ML043010161

New England Coalition'S Request for Hearing, Demonstration of Standing, Discussion of Scope of Proceeding and Contentions

ML043010161
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	08/30/2004
From:	Shadis R New England Coalition
To:	NRC/SECY
Julian E
References
50-271-OLA, ASLBP-04-832-02-OLA, FOIA/PA-2004-0369, RAS 8672
Download: ML043010161 (54)

Text

AUGUST 30,2004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C 8 M MI S SION Docketed BEFORE THE SECRETrnY USNRC August 31, 2004 (12:30PM)

In the Matter of Docket No. 50-271 OFFICE OF SECRETARY ENTERGY NUCLEAR Vl3tMONT YANKEE L.L.C. RULEMAKINGS AND and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. ADJUDICATIONS STAFF (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S REOUEST FOR HEARING, DEMONSTRATION OF STANDING, DISCUSSION OF SCOPE OF PROCEEDING AND CONTENTIONS By this filing, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.309, New England Coalition of Brattleboro, Vermont, by arid through its Staff Technical Advisor and Member-in- Good-standing, Raymond Shadis, representing the organization pro se, requests a hearing in the above captioned matter.

New England Coalition's Appointment of Mr. Shadis as pro se representative is attached as Exhibit A.

In support of its qualification t o make this request, herein below New England Coalition demonstrates standing and discusses the scope of the hearing.

New Engtanid Coalition Has Standiner To Obtain a hear in^ Under 10 C.F.R. 62.309(d)

1. New England Coalition (fornierly New England Coalition on Niiclear Pollution) has, on any occasions been accorded standing in NWC ~ r ~ c ~ ei d~ i ~~ o~ New s~ vEngland

~ ~ gnitclear power stations, including Yankee Rowe9 Seabrook, and Vermont Yankee.

New England Coalition is a non-profit, menibership organization headquartered at 67 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont and incorporated in the State of Vermont.

2. The natitre sf the reqmestor's/~etitio~~r~~ rig t under the Act to be ma e a party to the proceeding, nature and extent of the req.saestsr's/~etitioner'sproperty, anci cia^ or other interest in the proceeding, and the p o s s ~ b ~ e of any decision or order that may be effect issued irn the pr~ceedinigon the rerjsreStQr's/~"titiQner's hiterest.

New England Coalition is an environmental organization dedicated 10 irioming ths public about the public and occupational safety and health risks inherent in nuclear pollution and advocating for sustainable energy sources. Ncw England Coalition is a 50 1(c)(3) tax-exempt organization.

New England Coalition counts several hundred members in Vermont and additional members throughout the eastern United States.

New England Coalition claims standing in tw-o ways: First New England Coalition claims ham and/or injury in fact for the entity of the organization through the declaration of its Clerk of the Corporation, Pamela Long [Exhibit B]; Second, New England Coalition claims standing through its representative members, Diana Sidebotham, Sarah Motkov, Charles Butterlield, Paul Sather, Richard Schmid, Mary King, and William Murray, all of whom live within the vicinity of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station and whose declarations are attached as Exhibit C.

New England Coalitions declaration and New England Coalitions representative members declarations claim harm and/or iiijuiy in fact traceable to NRCs action, or inaction, as well as substantial likelihood that the requested relief will provide a remedy. The requested relief in this instance is that NRC grants New England Coalition a hearing in the above captioned matter.

New England Coalitions Request for a Hearing and the claims of its representative members are supported by the declarations of nuclear power plant experts, Arnold Gundersen and Paul Id. Blanch. The Declaratisiis of M. Gundersen and MI-.Blanch are attached hereto respectively as Exhibits D and E.

The injury in fact that is concrete and actual or imminent in this case is predicated on declarants, New England Coalition and representative members, seeking their right as 2

aEected persons, eo participate in an NRC adjudicatory hearing on the recently noiiced license amendment application filed by Entergy. The license amendment would increase thermal power at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station by 20%.

New England Coalition representative members reside within one to fifteen miles of Vermont Yankee and have legitimate concerns over the quality of engineering, analysis, review, and oversight going into an extraordinary power boost for a reactor that has been in commercial operation longer than any other in New England.

The members concerns for health, safety, and property are heightened by members awareness that Extended Power Uprates are a new process and one that has been deployed at only a handhl of reactors. They are aware that half of the plants with extended power uprates have had unexpected power compoizent failures.

In the first half of 2004, Vermont Yankee has lost nuclear hel, found cracks in the reactors steam dryer, and had a transformer fire following a massive electric short and flawed reactor scram.

Members are aware that no reactor in New England has operated to the end of its licensed lifetime; that of the four that are permanent closed, all were highly rated by NWC until circumstances triggered extraordinary inspections that revealed financially untenable design and age-related, safety-related defects. Very few say they believe Vermont Yankee is an exception.

Members are conscious of tlae difficulties of emergency response planning in the niral tri-state region covered by Vermont Yankees Emergency Planning Zone. They are all homeowners and a few Q W businesses

~ in the area.

1 The NRG has also recognized a presumptive standing for persons living near nuclear facilities who raise

~ T ~ J / Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-20,4$

safety concerns. iVort1zeast Nuclear Energy C G I H ~ (Millstone NRC 87, 93-94 (1998): Feiermont Yankee iVucleenr Power Corp. (Vemmnt Yankee Nuclear Poner Station). LBP 7, 25 NRC I 16, 11 8(1987); Coiisumel:5 P o w r ro39ipany (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LEP-79-20, 10 NRC 108,115 3

As the only large-scale industrial facility in the area; and one uniqtie in it; potential accident consequences, Vermont Yankee casts a long shadow into the lives ofWew England Coalition members. Consideration of the potential for a nuclear accident interferes with the quiet use and enjoyment of their respective homes and propsrties.

Consideration of the risk of an accidental radiological release from Vermont Yankee is not remote or speculativs, but a day-today Concern in the surrounding communities where the licensee annually distributes emergency response instructions. This is the kind of h a m New England Coalition and its members should be able to raise in a full and fair public hearing on the proposed extended power uprate under the Atomic Energy Act 89a, 42 U.S.C. $2239.

The Declarations of Arnold Gundersen and Paul Blanch present both an assessment of the uncertain nature of risk assessments and of the areas of diminished margins of safety and assurance that will result froin EPU at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station under present conditions and under the present application.

The evident need for modification or denial of the EPU license amendment application, which could be achieved through an ARC formal public hearing, coupled with harms and concerns raised in the declarations of New England Coalition and its representative members, more meet the standing requirements of the N R C .

There is nothing speculative, remote, or theoretical about the causal link between the injuries in fact described above and the NRC action proposed in the license amendment application.

(1979) (standing presumed where organization raises safety issues on behalf of member residing near a nuclear facility).

4

On October 17,200 1 , less than three years ago, the N R C Advisory Committee on Reactor Safegiards wrote to the Commission of the first application for a 20 percent? extended power uprate:

Many technical issues must be addressed in an application for power uprate. Of these, we consider five to be especially significant:

1. Susceptibility of the plant to ATWS (Anticipated Transients Without Scram)

2. ATWS recovery

3. Reduction in some of the times available for operator actions because of higher decay heat

4. Material degradation due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) of reactor intemals and flow-assisted corrosion and fatigue of feedwater piping.

5. Containment response to accident events involving higher decay heat levels.

Our examinations of the staffs SER and Requests for Additional Information submitted by the staff to the applicant persuaded us that the staff had raised numerous, pertinent issues concerning the conformance of the power uprate to approved methodologies. Though we persuaded ourselves eventually that the DAEC power uprate could be accomplished safely, we found it difficult to obtain information on the technical resolution of the issues either in the staffs SER or in our meetings with the staff.

New England Coalition and its representative members seek remedies through the FRCs hearing process for the imminent harm from increased risk of a release of radiological contaminants fiom Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

It is within NRCs authority to provide such reliec upon hearing and considering evidence, to provide relief in the form of denial or modification ofthe proposed license amendment.

New England Coalition and its representative members want an opportunity to obtain discovery from Entergy concerning the subjects of New England Coalitions contentions, the 5

declarations of its expert witnesses, and the underlying documents of the license amendment application generally. They want to be able present witnesses Gundersen and Blanch and other witnesses to provide testimony in this case. They also want to cross-examine witnesses for Entergy and others who may appear at hearing.

Given the gravity of the harms confronting them, the basic elements of due process at hearing should be available to them in seekin3 agency remedies. Drrke Power CQ.v. Cclrolinct Envivonnzentcll Stzidy Gmzp, 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) (recognizing that the emission of non-natural radiation into . . . environment would also seem a direct and present injury for purposes of standing).

The Atomic Energy Act was intended to protect the health and safety of persons stick as New England Coalition and its members froin the dangers of radiation produced by the NRCs licensees. Rockj%rdLeag~4i! of Women lbtem v. NRC, 679 F. 2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982)

(NRG regulations intended to protect public fiom dangers of nuclear accidents); see gerzercdly Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. $201 1 et seq. (2003), as amended by ]ERA, 42 U.S.C. $5801 et seq. (2003). Congress provided for full, fair, public hearing process for interested persons who may be affected by the NRCs licensing of nuclear facilities. 5189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. $2239.

New England Coalition and its representative members are entitled to seek a hearing on such matters before the NR@ under 5189a of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 92239, and may appeal adverse decisions in such public hearings or rule making proceedings under 42 U.S.C.

52239(b). Thus, the harms at issue in this case are within the zone ofinterest, protections and remedies available under the Atomic Energy Act.

6

New England Coalition satisfies the requisites of standing through its affected interests and through its representative members, who have authorized the organization io represent their interests in the proceeding, as they all have standing to bring this case in their own rights.

New England Coalitions purposes are germane to the representation of its representative members who live in communities near Vermont Yankee, and want to learn about and participate in decisions that are a result of continued reliance on the nuclear fuel chain to produce electricity.

Neither the adjudication of New England Coalitions representatke imernoers claims nor the relief they request requires their participation at hearing. They have authorized New England Coalition to represent them in this matter.

For the reasons set forth above, New England Coalition has organizational standing in this proceeding.

