ML102720402

New England Coalition'S Reply to NRC Staff and Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee Opposition to New England Coalition'S Motion to Reopen the Hearing & Reply to NRC Staff'S Answer to Proposed New Contention

ML102720402
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	09/20/2010
From:	Shadis R New England Coalition
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-271-LR, ASLBP 06-849-03-LR, RAS M-446
Download: ML102720402 (26)

Text

DOCKETED 1Phr& ffi- q4'(6 USNRC September 22, 2010 (8:00a.m.)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY September 20, 2010 RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, LLC Docket No. 50-271-LR AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR (License Renewal Application (On Remand)

NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE OPPOSITION TO NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND REPLY TO NRC STAFF'S ANSWER TO PROPOSED NEW CONTENTION Raymond Shadis Pro Se Representative New England Coalition zk'X6 - 0'sý -'2

INTRODUCTION Pursuant to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's ("Board") Scheduling Order of July 12, 2010, New England Coalition ('NEC") herein provides Reply to the Staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("Staff') and Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee ("Entergy") Opposition to NEC's Motion to Reopen the Hearing and for Admission of a New Contention. In its Introduction, Staff sums its Opposition as follows:

1. NEC's Motion should be denied because it fails to identify a significant safety issue,

2. is untimely, and

3. is not likely to materially affect the outcome of the proceeding.

Furthermore, alleges the Staff, NEC's new contention does not meet the [manifold]

requirements of 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(c) and 2.309(f(1).

Entergy's opposition follows a similar, albeit more elaborated outline. NEC herein follows the outline of NRC Staff's Opposition, but its intent is to speak to the particulars presented by both opposing parties ("Opposition").

None of Staffs allegations above are true. Nor are similar allegations from Entergy. As NEC has demonstrated and will confirm below,

1. NEC's Motion raises a grave issue of public safety. The physical and operational integrity of nuclear power plant safety-related electrical cables is vital to safety. Failure of such cables has the potential to initiate a nuclear accident or to interfere with mitigation of a nuclear accident once it has begun due to other causes.

2. NEC's Motion is timely inasmuch as NEC brought this motion as soon as possible following (a) initial notice of severe, potentially fatal, flaws in Entergy's approach to aging management of unqualified safety-related electrical cables susceptible to submergence, and (b) a diligent attempt to gather sufficient documentation to meet NRC standards for adequate basis.

Entergy field regimens for maintaining systems and components are almost indistinguishable 2

from those described in the Entergy LRA AMP, in particular the AMPs addressing below-grade electrical cables. The failures and system breakdowns in preventing submergence of safety-related but environmentally unqualified cable at VY were in NEC's view warnings from industry experience of what is in store absent some sincere improvement in the LRA AMPS. Entergy wastes a good deal of type explaining the many opportunities NEC had to take issue with the AMPs from early 2006 to the present. What was wrong with the AMPs was not readily apparent until events at Vermont Yankee revealed the details of Entergy's intentions which are masked in the omissions, vagaries, and generalities of the AMPs. Who could have guessed that Vermont Yankee had a history of flooded non-waterproof cables to which the AMPS would be applied, or that Entergy had no intention of preventing periodic and sustained immersion of these many cables? No, NEC's first notice of a fly in the ointment was the Inspection Report of May 10, 2010; itself inadequate to lay the basis for a contention, but enough to set NEC on the track of Entergy's handling of the flooding and the industry/regulatory context in which the flooding incident[s] could develop their full implications for the LRA.

3. Inasmuch as NEC raises an aging management issue with grave safety implications, a fair hearing on this proposed contention, should the intervenor prevail, is certain to result in an amendment to and/or conditioning of the initial order(s) and a positive effect on assurance of adequate protection of public safety.

New England Coalition responds to and soundly refutes Staff's foregoing opposition arguments seriatim in the DISCUSSION below.

BACKGROUND On July 8, 2010, the Commission remanded this matter to the Board for the purpose of allowing the New England Coalition, Inc. (NEC) and the Department of Public Services of the State of Vermont (Vermont) the opportunity to submit a revised Contention 2.'

1 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-17, 72 NRC, slip op. at 2 and 51-56 (July 8, 2010) 3

The Commission's Order declined NEC's request that the adjudication be held in abeyance until NRC's resolution of issues regarding leaking piping at Entergy Vermont Yankee was complete.

The Commission added however, added" We observe, however, that the proceeding will remain open during the pendency of the remand. During that time, NEC and Vermont are free to submit a motion to reopen the record pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.326, should they seek to address any genuinely new issues related to the license renewal application that previously could not have been raised.2 .

On July 12, 2010, the Board issued a Schedule stating in relevant part,

2. Motion to Reopen: If any party seeks to file a motion to reopen, it shall be filed on or before August 20, 2010. Any such motion shall separately address each of the criteria specified in 10 C.F.R. § 2.326 and shall be accompanied by the specified affidavit(s).

a. If the motion to reopen relates to a contention not previously in controversy, then the motion shall be accompanied by such new contention together with a filing supporting 3

the admissibility of the new contention under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f(1) and 2.309(c).

