ML17037C418
| ML17037C418 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1977 |
| From: | Eric Thomas LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML17037C418 (24) | |
Text
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Mr. Edson Ge'Case FROM:
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Washington, De CD E ~ B,i Thomas, Jr, ~
DATE OF DOCUMENT 5/19/77 DATE RECT)VEP e
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LAW OFFICES OF LEBOEUF, LAMB,LEIBY 8, rvtACRAE l757 N STREET, N.W.
WAsHINGTON> D. C. 20086 TELL'PHONE 202 457 2500 CASLC AOORESS LEON A. AI.LCN,JR.
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JACOB FRIEDLANDER DONALD J. GREENE JAM C 5 A. O R C E R, 11 JOHN L. GROSE a
DOUGLAS W. HAWKS CAR L D. HO BEL MAN MICHAEL IOVENKO JAMCS F. JOHNSON, 4m<
RONALD D.JONES LEX K.LARSON ORANT S. LEWIS CAMERON F MAcRAE a CAMCRON F'ACRAE, 1K a GERARD A. MAHER SHCILA H. MARSHALL JAMES O. MCELROY JAMFS P. MCORANERY, JR a a PHILIP PALMER McGUIOAN L. MANNINO MUNTZINGa a JAMES O'ALLEY,JR. a J. MICHAEL PARISH JOHN A.RUDY PAUL O. RUSSELL HAROLD M. SEIDCL CHARLES P. SIFTON HALCYON 0 SKINNER JOSEPH S.STRAUSS SAMUEL M. SUGDEN EUGENE B. THOMASa JR.i a LEONARD M. TROSTEN HARRY H. VOIOT a a H. RICHARD WACHTEL OERARD P. WATSON LESWIHJWASHIHBZOHP0 C TELEX.'40214 May 19, 1977 8
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,0 RANDALLJ. LcSOEUFP JR. I929 I975 AORIAH C. LEISY l952 IQTB OF COIIHSEL ARVIN C.UPTON l40 QROADWAY NEW YORK'.Y. 10005 TELEPHONE 2I2 259-II00 CASLC A00RESS LESWIHp HEW YORK TELEXI4224IB aRESIDCNT PARTNERS WASHINGTON OFFICE jADMITTCDTO THC DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR Mr. Edson G.
Case Acting Dixector Offi.ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation",,I"',"I"," ',
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi,onLt'~~<'>-~~<<'"~" ~J Washington, D.
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Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point. Nucleax Station Unit No.
1Docket No. 50-220
Dear Mr. Case:
following:
As counsel for Ni.agara Mohawk,'
enclose the (1}
Three (3), originals and nineteen (19}
copies of an application to amend Operating License No. DPR-63; and (2)
Forty (40) copies'ach of two (2) documents entitled Attachments A and B whi,ch set forth the technical bases fox the requested change in the Technical Specifications.
The requested change in the Technical Specifications relates to instrumentation used to monitor drywell suppression chamber differential pressure and suppression chamber water level.
Very truly yours, LEBOEUFF LAMBF LEXBX 6 MACRAE Enclosures By ugene B. Thomas, Jr.
Partner
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION )
(Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
)
Unit.No. l)
)
Docket No. 50-220 APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO OPERATING LICENSE Pursuant to Section 50.90 of the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Niagara Mohawk Power Cor-poration, holder of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-63, hereby requests that Table 3.3.4 of the Technical Speci-fications and Bases set forth in Appendix A to that License be amended.
This proposed change has been concurred with by the Site Operations Review Committee and Safety Review and Audit Board.
The proposed Technical Specification change is set forth in Attachment A to this application.
Supporting Information, which demonstrates that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, is set forth in Attachment B.
The proposed change would not authorize any change in the types or any increase in the amounts of effluents or any change in the authorized power level of the facility.
0
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I Ip WHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requests that Appendix A to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-63 be amended in the form attached hereto as Attachment A.
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION Gerald K. Rhode Vice President-Engineering Subscribed and sworn to before me this ~>~
day of May, 1977.
N TARY PUBLIC HAZEL'. CARRICK IVotary Public in tho State of Now YorR Qualified rn Onon. Co. No. 4524460
'tlat i,'ow>>iis-tun bpiros March 30,19'P~
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Attachment A
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation License No.
DPR-63 Docket No. 50-220 Pro osed Chan es to Pacilit 0 eratin License Attached are revisions to Pages
- 188, 190, 236 and 237.
Also attached are additional Pages 232b and 232c.
t
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SUR'jEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.6.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION A licabilit :
Applies to the operabil.sty of the plant instrumentation that. performs a safety function.
4.6.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION A~li bill Applies to the surveillance of the in-strumentation that performs a safety function.
Ob ective:
To assure the operability of the instru-mentation required for safe operation.
Ob ective:
To verify the operability of protec-tive instrumentation.
S ecification:
The set points, minimum number of trip systems, and minimum number of instrument channels that must be op-erable for each position of the re-actor mode switch shall be as given in Tables 3.6.2a to 3.6.21.
S ecification:
a.
Sensors and instrument channels shall be checked, tested and cali-brated at least as frequently as listed in Tables 4.6.2a to 4.6.21.
If the requirements of a table are not met, the actions listed below for the respective type of instrumentation shall be taken.
(1)
Instrumentation that initiates scram-control rods shall be inserted.
188
LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SU@EILLpLNCE RE(UIREHENT (8)
(10)
Off-Gas and Vacuum Pump Isolation-The respective system shall be iso-lated or the instrument channel shall be considered inoperable and Specification 3.6. 1 shall be applied.
Diesel Generator Initiation - The diesel generator shall be considered inoperable and Specification 3.6.3 shall be applied.