E PROCEEDING New England Coalition contends that the proper subject matter of the hearing in this case is a full adjudicatory test of the license amendment application. The constant pressure extended power uprate that is proposed is by no means a routine or even a tried and true procedure. NRC is scrambling to reassess its review process after multiple EPU-related failures of steam dryers, instrumentation probes, and small bore piping. The fact that these failures were in no way predicted begs the question of what other failures, including failures of safety-related components may be lurking. New England Coalition experts are as concerned about missing information as they are about negative indicators. New England Coalition experts have show in their declarations that past plant activities have destroyed or destabilized any sort of reasonable technical and/or regulatory base from which to launch an uprate; in this case, the equivalent of a new 100 Mwt reactor within the shell of an aging reactor of antiquated design and uncertain 7

design criterion conformance. The issues raised by the application for a license amendment are highly, technical, legally complex, and soundly disputed (see Declarations of Gundersen and Blanch generally). There is also an issue of credibility. Since buying Vermont Yankee, Entergy has become the subject of widespread distrust in Vermont. During proceedings of the Vermont Public Service Board, the Board said in an order regarding the prodextion of documents of Entergy, Not only is it disingenuous in its reading ofthe nile since this tribunal imposed a filing deadline, but, more important, Entergys selective quotation suggests a willingness to be less than forthright with this Board. In an Order on July 8, 2003, the Board found that, ostensible organization that Entergy has provided for its discovery responses would be of little use to a reviewing party.

On October 7,2003, in an Order the Board found Entergys handling of discovery infsrmation to be . . . an example of the kind of corrosive and bullying attitude that threatens an otherwise fair and open process. The Board then went on to award Sanctions ion the form of requiring Entergy to reimburse $5 1,000 in costs incurred through discovery to New England Coalition. It might be said that Entergy, being relatively new to New England, was having trouble adjusting, but Vermont Yankee has its own, pre-Entergy, history of problems with being forthcoming. On September 18,2000, the NRC Office oEInvestigation issued a Notice of Violation for deliberately failing to comply with procedural requirements. The Notice makes it clear that the offending VY manager was untruthfill with investigators as he was cited for being untnithfiil with a maintenance contractor. The Associated Press (9/20/200) simply reported that Vermont Yankee violated its license when a plant manager daliberately gave false information to a contractor during a 1998 refiieling outage. Hubert J. Miller, NRC Region I administrator, the article said, rejected Yankees claim that it wasnt deliberate.

2 Vermont Public Service Board, Docket 6812, Order Re: Moliom to Compel, June 13, 2003.

8

New England Coalition contends that the subject of the license amendmatt ieqrtest is too serious and too complex for an Atomic Safety And Licensing Board took take any chance with the quality of information brought forward and therefore, New England Coalition strongly urges the NIRC to provide a hul sub-pai-t G hearing, where discovery can be mad5 io root out historic documentation only hinted at in the filing and where under cross examination the licensees witnesses can be encouraged to fill in the blanks regarding compliance with regulations and design criteria. New England Coalition SO urges because it does not believe that, given the stakes, the public interest can be served without the fbll panoply of adjudicatory tests of truth.

New England Coalition sets forth the following contentions premised upon the need of YAEC to obtain approval of the LTF on the basis described above.

CONTENTIONS Pursuant to NRC regulations under 10 CFW Part 2, Part 50,Part 54, part 71, and 10 CFR Appendix A, New England Coalition., sets forth the following contentions concerning approval of the License Termination Plan for Yankee Rowe CONTENTION PREMISED ON AN ENTERGY DOCUMENT SHOWING INADEQUATE QUALITY A § ~ ~ ~ CONTROL

~ ~ PROGRAM.

E / 'Q ~ ~ ~ ~

CONTENTION 1 and New England Coalition contends that an Extended Power Uprate license amendment approval should not be considered until the potential effect of a reduced QNQc program is investigated and analyzed. 10CFR 50.54 details the ~ ~ q u jfor~ maintaining

~ ~ e ~ a tquality assurance program. h y changes requiring a reduction in the program must be submitted to mc .

9

It is New England Coalitions understanding that Entergy has undertdax a fleet &oi? to transition quality assurance and quality control from Freestanding programs into the various departments such as, engineering, maintenance, in-service inspection, and so forth. This is troubling in that a manger responsible for cost cutting may then also be responsible for quality control. However, it appears that Entergy is taking these changes through appropriate channels, except for Verniont Yankee. New England Coalition finds no historic record of an application to NRC for this purpose.

Yet, an internal Entergy niernorandum dated April 15, 2004 [Exhibit F] shows on page two, that at Vermont Yanltee,There is no QC inspection group to transition. Whereas the extended power uprate launches from the assumption that the base plant has a minimum number of defects, there is no assurance of that without stand alone, or at least NRC approved and integrated, Q N Q C programs.

CONTENTIONS ON P MISED ON THE DECLARATIONS OF EXPERTS New England Coalitions experts provided support for the following contentions in their Declarations [Exhibits D &E]

CONTENTION 2 The license amendment should not be approved at this time because Entergy has failed to address the root cause of Main Steam Line lsolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage but instead proposes to shift the problem downstream to catch a higher allowable leakage in the condenser.

Entergys fails to pursue the root cause of a negative component performance trend that could ultimately yield failure ofthe MSIV safety f u i ~ t i ~ nMSIVs

. are a critical line of defense during a reactor accident.

wais for Contention 2 10

New England Coalition relies upon the Declaration of Arnold GLindersen under Main Steam kine Isoiatioai Valves [ E m I T D] and further testimony to be provided at hearing based upon his professional judgments and hrther study and review of the license amendment documents and related materials.

CONTENTION 3 The license amendment should not be approved at this time or until it is agreed by all parties that Large Transient Testing will be a prerequisite to Extended Power Uprate per the staff position on Duane Arnold Energy Center.

Without adequate characterization, there can be no assurance that the license amendment will adequately safeguard public: health by demonstrating compliance with IO C.F.R. Part 20 standards.

Basis for Contention 3 New England Coalition relies upon the Declaration of Arnold Gunclersen under Exception to Large Transient Testiarg IT D] and hrther testimony to be provided at hearing based upon his professional judgments and study and review of the EPU License Amendment documents and related materials.

CONTENTION 4:

The license amendment should not be approved. Entergy cannot assure seismic and structural integrity of the cooling towers under uprate conditions, in particular the Alternate Cooling System cell. At present the tninimum appropriate structural analyses have apparently not 11

New England Coalition relies upon the Declaration of Arnold GilnderseZi i_tndzrUltin~ate Meat Sink [EXHIBIT D] and hrtlter testimony to be provided at hearirlg based upon his professional judgments and study and review ofthe amendment application documents and related materials.

_CONTENTION5:

The license amendment should not be approved at this time because Entergy has failed to maintain documentation and records, as required under 10 CFR 51 and elsewhere, and adequate to determine plant condition and design basis conformance as a foundation on which to build uprate analysis.

Basis for Conteneioaa 5:

New England Coalition also relies upon the Declaration of Arnold Gundersen under Doenmentation and Record Retention ~ ~[EXMBIT ~ D] and~ further ~testimonye to be ~ $

provided at hearing based upon his professional judgments and study and rcview of the LTP documents and related materials.

CONTENTION 6 :

The proposed license amendment fails to preserve defense-in-depth. By placing dependence on maintaining containment pressure to secure Residual Meat Removal and Core Spray Pump suction under accident conditions, Entergy ignores single failure criteria and violates basic tenets of reactor safety. This must not be permitted as it deprives the public of protections afforded by defense-in-depth, Basis for Contention 6:

New England Coalition relies upon the Declaration ofPaul kf. Blanch, under Failure to Preserve Defemse in IT E] and further testimony to be provided at hearing based 12

upon his profissional judgments and study and review of the LTP documents 2nd related materials.

CONTENTION 7 :

Entergy has failed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71 (E) , Maintenance of Records and Making of Reports. Observance of the rule is essential to provide reviewers with accurate information about plant status.

Records provide a measure upon which future activity can be predicated while maintaining safety. Without accurate and complete records, no meaningfill review of the proposed uprate in its entirety can take place.

Therefore, bRC should deny this amendment until Entergy can demonstrate that it has its documentation and records in order.

CONCLUSION New England Coalition requests, having herein above met the requirements of I0 C.F.R. Part 2 for obtaining a hearing under 5189a of the Atomic Energy Act, that the Commission and/or Atomic Safety and Licensing Board grant New England Coalition a hearing in this matter.

Wespectfklly submitted this 30th day of August, 2004:

Raymond Shadis New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Express Delivery- Shadis Road Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801 shadis@prexar.com cc: Service List 13

Rsymsnhd S h a d i s BEFORE:THE SECRETARY

- t

In tk Matter of De&& NO.50-271 EPdiERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OYIEflATIQNS, INC (Vermont Ymkcc PIucimr Power Station)

-.....I._. -. . _I 1, D h a Sidebotham, declare as follows:

1. My n m e is Diana Sidebotham 1 Eve at 5 1 Overlds, Yutncy, V m o n t . My home is approximately 1 5 miles f i o n Vermont Ymke Nuckar Power Station 2.I o m Hill and Dde EBrms,which has Seen in my fitdy for three generations. It is thcrc that I make my home md conduct bashew in hay7mplc syrup, wd timber. Yhk fami has commerci;il orchatds, is slrictly organic, and b one ofjwt a few remaining active Fk-nas in Putncy. I cnjoy a clean and healthy natural environrneat, md enjoy the peacc of my surroundings and c o m ~ t yI .rdy on 10~d water drinking w a i a supplies a d , t o a substantial degree. on local suppliers fixfresh h i t s , vegctabks, and other j?TlldUCe.

3.1 arn a mcmber of [he New England Codtion md serve 51s Prcsidcnt ofthe New England Codition Board ofTrustees. I have s l u t h o M New England Coalition io rqxeseni m in this fIccnsc mcnciment proceedmg for all ofthe rewms stated below.

4. I am concemcd abaut the efltcts ofthe propscd incrt?aseofreactor powcr at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Statlion, subject of the above captioned mttcr, on my h d t h and safcty, and on thc value of my property. In particuim, I m concerned that thc proposed exfendcd powcr uprale of the r w m r at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Powa Ststion could increase bath the potcntiaf for an accident and thc harmcul consequences of an ofkite radiological release from the plant.

5. For instance, 1 m conccrned Ihat, ;liccordhg to ENVY public s&itenlents, ENVY proposes IO increase steam now by twenty percent without substanlial modifications to the plants equipmat. It is my understanding that similar increases at othcr cxlended power uprate plants have resulted in equipment failures that could have had saiety comuquences, and that ENVY proposes to proceed kore thc roots c;susesofthose hilures are IhorcrugIdy understood.

6. I am also conc~medthat (EWY) proposes l o increase reactor thermal power by twenty percent, by burning more fuel. This would hcrcIlsc the m o u n t nfradioactivc

Raymond S h a d i 5 207-S82-BO13 p. 3 matcrid available to bc rcleixsed to thc cnviroment in an accident ad providc mOie k a t and stem t o propel relescd materials into thc cnvjronment. I m concernd that such accident rcleascs will cil~seiu1incrcascd health and proprty nsk to me and to my

~onswunity.

