ML051990328
| ML051990328 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/2005 |
| From: | Troy Pruett NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Ray H Southern California Edison Co |
| References | |
| IR-05-003 | |
| Download: ML051990328 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000361/2005003
Text
July 15, 2005
Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President
San Onofre, Units 2 and 3
Southern California Edison Co.
P.O. Box 128, Mail Stop D-3-F
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
SUBJECT: SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000361/2005003; 050000362/2005003
Dear Mr. Ray:
On June 26, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 facility. The enclosed integrated
report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on April 15 and June 24, 2005,
with Dr. R. Waldo and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your
licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel.
This report documents two NRC identified findings of very low safety significance (Green). One
of these findings was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements; however, because
of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action
program, the NRC is treating this finding as a noncited violation (NCV) consistent with
Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this noncited violation, you should
provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011-
4005; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington
DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 2 and 3, facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection
Southern California Edison Co. -2-
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component
of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Troy W. Pruett, Chief
Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
Dockets: 50-361
50-362
Licenses: NPF-10
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000361/2005003; 05000362/2005003
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/enclosure:
Chairman, Board of Supervisors
County of San Diego
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335
San Diego, CA 92101
Gary L. Nolff
Power Projects/Contracts Manager
Riverside Public Utilities
2911 Adams Street
Riverside, CA 92504
Eileen M. Teichert, Esq.
Supervising Deputy City Attorney
City of Riverside
3900 Main Street
Riverside, CA 92522
Raymond Waldo, Vice President,
Nuclear Generation
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Southern California Edison Co. -3-
David Spath, Chief
Division of Drinking Water and
Environmental Management
California Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732
Sacramento, CA 94234-7320
Michael R. Olson
San Onofre Liaison
San Diego Gas & Electric Company
P.O. Box 1831
San Diego, CA 92112-4150
Ed Bailey, Chief
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Mayor
City of San Clemente
100 Avenida Presidio
San Clemente, CA 92672
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Sacramento, CA 95814
Douglas K. Porter, Esq.
Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, CA 91770
Dwight E. Nunn, Vice President
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Daniel P. Breig, Station Manager
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Southern California Edison Co. -4-
A. Edward Scherer
Southern California Edison
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Brian Katz, Vice President, Nuclear
Oversight and Regulatory Affairs
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Adolfo Bailon
Field Representative
United States Senator Barbara Boxer
312 N. Spring Street, Suite 1748
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Chief, Technological Services Branch
FEMA Region IX
Department of Homeland Security
1111 Broadway, Suite 1200
Oakland, CA 94607-4052
Southern California Edison Co. -5-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (KMK)
Senior Resident Inspector (CCO1)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (TWP)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (NFO)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
RidsNrrDipmIipb
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
ADAMS: WYes G No Initials: _TWP_
W Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive W Non-Sensitive
R:\_SO23\2005\SO200503RP-CCO.wpd
RIV:RI:DRP/D SRI:DRP/D C:DRS/PEB C:DRS/PSB C:DRS/OB
MASitek CCOsterholtz LJSmith MPShannon ATGody
T - TWPruett T - TWPruett /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
7/13/05 7/13/05 7/8/05 7/12/05 7/12/05
C:DRS/EB C:DRP/D
JAClark TWPruett
/RA/ /RA/
7/11/05 7/15/05
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket: 50-361, 50-362
Report No.: 05000361/2005003 and 5000362/2005003
Licensee: Southern California Edison Co. (SCE)
Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
Location: 5000 S. Pacific Coast Hwy.
San Clemente, California
Dates: April 8 through June 26, 2005
Inspectors: C. J. Araguas, General Engineer, NRR
T. W. Jackson, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch B, DRP
R. E. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. C. Osterholtz, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch D, DRP
M. A. Sitek, Resident Inspector, Project Branch D, DRP
T. F. Stetka, Senior Operations Engineer
Approved By: Troy W. Pruett, Chief, Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000361/2005003, 05000362/2005003; 04/08/05 - 06/26/05; San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 & 3; Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Maintenance
Effectiveness and Temporary Plant Modifications
This report covered a 3-month period of inspection by three resident inspectors, two regional
office inspectors, and one headquarters inspector. The inspection identified one noncited
violation and one finding. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination
Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be
Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management's review. The NRCs program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green. The inspectors identified a finding for the failure to develop an adequate
plan to identify hydraulic leakage on Main Feedwater Block Valve 3HV4051.
This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with
operators failing to identify the leak on shiftly rounds. This issue was entered
into the licensees corrective action program as Action Requests 050401214 and
050401222.
The finding is determined to be greater than minor because it was associated
with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and
affects the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that
upset plant stability. Furthermore, if left uncorrected, the finding would have
become a more significant safety concern in that continued hydraulic fluid
leakage from Valve 3HV4051 could result in a plant transient. Using Manual
Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the
finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the
hydraulic fluid leakage had not increased to the point where it would contribute to
both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or
functions would not be available (Section 1R23).
