RHR boundary valves and ensure injection of water into the reactor vessel, as described in the current NMP2 TS Bases. The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated at Level 1 and certain AHR valves are closed at Level 3 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are available to prevent or minimize fuel damage. Certain AHR valves are closed upon receipt of the Drywall Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Function in order to minimize

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 4 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes the possibility of fuel damage. The applicability of these Functions is modified and modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF. The TSTF-542 Functions 2.a and 2.b align to NMP2 Functions 2.b and 2.c, respectively.

o The TSTF-542 Function 2.c. LPCI Pump B Start - Time Delay Relay aligns with the NMP2 Function 2.e, and is clarified as (Normal Power). The existing NMP2 Functions 2.f. LPCI Pump C Start - Time Delay Relay (Normal Power), 2.g.

LPCI Pump B Start - Time Delay Relay (Emergency Power) and 2.h. LPCI Pump C Start - Time Delay Relay (Emergency Power) are retained to accommodate existing NMP2 Instrumentation. The Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal and Emergency Power) are assumed to be Operable in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation. The applicability of these Functions is modified and Modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF.

o The TSTF-542 Function 2.d. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) is modified to align with the NMP2 instrumentation for Injection Permissive using 2.i, LPCI Band C Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive). Low differential pressure signals across the injection valves are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems maximum design pressure. The applicability of this Function is modified and modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF. The REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION is modified to be 1 per valve to align to the existing NMP2 circuitry requirements.

o The remaining TSTF-542 Functions 2.e and 2.f align to NMP2 Functions 2.j and 2.k.

Table 3.3.5.1-1 Function 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System:

o The NMP2 Functions 3.b. Drywall Pressure - High and 3.i. Manual Initiation are modified with a Note (d) which is being retained and relabeled as Note (b).

This Note was approved in Amendment 160 (Reference 4).

o The TSTF-542 Function 3.d. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Level - Low is modified to align with the NMP2 instrumentation for 3.d. Pump Suction Pressure-Low and 3.e. Pump Suction Pressure - Timer. Low pump suction pressure, which is an indication of low level in the CST, indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source.

The applicability of these Functions is modified and Modes 4 and 5 are removed to align with the intent of the TSTF.

o The remaining TSTF-542 Functions 3.e through 3.h align to NMP2 Functions 3.f through 3.k, respectively.

Table 3.3.5.1-1 Function 4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A:

o The existing Function 4 was not modified for NMP2. NMP2 does not have a Drywall Pressure - High Function and does not have an ADS Bypass Timer for ADS. NMP2 does not contain the Notes for Function 4 and therefore the renumbering of the Notes was not required.

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 5 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes

Table 3.3.5.1-1 Function 5. ADS Trip System B:

o The existing Function 5 was not modified for NMP2. NMP2 does not have a Drywell Pressure - High Function and does not have an ADS Bypass Timer for ADS. The current NMP2 TS do not contain the Notes for Function 5 and, therefore, the renumbering of the Notes was not required.

The new TS Section 3.3.5.2 is modified to accommodate the existing NMP2 instrumentation configuration, similar to the changes in TS Section 3.3.5.1 above. The following changes have no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and are an acceptable variation:

The Notes section preceding the Surveillance Requirements is clarified by adding a Note 2. This Note 2 is carried over from the current approved NMP2 TS from LCO 3.3.5.1 to align with the other changes in Section 3.3.5.2 created by implementing TSTF-542.

Table 3.3.5.2-1 Function 1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Subsystems:

o The TSTF-542 Function 1.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) is modified to align with the NMP2 instrumentation for Injection Permissive using 1.a. LPCS Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) and 1.b. LPCI A and LPCS Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive).

o The remaining TSTF-542 Functions 1.b through 1.d align to NMP2 Functions 1.c through 1.e.

Table 3.3.5.2-1 Function 2. LPCI Band LPCI C Subsystems:

o The TSTF-542 Function 2.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) is modified to align with the NMP2 instrumentation for Injection Permissive and is renamed 2.a, LPCI B and C Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive).

Table 3.3.5.2-1 Function 3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System:

o The TSTF-542 Function 3.b. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low is renamed to Pump Suction Pressure-Low to align with the same instrumentation name used in Table 3.3.5.1-1, with the same justification.

o The NMP2 Functions for 3.c. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Bypass) and 3.e. Manual Initiation are modified with a Note (d). This Note was approved in Amendment 160 (Reference 6}.

The renumbered NMP2 TS Section 3.3.5.3 for RCIC System Instrumentation retains the two Notes in the Actions section, the existing Functions, and the existing wording of Note 2 prior to the Surveillances from the currently approved TS. This change has no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and is an acceptable variation.

The NMP2 TS Section 3.3.6.1 is modified to accommodate the existing NMP2 instrumentation configuration and is aligned to the BWR/6 STS, without a setpoint control program. The following changes have no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and are an acceptable variation:

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 6 of 9 Docket No. 50-410 Evaluation of Proposed Changes

Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 2. Primary Containment Isolation:

o NMP2 does not have a Function 2.g. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust Radiation - High and does not have the corresponding LCO Condition K.

This change was not implemented and there are no changes to the current NMP2 Function 2.

Table 3.3.6.1-1 Function 5. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation:

o The change to TSTF-542 Function 5.c for Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 is made to the NMP2 Function 5.b due to numbering differences.

The NMP2 TS Section 3.3.6.2, Table 3.3.6.2-1, Function 4, is a different function for NMP2 due to a change in instrumentation. This change has no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and is an acceptable variation.

The current NMP2 TS Section 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Logic is being revised to remove OPDRVs from the Applicability of the LCO and from Condition F. This requirement differs from the Standard Technical Specifications on which TSTF-542 was based, but is encompassed in the TSTF-542 justification.

The revised Surveillance, SR 3.5.2.3.b is modified to clarify Condensate Storage Tank B because this is the suction source for High Pressure Core Spray. This clarification is in the current approved NMP2 TS. The change has no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and is an acceptable variation.

The revised Surveillance, SR 3.5.2.6 is modified with a note to allow an ECCS pump that is already aligned for shutdown cooling to stay aligned and minimize the risk associated with realigning to minimum flow for 10 minutes and then manipulate the plant again to realign back to shutdown cooling mode. The change has no effect on the adoption of the TSTF-542 and is an acceptable variation.

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Exelon requests adoption of TSTF-542 "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control,"

which is an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), into the NMP2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment replaces the existing requirements in the TS related to "operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel" (OPDRVs) with new requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Inventory Control (RPV WIG) to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires reactor vessel water level to be greater than the top of active irradiated fuel.

Exelon has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 7 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes replace existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIG that will protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. Draining of RPV water inventory in Mode 4 (i.e., cold shutdown) and Mode 5 (i.e., refueling) is not an accident previously evaluated and, therefore, replacing the existing TS controls to prevent or mitigate such an event with a new set of controls has no effect on any accident previously evaluated. RPV water inventory control in Mode 4 or Mode 5 is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. The existing OPDRV controls or the proposed RPV WIG controls are not mitigating actions assumed in any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event (which is not a previously evaluated accident) by imposing new requirements on the limiting time in which an unexpected draining event could result in the reactor vessel water level dropping to the top of the active fuel (TAF). These controls require cognizance of the plant configuration and control of configurations with unacceptably short drain times.

These requirements reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event. The current TS requirements are only mitigating actions and impose no requirements that reduce the probability of an unexpected draining event.

The proposed changes reduce the consequences of an unexpected draining event (which is not a previously evaluated accident) by requiring an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem to be operable at all times in Modes 4 and 5. The current TS requirements do not require any water injection systems, ECCS or otherwise, to be Operable in certain conditions in Mode 5. The change in requirement from two ECCS subsystems to one ECCS subsystem in Modes 4 and 5 does not significantly affect the consequences of an unexpected draining event because the proposed Actions ensure equipment is available within the limiting drain time that is as capable of mitigating the event as the current requirements. The proposed controls provide escalating compensatory measures to be established as calculated drain times decrease, such as verification of a second method of water injection and additional confirmations that containment and/or filtration would be available if needed.

The proposed changes reduces or eliminates some requirements that were determined to be unnecessary to manage the consequences of an unexpected draining event, such as automatic initiation of an ECCS subsystem and control room ventilation. These changes do not affect the consequences of any accident previously evaluated since a draining event in Modes 4 and 5 is not a previously evaluated accident and the requirements are not needed to adequately respond to a draining event.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 8 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes replace existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIC that will protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. The proposed changes will not alter the design function of the equipment involved. Under the proposed changes, some systems that are currently required to be operable during OPDRVs would be required to be available within the limiting drain time or to be in service depending on the limiting drain time. Should those systems be unable to be placed into service, the consequences are no different than if those systems were unable to perform their function under the current TS requirements.

The event of concern under the current requirements and the proposed change is an unexpected draining event. The proposed changes do not create new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators that would cause a draining event or a new or different kind of accident not previously evaluated or included in the design and licensing bases.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed changes replace existing TS requirements related to OPDRVs with new requirements on RPV WIC. The current requirements do not have a stated safety basis and no margin of safety is established in the licensing basis. The safety basis for the new requirements is to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. New requirements are added to determine the limiting time in which the RPV water inventory could drain to the top of the fuel in the reactor vessel should an unexpected draining event occur. Plant configurations that could result in lowering the RPV water level to the TAF within one hour are now prohibited. New escalating compensatory measures based on the limiting drain time replace the current controls. The proposed TS establish a safety margin by providing defense-in-depth to ensure that the Safety Limit is protected and to protect the public health and safety. While some less restrictive requirements are proposed for plant configurations with long calculated drain times, the overall effect of the change is to improve plant safety and to add safety margin.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Exelon concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

License Amendment Request Attachment 1 Adoption of TSTF-542, Revision 2 Page 9 of 9 Docket No. 50-41 O Evaluation of Proposed Changes

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

5.0 REFERENCES

1. Final Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control" (TAC No. MF3487) dated December 20, 2016, ADAMS Accession No. ML163438008

2. TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control,"

dated December 20, 2016.

3. Letter from NRC (M. Dudek) to Exelon (D. Gudger), Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; And Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Implementation of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler 523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation" (TAC Nos. MF4405, MF4406, MF4407, and MF4409), dated July 30, 2015, ADAMS Accession No. ML15161A380

4. NEDC-30936-P-A, "8WR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part2," December 1988

5. NEDC-30851-P-A, Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for 8WR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation, " March 1989

6. Letter from NRC (D. Pickett) to Exelon (8. Hanson), Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 - Issuance of Amendment Regarding High Pressure Core Spray System and Reactor Core Isolating Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Technical Specifications (Emergency Circumstances) (CAC No. MF8868), dated November 29, 2016, ADAMS Accession No. ML 16333AOOO

ATTACHMENT 2 License Amendment Request Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-41 o Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2 Proposed Technical Specification Marked-Up Pages TS Pages 3.5.1-1 3.7.3-1 ii 3.5.2-1 thru -9 3.7.3-3 1.1-3 3.5.3-1 3.7.3-4 3.3.5.1-2 3.6.1.3-9 3.8.2-2 3.3.5.1-4 3.6.4.1-1 3.8.2-3 3.3.5.1-5 3.6.4.1-2 3.8.2-4 3.3.5.1-8 thru 12 3.6.4.2-1 3.8.5-1 3.3.5.2-1 thru -5 3.6.4.2-3 3.8.5-2 3.3.5.3-1 thru -4 3.6.4.3-1 3.8.9-1 3.3.6.1-10 3.6.4.3-2 3.8.9-2 3.3.6.2-4 3.6.4.3-3 3.3.7.1-4 3.7.2-1 3.3.8.2-1 3.7.2-2 3.3.8.2-2 3.7.2-3

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1 Definitions .......................................................................................... 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors ............................................................................ 1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times .............................................................................. 1.3-1 1.4 Frequency.......................................................................................... 1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.1 SLs .................................................................................................... 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations ...................................................................................... 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ......... 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ........................ 3.0-5 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) ...................................................... 3.1.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies ..................................................................... 3.1.2-1 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY .......................................................... 3.1.3-1 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times ............................................................. 3.1.4-1 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators ................................................. 3.1.5-1 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control ...................................................................... 3.1.6-1 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System .......................................... 3.1.7-1 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves ......................................................................... 3.1.8-1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)............................................................................ 3.2.1-1 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) ............................ 3.2.2-1 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)............................... 3.2.3-1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.1.1-1 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation ............................. 3.3.1.2-1 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ............................................... 3.3.2.1-1 3.3.2.2 Feedwater System and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation ................................................... 3.3.2.2-1 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation .......................... 3.3.3.1-1 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ........................................................... 3.3.3.2-1 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.4.1-1 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation ............................. 3.3.4.2-1 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.5.1-1 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.5.2-1 3.3.5.23 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.5.23-1 (continued)

NMP2 i Amendment 91, 123, 135,

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ............................ 3.3.6.1-1 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ....................... 3.3.6.2-1 3.3.7.1 Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) System Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.7.1-1 3.3.7.2 Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.7.2-1 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation ........................................... 3.3.8.1-1 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Logic ............................................................... 3.3.8.2-1 3.3.8.3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Scram Solenoids ............................................. 3.3.8.3-1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ...................................................... 3.4.1-1 3.4.2 Flow Control Valves (FCVs) .......................................................... 3.4.2-1 3.4.3 Jet Pumps ..................................................................................... 3.4.3-1 3.4.4 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)......................................................... 3.4.4-1 3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ......................................................... 3.4.5-1 3.4.6 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ............................... 3.4.6-1 3.4.7 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ...................................... 3.4.7-1 3.4.8 RCS Specific Activity ..................................................................... 3.4.8-1 3.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown ...................................................... 3.4.9-1 3.4.10 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown .................................................... 3.4.10-1 3.4.11 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits................................ 3.4.11-1 3.4.12 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure .................................................... 3.4.12-1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating ........................................................................ 3.5.1-1 3.5.2 ECCS - ShutdownReactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control ................................................................. 3.5.2-1 3.5.3 RCIC System ................................................................................ 3.5.3-1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment .................................................................... 3.6.1.1-1 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks ..................................................... 3.6.1.2-1 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ............................. 3.6.1.3-1 3.6.1.4 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure ............................... 3.6.1.4-1 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ................................................................ 3.6.1.5-1 3.6.1.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray .............................. 3.6.1.6-1 3.6.1.7 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers .................... 3.6.1.7-1 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature....................................... 3.6.2.1-1 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ...................................................... 3.6.2.2-1 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling................................................................................. 3.6.2.3-1 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray.................................................................................... 3.6.2.4-1 (continued)

NMP2 ii Amendment 91,

Definitions Insert A 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS TIME initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial movement of the (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE associated turbine stop valves or turbine control TIME valves to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or (continued)

NMP2 1.1-3 Amendment 91, 125

INSERT A DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a) The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate; b) The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common Mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error), for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

1. Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2. Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or

3. Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who is in continuous communication with the control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power.

c) The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; d) No additional draining events occur; and e) Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. As required by B.1 ------------NOTES-----------

Required Action A.1 1. Only applicable and referenced in in MODES 1, 2, Table 3.3.5.1-1. and 3.