7. In addition, according lo local news accounts o f N u c l w Reglrlatorpr Comrni~~ion

{NRC) inspection rcports, ENVY has Eaicd to provide adcquate emergency response co~ximu~cat~ons during m u a l emxgency resgonsc cxertcks in 2002 and 2003. And, during a r w n t trmsformr frrc, ENVY f d e d to communicate a t h c l y alert to a sign3canl segment of thc Emergency Planning 7 ~ xThercforc. I m concerned that dccrcased safety w g l n s will be permitted at Vermorlt Y d c o Nuclem Power Station withuut adequatc assurance that ENVY can and will givc timely public notice of an emergency.

9. Further, 1 am concerned kcauusc Vcmont 'Ymkcc has heen j,comcreh1 operation iorgcr than my other Ncw England nuchar power plant and will be subjectcd to wear and s t r s~a re& of thc proposed upratc thai were ncvcr contemplated in thc plant's originaldssign Millstone I, Y d e e Rowe, M& Yankee, md Hadclam Neck (Connecticut Y&w) Nuclear Powcr Plants were ail p~rmarrefi-tlyC ~ O S Ch~h r e the end oft&ck.license. All wcrc closed afkr extraordbry NBC conducted e x ~ ~ t i o n s revedd sdct y-rehted design flaws, improper nsodi&z.itions, and agc-related defccts.

However, Vermont Y d e e will reccivc no examination comparable in scope or depth prior to upr;l:e, Tlius wc have no i~ssumm h a t Vbemnt Yankee is not a h riddled with safety-rclatcd delbcls that will initiate m xcidcnt or o t h t s e d e s 1 lhzmselvcs under upmtc conditions,

10. Fhdy, T am conccrncd that Vermont Yankee nxty be not oprathg in compliance with federal sal'ety regulations. More directly, 1rnconcerned that W Y is appsvcntly unable to demonstrate coherent, readily accessible doament&n oV c m n t Ymkec's c o m p h e with all applicable design and operational d c t y criteria. Based on an extensive and notorious p u b k dispute between ENVY a d New England Coalition's cxpcrts, Mi. Pad M. Blanch and Mr. b o l d Gunderscn, I believe that thc risks inherent in the proposed uprate cannot be quantified until the Vermont Yankee's appfimbk safety crite~&arc h e d md compliance with tho% criteria is properiy documented.

I 1. if the NRC providcs New E n g h d Coalition with n h m k g in this casc,the New E'ngland Coalition will be able to try to gct the proposcd license mendmnt rejected OT modified to address safety conwm. This would ~crveto protect mc, my property and my fm b u s b a s from the risks isvolved in the proposed extended power uprate at Vemont Yankee.

1 deckwe under p c d t y ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on Atlgast && 2004.

Y I.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COlWdISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

I, William F. Murray, declare as follows:

1. My name is William F. Murray. I live at 933 Weatherhead Hollow Road, Guilford, Vermont. My home is approximately four miles from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

2. I have lived in this area since 1976. My wife and I own and share ow home, which we built seven years ago. We especially value it for its natural and tranquil community setting. We enjoy outdoor activities; including gardening, tending our property, walking, and general outdoor recreation in the vicinity of our home. We rely on local water drinking water supplies. We rely on Vermont food products m d locally grown produce for a substantial portion of our diet.

3. I am a member of the New England Coalition and I have authorized New England Coalition to represent me in this license amendment proceeding.

4. I am concerned about the effects of the proposed increase of reactor power at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station, subject of the above captioned matter, on my health and safety, and on the value of my property. In particular, I am Concerned that the proposed extended power uprate of the reactor at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station could increase both the potential for an accident and the hannful consequences of an offsite radiological release from the plant.

5. I am also concerned that Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) proposes to increase reactor thermal power by twenty percent, by burning more fuel. This would increase the amount of radioactive material available to be released to the environment in an accident and provide more heat and steam to propel released materials into the environment. I ani concerned that such accident releases will cause an increased health risk to me and to my fmily. I am further concerned that such an radiological release may cause contamination that will devalue my property and may cause contamination of GUT water supply as well as local food sqpglies.

Declaration of William 6. In addition, according to local news accounts of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection reports, ENVY has failed to provide adequate emergency response communications during annual emergency response exercises in 2002 and 2003. And, during a recent transformer fire, ENVY failed to communicate a timely alert to a significant segment of the Emergency Planning Zone. Therefore I am concerned that decreased safety margins will be permitted at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station without adequate assurance that ENVY can and will give timely public notice of an emergency.

7. Further, I am concerned because Vermont Yankee has been in longer commercial operation than any other New England nuclear power plant and will be subjected to wear and stresses as a result of the proposed uprate that were never contemplated in the plants original design. Millstone I, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, and Haddam Neck (Connecticut Yankee) Nuclear Power Plants were all permanently closed before the end of their license and all were closed after extraordinary NRC conducted examinations revealed safety-related design flaws: improper modifications, and age-related defects.

However, Vermont Yankee will receive no examination comparable in scope or depth prior to uprate. Thus we have no assurance that Vermont Yankee is not also riddled with safety-related defects that will initiate an accident or otherwise manifest themselves under uprate conditions.

8. Finally, I am concerned that Vermont Yankee may be not operating in compliance with federal safety regulations and more directly that ENVY is apparently unable to demonstrate coherent, readily accessible documentation of Vermont Yankees conipliance with all applicable design and operational safety criteria. Based on a well-publicized dispute between ENVY and New England Coalition, I believe that the risks inherent in the proposed uprate cannot be quantified until the Vermont Yankees applicable safety criteria are listed and compliance with those criteria is properly documented.

9. If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grants New England Coalition a hearing in the above captioned matter, New England Coalition will have the opportunity to advocate before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the proposed license amendment should be rejected or modified to address safety concerns. This would serve to protect my wife and me, and my property from the risks involved in the proposed extended power uprate at Vermont Yankee.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C OMhl I SSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket Xo. 50-271 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VEFWONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

DECLARATION OF RIAIRU KING I, Mary King, declare as follows:

1. My name is Mary King. I live at 62 Hinsdale Road, Noi-thfield, Massachusetts. My home is approximately four miles from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

2. My partner, Shirley Keech, and I own and share our home and land. We especially value it for its natural setting with an open view across the meadows to the Connecticut River. Our acreage is intensely cultivated, with our gardens providing all of our food and our woodlot providing all of our home heating. We have invested heavily in plantings of fi-uit and nut crop trees, fruit-bearing vines, bushes, herbaceous plants, and perennials.

We rely on local water drinking water supplies. Our lives are intimately, profoundly, deeply tied to this land.

3. I am a member of the New England Coalition and I have authorized New England Coalition to represent me in this license amendment proceeding.

4. I am concerned about the effects of the proposed increase of reactor power at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station, subject of the above captioned matter, on my health and safety, and on the value of my property. In particular, I am concerned that the proposed extended power uprate of the reactor at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station could increase both the potential for an accident and the harmfill consequences of an offsite radiological release from the plant.

5. For instance, I am concerned that, according to ENVY public statements, ENVY proposes to increase steam flow by twenty percent without substantial modifications to the plants equipment. It is my understanding that similar increases at other extended power uprate plants have resulted in equipment failures that could have had safety consequences, and that ENVY proposes to proceed before the roots causes of those failures are thoroughly understood.

6. I am also coccerned that Entergy Ni-dear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) propcses to increase reactor thermal ;?ewer by twenty percent, by burning more fuel. This would increase the amount of radioactive material available to be released to the environment ili

Declaration of M a r y King - 2 an accident and provide more heat and steam to propel released materials into the environment. 1 am concerned that such accident releases !vi11 cause an increased health risk to nie and to my partner. I am further concerned that such an radiological release may cause contamination that will devalue our property and may cause contamination of our water supply as well as local food supplies.

7. In addition, according to local news accounts of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection reports, ENVY has failed to provide adequate emergency response communications during annual emergency response exercises in 2002 and 2003. And, during a recent transformer fire, ENVY failed to communicate a timely alert to a significant segment of the Emergency Planning Zone. Therefore I am concerned that decreased safety margins will be permitted at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station without adequate assurance that ENVY can and will give timely public nntice of an emergency.

8. Further, I am concerned because Vemiont Yankee has been in longer commercial operation than any other New England nuclear power plant and will be subjected to wear and stresses as a result of the proposed uprate that were never contempiated in the plants original design. Millstone I, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, and Haddam Neck (Connecticut Yankee) Nuclear Power Plants were all permanently closed before the end of their license and all were closed after extraordinary NRC conducted examinations revealed safety-related design flaws, improper modifications, and age-related defects.

However, Vermont Yankee will receive no examination comparable in scope or depth prior to uprate. Thus we have no assurance that Verniont Yankee is not also riddled with safety-related defects that will initiate an accident or otherwise manifest themselves under uprate conditions.

9. Finally, I am concerned that ENVY is apparently unable to demonstrate coherent, readily accessible documentation of Verniont Yankees compliance with all applicable design and operational safety criteria. Based on news reports of a well-publicized dispute between ENVY and New England Coalition, I believe that the risks inherent in the proposed uprate cannot be quantified until the Vermont Yankees applicable safety criteria are listed and conipliance with those criteria is properly documented.

10. If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grants New England Coalition a hearing in the above captioned matter, New England Coalition will have the opportunity to advocate before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the proposed license amendment should be rejected or modified to address safety concerns. This would serve to protect my partner and me, and our property from the risks involved in the proposed extended power uprate at Verniont Yankee.

I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 26,2004.

UNITED STATES OF hifERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COhfMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY hi-CLEAR VERMONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

DECLARATION OF C RLES BUTTEWELD I, Charles Butterfield, declare as follows:

1. My name is Charles Butterfield. I live at 433 Oxbow Road, Hinsdale, New Hampshire.

My home is approximately five miles from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

2. My wife, Nancy, and I have owned and shared our home for 42 years. We especially value it for its natural and tranquil community setting. We enjoy outdoor activities; including gardening, walking, and general outdoor recreation in the vicinity of ow home.

We rely on local water drinking water supplies. Our own gardens provide much of our food.

3. I am a member of the New England Coalition and I have authorized New England Coalition to represent me in this license amendment proceeding.

4. I am concerned about the effects of the proposed increase of reactor power at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station, subject of the above captioned matter, on my health and safety, and on the value of my property. In particular, I am concerned that the proposed extended power uprate of the reactor at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station could increase both the potential for an accident and the harmful consequences of an offsite radiological release from the plant.