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) for
the failure to include component deficiencies of a system important to safety in
the maintenance rule program. Specifically, the licensee did not incorporate
piping header failures of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 steam bypass control system into
the maintenance rule program to ensure appropriate monitoring and goal setting
activities were established. This issue was entered into the corrective action
program as AR 050200923.
ENCLOSURE
-2-
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it affected the
equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and
affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of
systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet, the finding was
determined to have very low safety significance because the steam bypass
control system did not experience a loss of function (Section 1R12).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
- None.
ENCLOSURE
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 operated at approximately 99 percent reactor power until April 16, 2005, when the unit
was shutdown to repair an internal hydraulic leak on main feedwater isolation Valve 2HV4052.
The unit returned to approximately 99 percent power on April 19 and remained there for the
duration of the inspection period.
Unit 3 operated at approximately 100 percent reactor power until May 4, 2005, when the unit
was shutdown to repair cracks in the steam bypass system header piping and to repair an
external hydraulic leak from main feedwater block Valve 3HV4051. The unit returned to
approximately 100 percent reactor power on May 12 and remained there for the duration of the
inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed a review of the licensees readiness for impending adverse
weather involving the effects of a tsunami that may be generated from an off shore
earthquake. The inspectors (1) reviewed plant procedures, the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report, and Technical Specifications to ensure that operator actions defined in
adverse weather procedures maintained the readiness of essential systems; (2) walked
down portions of the below listed systems to ensure that adverse weather features were
sufficient to support operability, including the ability to perform safe shutdown functions;
(3) reviewed maintenance records to determine that applicable surveillance
requirements were current if an anticipated tsunami developed; and (4) reviewed plant
modifications, procedure revisions, and operator work arounds to determine if recent
facility changes challenged plant operation.
- June 12, 2005, Unit 2 and 3 saltwater cooling system and emergency diesel
generators
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
ENCLOSURE
-2-
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors: (1) walked down portions of the two listed risk important systems and
reviewed plant procedures and documents to verify that critical portions of the selected
systems were correctly aligned; and (2) compared deficiencies identified during the walk
down to the licensee's corrective action program to ensure problems were being
identified and corrected.
- On May 3, 2005, the inspectors walked down the Unit 3 Train A high pressure
safety injection system while Train B of the same system was being used to fill
safety injection Tank T-008
- On May 9, 2005 the inspectors walked down the Units 2 and 3 control room
emergency air cleanup system while maintenance was being performed on the
Units 2 and 3 toxic gas isolation system
The inspectors completed two samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors walked down the six listed plant areas to assess the material condition of
active and passive fire protection features and their operational lineup and readiness.
The inspectors: (1) verified that transient combustibles and hot work activities were
controlled in accordance with plant procedures; (2) observed the condition of fire
detection devices to verify they remained functional; (3) observed fire suppression
systems to verify they remained functional; (4) verified that fire extinguishers and hose
stations were provided at their designated locations and that they were in a satisfactory
condition; (5) verified that passive fire protection features (electrical raceway barriers,
fire doors, fire dampers, steel fire proofing, penetration seals, and oil collection systems)
were in a satisfactory material condition; (6) verified that adequate compensatory
measures were established for degraded or inoperable fire protection features; and
(7) reviewed the corrective action program to determine if the licensee identified and
corrected fire protection problems.
ENCLOSURE
-3-
C May 18, 2005, Unit 2 Train A engineered safety feature (ESF) switchgear room
C May 18, 2005, Unit 2 Train B ESF switchgear room
C June 14, 2005, Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) room, all accessible elevations
C June 16, 2005, Unit 3 Train A ESF switchgear room
C June 16, 2005, Unit 3 Train B ESF switchgear room
C June 17, 2005, Unit 3 AFW room, all accessible elevations
The inspectors completed six samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
a. Inspection Scope
On June 21, 2005, the inspectors observed testing and training of senior reactor
operators and reactor operators to identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the training,
to assess operator performance, and to assess the evaluator's critique. The training
scenario involved a steam generator tube rupture and loss of offsite power.
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the two below listed maintenance activities to: (1) verify the
appropriate handling of structure, system, and component (SSC) performance or
condition problems; (2) verify the appropriate handling of degraded SSC functional
performance; (3) evaluate the role of work practices and common cause problems; and
(4) evaluate the handling of SSC issues reviewed under the requirements of the
maintenance rule, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, and the Technical Specifications.
- April 8 - June 26, 2005, Units 2 and 3 inspections of 480 VAC ABB breakers
following a failure of the Unit 3 Holdup Tank Pump 3P741 480 VAC ABB breaker
ENCLOSURE
-4-
- April 8 - May 31, 2005, Units 2 and 3 steam bypass control system (SBCS)
evaluation under the requirements of the maintenance rule
The inspectors completed two samples.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR
50.65(a)(1) for the failure to include Units 2 and 3 SBCS deficiencies in the maintenance
rule program. This caused a lapse in the determination of appropriate system
monitoring and goal setting to maintain system reliability.