2. Only applicable for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND B.2 ------------NOTES-----------

1. Only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

2. OOnly applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.

Declare High Pressure 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from Core Spray (HPCS) discovery of System inoperable. loss of HPCS initiation capability AND (continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-2 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. As required by C.1 ------------NOTES------------

Required Action A.1 1. Only applicable and referenced in in MODES 1, 2, Table 3.3.5.1-1. and 3.

2. Only applicable for Functions 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 1.i, 1.j, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h, and 2.i.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND C.2 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

D. As required by D.1 ------------NOTE-------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable if and referenced in HPCS pump suction is Table 3.3.5.1-1. not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare HPCS System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from inoperable. discovery of loss of HPCS initiation capability AND (continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-4 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2.1 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

OR D.2.2 Align the HPCS pump 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. As required by E.1 ------------NOTES------------

Required Action A.1 1. Only applicable and referenced in in MODES 1, 2, Table 3.3.5.1-1. and 3.

2. Only applicable for Functions 1.k, 1.l, and 2.j.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND E.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-5 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 3.e, 3.g, 3.h, and 3.i; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions other than 3.e, 3.g, 3.h, and 3.i,provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.3 Calibrate the trip unit. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.3.5.1-8 Amendment 91, 152

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 157.8 Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2(ba) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 10.8 inches Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2(ba) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig (Boundary Isolation) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCS Pump Start - Time 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 12 seconds Delay Relay (Normal SR 3.3.5.1.5 Power) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump A 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 7 seconds Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Normal Power) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. LPCS Pump Start - Time 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 6.75 Delay Relay (Emergency SR 3.3.5.1.5 seconds Power) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6

h. LPCI Pump A 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 2 seconds Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Emergency 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 Power)

i. LPCS Differential 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 40 psid and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 98 psid (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 4(a),5(a) 1 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 40 psid and SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 98 psid SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (continued)

(a) When associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown."

(ba) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator (DG).

NMP2 3.3.5.1-9 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems (continued)

j. LPCI A Differential 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 70 psid and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 150 psid (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 4(a),5(a) 1 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 70 psid and SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 150 psid SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

k. LPCS Pump Discharge 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 1000 gpm Flow Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 d 1440 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

l. LPCI Pump A Discharge 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 770 gpm and Flow - Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 930 gpm 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

m. Manual Initiation 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a),5(a)

2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 157.8 Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2(ba) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 10.8 inches Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2(ba) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (continued)

(a) When associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2.

(ba) Also required to initiate the associated DG.

NMP2 3.3.5.1-10 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems (continued)

d. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig (Boundary Isolation) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCI Pump B 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 7 seconds Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Normal Power) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump C 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 12 seconds Start Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Normal Power) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. LPCI Pump B 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 2 second Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Emergency 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 Power)

h. LPCI Pump C 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 7 second Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Emergency 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 Power)

i. LPCI B and C 1,2,3 1 per valve C SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 70 psid and Differential SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 150 psid Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.3 (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 4(a),5(a) 1 per valve B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 70 psid and SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 150 psid SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

j. LPCI Pump B and LPCI 1,2,3, 1 per pump E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 770 gpm Pump C Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Flow - Low (Bypass) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 d 930 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

k. Manual Initiation 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a),5(a)

(continued)

(a) When associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2.

NMP2 3.3.5.1-11 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 4(ba) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 101.8 Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Level 2 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 4(ba) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig (db) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 209.3 Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Pump Suction 1,2,3, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 94.5 inches Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 H2O 4(c),5(c) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. Pump Suction 1,2,3, 1 D SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 5.5 seconds Pressure - Timer SR 3.3.5.1.5 4(c),5(c) SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. Suppression Pool Water 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 200.7 ft Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. HPCS Pump Discharge 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 220 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Bypass) 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

h. HPCS System Flow 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 580 gpm and Rate - Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 720 gpm 4(a),5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

i. Manual Initiation (db) 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a),5(a)

(continued)

(a) When associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2.

(ba) Also required to initiate the associated DG.

(c) When HPCS is OPERABLE for compliance with LCO 3.5.2 and aligned to the condensate storage tank while tank water level is not within the limit of SR 3.5.2.2.

(d) (b) The injection functions of Drywell Pressure-High and Manual Initiation are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure less than 600 psig.

NMP2 3.3.5.1-12 Amendment 160

RCIC SystemRPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.5.2-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel.

B. As required by Required B.1 Declare associated Immediately Action A.1 and referenced penetration flow path(s) in Table 3.3.5.2-1 incapable of automatic isolation.

AND B.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME. Immediately C. As required by Required C.1 Place channel in trip. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

NMP2 3.3.5.2-1 Amendment

RCIC SystemRPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Declare HPCS system 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced inoperable.

in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

OR D.2 Align the HPCS pump 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. As required by Required E.1 Declare HPCS system 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced inoperable.

in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

AND Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

F. As required by Required F.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action A.1 and referenced OPERABLE status.

in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion ECCS injection/spray Time of Condition C, D, E, subsystem inoperable.

or F not met.

NMP2 3.3.5.2-2 Amendment

RCIC SystemRPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.3.5.2-3 Amendment

RCIC SystemRPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

Subsystems

a. LPCS Differential 4, 5 1(a) C SR 3.3.5.2.1 40 psid and Pressure-Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 98 psid (Injection Permissive)

b. LPCI A Differential 4, 5 1(a) C SR 3.3.5.2.1 70 psid and Pressure-Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 150 psid (Injection Permissive)

c. LPCS Pump 4, 5 1 per pump F SR 3.3.5.2.1 1000 gpm Discharge Flow-Low (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 and (Bypass) 1440 gpm

d. LPCI Pump A 4, 5 SR 3.3.5.2.1 770 gpm and Discharge Flow-Low 1(a) F SR 3.3.5.2.2 930 gpm (Bypass)

e. Manual Initiation 4, 5 1 per F SR 3.3.5.2.3 N/A subsystem (a)

2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems

a. LPCI B and C 4, 5 1 per pump C SR 3.3.5.2.1 70 psid and Differential (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 150 psid Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)

b. LPCI Pump B and 4, 5 1 per pump F SR 3.3.5.2.1 770 gpm LPCI Pump C (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 and Discharge Flow-Low 930 gpm (Bypass)

c. Manual Initiation 4, 5 1 per F SR 3.3.5.2.3 N/A subsystem (continued)

(a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

NMP2 3.3.5.2-4 Amendment

RCIC SystemRPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 2 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System 4, 5 1 (a) E SR 3.3.5.2.1 209.3

a. Reactor Vessel SR 3.3.5.2.2 inches Water Level-High, Level 8 (b) (b) 1 (a) D SR 3.3.5.2.1 94.5 inches 4 ,5

b. Pump Suction SR 3.3.5.2.2 H2O Pressure-Low

c. HPCS Pump 4, 5 1 per pump F SR 3.3.5.2.1 220 psig Discharge (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 Pressure-High (Bypass) (d)

d. HPCS System Flow 4, 5 F SR 3.3.5.2.1 > 580 gpm and Rate-Low (Bypass) 1 per pump SR 3.3.5.2.2 720 gpm (a)

f. Manual Initiation (d) 4, 5 F SR 3.3.5.2.3 N/A 1 per Subsystem (a)

4. RHR System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel (c) 2 in one B SR 3.3.5.2.1 157.8 inches Water Level-Low, Trip system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Level 3

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel (c) 2 in one B SR 3.3.5.2.1 101.8 inches Water Level-Low Trip system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Low, Level 2 (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

(b) When HPCS is OPERABLE for compliance with LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control," and aligned to the condensate storage tank.

(c) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

(d) The injection functions of Drywell Pressure-High and Manual Initiation are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure less than 600 psig.

NMP2 3.3.5.2-5 Amendment

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.23 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.2 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.23 The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.23-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

2. When the Function 2 channels are placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of SR 3.5.3.4, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions is not required.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.23-1 for the channel.

B. As required by B.1 Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from Required Action A.1 inoperable. discovery of and referenced in loss of RCIC Table 3.3.5.23-1. initiation capability AND B.2 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

(continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.3-1 Amendment 91

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.23 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. As required by C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Required Action A.1 OPERABLE status.

and referenced in Table 3.3.5.23-1.

D. As required by D.1 ------------NOTE------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable if and referenced in RCIC pump suction is Table 3.3.5.23-1. not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from inoperable. discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. Required Action and E.1 Declare RCIC System Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

NMP2 3.3.5.3-2 Amendment 91

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.23 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.23-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 4 and 5; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 2, and 3 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.23.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.23.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.23.3 Calibrate the trip units. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.23.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.23.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.3.5.3-3 Amendment 91 152

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.23 Table 3.3.5.23-1 (page 1 of 1)

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS PER FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.23.1 t 101.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.23.2 SR 3.3.5.2.33 SR 3.3.5.23.4 SR 3.3.5.23.5

2. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.23.1 d 209.3 inches Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.23.2 SR 3.3.5.23.3 SR 3.3.5.23.4 SR 3.3.5.23.5

3. Pump Suction 2 D SR 3.3.5.23.1 t 101 inches Wg Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.23.2 SR 3.3.5.23.3 SR 3.3.5.23.4 SR 3.3.5.23.5

4. Pump Suction 1 D SR 3.3.5.23.2 d 12.3 seconds Pressure - Timer SR 3.3.5.23.4 SR 3.3.5.23.5

5. Manual Initiation (a) 2 C SR 3.3.5.23.5 NA (a) The injection function of Manual Initiation is not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure less than 600 psig.

NMP2 3.3.5.3-4 Amendment 160

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. RHR SDC System Isolation (continued)

(d)

b. Reactor Vessel Water 3,4,5 2 J SR 3.3.6.1.1 t 157.8 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

c. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 d 148 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

d. Reactor Building Pipe 3 1 per area F SR 3.3.6.1.1 Chase Area SR 3.3.6.1.3 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 El. l 319 ft. d 144.5qF El. l 292 ft. d 140.5qF El. l 266 ft. d 140.5qF El. l 227 ft. d 140.5qF

e. Reactor Building 3 1 per area F SR 3.3.6.1.1 d 134qF General Area SR 3.3.6.1.3 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 4 G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA NMP2 3.3.6.1-10 Amendment 91

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES AND REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3,(a) 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 t 101.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5

-3

3. Reactor Building Above the 1,2,3, 1 SR 3.3.6.2.1 d 2.46 x 10 Refuel Floor Exhaust (a),(b) SR 3.3.6.2.2 Ci/cc Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5

-3

4. Reactor Building Below the 1,2,3, 1 SR 3.3.6.2.1 d 2.46 x 10 Refuel Floor Exhaust (a),(b) SR 3.3.6.2.2 Ci/cc Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

(ba) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

NMP2 3.3.6.2-4 Amendment 91, 101

CREF System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Table 3.3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Room Envelope Filtration System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.7.1.1 t 101.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.7.1.2 (a) SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 C SR 3.3.7.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5

-6

3. Main Control Room 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.7.1.1 d 5.92 x 10 Ventilation Radiation SR 3.3.7.1.2 Ci/cc Monitor - High (a),(b) SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

(a) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

NMP2 3.3.7.1-4 Amendment 91, 125

RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic 3.3.8.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Logic LCO 3.3.8.2 Two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be OPERABLE for each RPS logic bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with both residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling (SDC) suction isolation valves open, MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS.,

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both RPS logic A.1 Restore electric 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months buses with one power monitoring electric power assembly(s) to monitoring assembly OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

B. One or both RPS logic B.1 Restore electric 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months buses with both power monitoring electric power assemblies to monitoring assemblies OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

NMP2 3.3.8.2-1 Amendment 91

RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic 3.3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion restore one electric Time of Condition A or power monitoring B not met in MODE 4 or assembly to OPERABLE 5 with both RHR SDC status for each RPS suction isolation logic bus.

valves open.

OR D.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the RHR SDC System.

E. Required Action and E.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion fully insert all Time of Condition A or insertable control B not met in MODE 5 rods in core cells with any control rod containing one or withdrawn from a core more fuel assemblies.

cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

F. Required Action and F.1.1 Isolate the Immediately associated Completion associated secondary Time of Condition A or containment B not met during penetration flow movement of irradiated path(s).

fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, OR or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during F.1.2 Declare associated Immediately OPDRVs. secondary containment isolation valves inoperable.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.3.8.2-2 Amendment 91

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure d 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE --------------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCS.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS A.1 Restore low pressure 7 days injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. High Pressure Core B.1 Verify by Immediately Spray (HPCS) System administrative means inoperable. RCIC System is OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE.

AND B.2 Restore HPCS System 14 days to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.5.1-1 Amendment 91, 109,

RPV Water Inventory Control ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.2 ECCS - ShutdownREACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL LCO 3.5.2 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to top of active fuel (TAF) shall be 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND Two One ECCS injection/spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4, and 5 MODE 5 except with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and water level t 22 ft 3 inches over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Rrequired ECCS A.1 Restore required ECCS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months injection/spray injection/spray subsystem subsystem inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action to suspend Immediately associated Completion operationsestablish a Time of Condition A not method of water injection met. capable of operating without offsite electrical power. with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C.1 Verify secondary and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .Two containment boundary is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months required ECCS capable of being Immediately injection/spray established in less than the subsystems DRAIN TIME.

NMP2 3.5.2-11 Amendment 91

RPV Water Inventory Control ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 inoperable.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months C.1 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

AND C.2 Restore one ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-21 Amendment 91

RPV Water Inventory Control ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.2 Verify each secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.3 Verify one standby gas 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME.

D. DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . ----------NOTE------------

Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power.

D.1 Initiate action to establish Immediately an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level > TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND D.2 Initiate action to establish Immediately secondary containment boundary.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-31 Amendment 91

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action C.2 D.1 Initiate action to Immediately and associated restore secondary Completion Time not containment to met. OPERABLE status.

AND D.2 Initiate action to restore one standby gas treatment subsystem to OPERABLE Immediately status.

AND D.3 3 Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room. Immediately AND D.4 Initiate action to verify one standby gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation.

restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

E. Required Action and E.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion DRAIN TIME to 36 Time of Condition C or hours.