5. For instance, I am concerned that, according to ENVY public statements, ENVY proposes to increase steam flow by twenty percent without substantial modifications to the plants equipment. It is my understanding that similar increases at other extended power uprate plants have resulted in equipment failures that could have had safety consequences, and that ENVY proposes to proceed before the roots causes of those failures are thoroughly understood.

6. I am also concerned that Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) proposes to increase reactor thermal power by twenty percent, by burning more fuel. This would increase the amount of radioactive material available to be released to the envirorment in an accident and provide more heat and steam to propel released materials into the environment. I am concerned that S L I ~ accident I releases Will cause an increased health

Declaratior? of Charles Butterfieid - 3 risk to me and to my family. I am further concerned that such an radiological release may cause contamination that will devalue my property and may cause contamination of our water supply as well as local food supplies.

7. In addition, according to local n w s accounts of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection reports, ENVY has failed to provide adequate emergency response communications during annual emergency response exercises in 2002 and 2003. And, during a recent transformer fire, ENVY failed to communicate a timely alert to a significant segment of the Emergency Planning Zone. Therefore I am concerned that decreased safety margins will be permitted at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station without adequate assurance that ENVY can and will give timely public notice of an emergency.

8. Further, I ain concerned because Vermont Yankee has been in longer commercial operation than any other New England nuclear power plant and will be subjected to wear and stresses as a result of the proposed uprate that were never contemplated in the plants original design. Millstone I, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, and Haddam Neck (Connecticut Yankee) Nuclear Power Plants were all permanently closed before the end of their license and all were closed after extraordinary NRC conducted examinations revealed safety-related design flaws, improper modifications, and age-related defects.

However, Vermont Yanlkee will receive no examination comparable in scope or depth prior to uprate. Thus we have no assurance that Vermont Yankee is not also riddled with safety-related defects that will initiate an accident or otherwise manifest themselves under uprate conditions.

9. Finally, I am concerned that Vermont Yankee may be not operating in compliance with federal safety regulations and more directly that ENVY is apparently unable to demonstrate coherent, readily accessible documentation of Vermont Yankees compliance with all applicable design and operational safety criteria. Based on a well-publicized dispute between ENVY and New England Coalition, I believe that the risks inherent in the proposed uprate cannot be quanrified until the Vermont Yankees applicable safety criteria are listed and compliance with those criteria is properly documented.

10. If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grants New England Coalition a hearing in the above captioned matter, New England Coalition will have the opportunity to advocate before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the proposed license amendment should be rejected or modified to address safety concerns. This would serve to protect my wife and me, and my property from the risks involved in the proposed extended power uprate at Vermont Yankee.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August a, 2004.

in the Miitttrr of Docket No. so-27 i LNTERCY NUCLEAR VI~UV~ONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERCY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, RdC.

(Vcnnunl Yank= Nuclear Powr Station)

I, Sarah Kutkov, d c c h c as follows:

I . My name is Sarah Kotknv. I live a1 13 1 1 S l a p Road, Guilford, Vermont. My home lies within 10 miles of Vemionr Yankee Nuclezw Power Station.

2. bfy liusband. F r d Kotkov, and I share md own our h o w and crlrich OUT livcs with gardcning md othcrwisc tcndkg OUT grounds, md enjoying our precious and bttautifiri natural environment. We rcIy 011 local watcr drinking watcr supplies and, IO a substantial degree, on local suppliers fur fruits, vegetables, and othcr producc.

3. 1 am a membcr ofthc New England Coalition u d h r the reawns staled below, T have uu~horizedNew England Coalition to rcprcscnt rnc in this iiccnsc m c n d m n t proceeding.

4. I am conccmcd a b u t the cffccts of thc proposed incre~sseof reactor powzr at Vermont Yaulcee Nuclmr Station, subjcct of thc above captioned matter, on my health m d sakty, and on the value of my property. In particular, 1 an concerned that tlic p r o p o d cxtcndcd p w e r uprate ofthe rexlor at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station could increase both the risk Land thc hardid comcqucnccs of an offsite release From the plant.

5. For instance, I am concerned ihat Enterby Nuclear Vermont Y d c c ("WVY")

proposes to increase reaclor rhernial power by twenty percent; burning morc fuel md thus increasing the amount of radioactive material available to be released tu the environment in m accident as well as providing morc hcst s t e m to propel relea.xd materials into the cnvironment. T run concerned thxi such accident releases will muse an iricrcascd hcaith risk to m find to niy h n i l y . I am l'urther concerned that such ;111accidcnt rclcasc GI1 cause a contanhation risk to my propcrty h t will dcvaluc my propmy and il conimination risk to our water supply as wcllas local food supplies.

6. !n3ddition, according to 10~31news tlccounis ol'NucIear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection reports, ENVY has hilcd to provide adequaie emergency rc,.iponx comunications during mudemergsncy rcsponsc sxcrckr in 2002 and 2003. And, duting a recent transfbrmer &eqENVY hiled to communicate a timdy a1c1-1to a

Occlarstion o f Sarah khthov 2 7 . 1 a n concerned that. according to ENVY public stntcmcnts, ENVY proposes to incrcasc steam OOW by twenty pcrccnt without mbstaiitial modifica~ioiist o the plant's equipment; that sinirl;u hcrmscs at other sxkndcd power upratt plants h v c resulted in equipment failures that could have had safety comeqimces, a d that ENVY propses to procccd bel'ore the roots causcs of those hilures are thoroughly mcierstood.

8. ll'lhr WRC provides Ncw England Coalition wirh a heating in this case, thcy will he ablc to t r y to get the proposd liccnse amendment rcjcctcd or modified t o addrsss sakty concerns. 'I'his woufd serve 10 protect me, my family, and my propcrty from the risks involved in thc proposcd extended power upratc at Vermont Ymkcc.

1 declare under pcnalty ofpcjury that the forcgohg is true and correct. Exwuted on August Lc. 2004.

/<&*-

Scar& Kotkov

UNITED STATES OF AiMERiCA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMPvIISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-27 1 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

DECLARATION OF PAUL SATHER I, Paul Sather, declare as follows:

1. My name is Paul Sather I live at 1 1 1 West Road, Vernon, Vermont. My home is approximately one mile from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

2. My wife and I share and own our home. We enjoy outdoor activities including gardening and otherwise tending our grounds. We enjoy a clean and healthy natural environment, and enjoy the peace of my surroundings and community. We rely on local water drinking water supplies and, to a substantial degree, on local suppliers for fresh fruits, vegetables, and other produce

3. I am a member of the New England Coalition and I have authorized New England Coalition to represent me in this license amendment proceeding.

4. I am concerned about the effects of the proposed increase of reactor power at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station, subject of the above captioned matter, on my health and safety, and on the value of my property. In particular, I am concerned that the proposed extended power uprate of the reactor at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station could increase both the potential for an accident and the harmful consequences of an offsite radiological release froin the plant.

5. For instance, I am concerned that, according to ENVY public statements, ENVY proposes to increase steam flow by twenty percent without substantial modifications to the plants equipment. It is my understanding that similar increases at other extended power uprate plants have resulted in equipment failures that could have had safety consequences, and that ENVY proposes to proceed before the roots causes of those failures are thoroughly understood.

6. I ani also concerned that Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) proposes to increase reactor thermal power by twenty percent, by burning more fuel. This would increase the amount of radioactive material available to be released to the environment in an accident and provide more heat and steam to propel released materials into the environment. I am concerned that such accident releases will cause an increased health

risk to me and to my family. I am further concerned that such an accident release will cause a contamination risk to my property that will devalue my property and a contamination risk to our water supply as well as local food supplies. . Forced evacuation resulting from a nuclear accident at Vermont Yankee would destroy our peace and our community and permanent evacuation would cost our home as well.

7. In addition, according to local news accounts of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection reports, ENVY has failed to provide adequate emergency response communications during annual emergency response exercises in 2002 and 2003, And, during a recent transformer fire, ENVY failed to communicate a timely alert to a significant segment of the Emergency Planning Zone. Therefore I am concerned that decreased safety margins will be permitted at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station without adequate assurance that ENVY can and will give timely public notice of an emergency.

8. Further, I ani concerned because Vermont Yankee has been in longer commercial operation than any other New England nuclear power plant and will be subjected to wear and stresses as a result of the proposed uprate that were never contemplated in the plants original design. Millstone I, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, and Haddam Neck (Connecticut Yankee) Nuclear Power Plants were all permanently closed before the end of their license and all were closed after extraordinary NRC conducted examinations revealed safety-related design flaws, improper modifications, and age-related defects.

However, Vermont Yankee will receive no examination comparable in scope or depth prior to uprate, thus we have no assurance that Vermont Yankee is not also riddled with safety-related defects that will initiate an accident or otherwise manifest themselves under uprate conditions.

9. Finally, I am concerned that Vermont Yankee may be not operating in compliance with federal safety regulations and more directly that ENVY is apparently unable to demonstrate coherent, readily accessible documentation of Vermont Yankees compliance with all applicable design and operational safety criteria. Based on an extensive and notorious public dispute between ENVY and New England Coalitions experts, Mr. Paul M. Blanch and Mr. Arnold Gundersen, I believe that the risks inherent in the proposed uprate cannot be quantified until the Vermont Yankees applicable safety criteria are listed and compliance with those criteria is properly documented.

10. If the NRC provides New England Coalition with a hearing in this case, they will be able to try to get the proposed license amendment rejected or modified to address safety concerns. This would serve to protect me, my family, and my property from the risks involved in the proposed extended power uprate at Vermont Yankee.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August z, 2004.

TdG76tLL Paul Sather

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Page 1 of 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY h the Mattzr of Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)-

DECLARATION OF RICHARD SCHMID I, Richard Schmid, declare as follows:

1. My name is Richard Schmid. I live at 493 Melchen Road, Brattleboro, Vermont. My mailing address is Post Office Box 2418, Brattleboro, Vermont 05303. My home lies within 10 miles of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

2. My wife, Nancy, and I share own our home and especially value it for its natural and tranquil community setting. We pnze our extensive gardens and enjoy tending them. I am a professional ai-tist of more than fifty years standing with landscape paintings providing my livelihood. My work requires that I roam our local fields and woodlands to locate and study the sites and vistas for my paintings. Continuous intimate connection to our familiar natural environment is essential to informing and producing my work.

3. I am a member of the New England Coalition and I have authorized the New England Coalition to represent me in this proceeding.