Description.
On February 14, 2005, the licensee identified that a small amount of air was leaking into
the Unit 3 main condenser due to a decrease in condenser vacuum. The source of the
air intrusion was determined to be a through-wall crack of approximately 14 inches in the
north piping header of the SBCS between the SBCS control valves and the Unit 3 main
condenser. The SBCS consists of two piping headers. Each header is designed to
remove heat to the main condenser at the equivalent of approximately 30 percent
reactor power. The affected portion of the SBCS was isolated, and the SBCS remained
operable with the south header still available. On February 21 the licensee inspected
the Unit 2 north SBCS header and discovered that cracks were developing at a similar
location to that observed on Unit 3. The Unit 2 north header was also isolated. The
south headers of the SBCS for both Units 2 and 3 had undergone an upgrade in 1986
and neither showed any signs of degradation.
The licensees analysis of the degraded piping concluded that a combination of weld
defects, residual stresses, and high frequency vibrations contributed to the degradation.
The repairs to the SBCS headers included upgrades to minimize vibration and residual
stresses.
The inspectors discovered that the licensee had not captured the SBCS deficiencies in
their maintenance rule program for monitoring or goal setting. The inspectors
determined that the through-wall cracking rendered the SBCS inherently unreliable in
accordance with NUMARC 93-01, Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2.
Specifically, Section 9.3.3 of NUMARC 93-01 indicated that, . . . an inherently reliable
structure, system, or component (SSC) is one that, without preventive maintenance, has
high reliability. The need to place an SSC under (a)(1) and establish goals may arise if
the inherently reliable SSC has experienced a failure. In such cases, the SSC cannot
be considered inherently reliable. The inspectors concluded that the SBCS failures
should have been tracked for monitoring and goal setting in the licensees maintenance
rule program.
ENCLOSURE
-5-
Analysis
The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the failure to recognize the
applicability of the maintenance rule for a failure of the SBCS. This finding was
associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was determined to be
greater than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the
mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the
availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual
Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheet, the finding
was determined to have very low safety significance because the SBCS did not actually
experience a loss of function.
Enforcement
10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee monitor the performance or
condition of SSCs against licensee established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance that such SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended function.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not establish goals to provide a reasonable
assurance that the Units 2 and 3 SBCSs were capable of fulfilling their intended
function. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered
into the licensees corrective action program as AR 050200923, this violation is being
treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy: NCV
05000361;05000362/2005003-01, Failure to Properly Implement Maintenance Rule
Requirements for SBCS Header Cracks.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
Emergent Work Control
The inspectors: (1) verified that the licensee performed actions to minimize the
probability of initiating events and maintained the functional capability of mitigating
systems and barrier integrity systems; (2) verified that emergent work-related activities
such as troubleshooting, work planning/scheduling, establishing plant conditions,
aligning equipment, tagging, temporary modifications, and equipment restoration did not
place the plant in an unacceptable configuration; and (3) reviewed the corrective action
program to determine if the licensee identified and corrected risk assessment and
emergent work control problems.
- April 8, 2005, Unit 2 main feedwater isolation Valve 2HV4052 hydraulic fluid leak
(AR 050301752)
- May 1, 2005, Unit 3 safety injection Tank T-008 leakage through low pressure
safety injection Loop 1A Check Valve 3MU072 (AR 050500027)
ENCLOSURE
-6-
- May 2, 2005, Unit 3 pressurizer level error Bistable 3110BX failure
(AR 050500031)
- May 13, 2005, Unit 2 reactor coolant Pump 3P001 speed input failure to core
protection calculator Channel B (AR 050500561)
The inspectors completed four samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions (71111.14, 71153)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors: (1) reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and/or strip charts for
the below listed evolutions to evaluate operator performance in coping with nonroutine
events and transients; (2) verified that the operator response was in accordance with the
response required by plant procedures and training; and (3) verified that the licensee
has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with personnel
performance problems that occurred during the nonroutine evolutions sampled.
- On April 28, 2005, Unit 2 second point main feedwater Heater E038 steam
extraction Valve 2HV8808 closed because of level oscillations in the first and
second point feedwater heaters. Operator action was required to compensate
for the approximately 0.5 percent reactor power increase that occurred when
Valve 2HV8808 automatically closed.
- On May 4-5, 2005, operators began reducing power on Unit 3 to Mode 3 in order
to support repairs to the hydraulic system associated with main feedwater block
Valve 3HV4051.
The inspectors completed two samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors: (1) reviewed plant status documents such as operator shift logs,
emergent work documentation, deferred modifications, and standing orders to
determine if an operability evaluation was warranted for degraded components;
ENCLOSURE
-7-
(2) referred to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and design basis documents to
review the technical adequacy of licensee operability evaluations; (3) evaluated
compensatory measures associated with operability evaluations; (4) determined
degraded component impact on any Technical Specifications; (5) used the Significance
Determination Process to evaluate the risk significance of degraded or inoperable
equipment; and (6) verified that the licensee has identified and implemented appropriate
corrective actions associated with degraded components.