D not met.

OR DRAIN TIME < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

NMP2 3.5.2-42 Amendment 91, 152

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify, for each required low pressure ECCS DRAIN In accordance with TIME 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . the Surveillance injection/spray subsystem, the suppression Frequency Control pool water level is t 195 ft. Program (continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-52 Amendment 91, 152

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for the required High Pressure Corea required In accordance with low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the the Surveillance suppression pool water level is 195 ft. Frequency Control Spray (HPCS) System, the: Program

a. Suppression pool water level is t 195 ft; or

b. Condensate storage tank B water level is t 26.9 ft.

SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for each required ECCS injection/a required In accordance with High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, the: the Surveillance Frequency Control

a. Suppression pool water level is 195 ft. Program orOR

.spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

b. . Condensate storage tank B water level is 26.9 ft.

SR 3.5.2.4 Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

NOTE----------------------------------

One low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

NOTE----------------------------------

Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. In accordance with

the Surveillance Frequency Control Verify each required ECCS injection/spray Program subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is NMP2 3.5.2-63 Amendment 91, 150, 152

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.5.2.5 -----------------------------NOTE------------------------------

Not required to be met for system vent paths opened under administrative control.

Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem each manual, power operated, and the Surveillance automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, Frequency Control sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the ProgramInservice correct position. Testing Program (continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-73 Amendment 91, 150, 152

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each required ECCS pump In accordance with develops the the Inservice specified flow rate with the specified Testing Program developed head.

TOTAL SYSTEM FLOW RATE DEVELOPED HEAD LPCS t 6350 gpm t 284 psid LPCI A, B t 7450 gpm t 127 psid LPCI C t 7450 gpm t 140 psid HPCS t 6350 gpm t 327 psid SR 3.5.2.6 -----------------------------NOTE------------------------------

Not required to be met for ECCS pumps aligned for shutdown cooling.

In accordance with Operate the required ECCS injection/spray the Surveillance subsystem through the recirculation line for 10 Frequency Control minutes.----------------------------NOTE------------------------ Program Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verify each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.-----

NOTE----------------------------------

Instrumentation response time may be assumed to be the design instrumentation response time. In accordance with

the Surveillance Frequency Control Verify the ECCS RESPONSE TIME for each ECCS Program injection/spray subsystem is within limits.

NMP2 3.5.2-84 Amendment 91, 152

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 SR 3.5.2.8 -----------------------------NOTE------------------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem In accordance with actuates on a manual initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.5.2-94 Amendment 91, 152

RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System A.1 Verify by Immediately inoperable. administrative means High Pressure Core Spray System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System 14 days to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Reduce reactor steam 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months dome pressure to 150 psig.

(continued)

NMP2 3.5.3-1 Amendment 91, 109

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued) E.3 Perform SR 3.6.1.3.6 Once per 92 days for the resilient seal purge exhaust valves closed to comply with Required Action E.1.

F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, D, or E not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. F.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months G.1 Initiate action to G. Required Action and suspend operations Immediately associated Completion with a potential for Time of Condition A, draining the reactor B, C, D, or E not met vessel (OPDRV)s.

for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during OR MODE 4 or 5.

G.21 Initiate action to restore valve(s) to Immediately OPERABLE status.

NMP2 3.6.1.3-9 Amendment 91,

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.1-1 Amendment 91, 101

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Secondary containment C.1 -----------NOTE-----------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of recently irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the ------------------------------

secondary containment or during OPDRVs. Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND C.2 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify secondary containment vacuum is In accordance with t 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify all secondary containment In accordance with equipment hatches are closed and sealed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.1-2 Amendment 91, 101, 152,

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable. one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.2-1 Amendment 91, 101,

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 -------------NOTE------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable.

or B not met during ---------------------------------

movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the Suspend movement of Immediately secondary containment. recently irradiated fuel or during OPDRVs. assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND D.2 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

NMP2 3.6.4.2-3 Amendment 91, 101.

SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and ---------------NOTE----------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A ---------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately fuel assemblies in the subsystem in secondary containment. operation.

or during OPDRVs.

OR (continued)

,NMP2 3.6.4.3-1 Amendment 91, 101,

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND C.2.2 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

D. Two SGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 -----------NOTE-----------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of recently irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the -------------------------------

secondary containment, or during OPDRVs. Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.3-2 Amendment 91, 101,

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued) AND E.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each SGT subsystem for In accordance with t 10 continuous hours with heaters the Surveillance operating. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates on an In accordance with actual or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.4 Verify each SGT decay heat removal air In accordance with inlet valve can be opened. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.6.4.3-3 Amendment 91, 101, 152

CREF System 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) System LCO 3.7.2 Two CREF subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE --------------------------------------------

The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREF subsystem A.1 Restore CREF 7 days inoperable for reasons other subsystem(s) to than Condition B. OPERABLE status.

OR Two CREF subsystems inoperable with safety function maintained.

B. One or more CREF B.1 Initiate action to Immediately subsystems inoperable due implement mitigating to inoperable CRE boundary actions.

in MODES 1, 2, or 3.

AND B.2 Verify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary 90 days to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.2-1 Amendment 91, 97, 125, 126,

CREF System 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D. Required Action and -----------------NOTE-----------------

associated Completion Time LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

of Condition A not met ------------------------------------------

during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in D.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately the secondary containment. components of CREF or during OPDRVs. subsystem(s) equivalent to a single CREF subsystem in emergency pressurization mode.

OR D.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND D.2.2 Initiate action to suspend Immediately OPDRVs.

E. Two CREF subsystems E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable with safety function not maintained in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition B.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.2-2 Amendment 91, 97, 125, 126,

CREF System 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two CREF subsystems ------------------NOTE------------------

inoperable with safety LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

function not maintained --------------------------------------------

during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately the secondary containment. recently irradiated or during OPDRVs. fuel assemblies in the secondary OR containment.

One or more CREF AND subsystems inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary F.2 Initiate action to suspend Immediately during movement of recently OPDRVs.

irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

or during OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Operate each CREF subsystem for t 1 continuous In accordance with hour. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.2.2 Perform required CREF System filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing with the VFTP Program (VFTP).

SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each CREF subsystem actuates on an actual In accordance with or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

NMP2 3.7.2-3 Amendment 91, 95, 97, 125, 126, 152,

Control Room Envelope AC System 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Control Room Envelope Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3.7.3 Two control room envelope AC subsystems for the areas listed below shall be OPERABLE:

a. Main Control Room area; and

b. Relay Room area.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room A.1 Restore control room 30 days envelope AC subsystem envelope AC for the Main Control subsystem for the Room area inoperable. Main Control Room area to OPERABLE status.

B. One control room B.1 Restore control room 30 days envelope AC subsystem envelope AC for the Relay Room subsystem for the area inoperable. Relay Room area to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.3-1 Amendment 91, 125, 128,

Control Room Envelope AC System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and ------------------NOTE-------------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A ---------------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently F.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies control room envelope in the secondary AC subsystem for the containment or during Main Control Room OPDRVs. area in operation.

OR F.2.1 Suspend Immediately movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND Immediately F.2.2 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

G. Required Action and ------------------NOTE-------------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition B ---------------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently G.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies control room envelope in the secondary AC subsystem for containment or during the Relay Room OPDRVs. area in operation.

OR G.2.1 Suspend Immediately movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND Immediately G.2.2 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

NMP2 3.7.3-3 Amendment 91, 125,128,

Control Room Envelope AC System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. Required Action and ------------------NOTE-------------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition C or D ---------------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently irradiated fuel H.1 Suspend movement of Immediately assemblies in the recently irradiated fuel secondary containment. assemblies in the or during OPDRVs. secondary containment.

Immediately AND H.2 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each control room envelope AC In accordance with subsystem has the capability to remove the the Surveillance assumed heat load for the Main Control Room Frequency Control area and the Relay Room area. Program NMP2 3.7.3-4 Amendment 128, 152,

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO Item a. not met. ------------------NOTE-------------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, when any required division is de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations Immediately with a potential for Immediately draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

AND A.2.43 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.8.2-2 Amendment 91,

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. LCO Item b. not met. B.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND B.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND B.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs. Immediately AND B.43 Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

C. LCO Item c. not met. C.1 Declare High Pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Core Spray System inoperable.

NMP2 3.8.2-3 Amendment 91,

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1 ------------------------------- NOTES ----------------------------

1. The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.7 through SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.11 through SR 3.8.1.14, SR 3.8.1.16, and SR 3.8.1.17.

2. SR 3.8.1.10 and SR 3.8.1.17 are not required to be met when associated ECCS subsystem(s) are not required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control."

In accordance For AC sources required to be OPERABLE, the with applicable SRs of Specification 3.8.1, except SRs SR 3.8.1.15 and SR 3.8.1.18, are applicable.

NMP2 3.8.2-4 Amendment 91,

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 The following DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. One Division 1 or Division 2 DC electrical power subsystem; and

b. The Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.9, Distribution System - Shutdown.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

NOTE --------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electric power required feature(s) subsystems inoperable. inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.8.5-1 Amendment 91, 103,

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

AND A.2.43 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1 -----------------------------------NOTE----------------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.7 and SR 3.8.4.8.

For DC electrical power subsystems required In accordance to be OPERABLE the following SRs are with applicable applicable: SRs SR 3.8.4.1, SR 3.8.4.2, SR 3.8.4.3, SR 3.8.4.4, SR 3.8.4.5, SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.

NMP2 3.8.5-2 Amendment 91,

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Shutdown LCO 3.8.9 The necessary portions of the Division 1, Division 2, and Division 3 AC and DC and the Division 1 and Division 2 120 VAC uninterruptible electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or 120 VAC supported required uninterruptible feature(s) electrical power inoperable.

distribution subsystems inoperable. OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.8.9-1 Amendment 91,

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.9 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

AND A.2.43 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC, DC, and 120 VAC uninterruptible electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.

AND A.2.54 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and power In accordance with availability to required AC, DC, and the Surveillance 120 VAC uninterruptible electrical power Frequency Control distribution subsystems. Program NMP2 3.8.9-2 Amendment 91, 152,

ATTACHMENT 3 License Amendment Request Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-41 O Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2 Revised Technical Specification Pages TS Clean Pages 3.3.8.2-1 3.6.4.3-1 thru -3 ii 3.3.8.2-2 3.7.2-1 thru -3 1.1-3 thru 1.1-8 3.5.1-1 3.7.3-1 3.3.5.1-2 3.5.2-1 thru -5 3.7.3-3 3.3.5.1-4 3.5.3-1 3.7.3-4 3.3.5.1-5 3.6.1.3-9 3.8.2-2 thru -4 3.3.5.1-8 thru -12 3.6.4.1-1 3.8.5-1 3.3.5.2-1 thru -5 3.6.4.1-2 3.8.5-2 3.3.5.3-1 thru -4 3.6.4.2-1 3.8.9-1 3.3.6.1-10 3.6.4.2-3 3.8.9-2 3.3.6.2-4 3.3.7.1-4

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1 Definitions .......................................................................................... 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors ............................................................................ 1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times .............................................................................. 1.3-1 1.4 Frequency.......................................................................................... 1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.1 SLs .................................................................................................... 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations ...................................................................................... 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ......... 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ........................ 3.0-5 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) ...................................................... 3.1.1-1 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies ..................................................................... 3.1.2-1 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY .......................................................... 3.1.3-1 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times ............................................................. 3.1.4-1 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators ................................................. 3.1.5-1 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control ...................................................................... 3.1.6-1 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System .......................................... 3.1.7-1 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves ......................................................................... 3.1.8-1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)............................................................................ 3.2.1-1 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) ............................ 3.2.2-1 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)............................... 3.2.3-1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.1.1-1 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation ............................. 3.3.1.2-1 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ............................................... 3.3.2.1-1 3.3.2.2 Feedwater System and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation ................................................... 3.3.2.2-1 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation .......................... 3.3.3.1-1 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ........................................................... 3.3.3.2-1 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.4.1-1 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation ............................. 3.3.4.2-1 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.5.1-1 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation .................................................................................. 3.3.5.2-1 3.3.5.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.5.3-1 (continued)

NMP2 i Amendment 91, 123, 135

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ............................ 3.3.6.1-1 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ....................... 3.3.6.2-1 3.3.7.1 Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) System Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.7.1-1 3.3.7.2 Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.3.7.2-1 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation ........................................... 3.3.8.1-1 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Logic ............................................................... 3.3.8.2-1 3.3.8.3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Scram Solenoids ............................................. 3.3.8.3-1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ...................................................... 3.4.1-1 3.4.2 Flow Control Valves (FCVs) .......................................................... 3.4.2-1 3.4.3 Jet Pumps ..................................................................................... 3.4.3-1 3.4.4 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)......................................................... 3.4.4-1 3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ......................................................... 3.4.5-1 3.4.6 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ............................... 3.4.6-1 3.4.7 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ...................................... 3.4.7-1 3.4.8 RCS Specific Activity ..................................................................... 3.4.8-1 3.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown ...................................................... 3.4.9-1 3.4.10 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown .................................................... 3.4.10-1 3.4.11 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits................................ 3.4.11-1 3.4.12 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure .................................................... 3.4.12-1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating ........................................................................ 3.5.1-1 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control ........................................................................... 3.5.2-1 3.5.3 RCIC System ................................................................................ 3.5.3-1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment .................................................................... 3.6.1.1-1 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks ..................................................... 3.6.1.2-1 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ............................. 3.6.1.3-1 3.6.1.4 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure ............................... 3.6.1.4-1 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ................................................................ 3.6.1.5-1 3.6.1.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray .............................. 3.6.1.6-1 3.6.1.7 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers .................... 3.6.1.7-1 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature....................................... 3.6.2.1-1 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ...................................................... 3.6.2.2-1 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling................................................................................. 3.6.2.3-1 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray.................................................................................... 3.6.2.4-1 (continued)

NMP2 ii Amendment 91

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a) The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate; b) The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common Mode failure (e.g.,

seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error),

for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

1. Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2. Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or

3. Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who is in continuous communication with the control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power.

c) The penetration flow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory; d) No additional draining events occur; and e) Realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in lieu of a calculated value.

(continued)

NMP2 1.1-3 Amendment

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS TIME initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial movement of the (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE associated turbine stop valves or turbine control TIME valves to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or (continued)

NMP2 1.1-4 Amendment 91, 125

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE 2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from (continued) sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE; and

c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

LINEAR HEAT GENERATION The LHGR shall be the heat generation rate per RATE (LHGR) unit length of fuel rod. It is the integral of the heat flux over the heat transfer area associated with the unit length.