4. I am concerned about the effects of the proposed increase of reactor power at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station, subject of the above captioned matter, on my health and safety, on the value of my property, and on my ability to pursue my livelihood. In particular, I am concerned that the proposed extended power uprate of the reactor at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station could increase both the risk and the harmful consequences of an offsite release from the plant.

5. For instance, I am concerned that Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) proposes to increase reactor thermal power by twenty percent; burning more fuel and thus increasing the amount of radioactive material available to be released to the environment in an accident as well as providing more heat and steam to propel released materials into the environment. I am concerned that such accident releases will cause an increased health risk to me and to my family. I am further concerned that such an accident release

Page 2 of 2 will cause a contamination risk to my property that will devalue my property and a contamination risk to our water supply as well as local food supplies. Moreover, I am concerned that the proposed uprate places at increased risk my unfettered access to the local natural environment for the purposes of producing my work and livelihood.

6. In addition, according to local news accounts of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection reports, ENVY has failed to provide adequate emergency response comniunications during annual emergency response exercises in 2002 and 2003. And, during a recent transformer fire, ENVY failed to communicate a timely alert to a significant segnent of the Emergency Planning 'Zone. Therefore I am concerned that decreased safety margins will be permitted at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station without adequate assurance that ENVY can and will give timely public notice of an emergency.

7. I am concerned that, according to ENVY public statements, ENVY proposes to increase steam flow by twenty percent without substantial modifications to the plant's equipment; that similar increases at other extended power uprate plants have resulted in equipment failures that could have had safety consequences, and that ENVY proposes to proceed before the roots causes of those failures are thoroughly understood.

8. If the NRC provides New England Coalition with a hearing in this case, they will be able to try to get the proposed license amendment rejected or modified to address safety concerns. This would serve to protect me and my family from the health and safety risks involved in the proposed extended power uprate at Vermont Yankee.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

In the Matter of Docket NO. 50-271 ENTERGY NUCLEAR W N Q N T YANKEE C.L.C. and ENTERGY NUCLEAR O P E ~ T I B N SPNC. ,

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

ION OF m B L D G W E R S E N IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS, Under penalty of perjury, Arnold Gundersen declares as follows:

1. My name is - h o l d Gundersen. I am a nuclear engineer and an independent consultant on nuclear safety and engineering issues. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit D-A.

2. I am a qualified expert on matters relating to the safety of operation of inticlear power plants.

3 . T am familiar with the Sice~ls~amendment application for a power uprate that has been submitted by Entergy Nuclear Verinornt Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Entergy) for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. (Vermont Yankee)

T am also familiar with Entergys correspondence with the NRC regarding the application, and with Entergy and NBC Staff correspondence and reports that are relevant to the uprate application.

Entergy proposes to increase the maximum authorized power level for opei-atioiiof the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant from 1593 megawatts thermal ( W t ) to 1912 h N t , an increase of approximately 20 percent.

I believe the proposed uprate unacceptably increases the potential for and consequences of an accident at the Vermont Yankee ~iudetapower plant, in several respects.

2 The safety function of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) is to close and maintain an essentially leak-tight barrier to the rzlease of containment atmosphere.

In anticipation of Extended Power Uprate (EPU) and in response to Condition Report-VTY-2004-09 1 8, MSTV As -Found LLRTs Show An Adverse Trend , Entergy proposes to increase the allowable ,as Found, Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) Main Steam Isolation Valve leakage from 44scfi to 62scfli. Further, Entergy proposes to adopt a less conservative test methods than that which presently yields an adverse trend in -MSW LLRT failures. I believe this proposed change would result in a reduction in safety margin even at the present power level.

If the requested power uprate is approved, the change in allowable MSIV leakage during testing would mask the increased v-herability ofthe MSIVs to leakage andlor loss of hnction due to warping and/or or binding under a power uprate. According to Entergy, Flow induced damage can include valve stem bending, valve stern disc separation and damage to the guide (Id at 27) Therefore, it poses an unacceptable safety risk.

Since 1973, as shown in a 2004 Entergy report, the LLRT MSlVs have been tested 23 times. CR-VTY-2004-0917, MSIV As-Found LERTs Show an Adverse Trend at page 17, (May 5, 2004) (hereinafter MSIV Test Report). A copy is attached as Exhibit B.

Between 1973 and 2004, there have been 14 LLRT MSIV test failures. Id at p. 17 Of these failures, four occurred in the first 23 years from 3973-1996. During the last eight years, ten failures occurred. Id at p. 17.

Entergy attributes the increased failure rate after 1996 to more conservative test methods.

According to Entergy, [tlhe low Incidence of MSIV failures prior to 1996 is .. . the result of non-conservative test method.. .. The validity of this method relies on a number of assunnptions that could not be verified ... MSHV Test Report at page 11.

Entergy also concluded that [tlhe As Found LLRT history for MSIVs shows an adverse trend over the past four refueling outages. In WB-21, there were zero; irr W O -22 there was one; in WQ 23 there were two; in RFO-24 there were three. Id at p 1. Entergy believes that the appropriate solution to the problem ofthe increased MSIV test failure rate is raise the leakage limits in accordance with Entergys pending alternate source tern license amendment. Id at page 2.

It I disagree with Entergys diagnosis of the reason far the increased LEKT failure rate. In my view, the MSilVs are failing, at an increasing rate because they are aging and corroding.

Various statements in the MS1V TestReport support my view. At page 12, Entergy states that . there is also a consensus that the Wye pattern globe valve is less than I..

optimal from a design and application point .of view... At page 08, Entergy states that This pattern of valve features a stem that enters the pipe at an angle, typically about 45 degrees.

3

...theseating force in the MSIVs is marginal. The proposed extended power uprate would result in an increase in steam flow oP20%, with steam circulating faster, and carrying more moisture. Thus components, the hnction of which is now, marginal become components, the unction of which is now inadequate to maintain present safety margins.

In RFO -21 (1999), the identical test to that now considered by Entersy to be too consewative resulted in nu deficiencies. Tn WO- 22 (2001>,there was only one deficiency. 1d.p-17.Based on these test results, it is reasonable to csnclude that the problem i s not that the test is a poor one. The problem is that as the plant ages, the valve leakage is increasing.

The failure rate of the MSIVs can be charted on a classic bathtub curve, showing increasing deficiencies each outage, as the plant gets older. The bathtub curve is a graph that displays time on the horizontal axis and component failures on a vertical axis. In any engineered system, one can expect a relatively high mmber of failures suus after startup (a break-in period) a low frequeiicy of failures during mid-life, and an incrsasing number of failures towards the end of life. The graphed curve described by this phenomenon rises steeply at either end and is rather low and flat in the mid-section, thus it resembles in outline, a bathtub.

Based on the available infomation in the application, in several thousand pages of Entergy Vermont Yankee documents I have reviewed, on this condition report (obtained in August by New England Coalition through a Freedom of Information Act request), or the reasons stated above, and based on my professional judgment, I believe that if the power level of the Vermont Yankee plant is increased, the problem of MSIV failure will also increase.

Exception 40 Large Transient Testing Entergy does not plan to perform Large Transient Testing of its systems (SCRAM from full power) at uprated condition. This cannot be justified as good engineering practice nor is it in accord with staff positions interpreting NlRC regulation. I disagree with and dispute the assumptions and reasoning Entergy musters to promote this exception. It is my strongly held professional opinion that no such exception or exemption must be allowed.

On September 8,2003, Entergy transmitted by letter to NRC, as part ofits license amendment application, B W 03-08/Attachment 7, ~ ~ for Exception

~ to LarPe~ ~

Transient Testing, whkh states at page 1 under The basis for the Constant Pressure Power Uprate (CPPU) request was prepared following the guideline lines contained in the General Electric (GE) Company Licensing Topical Report for Constant Pressure Power Uprate (CLTR) Safety Analysis: NEDC-33004 Rev.4, July 2003. The NRC Staff did not accept GEs proposal for the generic elimination of large transient tzstjlng @e.??&in Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure and turbine load rejection) presented in NEDDC-33004P

Rev.3. Therefore, on a plant specific basis, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, is taking exception to the large transient tests; MSIV closure and turbine generator b a d rejecttien.

Entergy then argues that, although no plants have implemented an Extended Power Uprate (EPU) using the CETR, thirteen plants have implemented EPUs without increasing reactor pressure.

Entergy proceeds to list the thirteen including, to flesh out the list and as if they were regulated by NRC,two in Europe.

Further, Entergy says, Data collected from testing responses to unplanned transients for

[two US plants and One Swiss plant] has shown that plant response has consistently been within expected parameters. It is unclear if these transients were indeed unplanned or if they were deliberate tests. It makes a diRerence when the discussion is about whether or not to do tests.

Entergy igrrores the N R C staffs decision in the case ofthe Duariz Amold EPU application, Section 10.4, of your submittal, NEDC-32980P, stated that DAEC does not intend to perform tests involving automatic scram from high power, because Duane Arnolds operating history, the transient analysis performed at uprated condition and comparable uprate test performed at other stations such as Hatch, all demonstrate the unit can withstand these test. You pointed out that high power test will subject the unit to unnecessary plant transients. You added that is Duane Arnold experiences a Main Steam Isolation Valve closure of Generator Load reject at the uprates RTP, you will analyze the data available and confirm that the unit responded as expected. You concluded that you have verified that the data to assess the plants response to the transiznt.

The NRC-approved ELTR-1 requires the NISNC test to be performed if the power imprate is more than 10% above previously recorded M S N closure t ~ ~ data. ~ sThe~ topicale ~ report~ also requires the GLR test to be performed if the uprate is more than

~ s l y araiasierat data. (Emphasis added) 1 § % d~ r e ~ ~ orecorded Please provide hrther clarifications, idiorrnation and answers to the following questions.

5) You cited uprated test performed at Hatch as an example of industry experience that indicates Duane himold could also withstand isolation transients form high power. For the Hatch Unit 1 and 2 uprate test, compare the units actual response with the applicable transient analyses.

Discuss how this industry experience demonstrates that Duane Arnold power uprate, the cycle-specific limiting transient analysis would provide equivalent protection compared to startup test.

10.04 Entergjrs next argument, were it applied to the aircraft industry, would scare away airline passengers in droves: Ifperforiaied, these tests would not confirm any new or insignificant aspect of perfoi-mance that is not routinely demonstrated by component level testing. To follow the analogy, if an aircraft were fitted with a more powerfkl engine, so long as the engine was tested on the ground, why bother to test it in Right; fastened to the airframe. Wiry not just put it on the nnorning T L P ~to ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Entergy argues that Vermont Yankee has experienced fill1 power bad rejections at 100%

power in the past and no significant anomalies were seen. How this bears on performance at 120% power is something of a mysteiy. I believe that Entergy simply doesnt want to rapid cycle the plant for fear of immediate or cumulative consequences. In as much as Entergy has already announced that it will seek a twenty-year license extension with all of the thermal and pressure cycles in excess of its design life, such a timid approach to one full power test seenis to me to be very much out ofplace.