- April 8, 2005, AR 050400354 - Unit 3 refueling water storage tank to charging
pump suction Valve 3LV0227C relay failure
- April 21, 2005, AR 050301800 - effect on the Unit 2 component cooling water
(CCW) system as a result of missing taper pins from CCW return isolation valve
2HV6500 from the Train B shutdown cooling heat exchanger
- May 12, 2005, AR 050500710 - Unit 2 cask handling crane modifications not
completed before return to service
- May 13, 2005, AR 050500795 - Unit 2 missing seismic restraints from the
Train A and B emergency diesel generator air start system piping
- June 1, 2005, AR 050301091 - Units 2 and 3 potentially degraded offsite grid
voltage
The inspectors completed five samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds (71111.16)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the one below listed operator workaround to: (1) determine if
the functional capability of the system or human reliability in responding to an initiating
event is affected; (2) evaluate the effect of the operator workaround on the operators
ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures; and (3) verify that
the licensee has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated
with operator workarounds.
- May 30, 2005, Unit 3 safety injection Tank T009 Fill/Drain Valve 3HV9362 leakby
The inspectors completed one sample.
ENCLOSURE
-8-
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the five below listed postmaintenance test activities of risk
significant systems or components. For each item, the inspectors: (1) reviewed the
applicable licensing basis and/or design-basis documents to determine the safety
functions; (2) evaluated the safety functions that may have been affected by the
maintenance activity; and (3) reviewed the test procedure to ensure it adequately tested
the safety function that may have been affected. The inspectors either witnessed or
reviewed test data to verify that acceptance criteria were met, plant impacts were
evaluated, test equipment was calibrated, procedures were followed, jumpers were
properly controlled, the test data results were complete and accurate, the test
equipment was removed, the system was properly re-aligned, and deficiencies during
testing were documented. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective action program
to determine if the licensee identified and corrected problems related to
postmaintenance testing.
- August 16, 2004, WAR 2-0401391 - Unit 2 Train B emergency diesel generator
2G003 governor upgrade
- April 13, 2005, WAR 2-0500287 - Unit 2 AFW Pump 2P141 planned
maintenance
- April 16, 2005, WAR 2-0500339 - Unit 2 Train B CCW Pump 2P026 discharge
check Valve 2MU102 replacement
- April 18, 2005, WAR 2-D3H4052 - Unit 2 main feedwater isolation
Valve 2HV4052 hydraulic fluid leak repair
- April 20, 2005, MO 04111321000 - Unit 2 AFW Pump 2P504 packing
adjustments
The inspectors completed five samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
ENCLOSURE
-9-
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)
a. Inspection Scope
For the listed outage, the inspectors reviewed the following risk significant outage
activities to verify defense in depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan and
compliance with the Technical Specifications: (1) the risk control plan;
(2) tagging/clearance activities; (3) reactor coolant system instrumentation; (4) electrical
power; (5) decay heat removal; (6) reactivity control; (7) containment closure; (8) heatup
and coldown activities; and (9) licensee identification and implementation of appropriate
corrective actions associated with outage activities.
- May 4, 2005, Unit 3 planned outage to repair cracks in the steam bypass header
piping and to repair an external hydraulic leak from main feedwater block Valve
3HV4051
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, procedure
requirements, and Technical Specifications to ensure that the six below listed
surveillance activities demonstrated that the SSCs tested were capable of performing
their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to
verify that the following significant surveillance test attributes were adequate:
(1) preconditioning; (2) evaluation of testing impact on the plant; (3) acceptance criteria;
(4) test equipment; (5) procedures; (6) jumper/lifted lead controls; (7) test data;
(8) testing frequency and method demonstrated Technical Specification operability;
(9) test equipment removal; (10) restoration of plant systems; (11) fulfillment of ASME
Code requirements; (12) updating of performance indicator data; (13) engineering
evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested SSCs not meeting the test
acceptance criteria were correct; (14) reference setting data; and (15) annunciators and
alarms setpoints. The inspectors also verified that the licensee identified and
implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
- April 12, 2005, Unit 2 safety injection Tank 2T-009 surveillance per
Procedure SO123-III-1.1.23, Units 2 and 3 Chemical Control of Primary Plant
and Related Systems, Revision 43
ENCLOSURE
-10-
- May 5-6, 2005, Unit 3 pressurizer spray Valves 3PV100A and 3PV100B
performance tests per Procedure SO23-I-6.300, Air Operated Valve Diagnostic
Testing, Revision 7
- May 13, 2005, Unit 3 CCW Pump 3P026 inservice test per Procedure SO23-3-
3.60.3, Component Cooling Water and Seismic Makeup Pump Test, Revision 5
- May 26, 2005, Unit 2 AFW Pump 2P140 inservice test per Procedure SO23-3-
3.60.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Testing, Revision 10
- June 1, 2005, Unit 3 AFW Pump 3P504 inservice test per Procedure SO23-3-
3.60.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Testing, Revision 10
- June 16, 2005, Units 2 and 3 sound powered phone system check per
Procedure SO23-6-31, Communication System Operation, Revision 4
The inspectors completed six samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, plant drawings,
procedure requirements, and Technical Specifications to ensure that the one listed
temporary modification was properly implemented. The inspectors: (1) verified that the
modification did not have an effect on system operability and availability; (2) verified that
the installation was consistent with the modification documents; (3) ensured that the
post-installation test results were satisfactory and that the impact of the temporary
modification on permanently installed SSCs were supported by the test; (4) verified that
the modifications were identified on control room drawings and that appropriate
identification tags were placed on the affected drawings; and (5) verified that appropriate
safety evaluations were completed. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified
and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the temporary
modification.