Emergency Ventilation Initiation-The emergency ventilation system shall be considered inoperable and Specification 3.4.4 shall be applied.
High Pressure Coolant Injection Initiation - The high pressure coolant injection system shall be considered inoperable and Spec-ification 3.1.8.c shall be applied.
(12) Primary Containment Monitoring-The primary containment monitoring instrumentation shall be considered inoperable and Specification 3.3.8 shall be applied.
b.
During operation with a Maximum Total Peaking Factor (HTPF) greater than the design value, either:.
The APRH scram and rod block set-tings shall be reduced to the values given by the equations in Specifica-tion 2.1.2.a; or (2)
The power distribution shall be changed such that the HTPF no longer exceeds the design value.
190
Table 3.6.21 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT MONITORING Limitin Condition For 0 eration Parameter Minimum No.
of Tripped or-Operable Tri S stems Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels Per Operable Tri S stem Set Point Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be 0 erable C
c C
C 8
0tJ M
Sl5 CC C/l C/l (1-)
Drywell-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure Figure 3.3.8 X
X (2)
Suppression Chamber Hater Level Specification 3.3.2 X
X 232b
Table 4.6.21 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT MONITORING Surveillance Re uirement Parameter Sensor Check Instrument Channel Test Instrument Channel Calibration (1)
Drywell-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure once/day Once Per Operating Cyc1e, (2)
Suppression Chamber Hater Level once/day Once Per Operating Cycle 232c
BASES FOR 3.6.2 AND 4.6.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION The set points on the generator load rejection and turbine stop valve closure scram trips are set to anti-cipate and minimize the consequences of turbine trip with failure of the turbine bypass system as described in the bases for Specification 2.1.2.
Since the severity of the transients is dependent on the reactor op-erating power level, bypassing of the scrams below the specified power level is permissible.
The primary containment monitoring system is provided to alert the operator of conditions which could reduce safety margins during a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident.
Appropriate operator corrective action is described in Specification 3.3.8, should Limiting Conditions for Operation be exceeded.
This monitoring instrumentation does not automatically initiate engineered safeguards systems.
Although the operator will set the setpoints at the values indicated in Tables 3.6.2.a-l, the actual values of the various set points can differ appreciably from the value the operator is attempting to set.
The de-viations include inherent instrument error, operator setting error and drift of the set point.
These errors are compensated for in the transient analyses by conservatism in the controlling parameter assumptions as discussed in the bases for Specification 2.1.2.
The deviations associated with the set points for the safety systems used to mitigate accidents have negligible effect on the initiation of these systems.
These safety systems have initiation times which are orders of magnitude greater than the difference in time between reach-ing the nominal set point and the worst set point due to error.
The maximum allowable set point deviations are listed below:
Neutron Flux
.APRM, +2.7Ã of rated neutron flux IRH, +2.5'A of rated neutron flux Recirculation Flow, + 1/ of rated recirculation flow Reactor Pressure,
+15.8 psig Containment Pressure,
+0.053 psig Reactor Water Level, +2.6 inches of water Hain Steam Line Isolation Valve Position,
+2.5Ã of stem position Scram Discharge Volume, + 0 and -
1 gallon Condenser Low Vacuum, +0.5 inches o'f mercury 236
0
BASES FOR 3.6.2 AND 4.6.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION High Flow-Main Steam Line,
+1 psid High Flow-Emergency Cooling Line, +1 psid High Area Temperature-Hain Steam Line, +10F High Area Temperature-Clean-up and Shutdown,
+6F High Radiation-Main Steam Line, +100/ and
-50% of set point value High Radiation-Emergency Cooling System Vent, +100/ and
-50%
oi set point High Radiation-Reactor Building Vent,
+100% and
-50% of set point High Radiation-Refueling
- Platform,
+100% and
-50% of set point High Radiation-Offgas Line, +50/ of set point, (Appendix D)*
Drywell-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure,
+0.1 psid Suppression Chamber Water Level, +4.8 inches The test intervals for the trip systems result to calculated failure probabilities
<10 which corresponds to the proposed IEEE Criteria For System Failure Probability.
(IEEE SG-3, Information Docket 81 - Protec-tion System Reliability, April 24, 1968).
The test integyals for the trip systems result in calculated failure probabilities ranging from 6.7 x 10 to 1.76 x 10
~~ (Fifth Supplement,
- p. 115).*
The more frequent sensor checks result in even less probability that the particular system will fail.
Because of local high radiation, testing instrumentation in the area of the main steam line isolation valves can only be done during periods of Station shutdown.
These func-tions include high area temperature isolation, high radiation isolation and isolation valve position scram.
Testing of the scram associated with the shutdown position of the mode switch can be done only during periods of Station shutdown since it always involves a scram.
- FSAR 237
Attachment B
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation License No.
DPR-63 Docket No. 50-220 Su ortin Information A September 30, 1976 letter from the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission requested information related to instrumentation which is used to monitor drywell suppression chamber differential pressure and suppression chamber water level.
Technical Specifications on these parameters were also requested.
On November 5, 1976 we submitted a Technical Specification change on drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure.
There presently exists Technical Specifications on suppression chamber water level.
Also included in that submittal was a description the instrumentation being used to monitor both differential pressure and water level.
A February 4, 1977 letter from the Commission stated that the instrumentation presently installed is unacceptable.
We were requested at this time to install instrumentation that would meet the requirements of the staff technical position attached to that letter.
Instrumentation to meet the staff technical position is being installed during the Spring 1977 refueling outage.
Since this instrumentation performs a monitoring function o'nly and has no automatic initiation features associated with it, the surveillance requirements set forth in Table 3.6.21 are deemed adequate.
In addition, surveillance requirements on this instrumentation are commensurate with surveillance requirements on instrumentation which performs only monitoring functions.
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