It is my professional opinion that, in order to preserve the current levels of assurance of safety, Entergy should be required to test Uerinont Yankee rapid shutdown capability at full uprated power not only to test its aging components, but also to test its operating crew under circumstances that are not a complete surprise.

Ultimate Heat Sink It is my professional opinion based upon Entergy documents that Vermont Yankee is operating with safety class4 and I1 components, namely, an Alternate Cooling System (ACS) dedicated cooling tower cell and co-joined adjacent cooling tower cells, in an unanalyzed condition.

It is my understanding from a review of Entergy document3 that it is Entergys intention to alter, as a part of EFU activities, o p e r a t b d parameters, that is, flow and temperature in all cells and to change fan, motor, and g-earboxsize in all but the ACS cell. All of these cells have been modified overtime without adequate stnictural and seismic analysis.

In addition, complete records are apparently no longer available from which to codirm original or modified design specifications and structural analysis.

We do know from Vermont Yankee records that many structural supports have been determined to be marginal or sub-standard. Failure of the ACS cell or failure of adjacent cells impinging on the ACS cell and causing it to fail would obviate the ACS accident mitigation function.

Background:

Yn January of 2003, in proceedings before the Vermont Public Service Board, Entergy announced its iiitention to change cooling tower fans, presently 125 horsepower fans, to 200 horsepower fans in order to belter remove extra heat anticipated as a result of the proposed extended power uprate

6 On June 15, 2003, Entergy announced that plans had changed. Entergy would nom be installing more efficient I25 horsepower fan motors and fans.

On March 15, 2004, the Vel-mont Public Service Board, concerned with mitigating increased vapor plume visual effects, ordered Entergy to revert to the original plan to install 200 horsepower fans.

Entergy asked that an exception be made for one cooling tower cell, which it designated as an ultimate heat sink or Alternate Cooling System. As such this cell is a Class-I safety-related system which is to be seismically qualified and which is fed by the emergency diesel generators in the event of a loss of offsite power.

As Fay K. Thayer, Eiitei-gySite Vice-President testified before the Vermont Public Service Board on July 8, 2004, Of the 22 cells, one cell, referred to as cell "CT2-1," is unique because, in addition to its normal cooling function, it serves an important safety function as well. Cell CT2-I was designed and built to allow safe shutdown of the VY Station following a loss of cooling water from the river intake structure. During that emergency condition, water stored in a deep basin beneath the west cooling tower is pumped ihl-ough plant heat exchangers, where it is heated, and then returned to cell CT2-1. Once it returns to the cell, the water drains back into the deep basin while transferring heat to the air flowing through the cell.

W S B Transcript 07-08-04 at p-1 Stone & Webster Consultant, Dan Yasi, elaborates on the purpose of the system:

During original licensing, there was a special consideration for the hypothetical loss of the Vernon dam. This led to the design and implementation of the Alternate Cooling System. The ACS is not an engineered safeguards system and is not relied upon for design accidents.

In addition to a loss of the Vernon Dam, ACS is credited for two other special events (Appendix R Fire in the Intake Structure, and 100-year flood of the intake structure. So ACS is a special heat removal system used in these special events to achieve and maintain safe shutdown when the normal Service Water System (pumping from the CT River) is lost.

ACS has a design inventoiy of 7 days." memo from Dan Yasi (Stone

&Webster) to Brian Hobbs (Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee) 6/28/03 BATES 008240

Subject:

VYWATERS'r'STEhfS Documents I have recently received fiom Entergy in my role as an expert witness on behalf of the New England Coalition before the Vermont Public Service Board indicate that Vermont Yankee has knowingly operated with a safety system in an unanalyzed condition for the last li 8 years. Specifically the safety related seismic cooling tower had its fill replaced in the mid 1980's but that modification was never properly analyzed to

7 determine if it effected the seismic qualification of the tower. This is and has been known to VY. An undated Tower Performance, Tnc. document produced in discovery states "there has not been any analysis of tha class ii structure to account for the additional fill that was added in the mid 1980's" Furthermore, in my review of VY records produced in the Vermont Public Service Board Hearings, i have discovered a disturbing i r e d in the area of records retention [see below]

for safety related items. The newly provided ENVY material confirms that previously identified trend.

A. The original seismic analysis ofthe safety related cooling tower was done by Fluor before the plant was built. An undated attachment to an elnail from Dan Yasi dated 12/6/02 states (Bates CT00205 and 2061, There is no documentation of the calculation of the loads used for the analysis or a comparison of the calculated loads to allowable loads.

B. M R 83-2055 modified the Cooling towers in 1983. An attachment to an email from Dan Yasi dated 12/6/02 states (Bates CT00206), "I am not able to locate any analysis associated with these modifications to determine what force would cause the ties to break." The "ties" referred to here are steel rood connecting the tower cells. Without knowing the breaking strength ofthese rods, it cannot be said that the collapse of one or more cells would not propagate collape throughout the entire set.

C . MR 8-0635 and 0636 again modified the cooling towers in 1985. An attachment to an email from Dan Yasi dated 12/6/02 states (Bates CT 00206), "Again, I was not able to locate any analysis associated with these modifications."

D. Through a FOIA request in August 2004 New England Coalition obtained an excerpt of a Stone and Webster report first transmitted internally (Entergy) on December 18, 2002 and copied to management and rJRC on June 2,2004. It confirms the conclusions cited above; with reviewers adding, " Essentially, the record of analysis for the Class I cells indicates that several members were slightly overstressed for the SSE seismic loads, however they were judged to be acceptable. There were more members that are at approximately 85% of the allowable load or more that would be suspect ifthe new equipment is installed.

A new analysis would have to be performed to qualify the towers for the additional loads.

Entergy has asked the Vermont Public Service oard for permission to delay changing out the cooling tower motors until the next refueling outage. This may be why w-e could not find a discussion of the safety-related uprate activity in the EPU license amendment application. I believe, however, that this issue should be addressed now and that, per 10 CFR 54 and 50.59, the licensee should not be permitted to operate with any safety-related equipment in an unanalyzed condition.

In testimony before the Vermont Public Service Board, I noted documentation and record retention problems associated with the 1986 Chicago Bridge & Troa report on the 40 year design life of the plant, portions of w-hich are missing.

Since the end ofPublic Service Board hearings, of course there has been the well-publicized missing fuel rod docurnentation problem (1 979 +) as well as 20 undocumented cracks in the steam dryer, which grY has stated may have been there since the plant was built.

In October 1996, the ? R C seat PKNPC a letter recpiring a response in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f) regarding the adequacy and availability of design basis information.

One wonders how VUSlicensee could have told N W C then that it had design basis information under control and now tell the Vermont Public Service Board and intervenors that some inforination is unavailable.

The cornfn~nthread for all these documentation issues is that all of them occurred a long time ago. If the original design basis of the plant cannot be found, it is difficult to predict the future performance of the plant, Vermont Yankee has had special NRC Architect and Engineering Inspections (1 997) in the past. Entergy ciainis that in exc.ess of $20 miilionhas been spent over the last several years to recapture Vermont Yankees design basis. Yet Vermont Yankees in house documents and N R C Vermont Yankee inspection reports are rife with design basis issues.

Vermont Yankee claims to have its design basis and its documentation in good order; sufficient to form a base from which to build assumptions underpinning the EPU license amendment application.

I take issue with Entergys claim. It is my professional opinion, based upon a review of hundreds of Vermont YaikeeEntergy- documents, that its design basis aid documentation cannot support adequate assurance that EPU calculations are rooted in as-found, plant-specific design basis or regulatory conformance.

As this is being written an NlRC pilot program team inspection reviewing design basis and eiigineering is completing its field work at Vermont Yankee. If it is effective, it will have found, among other things, what is detailed in my declaration.

It is my firm opinion, that if this inspection fails to find what the very limited review of New England Codition experts have already illuminated, then this inspection is not sufficiently intense or broad enough in scope to confirm adequate assurance of public safety for existing plant power levels; never mind EPU levels.

As I testified before the Vermont Public Service Board, the conditions (of maintaining control of design basis) at Vebnont Yankee are less similar to the conditions thzt

triggered the 1996 NRC Independent Safety Assessinent at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station thafi they are similar to the findings ofthe Maine Yankee Independent Safety Assessment.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is tnie and correct. Executed on August 004

EXHDBlf D-A RESUME ARNOLD GUNDERSEN Burlington. Vennont Education MS rn Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1972 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Fellowship Thesis: Cmoling Tower Plume Rise BS NE Rensselaer Polytechnic Instituie, 197 1 Cum Laude, 3.74 out of 4.0 James J. Kenigan Scholar Committee Membershim Member of Cormaticut Low Level Radioactive Waste Advisory Committee ANSI N-198, Solid Radioactive Waste Processing Systems Three Rivers Community College Nuclear Advisory Board Exmrience 1990 to Present ARNOLD GUNDERSEN, FREE LANCE Nuclear consulting. Clients include Public Service Electric and Gas (litigation against Philadelplua Electric) and Commonwealth Edjson @r&n management consulting), as well as expert witness for plaintiffs a1 Three Mile Island 1979 to 1990 MUCLEAR ENERGY SERVICES Cornrate Officer and Senior Vice President Technical Services R s p s i b l e or overall pafomance of the company% Inservice Inspection (ASME X I ) , Quality Assurance (SNTC IA), and Staff Augmentation Business Units.

Senior Vice President of Enqineerinq Responsible for the overall performance of the company's Site Engineering, Boston Design Engineering and Engineered Prducts Business Units. Integrated the Danbury based, Boston based and site engineering f u n c t i ~ nto~ provide products such as fuel racks, nozzle dams, and transfer mechanisms and services such as materials management and procedure development.

Vice President of Enaineeinrr Services Responsible for the overall performance of the company's field engineering, operations engineering, and engineered products senices.

Integrated the D a n b q based and field based engineering functions to provide numerous product and services required by nuclear utilities.

General Manaaer of Field Enqineerinq Managed and directed NES' multi-disciplined field engineering staff on location at various nuclear plant sites. Site activities included structural analysis, procedure development, technical specifications and training.

Personally applied for and received one patent.