- April 20, 2005, Unit 3 main feedwater block Valve 3HV4051 to Steam
Generator E089 Fermanite repair
The inspectors completed one sample.
ENCLOSURE
-11-
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure to develop an
adequate monitoring plan to identify a hydraulic fluid leak on main feedwater block
Valve 3HV4051.
Description. On January 20, 2005, the licensee identified that Unit 3 main feedwater
block Valve 3HV4051 had an approximate one drop per second hydraulic fluid leak. On
January 27 the licensee successfully stopped the leak by installing a Furmanite rig
around a leaking fitting on the hydraulic supply piping to the valve.
On April 20 the inspectors walked down portions of the Unit 3 main feedwater system in
order to evaluate the condition of the Furmanite rig that had been installed on
Valve 3HV4051. The inspectors observed that the Furmanite rig was leaking hydraulic
fluid at the rate of approximately ten drops per minute. Furthermore, the inspectors
observed that the leak collection system revealed enough hydraulic fluid to demonstrate
that the leak had been active for more than one operations shift. Specifically, the catch
basin was full of hydraulic fluid and the tygon tubing that was leading into the 55 gallon
drum had an approximate eight inch section that was full of hydraulic fluid. The
inspectors informed the Unit 3 control room supervisor of the degraded condition of
Valve 3HV4051 and the licensee reinjected additional Furmanite the following day to
stop the leak.
Valve 3HV4051 serves as a backup to main feedwater isolation Valve 3HV4052, but it is
not currently credited in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as a containment
isolation valve. The hydraulic system of Valve 3HV4051 serves to keep the valve open
against high pressure nitrogen and its subsequent loss would result in the valve closing.
The closing of the valve would likely result in the loss of main feedwater and a reactor
trip.
The inspectors interviewed operations personnel that were on shift the three days prior
to the Furmanite rig leaking on April 20, 2005. The interviews consisted of three field
operators that performed rounds on Valve 3HV4051 and their shift manager. The
inspectors determined that all three operators and the shift manager had a different
understanding of the status of the valve and were either provided incomplete or no
instructions on how to monitor the status of the Furmanite rig on the valve. The
inspectors determined that a monitoring plan had not been established despite the
licensees assessment that the Furmanite rig was susceptible to leakage. The licensee
indicated that operators were expected to monitor the condition of the valve as part of
their normal shifty rounds, which included checking equipment for fluid leakage as
described in Procedure OSM-5, Operator Rounds. The licensee subsequently
developed a monitoring plan to ensure that Valve 3HV4051 would be inspected twice
per shift. The value of the monitoring plan was demonstrated when a three to four drop
per minute leak through the Furmainte rig was identified by the licensee on May 2. The
licensee elected not to reinject the valve, but instead permanently repaired it during a
planned shutdown on May 4.
ENCLOSURE
-12-
Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the failure to
develop an adequate monitoring plan to identify a hydraulic fluid leak from Valve
3HV4051. This finding was associated with the initiating events cornerstone. The
finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the
human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affects the
cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability.
Furthermore, if left uncorrected, the finding would have become a more significant
safety concern in that it continued hydraulic fluid leakage on Valve 3HV4051 could result
in a plant transient. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process,
Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance
because the hydraulic fluid leak had not increased to the point where it contributed to
both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or
functions were not available. This issue involved personnel human performance
crosscutting aspects associated with the failure to identify the hydraulic leak during
operator rounds.
Enforcement. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors
determined that the finding did not represent a noncompliance because Valve 3HV4051
is not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. While
Valve 3HV4051 serves as a backup to a containment isolation valve, it is not currently
credited in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as a containment isolation valve.
This finding had been entered into the licensees corrective action program as AR
050401214 and AR 050401222. This finding is identified as FIN 05000362/2005003-02,
Failure to Identify Hydraulic Leak on Main Feedwater Block Valve 3HV4051.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2005 Biennial Emergency
Preparedness Exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major
elements of the emergency plan. The scenario included a loss of electrical power to all
of the main control room alarms, a seized reactor coolant pump, a main steam line
break into the primary containment, and a helicopter crash into the main switchyard
which resulted in a loss of offsite power. The scenario continued with a station blackout
due to failures of the emergency diesel generators, and a steam generator tube rupture
and fuel cladding failure, resulting in an ongoing radioactive steam release to the
environment. The licensee activated all of their emergency facilities to demonstrate
their capability to implement the emergency plan.