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL A LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be a test TEST of all required logic components (i.e., all required relays and contacts, trip units, solid state logic elements, etc.) of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify OPERABILITY. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested.

MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER The MCPR shall be the smallest critical power RATIO (MCPR) ratio (CPR) that exists in the core for each class of fuel. The CPR is that power in the assembly that is calculated by application of the appropriate correlation(s) to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the actual assembly operating power.

MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of mode switch position, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closure bolt tensioning specified in Table 1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.

(continued)

NMP2 1.1-5 Amendment 91, 123, 145

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, division, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, division, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation.

These tests are:

a. Described in Chapter 14, Initial Test Program of the FSAR;

b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or

c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

PRESSURE AND The PTLR is the unit specific document that provides the TEMPERATURE LIMITS reactor vessel pressure and temperature limits, including REPORT (PTLR) heatup and cooldown rates, for the current reactor vessel fluence period. These pressure and temperature limits shall be determined for each fluence period in accordance with Specification 5.6.7.

RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer (RTP) rate to the reactor coolant of 3988 MWt.

REACTOR PROTECTION The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS TIME trip setpoint at the channel sensor until de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

(continued)

NMP2 1.1-6 Amendment 91, 140, 145

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) SDM shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical throughout the operating cycle assuming that:

a. The reactor is xenon free;

b. The moderator temperature is 68qF, corresponding to the most reactive state; and

c. All control rods are fully inserted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

With control rods not capable of being fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these control rods must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of the testing of one of the systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components during the interval specified by the Surveillance Frequency, so that all systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components are tested during n Surveillance Frequency intervals, where n is the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components in the associated function.

THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME consists RESPONSE TIME of two components:

a. The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until 80%

of the turbine bypass capacity is established; and

b. The time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until initial movement of the turbine bypass valve.

The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

NMP2 1.1-7 Amendment 91, 146

Definitions 1.1 Table 1.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

MODES REACTOR MODE AVERAGE REACTOR MODE TITLE SWITCH POSITION COOLANT TEMPERATURE (qF) 1 Power Operation Run NA 2 Startup Refuel(a) or Startup/Hot NA Standby 3 Hot Shutdown(a) Shutdown > 200 4 Cold Shutdown(a) Shutdown d 200 5 Refueling(b) Shutdown or Refuel NA (a) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

(b) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

NMP2 1.1-8 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. As required by B.1 ------------NOTE-----------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable and referenced in for Functions Table 3.3.5.1-1. 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND

NOTE-----------

Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.

B.2 Declare High Pressure 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from Core Spray (HPCS) discovery of System inoperable. loss of HPCS initiation capability AND (continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-2 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. As required by C.1 ------------NOTE------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable and referenced in for Functions Table 3.3.5.1-1. 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 1.i, 1.j, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h, and 2.i.

Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND C.2 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

D. As required by D.1 ------------NOTE-------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable if and referenced in HPCS pump suction is Table 3.3.5.1-1. not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare HPCS System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from inoperable. discovery of loss of HPCS initiation capability AND (continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-4 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2.1 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

OR D.2.2 Align the HPCS pump 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. As required by ------------NOTE------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable and referenced in for Functions Table 3.3.5.1-1. 1.k, 1.l, and 2.j.

E.1 Declare supported 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from feature(s) inoperable discovery of when its redundant loss of feature ECCS initiation initiation capability capability for is inoperable. feature(s) in both divisions AND E.2 Restore channel to 7 days OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-5 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.3 Calibrate the trip unit. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.3.5.1-8 Amendment 91, 152

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 157.8 Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 10.8 inches Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 ) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig (Boundary Isolation) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCS Pump Start - Time 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 12 seconds Delay Relay (Normal SR 3.3.5.1.5 Power) SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump A 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 7 seconds Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Normal Power) SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. LPCS Pump Start - Time 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 6.75 Delay Relay (Emergency SR 3.3.5.1.5 seconds Power) SR 3.3.5.1.6

h. LPCI Pump A 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 2 seconds Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Emergency SR 3.3.5.1.6 Power)

i. LPCS Differential 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 40 psid and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 98 psid (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (continued)

(a) Also required to initiate the associated diesel generator (DG).

NMP2 3.3.5.1-9 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. LPCI A and LPCS Subsystems (continued)

j. LPCI A Differential 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 70 psid and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 150 psid (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

k. LPCS Pump Discharge 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 1000 gpm Flow Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.3 d 1440 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

l. LPCI Pump A Discharge 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 770 gpm and Flow - Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 930 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

m. Manual Initiation 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA

2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 157.8 Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 10.8 inches Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 (continued)

(

(a) Also required to initiate the associated DG.

NMP2 3.3.5.1-10 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems (continued)

d. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig (Boundary Isolation) SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. LPCI Pump B 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 7 seconds Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Normal Power) SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. LPCI Pump C 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 12 seconds Start Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Normal Power) SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. LPCI Pump B 1,2,3, 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 2 second Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Emergency SR 3.3.5.1.6 Power)

h. LPCI Pump C 1,2,3 1 C SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 7 second Start - Time Delay SR 3.3.5.1.5 Relay (Emergency SR 3.3.5.1.6 Power)

i. LPCI B and C 1,2,3 1 per valve C SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 70 psid and Differential SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 150 psid Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.3 (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

j. LPCI Pump B and LPCI 1,2,3, 1 per pump E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 770 gpm Pump C Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 and Flow - Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.3 d 930 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

k. Manual Initiation 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA (continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.1-11 Amendment 91

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 5)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System

a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 4(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 101.8 Level - Low Low, SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches Level 2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

b. Drywell Pressure - High (b) 1,2,3 4(a) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

c. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 209.3 Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

d. Pump Suction 1,2,3, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 94.5 inches Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 H2O SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

e. Pump Suction 1,2,3, 1 D SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 5.5 seconds Pressure - Timer SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

f. Suppression Pool Water 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 d 200.7 ft Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

g. HPCS Pump Discharge 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 220 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

h. HPCS System Flow 1,2,3, 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 t 580 gpm and Rate - Low (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1.2 d 720 gpm SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

i. Manual Initiation (b) 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA (continued)

(a) Also required to initiate the associated DG.

(b) The injection functions of Drywell Pressure-High and Manual Initiation are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure less than 600 psig.

NMP2 3.3.5.1-12 Amendment 160

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.5.2-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel.

B. As required by Required B.1 Declare associated Immediately Action A.1 and referenced penetration flow path(s) in Table 3.3.5.2-1 incapable of automatic isolation.

AND B.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME. Immediately C. As required by Required C.1 Place channel in trip. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

(continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.2-1 Amendment

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. As required by Required D.1 Declare HPCS system 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced inoperable.

in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

OR D.2 Align the HPCS pump 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. As required by Required E.1 Declare HPCS system 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Action A.1 and referenced inoperable.

in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

AND Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

F. As required by Required F.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Action A.1 and referenced OPERABLE status.

in Table 3.3.5.2-1.

G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion ECCS injection/spray Time of Condition C, D, E, subsystem inoperable.

or F not met.

NMP2 3.3.5.2-2 Amendment

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function or the redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.3.5.2-3 Amendment

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Low Pressure Coolant Injection-A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

Subsystems

a. LPCS Differential 4, 5 1(a) C SR 3.3.5.2.1 40 psid and Pressure-Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 98 psid (Injection Permissive)

b. LPCI A Differential 4, 5 1(a) C SR 3.3.5.2.1 70 psid and Pressure-Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 150 psid (Injection Permissive)

c. LPCS Pump 4, 5 1 per pump F SR 3.3.5.2.1 1000 gpm Discharge Flow-Low (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 and (Bypass) 1440 gpm

d. LPCI Pump A 4, 5 SR 3.3.5.2.1 770 gpm and Discharge Flow-Low 1(a) F SR 3.3.5.2.2 930 gpm (Bypass)

e. Manual Initiation 4, 5 1 per F SR 3.3.5.2.3 N/A subsystem (a)

2. LPCI B and LPCI C Subsystems

a. LPCI B and C 4, 5 1 per pump C SR 3.3.5.2.1 70 psid and Differential (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 150 psid Pressure-Low (Injection Permissive)

b. LPCI Pump B and 4, 5 1 per pump F SR 3.3.5.2.1 770 gpm LPCI Pump C (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 and Discharge Flow-Low 930 gpm (Bypass)

c. Manual Initiation 4, 5 1 per F SR 3.3.5.2.3 N/A subsystem (continued)

(a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

NMP2 3.3.5.2-4 Amendment

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 2 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REFERENCED OTHER REQUIRED FROM SPECIFIED CHANNELS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

3. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System 4, 5 1 (a) E SR 3.3.5.2.1 209.3

a. Reactor Vessel SR 3.3.5.2.2 inches Water Level-High, Level 8 (b) (b) 1 (a) D SR 3.3.5.2.1 94.5 inches 4 ,5

b. Pump Suction SR 3.3.5.2.2 H2O Pressure-Low

c. HPCS Pump 4, 5 1 per pump F SR 3.3.5.2.1 220 psig Discharge (a) SR 3.3.5.2.2 Pressure-High (Bypass) (d)

d. HPCS System Flow 4, 5 F SR 3.3.5.2.1 > 580 gpm and Rate-Low (Bypass) 1 per pump SR 3.3.5.2.2 720 gpm (a)

f. Manual Initiation (d) 4, 5 F SR 3.3.5.2.3 N/A 1 per Subsystem (a)

4. RHR System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel (c) 2 in one B SR 3.3.5.2.1 157.8 inches Water Level-Low, Trip system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Level 3

5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel (c) 2 in one B SR 3.3.5.2.1 101.8 inches Water Level-Low Trip system SR 3.3.5.2.2 Low, Level 2 (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

(b) When HPCS is OPERABLE for compliance with LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control," and aligned to the condensate storage tank.

(c) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

(d) The injection functions of Drywell Pressure-High and Manual Initiation are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure less than 600 psig.

NMP2 3.3.5.2-5 Amendment

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.3 The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

2. When the Function 2 channels are placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of SR 3.5.3.4, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions is not required.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately inoperable. referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1 for the channel.

B. As required by B.1 Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from Required Action A.1 inoperable. discovery of and referenced in loss of RCIC Table 3.3.5.3-1. initiation capability AND B.2 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

(continued)

NMP2 3.3.5.3-1 Amendment 91

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. As required by C.1 Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Required Action A.1 OPERABLE status.

and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

D. As required by D.1 ------------NOTE------------

Required Action A.1 Only applicable if and referenced in RCIC pump suction is Table 3.3.5.3-1. not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare RCIC System 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from inoperable. discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability AND D.2.1 Place channel in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months trip.

OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months suction to the suppression pool.

E. Required Action and E.1 Declare RCIC System Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

NMP2 3.3.5.3-2 Amendment 91

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 4 and 5; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 2, and 3 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.3.3 Calibrate the trip units. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.3.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.3.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.3.5.3-3 Amendment 91 152

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 Table 3.3.5.3-1 (page 1 of 1)

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS PER FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.3.1 t 101.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.33 SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

2. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.3.1 d 209.3 inches Level - High, Level 8 SR 3.3.5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.3.3 SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

3. Pump Suction 2 D SR 3.3.5.3.1 t 101 inches Wg Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.3.2 SR 3.3.5.3.3 SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

4. Pump Suction 1 D SR 3.3.5.3.2 d 12.3 seconds Pressure - Timer SR 3.3.5.3.4 SR 3.3.5.3.5

5. Manual Initiation (a) 2 C SR 3.3.5.3.5 NA (a) The injection function of Manual Initiation is not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure less than 600 psig.

NMP2 3.3.5.3-4 Amendment 160

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

5. RHR SDC System Isolation (continued)

b. Reactor Vessel Water 3 2 J SR 3.3.6.1.1 t 157.8 inches Level - Low, Level 3 SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

c. Reactor Vessel 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 d 148 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.3 SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

d. Reactor Building Pipe 3 1 per area F SR 3.3.6.1.1 Chase Area SR 3.3.6.1.3 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 El. l 319 ft. d 144.5qF El. l 292 ft. d 140.5qF El. l 266 ft. d 140.5qF El. l 227 ft. d 140.5qF

e. Reactor Building 3 1 per area F SR 3.3.6.1.1 d 134qF General Area SR 3.3.6.1.3 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

f. Manual Initiation 1,2,3 4 G SR 3.3.6.1.6 NA NMP2 3.3.6.1-10 Amendment 91

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES AND REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 t 101.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.2.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.3 SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5

-3

3. Reactor Building Above the 1,2,3, 1 SR 3.3.6.2.1 d 2.46 x 10 Refuel Floor Exhaust (a) SR 3.3.6.2.2 Ci/cc Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5

-3

4. Reactor Building Below the 1,2,3, 1 SR 3.3.6.2.1 d 2.46 x 10 Refuel Floor Exhaust (a) SR 3.3.6.2.2 Ci/cc Radiation - High SR 3.3.6.2.4 SR 3.3.6.2.5 (a) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

NMP2 3.3.6.2-4 Amendment 91, 101

CREF System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Table 3.3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

Control Room Envelope Filtration System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.7.1.1 t 101.8 inches Level - Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5

2. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 C SR 3.3.7.1.1 d 1.88 psig SR 3.3.7.1.2 SR 3.3.7.1.3 SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5

-6

3. Main Control Room 1,2,3, 2 B SR 3.3.7.1.1 d 5.92 x 10 Ventilation Radiation SR 3.3.7.1.2 Ci/cc Monitor - High (a) SR 3.3.7.1.4 SR 3.3.7.1.5 (a) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

NMP2 3.3.7.1-4 Amendment 91, 125

RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic 3.3.8.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring - Logic LCO 3.3.8.2 Two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be OPERABLE for each RPS logic bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with both residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling (SDC) suction isolation valves open, MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both RPS logic A.1 Restore electric 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months buses with one power monitoring electric power assembly(s) to monitoring assembly OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

B. One or both RPS logic B.1 Restore electric 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months buses with both power monitoring electric power assemblies to monitoring assemblies OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

NMP2 3.3.8.2-1 Amendment 91

RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic 3.3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion restore one electric Time of Condition A or power monitoring B not met in MODE 4 or assembly to OPERABLE 5 with both RHR SDC status for each RPS suction isolation logic bus.

valves open.

OR D.2 Initiate action to Immediately isolate the RHR SDC System.