Director oi&r.ieral Encrineerinq

Managed and directed the Danbuq based e n p e e n n g staff. Staff disciplines included structural, nuclear. mechanical and systems engineering. Responsible for assignment of personnel as well as scheduling. cost performance. and technical assessment by sraff on assigned projects. This staff' proLided major engineering support IO the company's nuclear n'aste management. spenr fuel storage racks. and engineering consulting prognms.

1976 to 1979 NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC AND GAS CORPORATI05 Supervisor, Reliabilitv Engineering Organized and supenised reliabiliQ engineers to upgrade performance levels on seven operating coal units and one that was under construcuon. Applied anal\.-tical techruques and good engineering judgments to impro1.e capacit! factors by reducing mean time to repair and b? increasing mean time betryeen failures.

Lead Power Systems Enaineer Supervised the preparation of proposals, bid evaluation negotiation and administration of contracts for two 1300 MW NSSS Units including nuclear hel. and solid state control rooms. Represented corporation at numerous public forums including TV and radio on sensitive utility issues. Responsible for all nuclear and BOP portions of a PSAR Environmental Report, and Early Site Re1:ien'.

1972 to 1976 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION Enaineer Responsible Nuclear Engineer assigned to Millstone Unit 2 during start-up phase. Lead the high velocity flush and chemical cleaning of condensate and feedwater systems and obtained chscharge permit for chemicals. Developed Quality Assurance Categoq 1 Material, Equipment and Parts List. M&fied fuel pool cooling system at Connecticut Yankee, steam generator blowdoiin qstem and diesel generator lube oil system for Millstone. Evaluated Technical Specification Change Requests.

Associate Engineer Responsible Nuclear Engmeer assigned to Montage Units 1 & 2.

Interface Engineer nith NSSS vendor, performed containment leak rate analysis, assisted in preparation of PSAR and performed radiological health analysis of plant. Performed environmental radiation survey of Connecticut Yankee. Performed chloride intrusion transient analysis for Millstone Unit 1 feedwater system. Prepared Millstone Unit 1 off-gas modification licensing document and Environmental Report Amendments 1 & 2.

1971 to 1972 FENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE Critical Facilitv Reactor Operator, Instructor

Licensed AEC Reactor Opcntor instructing students%d utility reactor operalor trainees in start-up through full paver operation of a reactor.

1970 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS Assistant Enaineer Performed shielding design of radwaste and ausiliaq buildings for Newbold Island Units 1 -& 2, including development of computer codes.

August 30,2004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMRIITSSTON BEFORE HE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-27 1 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE L.L.C.and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS: IPJC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Powr Station)

DECLARATION OF PAUL M. BLANCH IN SUPPORT OF PETTTllONERS CONTENTIONS Under penalty of perjury, Paul M. Blanch declares as follows:

1. My name is Paul Blanch. I am an electrical engineer with more than 3 5 years of experience in the nuclear industry. I am an independent energy consultant. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit E-A.

2 . I am a qualified expert on matters relating to the safety of operation of nuclear power plants.

3 . 1 am familiar with the license amendment application for an Extended Bower Uprate that has been submitted by Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Entergy) for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. (Vermont Yankee). I am also familiar with Entergys correspondence with the NRC regarding the application, and with Entergy and WRC StaE correspondence aid repoiis that are relevant to the uprate application.

Entergy proposes to increase the maxirnurn authorized power level for operation of the Vermont klnkee nuclear power plant from 1 593 megawatts thermal ((MWt) to 1912 MWt, an increase of approximately 20 percent. I believe that, under present conditions, proposed uprate unacceptably increases the potential for and consequences of an accident at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant, in several respects and, in particular, as follows:

It is contended that all proposed changes should be evaluated for conformance to the plants design basis including the draft General Design Criteria. Further, 1 dispute the licensees assertion as contajned in letters Entergy filed with NWC as Supplements to its Application on October{, 2003 and January 3 1, 2004, that it is in compliance with all applicable design criteria.

EXHIBIT E

Blanch Declaration 8J3oio1- Page -2 Fur example, Draft General Design Criterion states under CRITBRIIBN 21 - SINGLE FASEURE DEFINITION, Multiple failures resulting from a single event shall be treated as a single failure. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Proposed Technical Specification Cliange No. 263 -Silpp'nenient No. 8 Extended Power Upiate Response to Request for Additional Information, Submitted under Docket No. 50-273 Letter BVU 04-058 Dated July 2, 2004, contains a proposed change supported by \TC-808 Revision 6, which addresses some of the changes with respect to the Single Failure Criterion #2 I .

The proposed change assunies that containment pressure will be maintained up to 7 PSIG above atmospheric pressure for as long as 200,000 seconds. Many single failures of ECCS components (pumps, Diesel Generators, valves, motors, etc.) have been addressed within this calculation and VY demonstrates that the ECCS will maintain its ability to cool the core after a large break LOCA.

However, and here 1 take objection and dispute the licensee's claims, the calculation fails to address any single active or passive failures ofthe containment or the torus including failures of valves and penetrations which may impact the operability of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. It fails to provide the impact not only on the ability to cool the reactor core but also fails to analyze the consequences of the additional dose to the control room and the site boundary sliszald a single failure occur wlile attempting to maintain this elevated pressure. Recent failures, both isolated and common mode' failures of BWEP containment vdves have not been considered.

The calculation also fails to discuss the requirement for defense in depth Regulatory Guide 1.174 (2.2.1.1 Defense in Depth) and the independence of barriers designed to prevent the release of radioactive materials to the environment.

This section requires:

Consistency with the defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained if e A reasonable balance is preserved among prevention of core damage, prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation.

0 Over-reliance on prograrrmatic activities to compensate for weaknesses in plant design is avoided.

' April 23, 2004 Docket No.: 50-321 NL-04-0652 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Licensee Event (LER 2004-02) Report "Air Actuator for Vacuum Breaker Failed LLRT due to Inadequate Design"

Blanch Declaration 5/30/04 - Page -3 Sysiem I-eduadancy,independence, and diversity are preserved commensurate with the expected fkequency, consequences of challenges to the system, and uncertainties (e.g., no risk outliers).

8 Defenses against potential common cause failures are preserved, and the potential for thc introduction of new common cause failure mechanisms is assessed.

8 Independence of barriers is riot ~ e (Emphasis

~ added)r ~ ~ ~

e Defenses against human errors are preserved.

8 The intent of the General Design Criteria in A~~~~~~~~A to 10 CFR Part 56) is ~ ~ ~ ~(Emphasis ~ a added) i ~ e ~ .

It is clear fiom the proposed changes that this Defense in Depth is being severely degraded with this change.

VY dearly states that for some events, such as a ai~s~-8f-C~olan~-A_ccidzn:, the sndysis meets the intent of Regulatory Guide I . 1. This Guide provides the NRCs regulatory position as to how to meet the intent of the revised GDC 41.

Page 17 of W C 898 states:

3.3 The calculation also conservatively assumes that containment pressure is equal to 14.7 psia regardless of the temperature and the initial pressure. This assumption is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.1.

It is clear that W is conforming to Reguiatory Guides; invoking them when it has the ability to comply but remaining silent when the change violates design guidance and regulatory requirements.

5. Failure to comply with the ~ e ~ ~ CFR

~of 16) ~ ~ Maintenance r 50.714e) e ~ ~ sof records, making of reports.

(e) Each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to the provisions of 5 50.21 or 5 50.22 ofthis part shall update per~rselicdly,as provided in paragraphs (e)7E(Ci) and (4) ofthis section, the final safety analysis report (FSAR) originally submitted as part ofthe application for the operating license, to assure that the information included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed. This submittal shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Cornmission by the licensee or prepared by the licensee pursuant .to Comnafssisn requirement since the submission of the original FSAX or, as appropriate, the last updated FSAR. The

Blanch DecIaration S/30M-i - Page -4 updated FSaW shall be revised to include the eEects of all changes made in the faeility or procedures as described in the F S U ; all safety evaluations performed by the licensee either in support of requested license amendments or in support of conclusions that changes did not involve an unrevietved safety question; arid all analyses of new safetji issues performed by or on behalf of the licensee at Commission request. The updated information shall be appropriately located within the FSAR.

This NRC Regulatory Guide states:

Revision 1 of NE1 98-03, Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Repom,Z dated June 1999,provides methods that are acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.7Bje).

Therefore, Regulatory Guide 1.181 endorses NE1 98-03 as an acceptable means of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71je).

NET 98-03 discusses Historicd Infirnnation that may be contained within the WSAR NE1 98-03 states with respect to this historical information:

CAI, ~~~~~~~~

Historical information is that which was provided in the original F S - R to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(b) and meets one or more ofthe following criteria:

e information that was accurate at the time the plant was originally licensed, but is not 0 intended or expected to be updated for the life of the plant 0 information that is not affected by changes to the plant or its operation information that does not change with time.

Vermont Yankee in its proposed Revision 18 to the W S A R is misapplying the intent of this historical information and in Appendix F of the UFASR classifies compliance with the General Design Criteria as Historical Information and fiirther states that compliance is addressed elsewhere in the U F S U .

By classifying compliance to the General Design Criteria as Historical VY is proposing to remove all commitments to these basic regulatory requirements.

Declaration of Paul M.Blanch Aupust 30,2004 Page -of __

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on August 26,2004.

Y Paul M.Blanch

EXHIBIT E-A Paul %I*Blanch 135 Hyde Road, West Hartford. CT 06117 800-539-1786 (Pager)

Or 860-236-0326 A 35+ !'ear professional presently consulting to the top managemeni of Nodleast Udities hlillstone NucLar Power Station, Indian Poinl XI^ Maine Yankee and viilli a &stin,m,tishftd!:seer s z engineer.

engineering manager and project coordinator for the constniction of nuclear pon-erplants.

Experience EMPLOYEE: CONCERYS AND SAFETY CBPJCIOUS W O W ENVLROSVJIEZT CONSULT-LNT

-- Febrmrv 2001 to Present Consultant reporting to the Chief Nuclear Officer at Indian Point Unit 2 assisting in the e\ aluation of the plant's Ernphyx Concerns Prog~zmand an assessment of the Safe& Conscious V;ork Emironment.

(SCWE) Work also includes assisting investigations of allcgations related to employee dmriniination and other technical and saIetj issues. Developed and iinplemented training p r o g m s for ECP and other site personnel.

EMFLOYEE CONCERNS AND SAFETY CONCIOUS WORK ENVIROh3IENT CONSULTANT

-- September 2001 to Present Coiisultant reporting to the President of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. Prim- responsibilities include the re-estabiishiient of a Safe@ Conscious Work Enlironment (SC%X: and to x t z m independent facilitator to resolve Merences behveen employees and management. Evaluated the Employee Concerns Program making recommendations [or improvement to the President. Conducted independent kvesfgations of allegations received internally and referrzl allegations from the hRC.