The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant
activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and
assessment of offsite dose consequences in the simulator control room and the
following emergency response facilities:
ENCLOSURE
-13-
- Operations Support Center
- Emergency Operations Facility
The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the
transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, protection of
emergency workers, emergency repair capabilities, and the overall implementation of
the emergency plan to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b),
10 CFR 50.54(q), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the above emergency
response facilities to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise
performance. The inspectors also attended the formal presentation of critique items to
plant management. The inspectors also reviewed emergency facility logs, emergency
notification forms, dose assessment records, and emergency news center press
releases to assess license performance during the exercise.
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the San Onofre Emergency Plan, Revisions 18 and 19,
submitted in November 2004 and April 2005 respectively. Revision 18 deleted two
Unit 1 emergency response positions and assigned their functions to Units 2 and 3
emergency response personnel, updated emergency action levels associated with
security events, and added the position of Emergency Operations Facility Security
Director to the licensees emergency response organization. Revision 19 removed two
Unit 1 radiation monitors from listed emergency plan equipment, consistent with License
Amendment 163 to Unit 1 Technical Specifications.
The inspectors reviewed the emergency plan implementing Procedure SO123 VIII-1,
Recognition and Classification of Emergencies, Revisions 22 and 23, submitted in
November 2004 and April 2005 respectively. Revision 22 removed two security related
emergency action levels and added six additional emergency action level initiating
conditions associated with security events, consistent with the safeguards contingency
plan and the security order from the Commission that implemented Nuclear Energy
Institute 03-12, "Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan,
Safeguards Contingency Plan, [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Security Program]." The revision also removed reference to the Unit 1 Fuel Storage
Building and associated radiation monitors from the emergency action levels due to
ENCLOSURE
-14-
removal of all fuel from the building. Revision 23 made changes to equipment
references to be consistent with Revision 19 of the Emergency Plan.
The revisions were compared to the previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654,
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the licensee adequately implemented the emergency
plan change process described in 10 CFR 50.54(q).
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a. Inspection Scope
For the below listed simulator-based training evolution contributing to Drill/Exercise
Performance and Emergency Response Organization Performance Indicators, the
inspectors: (1) observed the training evolution to identify any weaknesses and
deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action requirements
development activities; (2) compared the identified weaknesses and deficiencies against
licensee identified findings to determine whether the licensee is properly identifying
failures; and (3) determined whether licensee performance is in accordance with the
guidance of the NEI 99-02, Reulatory Assessment Indicator Guidelines, acceptance
criteria.
- June 21, 2005, Unit 2 simulator, seismic event followed by a loss of coolant
accident
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled submittals for the performance indicators listed below for the
period July 1 through December 31, 2004. The definitions and guidance of Nuclear
ENCLOSURE
-15-
Engineering Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, were used to
verify the licensees basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the accuracy
of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period.
- Drill and Exercise Performance
- Emergency Response Organization Participation
- Alert and Notification System Reliability
The inspectors reviewed a 100 percent sample of drill and exercise scenarios, licensed
operator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique
records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted during the
verification period. The inspectors reviewed the qualification, training, and drill
participation records for a sample of 10 emergency responders. The inspectors
reviewed alert and notification system maintenance records and procedures, and a
100 percent sample of siren test results. The inspectors also interviewed licensee
personnel that were responsible for collecting and evaluating the performance indicator
data.
The inspectors completed three samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Daily Reviews
In order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily
action request (AR) summary reports and attending AR review meetings.
.2 Annual Sample Review
The inspectors selected AR 050200369 for more in depth review to verify that licensee
personnel had taken corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue.
The AR was written to address a service advisory from Engine Systems Incorporated to
alert licensees that fuel injectors used in emergency diesel generators should be pop
tested if the injector had been stored for more than one year. The AR was reviewed to
ensure that the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was
performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The
inspectors evaluated the licensees actions against the requirements of the licensees
corrective action program as delineated in Procedure SO123-XV-50, Corrective Action
ENCLOSURE
-16-
Process, Revision 4. The inspectors determined that AR 050200369 was closed
without any corrective actions identified or documented in appropriate AR assignments.
The licensee subsequently reopened AR 050200369 in order to update the appropriate
emergency diesel generator procedures.
.3 Semiannual Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semiannual review of licensee internal documents, reports,
audits, and PIs to identify trends that might indicate the existence of more significant
safety issues. The inspectors reviewed the following:
- ARs generated during the previous six months
- station performance reports
- weekly production performance reviews
- corrective maintenance backlog
- quality assurance audit executive summaries
- system health reports
- performance indicators
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. However, during the review the inspectors
noted the following trends where performance deficiencies have recurred:
- On several occasions the inspectors have identified plant deficiencies that were
not identified as operator workarounds per licensee program requirements
(ARs 050400215, 050201018, 050600134). Through interviews and periodic
program reviews, the inspectors determined that on shift operators have little
ownership in the operator workaround program. The licensees philosophy that
the operator workaround program is only a management tool and not a tool for
shift operators may be a contributing factor to this deficiency.