E. Required Action and E.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion fully insert all Time of Condition A or insertable control B not met in MODE 5 rods in core cells with any control rod containing one or withdrawn from a core more fuel assemblies.

cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

F. Required Action and F.1.1 Isolate the Immediately associated Completion associated secondary Time of Condition A or containment B not met during penetration flow movement of irradiated path(s).

fuel assemblies in the secondary containment OR or during CORE ALTERATIONS F.1.2 Declare associated Immediately

. secondary containment isolation valves inoperable.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.3.8.2-2 Amendment 91

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure d 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE --------------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCS.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS A.1 Restore low pressure 7 days injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. High Pressure Core B.1 Verify by Immediately Spray (HPCS) System administrative means inoperable. RCIC System is OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE.

AND B.2 Restore HPCS System 14 days to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.5.1-1 Amendment 91, 109,

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.2 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER INVENTORY CONTROL LCO 3.5.2 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to top of active fuel (TAF) shall be 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND One ECCS injection/spray subsystem shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required ECCS A.1 Restore required ECCS 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months injection/spray injection/spray subsystem subsystem inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Initiate action to establish a Immediately associated Completion method of water injection Time of Condition A not capable of operating met. without offsite electrical power.

C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C.1 Verify secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-1 Amendment 91

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.2 Verify each secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.3 Verify one standby gas 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME.

D. DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . ----------NOTE------------

Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power.

D.1 Initiate action to establish Immediately an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level > TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND D.2 Initiate action to establish Immediately secondary containment boundary.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-2 Amendment 91

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.3 Initiate action to isolate Immediately each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room.

AND D.4 Initiate action to verify one Immediately standby gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation.

E. Required Action and E.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion DRAIN TIME to 36 Time of Condition C or hours.

D not met.

OR DRAIN TIME < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify DRAIN TIME 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-3 Amendment 91, 152

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.2 Verify, for a required low pressure ECCS In accordance with injection/spray subsystem, the suppression pool the Surveillance water level is 195 ft. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.3 Verify, for a required High Pressure Core Spray In accordance with (HPCS) System, the: the Surveillance Frequency Control

a. Suppression pool water level is 195 ft. Program OR

b. Condensate storage tank B water level is 26.9 ft.

SR 3.5.2.4 Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation the Surveillance are sufficiently filled with water. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.5 -----------------------------NOTE------------------------------

Not required to be met for system vent paths opened under administrative control.

Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray In accordance with subsystem each manual, power operated, and the Surveillance automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, Frequency Control sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the Program correct position.

(continued)

NMP2 3.5.2-4 Amendment 91, 150, 152

RPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.6 -----------------------------NOTE------------------------------ In accordance with Not required to be met for ECCS pumps aligned for the Surveillance shutdown cooling. Frequency Control

Program Operate the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line for 10 minutes.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verify each valve credited for automatically isolating In accordance with a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation the Surveillance position on an actual or simulated isolation signal. Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.8 -----------------------------NOTE------------------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem In accordance with actuates on a manual initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.5.2-5 Amendment 91, 152

RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System A.1 Verify by Immediately inoperable. administrative means High Pressure Core Spray System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System 14 days to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Reduce reactor steam 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months dome pressure to 150 psig.

(continued)

NMP2 3.5.3-1 Amendment 91, 109

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued) E.3 Perform SR 3.6.1.3.6 Once per 92 days for the resilient seal purge exhaust valves closed to comply with Required Action E.1.

F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, C, D, or E not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. F.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months G. Required Action and G.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion restore valve(s) to Time of Condition A, OPERABLE status.

B, C, D, or E not met for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during MODE 4 or 5.

NMP2 3.6.1.3-9 Amendment 91,

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment A.1 Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, containment to 2, or 3. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.1-1 Amendment 91, 101

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Secondary containment C.1 -----------NOTE-----------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of recently irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the ------------------------------

secondary containment

. Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify secondary containment vacuum is In accordance with t 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify all secondary containment In accordance with equipment hatches are closed and sealed. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.1-2 Amendment 91, 101, 152,

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

NOTES -----------------------------------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable. one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND (continued)

NMP2 3.6.4.2-1 Amendment 91, 101,

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and -------------NOTE------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable.

or B not met during ---------------------------------

movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately secondary containment. recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

NMP2 3.6.4.2-3 Amendment 91, 101.

SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and ---------------NOTE----------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A ---------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately fuel assemblies in the subsystem in secondary containment. operation.

OR (continued)

,NMP2 3.6.4.3-1 Amendment 91, 101,

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

D. Two SGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 -----------NOTE-----------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of recently irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the -------------------------------

secondary containment, or during OPDRVs. Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

NMP2 3.6.4.3-2 Amendment 91, 101,

SGT System 3.6.4.3 ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each SGT subsystem for In accordance with t 10 continuous hours with heaters the Surveillance operating. Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates on an In accordance with actual or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.4 Verify each SGT decay heat removal air In accordance with inlet valve can be opened. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program NMP2 3.6.4.3-3 Amendment 91, 101, 152,

CREF System 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) System LCO 3.7.2 Two CREF subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE --------------------------------------------

The control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREF subsystem A.1 Restore CREF 7 days inoperable for reasons other subsystem(s) to than Condition B. OPERABLE status.

OR Two CREF subsystems inoperable with safety function maintained.

B. One or more CREF B.1 Initiate action to Immediately subsystems inoperable due implement mitigating to inoperable CRE boundary actions.

in MODES 1, 2, or 3.

AND B.2 Verify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary 90 days to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.2-1 Amendment 91, 97, 125, 126,

CREF System 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D. Required Action and -----------------NOTE-----------------

associated Completion Time LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

of Condition A not met ------------------------------------------

during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in D.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately the secondary containment. components of CREF subsystem(s) equivalent to a single CREF subsystem in emergency pressurization mode.

OR D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

E. Two CREF subsystems E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable with safety function not maintained in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition B.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.2-2 Amendment 91, 97, 125, 126,

CREF System 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two CREF subsystems ------------------NOTE------------------

inoperable with safety LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

function not maintained --------------------------------------------

during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately the secondary containment. recently irradiated OR fuel assemblies in the secondary One or more CREF containment.

subsystems inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Operate each CREF subsystem for t 1 continuous In accordance with hour. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.2.2 Perform required CREF System filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing with the VFTP Program (VFTP).

SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each CREF subsystem actuates on an actual In accordance with or simulated initiation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

NMP2 3.7.2-3 Amendment 91, 95, 97, 125, 126, 152,

Control Room Envelope AC System 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Control Room Envelope Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3.7.3 Two control room envelope AC subsystems for the areas listed below shall be OPERABLE:

a. Main Control Room area; and

b. Relay Room area.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room A.1 Restore control room 30 days envelope AC subsystem envelope AC for the Main Control subsystem for the Room area inoperable. Main Control Room area to OPERABLE status.

B. One control room B.1 Restore control room 30 days envelope AC subsystem envelope AC for the Relay Room subsystem for the area inoperable. Relay Room area to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.3-1 Amendment 91, 125, 128,

Control Room Envelope AC System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and ------------------NOTE-------------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A ---------------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently F.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies control room envelope in the secondary AC subsystem for the containment Main Control Room area in operation.

OR F.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

G. Required Action and ------------------NOTE-------------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition B ---------------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently G.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies control room envelope in the secondary AC subsystem for containment . the Relay Room area in operation.

OR G.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(continued)

NMP2 3.7.3-3 Amendment 91, 125,128,

Control Room Envelope AC System 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. Required Action and ------------------NOTE-------------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition C or D ---------------------------------------------

not met during movement of recently irradiated fuel H.1 Suspend movement of Immediately assemblies in the recently irradiated fuel secondary containment. assemblies in the secondary containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify each control room envelope AC In accordance with subsystem has the capability to remove the the Surveillance assumed heat load for the Main Control Room Frequency Control area and the Relay Room area. Program NMP2 3.7.3-4 Amendment 128, 152,

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS

NOTE ------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LCO Item a. not met. ------------------NOTE-------------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, when any required division is de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

NMP2 3.8.2-2 Amendment 91,

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. LCO Item b. not met. B.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND B.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND B.3 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

C. LCO Item c. not met. C.1 Declare High Pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Core Spray System inoperable.

NMP2 3.8.2-3 Amendment 91,

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1 ------------------------------- NOTES ----------------------------

1. The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.7 through SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.11 through SR 3.8.1.14, SR 3.8.1.16, and SR 3.8.1.17.

2. SR 3.8.1.10 and SR 3.8.1.17 are not required to be met when associated ECCS subsystem(s) are not required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control."

For AC sources required to be OPERABLE, the In accordance SRs of Specification 3.8.1, except with applicable SR 3.8.1.15 and SR 3.8.1.18, are SRs applicable.

NMP2 3.8.2-4 Amendment 91,

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 The following DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a. One Division 1 or Division 2 DC electrical power subsystem; and

b. The Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem, when the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.9, Distribution System - Shutdown.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

NOTE --------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electric power required feature(s) subsystems inoperable. inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(continued)

NMP2 3.8.5-1 Amendment 91, 103,

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

AND A.2.3 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1 -----------------------------------NOTE----------------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.7 and SR 3.8.4.8.

For DC electrical power subsystems required In accordance to be OPERABLE the following SRs are with applicable applicable: SRs SR 3.8.4.1, SR 3.8.4.2, SR 3.8.4.3, SR 3.8.4.4, SR 3.8.4.5, SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.

NMP2 3.8.5-2 Amendment 91,

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Shutdown LCO 3.8.9 The necessary portions of the Division 1, Division 2, and Division 3 AC and DC and the Division 1 and Division 2 120 VAC uninterruptible electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or 120 VAC supported required uninterruptible feature(s) electrical power inoperable.

distribution subsystems inoperable. OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(continued)

NMP2 3.8.9-1 Amendment 91,

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.9 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

AND A.2.3 Initiate actions to restore required AC, DC, and 120 VAC uninterruptible electrical power distribution Immediately subsystems to OPERABLE status.

AND A.2.4 Declare associated required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and power In accordance with availability to required AC, DC, and the Surveillance 120 VAC uninterruptible electrical power Frequency Control distribution subsystems. Program NMP2 3.8.9-2 Amendment 91, 152,

ATTACHMENT 4 License Amendment Request Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-41 O Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," Revision 2 Proposed Technical Specification Bases Marked-Up Pages (for information only)

Bases Pages Bi B 3.3.7.1-3 B 3.6.1.3-3 Bii B 3.3.7.1-5 B 3.6.1.3-4 B 3.3.5.1-11 thru -22 B 3.3.8.2-4 B 3.6.1.3-12 B 3.3.5.1-27 B 3.3.8.2-6 B 3.6.2.2-2 B 3.3.5.1-29 B 3.5.1-1 B 3.6.4.1-2 B 3.3.5.1-30 B 3.5.1-5 B 3.6.4.1-3 B 3.3.5.1-32 B 3.5.2-1 B 3.6.4.2-2 B 3.3.5.1-37 B 3.5.2-2 B 3.6.4.2-5 B 3.3.5.2-1 thru -14 B 3.5.2-3 B 3.6.4.3-2 B 3.3.5.3-1 thru -13 B 3.5.2-4 B 3.6.4.3-3 B 3.3.6.1-26 B 3.5.2-5 B 3.6.4.3-4 B 3.3.6.1-27 B 3.5.2-6 B 3.3.6.2-4 B 3.5.3-1 B 3.3.6.2-6 B 3.5.3-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs ...................................................................... B 2.0-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ............................ B 2.0-6 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ...... B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ..................... B 3.0-16 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) ................................................... B 3.1.1-1 B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies.................................................................. B 3.1.2-1 B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY ....................................................... B 3.1.3-1 B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times .......................................................... B 3.1.4-1 B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators .............................................. B 3.1.5-1 B 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control ................................................................... B 3.1.6-1 B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System ....................................... B 3.1.7-1 B 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves ............................................................................... B 3.1.8-1 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)......................................................................... B 3.2.1-1 B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) ......................... B 3.2.2-1 B 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) ........................... B 3.2.3-1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.1.1-1 B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation .......................... B 3.3.1.2-1 B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ............................................ B 3.3.2.1-1 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater System and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation ................................................ B 3.3.2.2-1 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.3.1-1 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ........................................................ B 3.3.3.2-1 B 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation ............................................. B 3.3.4.1-1 B 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.4.2-1 B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.5.1-1 B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation .......................................................................... B 3.3.5.2-1 B 3.3.5.23 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

System Instrumentation .................................................... B 3.3.5.23-1 B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.6.1-1 B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.6.2-1 (continued)

NMP2 Bi Revision 0, 9 (A109) 22, 24 (A123),

33 (A135)

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.7.1 Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) System Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.7.1-1 B.3.3.7.2 Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation Instrumentation ................................................................. B 3.3.7.2-1 B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation ........................................ B 3.3.8.1-1 B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring Logic ................................................ B 3.3.8.2-1 B 3.3.8.3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring Scram Solenoids .............................. B 3.3.8.3-1 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ................................................... B 3.4.1-1 B 3.4.2 Flow Control Valves (FCVs) ....................................................... B 3.4.2-1 B 3.4.3 Jet Pumps .................................................................................. B 3.4.3-1 B 3.4.4 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) ..................................................... B 3.4.4-1 B 3.4.5 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ...................................................... B 3.4.5-1 B 3.4.6 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ............................ B 3.4.6-1 B 3.4.7 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ................................... B 3.4.7-1 B 3.4.8 RCS Specific Activity ................................................................. B 3.4.8-1 B 3.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System Hot Shutdown .................................................. B 3.4.9-1 B 3.4.10 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System Cold Shutdown................................................. B 3.4.10-1 B 3.4.11 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits ............................ B 3.4.11-1 B 3.4.12 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ................................................. B 3.4.12-1 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL (WIC), AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.1 ECCS Operating .................................................................... B 3.5.1-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control ...................... B 3.5.2-1 B 3.5.3 RCIC System ............................................................................. B 3.5.3-1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment ................................................................. B 3.6.1.1-1 B 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks ................................................. B 3.6.1.2-1 B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ......................... B 3.6.1.3-1 B 3.6.1.4 Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure ............................ B 3.6.1.4-1 B 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ............................................................ B 3.6.1.5-1 B 3.6.1.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray ........................... B 3.6.1.6-1 B 3.6.1.7 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ................ B 3.6.1.7-1 B 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature ................................... B 3.6.2.1-1 B 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ................................................... B 3.6.2.2-1 B 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling.............................................................................. B 3.6.2.3-1 B 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ................................................................................ B 3.6.2.4-1 B 3.6.3.1 Deleted....................................................................................... B 3.6.3.1-1 B 3.6.3.2 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration ............................ B 3.6.3.2-1 (continued)

NMP2 B ii Revision 0, 25 (A124)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, 2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, SAFETY ANALYSES, Level 3 and Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 LCO, and (continued)

APPLICABILITY (LCO 3.3.1.1, "RPS Instrumentation,") since the sensors are common to the RPS instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function per associated Division are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated LPCI subsystem is required to be OPERABLE, to ensure that no single instrumentation failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function per associated Division are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE, to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. (Two channels input to LPCS, LPCI A, and the Division 1 DG while the other two channels input to LPCI B, LPCI C, and the Division 2 DG.) Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d. Drywell Pressure - High and Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation)

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure - High Function and certain RHR valves are closed upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. Although, no credit is taken for the Drywell Pressure - High Function to start the low pressure ECCS in any design basis accident or transient analysis (thus Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Function is also not assumed), they are retained for overall redundancy and diversity as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis. In addition, credit is taken for the Drywell Pressure - High Function to start the associated DGs (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-11 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d. Drywell Pressure - High and Drywell SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Drywell Pressure - High Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. The Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Drywell Pressure - High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1) since the sensors are common to the RPS instrumentation.