EMPLOYEE CONCERNS AND SAFETY CONCI[QUS WORK E N W O h 3 I E X T CONSULTANT

-- February 1997 to 2001 Consultant reporting to the President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Coinpan! assisting in the recosen of the three FfNlstme Units previously on the NRC's --WatchList. P r i m q responsibilities include the re-establishment of a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) and to act as an independent facilitator to resolve differences betxeen employees and management. Coordinate many Merent groups at iMllstone iiicluding esecuti1.c management, legd, human resources and the Employee Concerns o r g m ~ t i o n .

Resolve differences at the Iowest possible management level. Coordinate nirh ECP to insestigate safety.

t e c b L i dand f-IIp;D issues and review outcomes to assure the in~estigztionwas conducted in an unbiased.

fair and equitable manner. Coordinate corrective aclion with the appropriate mamgement. legal and technical organizations, Work closely with top management and corporate communications to coordinate efforis to regain public confidence with the operation and management of the Millstone site. Probide assinance with r e p l a t o n compliance issues and interface with various public interest groups in the Millstone area including State oversight and groups critical of the hfillstone operations. Provide both formal and int'ormal feedback to the WRC about the recol'ery of bfillstone and the establishment of a Safeh Conscious l$7~rk Ensironment.

Conduct training and make presentations to top nuclear csccutii-cs about the need 10 maintain a Safe&

Conscious Work Enx,hi1Iiieni .ivhen requesied by the Nuclear Eiier~gInsiitute and the Nuclear Reglatog-Comniission.

Made regular presentations to public interest groups. State of Connecticut 01-ersight orgmizztions and [lie Nuclear Regulator?.. Commission as LO rti! pcrsonnl assessment of lhz nork enrironment at hfillsione and the status of corrective actions.

Worked as n tenrn member nith other hlillslone niaiiagement providing overall strategic dnection to the President to assist in the reco\ en. of hlillstone with specific emphasis on pubiic confidence and the establishment of a SCWE.

Provide routine advice to outside Iegal organizations and other nuclear utilily management 7.vith respect to dealing with employees raising safety concerns.

Conducted presentations (Septeniber 1999 and September 2000) to the Employee Concerns Program Forum providing a perspecti1 e on --$+ liistlebloncr" issues and n h a t management needs to do to properl) address these issues.

Conducted presentation in September 2000, along with NRC Chairman Meserve, to the NRC and the NRC's Inspector General's staff on a proposal to resolve -'High profile whistleblower" sihiations. I am continuing to work with the Nuclear E n e r g Institute to further refine this concept.

Worked closely 11411 the US General Accounting Oflice conducting its study related to the NRC's handling of whistleblower issues in the nuclea industry, ENERGY CONSULTANT -- 1993 to 1997 ProJided e q e r t witness testimony and worked with the NRC to change Federal Regulations for the proteteclion of individuals identifying safety issues at nuclear licensed facilities.

n'orked with the Offce of the Inspector General of the NEC to proyide major input to a revision of the recently passed federal "Energy Bill" providing additional protection to Nuclear Whistleblowers This has been referred to as "the Blanch Amendment" by some persoanel within the NRC.

Provided adlice to both attorneys and their clients to gain an understanding of the NRC and Department of Labor regulations governing the protection of n histieblowers under the Energy Reorganization Act NORTHEAST UTILITES -- 1972 PO 1993 Supervisor of Electrical Engineering (Instrument and Control Engineering Branch)

Responsible for programs to assure plant reliability and compliance with NRC regulations. Conducted periodic training of employees and contractors to inainlain continued cognizance of all corporate and station procedures and regulations. Worked as both a supenisor of an engineering organization and directed the efforts of Stone and Webster and Bechtel to assure safety and compliance during the design and construction of Mllstone Units 2 & 3. Primary interface between NU, Westinghouse and Stone and Webster or the conceptual design of electrical and process instrumentation systems during construction of Millstone Unit 3. Assured compliance with all NRC electrical standards and design criteria. Member of the Millstone Nuclear Review Board responsible lo the president to assure compliance with all applicable regulations.

rlccompiishments

Directed the des-eloprnent of thc first real titnc instnirncnt:i:ion monitoring systcm For practicnl usc in commercia! nuclz3r plants to assi'j the oxwall safeh status of the plant and to pro.r:ide im'orniation to remote facilitics during enicrgenc~e\tl1is. This elrort resulted in the identification of mail>.

instniinentation probleins not pre\.iousl-\.recognized or considered "undetectable failures.'I As a result of my efforts. and in f x e of strong opposition from the vendors and the indastrq., ihe hXC issued a BulIziin (90-01) requiring all utilities lo monitor Roseinount transmitters used in safety applications. .A supplement to the Bulletin n.as issued at the end OF 1992.

Recognized the inability of condensate pots to function under de-pressurization events as a direct result of NUScornpiitcrized instrument monitoring 3:) slem. This is one of tiiz most significant s d e h issues identified in the nuclear indusiq. Developed a nater injection ?stem into the reference legs that precluded the absorption of these gases. This solution was adopted by the entire nuclear inbustrg-.

Developed a program to reduce or eliminate the need for periodic calibration of analog instrumentation and thc eliminztion ofihe need for pressure transmitter response time testing. The formation of an ISA Standard actit%> (ISA 67.06) for the dcidopnient of a standard for Performance Monitoring of Safep Related Instruments in Nuclear Pover Plants i t a s a direct result of these eEorts.

Received a "First Use" award from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for the application of Signal Validation for the identification of failed sensors during accident. as a direct result of developing and implementing siLgal validation for emersency computer systems.

Nuclear Operations Engineer (1979 - 1981)

Senior I & C Engineer (197 1979)

UNITED STATES NAVY -- 1963 to 1971 Electrical plant and Reactor opentor and Leading Petty OEcer aboard the Nuclear Powered Submarine USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599). Quaiified electrical plant and reactor operator and instructor at Navy prototge reactor (SlC). US Na\y Submarine Scliool 1965. US N a y Nuclear Power School 1965. US Nab>-Electronics Technician School 1964.

Special Qudifications Actively participated and contributed to two recent studies conducted by the NRC and h'Lraddressing the cultural problems at Northeast Utilities. Collaborated n.ith the Fundamental Cause Assessment Team and the NRC's Millstone Independent Review Group and provided insights as to the root causes of the problems effecting the NU nuclear organization.

Named Utility Engineer of the Year ( 1993) by Westinghouse Electric and Control Magazine for advancing the safety of nuclear power.

Publicly recognized in October 1992 by the Chairman of the NRC (Ivan Selin) for significant contributions to nuclear safety, reiated to the identification of the condensate pot problems on Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors.

Testified before the US Senate Subcommittee about the failure of the NRC's r e p l a t o g practices and the NRC's mistreatment of Nuclear Whistleblo~vers.Instrumental in de\,eloping Connecticut's Nuclear Whistlebloner Law effective October 1. 1992 which is the strongest Whistleblower Protection Law in the country. Discussed in Time Magazine (March 4. 1996) as a contributor to nuclear safety.

Registered Professional Controls Engineer.

E ducat i on BS Eleclrical Engineering. hlagna Ciim Laude. 1972. Universip of Iiartiord Graduate courses in P~lecl~anical and Tiiennodynnmic Engineering US NaT? Submarine School. 1368 US NaJ? Nuclear Power School. 1965 US Nak? Electronics Technician School. 1964 Professional Associations Rfember of the ANS Standards Cornmiitee ( . A S 6.8.1 and 6.S.2) responsible for developing and specifj ing the requirements lor process. effluent and area radiation monitors k i coiilmeicial nuclear power plants.

Vice Chairman. Inslitule of Nuclear Poner O p a l i o n s (INTO) TJJo Standards Activities in response to Three hlile Islmd including Post Accident lfonironng requirements.

Member of the A N S Standards Committee responsible for del-eloping the rzquircmenis or seismic monitoring systems for nuclear power plants.

Chairman of Tn-o Coinmillees for the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INTO) related to Three hlile Island post accident monitoring requirements and emergenc response facilities.

Member of ISA 67.04 for the dewlopment of Instrument Setpoints for Nticleai Power Plants Registered Professional Engineer - California

August 30,2004 In the Matter of Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY NiJCLEAR 'allEWONT YANKEE L.L.C. and ENTERGU NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, TIVC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

NOTICE OF APPEBWANCE FOR RAYMOND SH-DIS Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.314(b), Raymond Shadis hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the New England Coalition..&!I Shadis has been duly authorized by New England Coalition's Board of Directors to represent New England Coalition in this proceeding.

His address is provided below. New England Coalition's address is P.O. Box 545, 67 Main Street, Brattleboro, 'VT, 05301 RespecthJh Submitted, Staff Technical Advisor New England Coalition P.O. Box 98 Shipping Address: Shadis Road Edgecomb, ME 04556 Tel. 2073382-780 1 Fax: 207-882-8013 E-mail. A L ~ Et ~ : c xLZ.

August 30,2004

Rulemakings and Adjijudicatlons Staff Office ofthe Secretary U.S. Nwtear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 E-mail.

Office ofthe General Counsel U S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washiragton, D.C. 2055i§-OOQ1 E-mail:

Sarah Hofmanii Esq.

Special Counsel Department of Public Service 1 12 State Street - Drawer 20 Montpeiier,VT 05620-260 1 E-mail:

Anihony Z. Roisman, Esq.

National Legal Scholars Law Firm Stonewall Farm 84 East Thetford Road Lyme,WW 03786 E-mail:

Jay E. Silberg, Esq.

ShawPittman 2300 w Street N.W.

Washington, D.C 20037 E-mail:

AUGUST 30,2004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA In the Matter of Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY WCLEAW VEWIBNT Y-ANKEE L.L.C.

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, IN@.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATT: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Dear Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Enclosed for filing in the above captioned matter please find the original and two copies o f m w ENGLAND FOR HEAWG, DEMONSTRATION OF STANDING, DISCUSSION OF SCOPE OF PROCEEDING AND CONTENTIONS, Exhibits A through E, and D-A, and E-A, Appointment of Pro Se Repraentative, Notice of Appearance, and a Certificate of Service.

Thank you for your consideration, Sincerely, Raymoid Shadis Pro Se Representative New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801 I:, -,.- j: ,,'>.- ~ , - ~

.?i ,.<::"$i&:, 31L! <;:',: -

I! iJ