- The inspectors noted at the end of the inspection period that Unit 2 safety
injection Tank 8 had developed a small leak of approximately 0.5 gallons
per hour through safety injection system check valves. Although minor, check
valve leakage in the safety injection system has been a chronic problem
(ARs 050500027, 030400450; also see IR 05000361;362/2003003
Section 1R13). The licensee indicated that an effort to benchmark other utilities
to better identify effective corrective actions would be performed.
- The inspectors noted that hydraulic leaks in main feedwater block valves and
main feedwater isolation valves have occurred three times within the last
six months (ARs 050500705, 050101113, and 041201554). The licensee was in
the process of evaluating the deficiencies for possible equipment aging issues
ENCLOSURE
-17-
and generic weaknesses at the end of the inspection period.
- The inspectors have previously identified multiple instances where ARs have
been closed with no corrective action taken or they did not identify or correct
deficiencies with interdepartmental communication and coordination that
contributed to complications in the resolution of problems (see IR 05000361;
362/2003003 Section 4OA2.1). The licensee initiated a task force to implement
more effective corrective actions to improve AR documentation and
interdepartmental communications (ARs 050500741 and 050500737,
respectively).
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000361/2005002-00, Missing Taper Pins on
CCW Valve Cause Technical Specification Required Shutdown
On February 14, 2005, the licensee manually shut down Unit 2 in response to a failure
of the component cooling water outlet isolation Valve 2HV6500 to the Train B shutdown
cooling heat exchanger. The licensee discovered that 2HV6500 had been rendered
inoperable because the two taper pins that held the valve disc to its stem were both
missing. The licensee was issued a noncited violation for this failure (see
IR 05000361;362/2005002, Section 1R13.1). This Licensee Event Report is closed.
4OA4 Crosscutting Aspects of Findings
Cross-References to Human Performance Findings Documented Elsewhere
Section 1R23 describes a finding where operations personnel failed to identify a
hydraulic fluid leak from main feedwater block Valve 3HV4051.
4OA5 Other Activities
Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/163: Operational Readiness of Offsite Power
The inspectors collected data pursuant to TI 2515/163, "Operational Readiness of
Offsite Power." The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures related to General
Design Criteria 17, "Electric Power Systems;" 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating
Current Power;" 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants;" and the Technical Specifications for the offsite
power system. The data was provided to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for
further review. Documents reviewed for this TI are listed in the attachment.
ENCLOSURE
-18-
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 15, 2005, the senior emergency preparedness inspector discussed the
inspection findings with Mr. D. Nunn, Vice President, and other members of the
licensee's staff. The inspector verified that no proprietary information was provided
during the inspection.
On June 24, 2005, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to
Dr. R. Waldo and others who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that
proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
ENCLOSURE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
C. Anderson, Manager, Site Emergency Preparedness
B. Ashbrook, Manager, Emergency Planning
D. Breig, Station Manager
D. Cleavenger, Project Analyst, Offsite Emergency Planning
B. Culverhouse, Manager, Offsite Emergency Planning
B. Katz, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight and Regulatory Affairs
R. Garcia, Technical Specialist, Offsite Emergency Planning
S. Giannell, Technical Specialist, Emergency Planning
M. Love, Manager, Maintenance
J. Madigan, Manager, Health Physics
C. McAndrews, Manager, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment
M. McBrearty, Technical Specialist, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
D. Nunn, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services
N. Quigley, Manager, Mechanical/Nuclear Maintenance Engineering
D. Richards, Project Manager, Emergency Planning
A. Scherer, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J. Scott, Technical Specialist, Emergency Planning
M. Short, Manager, Systems Engineering
T. Vogt, Manager, Operations
R. Waldo, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
D. Wilcockson, Manager, Plant Operations
T. Yackle, Manager, Design Engineering
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000361; NCV Failure to Properly Implement Maintenance Rule
05000362/2005003-01 Requirements for SBCS Header Cracks (Section 1R12)05000362/2005003-02 FIN Failure to Identify Hydraulic Leak on Main Feedwater
Block Valve 3HV4051 (Section 1R23)
Closed
05000361/2005-002-00 LER Missing Taper Pins on CCW Valve Cause Technical
Specification Required Shutdown (Section 4OA3)
A-1 ATTACHMENT
Discussed
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
In addition to the documents called out in the inspection report, the following documents were
selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the
inspection and to support any findings:
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
Abnormal Operating Instruction SO23-13-3, Earthquake, Revision 8
Abnormal Operating Instruction SO23-13.8, Severe Weather, Revision 8, Attachment 4, Post
Severe Weather/Tsunami Inspections, and Attachment 5, Tsunami Warning
050600633
050600890
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
SO23-3-2.7.1, SIT Fill/Loop Recirculation Using a HPSI Pump, Revision 12
SO23-3-2.27, Control Room Isolation and Emergency Ventilation System, Revision 15
Section 1R12: Maintenance Implementation
050100972
050200923
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
Procedures
SO123-209-1-M505, Single Failure Proof Trolley Project, Revision 0
A-2 ATTACHMENT
SONGS Priority 2 Reading 2-2526, Switchyard Voltage
California ISO Procedure OPE-508, Electrical System Emergency, Revision 4.1
Western Electricity Coordinating Council Reliability Criteria dated December 2004
050401269
030600403
Section 1R16: Operator Workarounds
SO123-XX-6, Operator Work Around Program, Revision 3
Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing
Procedures
SO23-II-11.156, Diesel Generator G002/G003 Electric Governor Test and Calibration,
Revision 2.