The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the LPCS and LPCI Drywell Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation.

(Two channels input to LPCS, LPCI A, and the Division 1 DG while the other two channels input to LPCI B, LPCI C, and the Division 2 DG.) The Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) is required to be OPERABLE when the associated LPCI subsystem is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure - High and Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Functions are not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to the Drywell Pressure - High and Drywell Pressure - High (Boundary Isolation) Functions setpoint.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h. LPCS and LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal and Emergency Power)

The purpose of these time delays is to stagger the start of the ECCS pumps that are in each of Divisions 1 and 2, thus limiting the starting transients on the 4.16 kV emergency buses. The Time Delay Relay (Normal Power) Function is necessary when power is being supplied from offsite power, (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-12 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h. LPCS and LPCI Pump SAFETY ANALYSES, Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal and Emergency Power)

LCO, and (continued)

APPLICABILITY and the Time Delay Relay (Emergency Power) Function is necessary when power is being supplied from the standby power sources (DG). The Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal and Emergency Power) are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation. That is, the analysis assumes that the pumps will initiate when required.

There are four Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal Power) and four Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Emergency Power),

one of each type in each of the low pressure ECCS pump start logic circuits. While each time delay relay is dedicated to a single pump start logic, a single failure of a Pump Start - Time Delay Relay (Normal or Emergency Power) could result in the failure of the two low pressure ECCS pumps, powered from the same emergency bus, to perform their intended function within the assumed ECCS RESPONSE TIMES (e.g., as in the case where both ECCS pumps on one emergency bus start simultaneously due to an inoperable time delay relay). This still leaves two of the four low pressure ECCS pumps OPERABLE; thus, the single failure criterion is met (i.e., loss of one instrument does not preclude ECCS initiation). The Allowable Values for the Pump Start - Time Delay Relays (Normal and Emergency Power) are chosen to be short enough so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each channel of Pump Start - Time Delay Relay (Normal and Emergency Power) Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated low pressure ECCS subsystem is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.i, 1.j, 2.i. LPCS and LPCI Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Low differential pressure across the injection valves signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems maximum design pressure. The Differential (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-13 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.i, 1.j, 2.i. LPCS and LPCI Differential Pressure - Low SAFETY ANALYSES, (Injection Permissive) (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. In addition, the Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the pressure difference across the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressurizing the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Each channel of Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) Function (one per valve) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.k, 1.l, 2.j. LPCS and LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not sufficiently open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump.

The LPCI and LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valves to ensure that the low pressure ECCS flows assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-14 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.k, 1.l, 2.j. LPCS and LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low SAFETY ANALYSES, (Bypass) (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

One differential pressure transmitter per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems flow rate. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open when flow is low with the pump running. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for approximately 8 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the RHR shutdown cooling mode. The Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

Each channel of Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) Function (one LPCS channel and three LPCI channels) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE, to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the ECCS function. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.m, 2.k. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation switch and push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one switch and push button (with two channels per switch and push button) for each of the two Divisions of low pressure ECCS (i.e., Division 1 ECCS, LPCS and LPCI A; Division 2 ECCS, LPCI B and LPCI C).

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-15 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.m, 2.k. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any APPLICABILITY accident or transient analyses in the USAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the switch and push buttons. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (two channels per division) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

High Pressure Core Spray System 3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCS System and associated DG is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating HPCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with HPCS is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). However, no credit is taken in this analysis to start the HPCS DG. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is chosen such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System flow with HPCS (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-16 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.b. Drywell Pressure - High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCS System and associated DG are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure - High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. Although no credit is taken for the Drywell Pressure - High Function to start the HPCS System in any DBA or transient analyses, credit is taken for this Function to start the associated DG; that is, HPCS is assumed to be initiated on Reactor Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 while the associated DG is assumed to be initiated on Drywell Pressure - High. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Drywell Pressure - High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE, except when reactor steam dome pressure is less than 600 psig due to the hot calibration/cold operation level error. Thus, four channels of the HPCS Drywell Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure - High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the drywell to the Drywell Pressure - High Function setpoint.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCS System.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-17 Revision 0, 49 (A160)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water APPLICABILITY inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no (continued) danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the HPCS injection valve to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function is not credited in the accident and transient analyses. It was retained since it is a potentially significant contributor to risk, thus it meets Criterion 4 of Reference 4.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for HPCS are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters from the wide range water level measurement instrumentation.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to isolate flow from the HPCS System prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.d, 3.e. Pump Suction Pressure - Low and Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Low pump suction pressure, which is an indication of low level in the CST, indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source.

Normally the suction valves between HPCS and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCS initiation signal, water for HPCS injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the pump suction pressure (indicating low water level in the CST) falls below a preselected level for a preselected time, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes.

This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. The Functions are (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-18 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.d, 3.e. Pump Suction Pressure - Low and Pump Suction SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure - Timer (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCS) since the analyses assume that the HPCS suction source is the suppression pool.

Pump Suction Pressure - Low signals are initiated from two pressure transmitters. The Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

The pressure at which the transfer occurs also ensures sufficient volume of water is used by the HPCS pump before the transfer occurs and is analytically determined to prevent the effects of vortexing. The Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is initiated by a single time delay relay. While the Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is provided to prevent spurious suction source automatic swaps, the Allowable Value is low enough such that the automatic suction swap from the CST to the suppression pool will occur before adequate pump suction head is lost.

Two channels of the Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS swap to suppression pool source. In addition, one channel of the Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to fulfill the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, HPCS is aligned to the CST, and the CST water level is not within the limits of SR 3.5.2.2. With CST water level within limits, a sufficient supply of water exists for injection to minimize the consequences of a vessel draindown event.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.f. Suppression Pool Water Level - High Excessively high suppression pool water could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the S/RVs. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-19 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.f. Suppression Pool Water Level - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and HPCS from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the APPLICABILITY possibility of HPCS continuing to provide additional water from a source outside containment. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. This Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCS) since the analyses assume that the HPCS suction source is the suppression pool.

Suppression Pool Water Level - High signals are initiated from two differential pressure transmitters. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function is chosen to ensure that HPCS will be aligned for suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression pool design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS swap to suppression pool source. In MODES 4 and 5, the Function is not required to be OPERABLE since the reactor is depressurized and vessel blowdown, which could cause the design values of the containment to be exceeded, cannot occur. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.g, 3.h. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the HPCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not sufficiently open.

The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow and high pump discharge pressure are sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump or the discharge pressure is low (indicating the HPCS pump is not operating). The HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) and HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valve to ensure that the ECCS flow assumed during the transients and accidents (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-20 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.g, 3.h. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and SAFETY ANALYSES, HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

One differential pressure transmitter is used to detect the HPCS System's flow rate. The logic is arranged such that the transmitter causes the minimum flow valve to open, provided the HPCS pump discharge pressure, sensed by another transmitter, is high enough (indicating the pump is operating). The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. (The valve will also close upon HPCS pump discharge pressure decreasing below the setpoint.)

The HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core. The HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure that the valve will not be open when the pump is not operating.

One channel of each Function is required to be OPERABLE when the HPCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.i. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation switch and push button channels introduce a signal into the HPCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one switch and push button (with two channels) for the HPCS System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the USAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-21 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.i. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the APPLICABILITY channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the switch and push button. Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the HPCS System is required to be OPERABLE, except when reactor steam dome pressure is less than 600 psig due to the hot calibration/cold operation level error. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

Automatic Depressurization System 4.a, 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen high enough to allow time for the low pressure core spray and injection systems to initiate and provide adequate cooling.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (Two channels input to ADS trip system A while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B). Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-22 Revision 0, 49 (A160)

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, B.3.1, and B.3.2 (continued)

However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both Divisions, this results in the affected portions in both Divisions of ECCS and DG being concurrently declared inoperable. For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic initiation capability (i.e., loss of automatic start capability for Functions 3.a and 3.b) is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system.

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.3.1 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped channels (and associated flow path(s) unisolated, as appropriate) must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1 and Required Action B.2), the two Required Actions are only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower.

Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Action B.3.1) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. Notes are also provided (Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in both Divisions (e.g., any Division 1 ECCS and Division 2 ECCS) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same variable as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCS System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-27 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) and 2.i (i.e., low pressure ECCS). For Functions 1.e, 1.f, 2.e, and 2.f, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if the Function 1.e or 1.f channel concurrent with Function 2.e or 2.f channel are inoperable. For Functions 1.g, 1.h, 2.g, and 2.h, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if the Function 1.g or 1.h channel concurrent with Function 2.g or 2.h channel are inoperable. For Functions 1.i, 1.j, and 2.i, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if three of the four channels associated with Functions 1.i, 1.j, and 2.i are inoperable. In addition, a Pump Start - Time Delay Relay may be inoperable in such a fashion that the associated offsite circuit or DG is affected (e.g., as in the case where two loads start outside the proper load block interval). If this is the case, the associated ACTIONS of LCO 3.8.1 or LCO 3.8.2, as appropriate, need to be taken.

Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action C.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated Division to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both Divisions, this results in the affected portions in both Divisions being concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, and 2.h, the affected portion of the Divisions are LPCS, LPCI A, LPCI B, and LPCI C. For Functions 1.i, 1.j, and 2.i, the affected portions of the Division are only those low pressure ECCS pumps directly affected by the inoperable channel (i.e.,

whose injection valve will not actuate properly due to an inoperable channel).

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1), the Required Action is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-29 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

The Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.e, 1.f, 1.g, 1.h, 1.i, 1.j, 2.e, 2.f, 2.g, 2.h, and 2.i. The Required Action is not applicable to Functions 1.m, 2.k, and 3.i (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis.

Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed.

Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of the Function was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both Divisions (i.e., any Division 1 ECCS and Division 2 ECCS) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same variable as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-30 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued) and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the HPCS suction piping),

Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 and E.2 Required Action E.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the LPCS and LPCI Pump Discharge Flow Low (Bypass)

Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). For Required Action E.1, the features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.k, 1.l, and 2.j (i.e., low pressure ECCS).

Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if three of the four channels associated with Functions 1.k, 1.l, and 2.j are inoperable. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action E.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected low pressure ECCS pump to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for more than one low pressure ECCS pump are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels of the low pressure ECCS pumps, this results in the affected low pressure ECCS pumps being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both Divisions. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action E.1), Required Action E.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required Action E.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. A Note is also provided (Note 2 to Required Action E.1) to delineate that Required Action E.1 is only applicable to low pressure ECCS Functions. Required Action E.1 is not applicable to HPCS Functions 3.g and 3.h since the loss of one channel results (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-32 Revision 0

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that REQUIREMENTS when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for (continued) performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months as follows: (a) for Functions 3.e, 3.g, 3.h, and 3.i; and (b) for Functions other than 3.e, 3.g, 3.h, and 3.i provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on reliability analyses (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.1-37 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded.

Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation,"

or LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation".

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur.

Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

NMP2 B 3.3.5.2-1 Revision 0

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control, and the definition of DRAIN TIME.

There are functions that are required for manual initiation or operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 and other functions that support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level.

The RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation supports operation of low pressure core spray (LPCS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), and high pressure core spray (HPCS). The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2.

APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not SAFETY ANALYSIS, required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety LCO, and analysis. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 APPLICABILITY to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur.

A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile piping systems.

Instead, an event is postulated in which a single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually initiated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.2-2 Revision 0

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE The specific Application Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability SAFETY ANALYSIS, discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Low Pressure Coolant Injection - A (LPCI) and Low Pressure Core (continued) Spray (LPCS) Subsystems 1.a, 1.b, 2.a. LPCS and LPCI Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Low differential pressure across the injection valves signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems maximum design pressure. The Differential Pressure -

Low (Injection Permissive) is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. In addition, the Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the pressure difference across the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressurizing the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Each channel of Differential Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Function (one per valve) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation.

1.c, 1.d, 2.b. LPCS and LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE The LPCI and LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

SAFETY ANALYSIS, Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing LCO, and the minimum flow valves to ensure that the low pressure ECCS APPLICABILITY flows assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed (continued) in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

One differential pressure transmitter per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems' floew rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open when flow is low with the pump running. The logic will close the minimum flow valves once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for approximately 8 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling mode.

The Pump Discharge Flow - Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

One channel of the Pump Discharge Flow - Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated LPCS or LPCI pump is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 to ensure the pumps are capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel when manually initiated.

1.e, 2.c. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation switch and push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one switch and push button (with two channels per switch and push button) for each of the two Divisions of low pressure ECCS (i.e., Division 1 ECCS, LPCS and LPCI A; Division 2 ECCS, LPCI B and LPCI C). The only time the manual initiation function is required to be OPERABLE is that associated with the ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (two channels per division) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 High Pressure Core Spray System 3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel.

Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the HPCS injection valve to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for HPCS are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters from the wide range water level measurement instrumentation. One channel associated with the HPCS System required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 is required to be OPERABLE.

The reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to isolate flow from the HPCS System prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.

One channel of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated HPCS is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 to ensure HPCS is capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel when manually initiated.

3.b. Pump Suction Pressure - Low Low pump suction pressure, which is an indication of low level in the CST, indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valves between HPCS and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCS initiation signal, water for HPCS injection would be taken from the CST.

However, if the pump suction pressure (indicating low water level in the CST) falls below a preselected level for a preselected time, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. The Functions are implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCS) since the analyses assume that the HPCS suction source is the suppression pool.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Pump Suction Pressure - Low signals are initiated from two pressure SAFETY ANALYSIS, transmitters. The Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function Allowable LCO, and Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while APPLICABILITY water is being taken from the CST. The pressure at which the (continued) transfer occurs also ensures sufficient volume of water is used by the HPCS pump before the transfer occurs and is analytically determined to prevent the effects of vortexing. The Pump Suction Pressure -

Timer Function is initiated by a single time delay relay. While the Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is provided to prevent spurious suction source automatic swaps, the Allowable Value is low enough such that the automatic suction swap from the CST to the suppression pool will occur before adequate pump suction head is lost.