SO23-II-11.152, Diesel Generator Governor and Overspeed Trip Adjustment, Revision 1
SO23-3-3.60.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Testing, Revision 10
SO23-3-3.31.3, Component Cooling Water Valve Testing - Offline, Revision 10
SO23-3-3.31.6, Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Testing - Offline or Long Interval,
Revision 6
SO23-3-3.30, Inservice Valve Testing Program, Revision 16
050301752
Section 1R20: Refueling and Outage Activities
Procedures
SO23-5-1.4, Plant Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 11
SO23-V-8.15, Boric Acid Leak Inspection, Revision 0
SO23-5-1.3.1, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load, Revision 23
Section 1EP1: Exercise Evaluation
A-3 ATTACHMENT
Procedures
SO123-VIII-10, Emergency Coordinator Duties, Revision 21
SO123-VIII-10.1, Station Emergency Director Duties, Revision 16
SO123-VIII-10.2, Corporate Emergency Director Duties, Revision 12
SO123-VIII-10.3, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 9
SO123-VIII-30, Units 2/3 Operations Leader Duties, Revision 10
SO123-VIII-30.1, Emergency Planning Coordinator Duties, Revision 20
SO123-VIII-30.3, OSC Operations Coordinator Duties, Revision 5
SO123-VIII-40.100, Dose Assessment, Revision 12
SO123-VIII-50, TSC Technical Leader Duties, Revision 12
SO123-VIII-50.2, EOF Technical Leader Duties, Revision 5
SO123-VIII-80, Emergency Group Leader Duties, Revision 12
SO123-XVIII-10.5, Facilities Management, Revision 4, TCN 4-2
Exercise and Drill Critiques: April 28, 2004; May 5, 2005; June 23, 2004; June 30, 2004;
March 9, 2005
Exercise Press Releases
Edison Declares "Alert" at San Onofre Nuclear Plant; "Site Area Emergency" Declared
at San Onofre; Four Fatally Injured Aboard U.S. Coast Guard Helicopter That Crashed
at San Onofre; Evaluations Underway at San Onofre Generating Station; Edison
Declares "General Emergency" at San Onofre Nuclear Plant; Field Monitoring Teams
Taking Radiation Readings; Radioactive Material Release from San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station Continues
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
SO123-VIII-0.401, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators, Revision 0
SSSPG-SO123-G-8, Offsite Emergency Planning Alert Notification System Performance
Indicators, Revision 1
SO123-XXI-1.11.3, Emergency Plan Training Program Description, Revision 13
A-4 ATTACHMENT
SO123-XVIII-10.1, Siren - Community Alert Siren System - Biweekly Silent Test,
Revision 5, TCN 5-1
SO123-XVIII-10.3, Siren - Community Alert Siren System - Quarterly Growl Test, Revision 6
SO 23-XV-24, Quarterly NRC Performance Indicator Process, Revision 1
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
Procedures
SO23-I-8.76, Emergency Diesel Generator Overhaul, Revision 4
SO23-I-8.61, Emergency Diesel Generator Power Pack Replacement, Revision 0
SO23-I-8.62, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Injector Replacement, Revision 0
SO23-I-8.74, Emergency Diesel Generator and Components Overhaul, Revision 7
Maintenance Orders
01110787000
01121258000
020300958
Section 4OA5: Other
Procedures
SO23-13-4, "Operation During Major System Disturbances," Revision 6
SO123-0-A7, "Notification and Reporting of Significant Events," Revision 2
SO123-XX-10, "Maintenance Rule Risk Management Program Implementation," Revision 1
SO123-XX-5, "Work Authorizations," Revision 13
SO23-12-8, "Station Blackout," Revision 18
GCC Operating Procedure OP-013: SONGS Voltage
SO23-12-11 ISS 2, "EOI Supporting Attachments," Revision 2
SO23-14-8, "Station Blackout Bases and Deviations Justification," Revision 6
A-5 ATTACHMENT
050501735
050600016
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AR action request
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CCW component cooling water
ESF engineered safety feature
NCV noncited violation
SBCS steam bypass control system
SSC structure, system, and component
A-6 ATTACHMENT