One channel of the Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS swap to suppression pool source. In addition, one channel of the Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to fulfill the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, HPCS is aligned to the CST, and the CST water level is not within the limits of SR 3.5.2.2. With CST water level within limits, a sufficient supply of water exists for injection to minimize the consequences of a vessel draindown event. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.c, 3.d. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the HPCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow and high pump discharge pressure are (continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate SAFETY ANALYSIS, is adequate to protect the pump or the discharge pressure is low LCO, and (indicating the HPCS pump is not operating). The HPCS APPLICABILITY System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) and HPCS Pump Discharge (continued) Pressure - High (Bypass) Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valve to ensure that the ECCS flow assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

One differential pressure transmitter is used to detect the HPCS Systems' flow rate. The logic is arranged such that the transmitter causes the minimum flow valve to open, provided the HPCS pump discharge pressure, sensed by another transmitter, is high enough (indicating the pump is operating). The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. (The valve will also close upon HPCS pump discharge pressure decreasing below the setpoint.)

The HPCS System Flow Rate - Low and HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is high enough to ensure that pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

The HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure that the valve will not be open when the pump is not operating.

One channel of each Function associated with one pump is required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 in MODES 4 and 5.

3.e. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation switch and push button channels introduce a signal into the HPCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one switch and push button (with two channels) for the HPCS System.

One channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated ECCS subsystem is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE RHR System Isolation SAFETY ANALYSIS, LCO, and 4.a - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low. Level 3 APPLICABILITY (continued) The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated RHR penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from two differential pressure transmitters (two per trip system) that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

This Function isolates the Group 11 valves.

Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation 5.a - Reactor Vessel Water level - Low Low, Level 2 The definition of DRAIN TIME allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES APPLICABLE Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 is initiated from four SAFETY ANALYSIS, differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between LCO, and the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and APPLICABILITY the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

(continued) While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level

- Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME.

This Function isolates the Group 8 valves.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

RHR System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3, and Reactor Water Cleanup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating Drain Time. If the instrumentation is inoperable, Required Action B.1 directs an immediate declaration that the associated penetration flow path(s) are incapable of automatic isolation. Required Action B.2 directs calculation of DRAIN TIME. The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow paths.

C.1 Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual initiation functions. If this permissive is inoperable, manual initiation of ECCS is prohibited. Therefore, the permissive must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . With the permissive in the trip condition, manual initiation may be performed. Prior to placing the permissive in the tripped condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to inject water into the RPV.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate any discovered inoperabilities and to place the channel in trip.

D.1 and D.2 Required Actions D.1 and D.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the same Function result in a loss of automatic suction swap for the HPCS system from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool.

The HPCS system must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the HPCS pump suction must be aligned to the suppression pool, since, if aligned, the function is already performed.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes the risk of HPCS being needed without an adequate water source while allowing time for restoration or alignment of HPCS pump suction to the suppression pool.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

Required Actions E.1 and E.2 apply when the HPCS Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 function is inoperable. If the function is inoperable and the channel is tripped, the HPCS pump discharge valve will not open and HPCS injection is prevented. The HPCS system must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and the function must be restored to Operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is provided to declare the HPCS System inoperable. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completion Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the HPCS and to locally open the discharge valve.

F.1 If LPCI or LPCS Discharge Flow - Low bypass function or HPCS System Discharge Pressure - High or Flow Rate - Low bypass function is inoperable, there is a risk that the associated ECCS pump could overheat when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. In this condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to ensure the pump does not overheat. If a manual initiation function is inoperable, the ECCS subsystem pumps can be started manually and the valves can be opened manually, but this is not the preferred condition.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completion Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the ECCS pumps and open the injection valves and to manually ensure the pump does not overheat.

G.1 With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions C, D, E, or ) not met, the associated ECCS injection/

spray subsystem may be incapable of performing the intended function, and must be declared inoperable immediately.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning or the SRs, the SRs for each RPV Water REQUIREMENTS Inventory Control instrument Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on reliability analyses (Refs. 6 and

7) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.2.3 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. Information Notice 84-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 92-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," May 1993.

5. Information Notice 94-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1," July 1994.

(continued)

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RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.

5.2 REFERENCES

6. NEDC-30936-P-A, BWR Owners Group Technical (continued) Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part2, December 1988

7. NEDC-30851-P-A, Supplement 2, Technical Specifications Improvement Analyiss for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation, March 1989 NMP2 B 3.3.5.2-14 Revision 0

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is insufficient or unavailable, such that RCIC System initiation occurs and maintains sufficient reactor water level such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System."

The RCIC System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2. The variable is monitored by four differential pressure transmitters that are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement. The logic can also be initiated by use of a manual switch and push button, whose two contacts are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic. Once initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.

The RCIC test line isolation valve is closed on a RCIC initiation signal to allow full system flow to the reactor vessel.

The RCIC System also monitors the RCIC pump suction pressure, which provides an indication of the water level in the condensate storage tank A (CST), since this is the initial source of water for RCIC operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction valve from the suppression pool is open. If the pump suction pressure (water level in the CST) falls below a preselected pressure for a preselected time, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two pressure transmitters are used to (continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES BACKGROUND detect low pump suction pressure (water level in the CST)

(continued) and a single time delay relay is used to provide a short delay in the automatic suction swap feature. Either transmitter along with its associated trip unit can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close (one-out-of-two logic). Once low pump suction pressure is detected, a time delay relay times out, then the automatic suction swap occurs. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip (one-out-of-two taken twice logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply valve closes (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve).

The RCIC System restarts if vessel level again drops to the low level initiation point (Level 2).

APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System, to provide makeup SAFETY ANALYSES, coolant to the reactor, is to respond to transient LCO, and events. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature APPLICABILITY System and no credit is taken in the safety analysis for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the RCIC System, and therefore its instrumentation, meets Criterion 4 of Reference 1. Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.23-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL (continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES APPLICABLE CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less SAFETY ANALYSES, conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its LCO, and Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if APPLICABILITY its actual trip setpoint is not within its required (continued) Allowable Value.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits by accounting for calibration uncertainty, process measurement uncertainty, primary element uncertainty, instrument uncertainty, and applicable environmental effects. The trip setpoints are derived from the analytical limits by accounting for calibration uncertainty, process measurement uncertainty, primary element uncertainty, instrument uncertainty, applicable environmental effects, and drift. The trip setpoints are also derived from the Allowable Values in the conservative direction by considering calibration uncertainty, instrument uncertainty, environmental effects, and drift. The most conservatively derived trip setpoints are used. In addition, both the Allowable Values and trip setpoints may have additional conservatisms.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since this is when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases for the RCIC System.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal feedwater flow is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.5.23-3 Revision 0

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES APPLICABLE 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY fuel damage could result. Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow with high pressure core spray assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level 1.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation.

Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the RCIC steam supply valve to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). (The injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve; but this is not required for OPERABILITY of the Level 8 instrumentation.)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for RCIC are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters from the wide range water level measurement instrumentation, which sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES APPLICABLE 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable APPLICABILITY Value is high enough to preclude isolating the injection valve of the RCIC during normal operation, yet low enough to trip the RCIC System prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

3, 4. Pump Suction Pressure - Low and Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Low pump suction pressure, which is an indication of low level in the CST, indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source.

Normally the suction valve between the RCIC pump and the CST is open and, upon receiving a RCIC initiation signal, water for RCIC injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the pump suction pressure (water level in the CST) falls below a preselected pressure for a preselected time, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply at makeup water is available to the RCIC pump. The pressure at which the transfer occurs ensures sufficient volume of water is used by the RCIC pump before the transfer occurs and is analytically determined to prevent the effects of vortexing. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Two pressure transmitters are used to detect low pump suction pressure (water level in the CST). The Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST. The Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is initiated by a single time delay relay. While the Pump Suction Pressure - Timer Function is provided to prevent spurious suction source automatic swaps, the Allowable Value (continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES APPLICABLE 3, 4. Pump Suction Pressure - Low and Pump Suction SAFETY ANALYSES, Pressure - Timer (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY is low enough such that the automatic suction swap from the CST to the suppression pool will occur before adequate pump suction head is lost.

Two channels of Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source.

In addition, one channel of the Pump Suction Pressure - Timer is required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

5. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation switch and push button channels introduce a signal into the RCIC System initiation logic that is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provides manual initiation capability.

There is one switch and push button (with two channels) for the RCIC System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the USAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the RCIC function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the switch and push button. Two channels of Manual Initiation are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE, except when reactor steam dome pressure is less than 600 psig due to the hot calibration/cold operation level error. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided (Note 1) to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES ACTIONS Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the (continued) Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel.

A second Note has been added (Note 2) that allows the Function 2 channels to be inoperable solely for performance of SR 3.5.3.4 without requiring entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function uses the wide range water level instruments, which are calibrated under hot conditions. However, SR 3.5.3.4 (the RCIC System flow test performed at low reactor pressure) is performed under conditions that result in the wide range water level instruments reading higher than actual reactor vessel water level (which is controlled using the narrow range water level instruments). The readings can be such that the level 8 trip is received. Therefore, this Note allows bypassing all the channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function to perform SR 3.5.3.4. This is acceptable since the duration of the Surveillance test is short and the RCIC System is being controlled by an operator who can secure the RCIC System if an actual high water level condition (as indicated by the narrow range instruments) is detected.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.23-1 in the accompanying LCO. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System (i.e., loss of automatic low water level start capability for Function 1 and loss of automatic high water level trip capability for Function 2). In this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two channels of a Function, in the same trip system, are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability),

the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 channels in the same trip system or two inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 channels in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 2) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

A risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (Ref. 2) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1), limiting the allowable out of service time if a loss of manual RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This is allowed since this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, thus a total loss of manual initiation capability (Required Action C.1) for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in the safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the RCIC System. In this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3 channels are inoperable and untripped or if the one Function 4 channel is inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted, Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued)

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 2) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC REQUIREMENTS System instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.23-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows:

(a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 4 and 5; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 2, and 3 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions (continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES SURVEILLANCE taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis REQUIREMENTS (Ref. 2) assumption of the average time required to perform (continued) channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.23.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.23.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.23.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.23-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be re-adjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.23.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.23.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

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RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.23 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

2. GENE-770-06-2-A, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," December 1992.

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Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.a, 5.d, 5.e. Area Temperature - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and isolation function. There are four channels for the RHR APPLICABILITY equipment room areas (two per area), eight channels for the reactor building pipe chase areas (two per area), and 10 channels for the reactor building general areas (two per area).

The Area Temperature - High Functions are only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Vessel Pressure - High Function and other administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

This Function isolates the Group 5 valves.

5.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in any transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs. The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (d)

(continued)

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Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES APPLICABLE 5.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (continued)

SAFETY ANANYSES, LCO, and to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only one trip system is required to be APPLICABILITY OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Vessel Pressure - High Function and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1) since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

This Function isolates the Group 5 valves.

5.c. Reactor Vessel Pressure - High The Shutdown Cooling System Reactor Vessel Pressure - High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the RHR System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the USAR.

The Reactor Vessel Pressure - High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Pressure - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

This Function isolates the Group 5 valves.

(continued)

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Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Low, Level 2 support actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis (Ref. 1).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.5.2, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation"), since this could indicate the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.

2. Drywell Pressure - High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are (continued)

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Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES APPLICABLE 3, 4. Reactor Building Above the Refuel Floor and Reactor Building SAFETY ANALYSES, Below the Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation - High (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Reactor Building Above the Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation - High signals are initiated from gaseous radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust ducting coming from the refuel floor. Reactor Building Below the Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation - High signals are initiated from gaseous radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust ducting coming from the different areas of the secondary containment below the refuel floor. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. Two channels of Reactor Building Above the Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Function and two channels of Reactor Building Below the Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation

- High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Exhaust Radiation - High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In addition, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded. Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate secondary containment during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits (continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.6.2-6 Revision 0, 5, 26 (A125)

CREF System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE The trip setpoints are also derived from the Allowable SAFETY ANALYSES, Values in the conservative direction by considering LCO, and calibration uncertainty, instrument uncertainty, APPLICABILITY environmental effects, and drift. The most conservatively (continued) derived trip setpoints are used. In addition, both the Allowable Values and trip setpoints may have additional conservatisms.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. A low reactor vessel water level could indicate a LOCA, and will automatically initiate the CREF System, since this could be a precursor to a potential radiation release and subsequent radiation exposure to control room personnel.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available (two channels per trip system) and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CREF System initiation. The Allowable Value for the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 is chosen to be the same as the Secondary Containment Isolation Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.2).

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), to ensure that the control room personnel are protected. In MODES 4 and 5, at times other than during OPDRVs, the probability of a vessel draindown event releasing radioactive material into the environment, or of a LOCA, is minimal. Therefore this Function is not required.

In addition, the Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor - High Function provides adequate protection.

(continued)

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CREF System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3. Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor - High SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CREF System initiation. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.

The Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during OPDRVs and movement of recently irradiated fuel in the secondary containment to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA ,or a fuel handling event, or a vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, when these specified conditions are not in progress (e.g., OPDRVs), the probability of a LOCA is low; thus, the Function is not required. Also, due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to initiate the CREF System during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to CREF System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable CREF System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable CREF System instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.7.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function dependent.

Each time an inoperable channel is discovered, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.7.1-5 Revision 0, 26 (A125)

RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic B 3.3.8.2 BASES APPLICABILITY Power Monitoring - Logic System OPERABILITY being required in (continued) MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with both residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction isolation valves open, MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment,DQG during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS A.1 If one RPS electric power monitoring assembly for an RPS logic bus is inoperable, or one RPS electric power monitoring assembly for each RPS logic bus is inoperable, the OPERABLE assembly will still provide protection to the RPS logic bus powered components under degraded voltage or frequency conditions. However, the reliability and redundancy of the RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic System are reduced and only a limited time (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) is allowed to restore the inoperable assembly(s) to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable assembly(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, Condition C, D, E, or F, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the remaining OPERABLE electric power monitoring assembly and the low probability of an event requiring RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic protection occurring during this period.

It also allows time for plant operations personnel to take corrective actions.

B.1 If both power monitoring assemblies for an RPS logic bus are inoperable, or both power monitoring assemblies for each RPS logic bus are inoperable, the system protective function is lost. In this condition, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is allowed to restore one assembly to OPERABLE status for each RPS logic bus. If one inoperable assembly for each RPS logic bus cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, Condition C, D, E, or F, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operations personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.8.2-4 Revision 0

RPS Electric Power Monitoring - Logic B 3.3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS F.1.1, F.1.2, F.2.1, F.2.2, F.3.1, and F.3.2 (continued)

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containmentRU during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, the ability to isolate the secondary containment and start the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) and Control Room Envelope Filtration (CREF) Systems cannot be ensured. Therefore, actions must be immediately performed to ensure the ability to maintain the secondary containment and CREF System functions. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) and starting the associated SGT and CREF subsystems (Required Actions F.1.1, F.2.1, and F.3.1) performs the intended function of the instrumentation the RPS electric power monitoring assemblies is protecting, and allows operations to continue.

Alternatively, immediately declaring the associated secondary containment isolation valves, SGT subsystem, or CREF subsystem inoperable (Required Actions F.1.2, F.2.2, and F.3.2) is also acceptable since the Required Actions of the respective LCOs (LCO 3.6.4.2, LCO 3.6.4.3, and LCO 3.7.2) provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.

SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that REQUIREMENTS when an RPS electric power monitoring assembly is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the other RPS electric power monitoring assembly for the associated RPS logic bus maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the assembly must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

This 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance is acceptable since it does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS electric power monitoring assembly function will initiate when necessary.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.3.8.2-6 Revision 0

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The ECCS is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network is composed of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. The ECCS also consists of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCS System.

On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start; simultaneously the system aligns, and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps.

Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCS pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the spray sparger above the core. If the break is small, HPCS will maintain coolant inventory, as well as vessel level, while the RCS is still pressurized.

If HPCS fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and LPCS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence would be allowed to time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs), depressurizing the RCS and allowing the LPCI and LPCS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly, and the LPCI and LPCS systems cool the core.

Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool is circulated through a heat exchanger cooled by the Service Water (SW) System. Depending on the location and size of (continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.1-1 Revision 0

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE inoperable at the time of the accident. The remaining SAFETY ANALYSES OPERABLE ECCS subsystems provide the capability to (continued) adequately cool the core and prevent excessive fuel damage.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of Reference 12.

LCO Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and six ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the three LPCI subsystems, the LPCS System, and the HPCS System. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the LPCS System and the three LPCI subsystems.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem operability.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10) could potentially be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10).

LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes when the required RHR pump is not operating or when the system is realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, the ADS function is not required when pressure is d 150 psig because the low pressure ECCS subsystems (LPCS and LPCI) are capable of providing flow into the RPV below this pressure. ECCS rRequirements for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control."

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.1-5 Revision 0, 43 (A150)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.A description of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating."

APPLICABLE The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of SAFETY ANALYSES break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of Reference 2.

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur, the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be 36

hours. A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF NMP2 B 3.5.2-1 Revision 0, 43 (A150)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

Two One ECCS injection/spray subsystems are is required to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide defense-in-depth should an unexpected draining event occur. The A ECCS injection/spray subsystems are is defined as either one of the three Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPC)I subsystems, the one Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, and or one the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System. The LPCS System and each LPCI subsystem consist of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. The HPCS System consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank B (CST) to the RPV. The necessary portions of the Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink capable of providing cooling to the RHR pump seal cooler are also required for a LPCI subsystem.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

One The LCO is modified by a Note which allows a required LPCI subsystem (A or B) may to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and (continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.2-1 Revision 0, 43 (A150)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES LCO operation for decay heat removal includes when the required (continued) RHR pump is not operating or when the system is realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode.

Because the restrictions on DRAIN TIME, sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to maintain RPV water inventory prior to the RPV level reaching the TAF.of low pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery.

APPLICABILITY RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5.

Requirements on water inventory control in other MODES are contained in LCOs in Section 3.3, Instrumentation, and other LCOs in Section 3.5, ECCS, RCIC, and RPV Water Inventory Control. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

OPERABILITY of the ECCS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the vessel. Requirements for ECCS OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3 are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases for LCO 3.5.1. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the water level maintained at t 22 ft 3 inches above the RPV flange. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.

The Automatic Depressurization System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is

< 150 psig, and the LPCS, HPCS, and LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without any depressurization of the primary system.

ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 If any onethe required ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, it the required inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient RPV flooding capability NMP2 B 3.5.2-2 Revision 0

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 to recover from an inadvertent vessel draindown. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended function. the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for restoring the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considersed the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME the availability of one subsystem and the low probability of an unexpected draining a vessel draindown event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.2-2 Revision 0

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued)

With If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be initiated immediately to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur.

The method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems, and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

C.1, C.2, and C.3 D.1, D.2, and D.3 With the DRAIN TIME less than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months but greater than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , compensatory measures should be taken to ensure the ability to implement mitigating actions should an unexpected draining event occur. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a controlled volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action C.1 requires verification of the capability to establish the secondary containment boundary in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to establish the secondary containment boundary are preplanned and necessary materials are available. The secondary containment boundary is considered established when one Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

If both of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable, all coolant inventory makeup capability may be NMP2 B 3.5.2-3 Revision 0

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 unavailable. Therefore, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. One ECCS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time to restore at least one ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment.

If at least one ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability is available in each secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability. The administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed by an administrative check, by examining logs or other (continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.2-3 Revision 0

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

Verification that the secondary containment boundary can be established must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. Secondary containment penetration flow paths form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action C.2 requires verification of the capability to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to isolate the secondary containment penetration flow paths are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Power operated valves are not required to receive automatic isolation signals if they can be closed manually within the required time. Verification that the secondary containment penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place one SGT subsystem in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to place a SGT subsystem in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that a SGT subsystem can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.1 is also applicable.

Required Action D.1 requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.1 states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical NMP2 B 3.5.2-4 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary. With the secondary containment boundary established, one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action D.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed in operation. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

F.1 If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition, there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

NMP2 B 3.5.2-4 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) information, to determine if the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status.

Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation. A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange, the realistic cross-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used.

The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake. Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted.

Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines and ongoing plant maintenance and testing activities.

NMP2 B 3.5.2-4 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system when misalignment issues (Reference 6) have been precluded by functional valve interlocks or by isolation devices, such that redirection of RPV water out of an RHR subsystem is precluded. Further, RHR Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system if its controls have not been transferred to Remote Shutdown, which disables the interlocks and isolation signals.

The exclusion of penetration flow paths from the determination of DRAIN TIME must consider the potential effects of a single operator error or initiating event on items supporting maintenance and testing (rigging, scaffolding, temporary shielding, piping plugs, snubber removal (except when risk is managed in accordance with TS LCO 3.0.8), freeze seals, etc.). If failure of such items could result and would cause a draining event from a closed system or between the RPV and the isolation device, the penetration flow path may not be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation.

Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requires SRs to be met between performances. Therefore, any changes in plant conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME requires that a new DRAIN TIME be determined. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.2 and SR 3.5.2.3 The minimum water level of 195 ft required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the ECCS pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention.

With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, all the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems are is inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CST.

When the suppression pool level is < 195 ft, the HPCS System is considered OPERABLE only if it can take suction from CST B and CST B water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the HPCS pump. Therefore, a verification that either the suppression pool water level is t 195 ft or the HPCS System is aligned to take suction from the CST and the CST contains t 253,000 gallons of water, equivalent to 26.9 ft, ensures that the HPCS System can supply 135,000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. In addition, to ensure the 135,000 gallons of makeup water is available, the HPCS suction source auto-swap from the CST to the suppression pool must be disabled (e.g., by closing the suppression pool suction valve and deenergizing the breaker for the valve motor operator). This is necessary since the actual trip setpoint of the HPCS Pump Suction Pressure - Low Function is NMP2 B 3.5.2-4 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 at a pressure sufficiently high such that 135,000 gallons would not be available before the auto-swap occurred.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.4 The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS subsystem will perform properly. This may also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.2-4 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, SR 3.5.2.6, and SR 3.5.2.7 REQUIREMENTS The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.4, SR 3.5.1.5, and SR 3.5.1.8 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, SR 3.5.2.6, and SR 3.5.2.7, respectively.

SR 3.5.2.45 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the required ECCS subsystem flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist be available for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that allows one LPCI subsystem to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable.

Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes when the required RHR pump is not operating or when the system is being realigned from or to the RHR shutdown cooling mode.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.2-5 Revision 0, 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.4 6 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Verifying that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually started and operate for at least 10 minutes demonstrates that the subsystem is available to mitigate a draining event. Testing the ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line is necessary to avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes was based on engineering judgment.

Because of the low pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent vessel draindown should occur.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include station a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verifying that each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated RPV water level isolation signal is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF should an unexpected draining event occur. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.8 The required ECCS subsystem is required to actuate on a manual initiation signal. This Surveillance verifies that a manual initiation signal will cause the required LCPI subsystem, LPCS System, or HPCS System to start and operate as designed, including pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active NMP2 B 3.5.2-6 Revision 0, 43 (A150), 44 (A152)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.2 components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6.3.3.3. Information Notice 84-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 92-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," May 1993.

5. Information Notice 94-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1," July 1994.

6. General Electric Service Information Letter No. 388, "RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6," February 1983.

27. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

NMP2 B 3.5.2-6 Revision 0, 43 (A150), 44 (A152)

RCIC System B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.3 RCIC System BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The RCIC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of RPV water level. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and RCIC systems perform similar functions. The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied.

The RCIC System (Ref. 2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the head spray nozzle.

Suction piping is provided from the condensate storage tank A (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from main steam line B, upstream of the inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The RCIC System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures, 165 psia to 1215 psia.

Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine control valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.5.3-1 Revision 0

RCIC System B 3.5.3 BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which (continued) discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge line "keep fill" system is designed to maintain the pump discharge line filled with water.

APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by SAFETY ANALYSES providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of Reference 3.

LCO The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity to maintain RPV inventory during an isolation event. Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure

> 150 psig since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized.

In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure d 150 psig, the ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel. In and in MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since RPV water inventory control is required by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control." the ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC System. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC System and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1 and A.2 NMP2 B 3.5.3-2 Revision 0, 9 (A109), 43 (A150)

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of Reference 5.

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.

The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in Ref. 1.

The normally closed manual PCIVs are considered OPERABLE when the valves are closed and blind flanges in place, or open under administrative controls. Normally closed automatic PCIVs, which are required by design (e.g., to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements) to be de-activated and closed, are considered OPERABLE when the valve is closed and de-activated. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Reference 1. Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents. In addition, the LCO ensures leakage through the secondary containment bypass leakage valves is within the limits assumed in the accident analysis. The secondary containment bypass leakage paths leakage rate limits are relocated to the TRM Table 3.6.1.3-1 and are maintained in accordance with the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Testing Program Plan.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not required to be normally closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves are required to be OPERABLE, however, to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.1.3-3 Revision 0, 45 (A156)

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABILITY those whosewhen the associated instrumentation is required to be (continued) OPERABLE according to LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these ACTIONS are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except for secondary containment bypass leakage rate, MSIV leakage rate, purge exhaust valve leakage rate, or hydrostatically tested line leakage rate not within limit, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated.

The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.1.3-4 Revision 0

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued) containment purge exhaust valve does not increase during the time the penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.1.3.6 is 184 days. Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per 92 days was chosen and has been shown acceptable based on operating experience.

F.1 and F.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1 and G.2H.1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met for PCIV(s) required OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. Action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. If suspending the OPDRVs would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR shutdown cooling to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the 12 inch and 14 inch primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, opened for an allowable reason.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.1.3-12 Revision 0, 38, 39

Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 BASES APPLICABLE Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of SAFETY ANALYSES Reference 2.

(continued)

LCO A limit that suppression pool water level be t 199 ft 6 inches and d 201 ft (referenced to mean sea level) is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analysis are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analysis, depending upon which is conservative for a particular calculation.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause significant loads on the primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. The requirements for maintaining suppression pool water level within limits in MODE 4 or 5 is addressed in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control."

ACTIONS A.1 With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analysis are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as the downcomers are covered, RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the drywell and suppression pool sprays. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within specified limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

B.1 and B.2 If suppression pool water level cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.2.2-2 Revision 0

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE and that fission products entrapped within the secondary SAFETY ANALYSES containment structure will be treated by the SGT System (continued) prior to discharge to the environment.

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of Reference 4.

LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment and leaks to secondary containment.

Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

Due to radioactive decay, secondary containment is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the important of maintaining secondary (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.1-2 Revision 0, 5, 26 (A125)

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1 and C.2 Movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause significant fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. Therefore, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.1-3 Revision 0, 5

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits SAFETY ANALYSES ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary (continued) containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of Reference 4.

LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated, automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference 3.

The normally closed manual SCIVs are considered OPERABLE when the valves are closed and blind flanges in place, or open under administrative controls. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference 3.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Due to radioactive decay, SCIVs are only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.2-2 Revision 0, 5, 26 (A125)

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, the movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies each secondary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.2-5 Revision 0, 5, 44 (A152)

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES BACKGROUND protect the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes (continued) gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter is provided to collect any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both fans will start and the associated train inlet and fan discharge valves will open.

Negative pressure in the reactor building is automatically controlled by the SGT System filter train recirculation line pressure control valves.

APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences SAFETY ANALYSES of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents. Due to radioactive decay, the SGT System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e.,

fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) (Refs. 3 and 4). For all events analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of Reference 5.

LCO Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases.

Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment.

Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Due to radioactive (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.3-2 Revision 0, 5, 26 (A125)

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES APPLICABILITY decay, the SGT System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel (continued) handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ).

ACTIONS A.1 With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, and C.2.1, and C.2.2 During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should be immediately placed in operation. This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing a significant amount of radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies must be (continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.3-3 Revision 0, 5, 26 (A125)

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2 (continued)

(continued) immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

D.1 If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, actions are required to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

E.1 and E.2 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

NMP2 B 3.6.4.3-4 Revision 0, 5

v t e Letter Sequence Request
CAC:MF9357, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Supplement, Supplement, Supplement Administration Meeting Questions 10 October 2017 Answers 3 November 2017 Results Approval Other:
MONTHYEAR2017-03-27 [Table View]

NMP2L2640, License Amendment Request - Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 2

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Subject:

SUBJECT:

1.0 DESCRIPTION

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 REFERENCES

1.0 DESCRIPTION

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 REFERENCES

5.2 REFERENCES

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NMP2L2640, License Amendment Request - Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 2

Text

Subject:

SUBJECT:

1.0 DESCRIPTION

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 REFERENCES

1.0 DESCRIPTION

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 REFERENCES

5.2 REFERENCES

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