Accordingly, on August 20, 2010, NEC filed its current Motion seeking the reopening of the Vermont Yankee license renewal proceeding for purposes of admission of the following new contention:

[The] [a]pplicant has not demonstrated adequate aging management review and/or time-limited aging analysis nor does the applicant have in place an adequate aging management program to address the effects of moist or wet environments on buried, below grade, underground, or hard-to-access safety related electric cables, thus the applicant does not comply with NRC regulation (10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a) and guidance and/or provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety (54.29(a) .'

2 Id at 10n37 3 The regulation specifies that new contentions filed in association with a motion to reopen must satisfy the requirements for "non-timely" contentions under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c). See. 10 C.F.R.

• 2.326(d).

NEC Motion at 8 4

DISCUSSION In contradiction to the Staff's Reply:

I. Staff says NEC's Motion does not satisfy the Commission's requirements for reopening the record and proceeds to the three key factors governing the reopening of a record.

A. Significant Safety Issue - Staff says NEC's motion to reopen does not address a significant safety issue. This staff assertion is patently, and on plain reading of NEC's Motion and the Declaration of its witness, untrue. An unbiased reading of the filings and the NRC Regulations, Guidance, and industry literature, which are rife with references to the serious safety implications of vulnerable electrical cables, makes it rather unavoidable to conclude that NRC Staff knows this and is playing word games in an altogether unscrupulous attempt to undermine NEC's case at what all parties must recognize is a vital node, the determination of whether or not NEC seeks to raise a significant safety issue.5 Staff's presentation of highly selective information and deviously contorted interpretation of regulation should not be countenance by the Board.

5The hearing must be reopened if a "significant", unresolved safety question is brought forward., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-I 38, 6 AEC 520 (1973),

reconsid. den., ALAB-141, 6 AEC 576; Vermont Yankee, ALAB-124,6 AEC 358,365 n.10 (1973).

Matters that should be considered in determining whether to reopen an evidentiary record at the request of a party), are (1) whether the matters sought to be addressed on the reopened record could have been raised earlier, (2) whether such matters require further evidence for their resolution, and (3) what the seriousness or gravity of such matters is. , Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520 (1973; Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), LBP-78-2, 7 NRC 83 (1978).

A matter may be of such 'gravity that a motion to reopen may be granted notwithstanding that it might have been presented earlier. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 188 n.17 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB- 1 38, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units'.1&2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1723 (1985); Houston Lighting & Power Co.,.(South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-45, 22 NRC 819, 822, 826 (1985).

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Given the abundance of references in NEC's Motion and the Declaration of Mr. Blanch, it simply should not be disputed that the central issue raised by NEC of whether or not the Entergy VY LRA proposes or has in place [in the LRA] an adequate program in place to address the deleterious effects of moisture or wetness on safety-related electrical cables is of grave safety significance; and one that thus provides adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety.

Staff and Entergy make much of the Reactor Oversight Process ("ROP") Inspection Report finding of "low safety significance" deliberately confusing Significance Determination in the ROP and 'safety significant' as it is used in NRC regulation and guidance. The ROP uses both potential consequences and probabilities to risk inform an oversight determination of risk significance of a particular incident. Inadvertent circumstance (dumb luck) plays heavily into ROP significance determinations; for example, if inspectors find a component vital to safety at full power inoperable during a refueling outage, the bottom drops out of the probability that it will be called on to perform a safety function and risk (safety) significance is assigned accordingly.

By contrast, in most NRC regulation and in NRC Guidance safety significance is considered, once a credibility threshold is passed, in an absolute or prescriptive sense, leaning heavily on potential consequences.6 NEC does not argue that the ROP low safety significance is wrong; it is simply irrelevant.

What is relevant is that all authorities speaking to the issue, EPRI, Brookhaven National Laboratory - authors of NUREG CR-7000, among them, all except perhaps in the context of this proceeding - NRC Staff and Entergy, recognize that subjecting electric cable to environments for which they are not rated and not coming up with an adequate game plan for managing their accelerated aging is a serious concern having grave safety implications.

6 NEC's Pro Se Representative served on NRC's Federal Advisory Committees Act (FACA) panel, Initial Implementation Evaluation Panel for the Reactor Oversight Process[Program] in 2000 and 2001 and participated in NRC Significance Determination Task Group workshops in 2002.

6

Electric cables are one of the most important components in a nuclear plant because they provide the power needed to operate safety-related equipment and to transmit signals to and from the various controllers used to perform safety operations in the plant.

In response to Generic Letter 2007-01, licensees provided data showing that the number of cable failures is increasing with plant age and that cable failures are occurring within the plants' 40-year licensing periods. These cable failures have resulted in plant transients and shutdowns, loss of safety redundancy, entries into limiting conditions for operation, and challenges to plant operators. The data also show that as many unanticipated (in-service) cable failures occur as do testing failures. Based on this information and the fact that licensees are now considering license extension to 60 years and more NRC is considering the need to monitor the condition of electric cables throughout their installed life through the implementation of a cable condition monitoring program.

Forewari4 NUREG CR-7000, 'Essential elements of an Electric Cable Condition Monitoring Program" NEC expert witness, Paul Blanch, in his declaration points to the view slides (ML092460425) from an August 19, 2010, NRC public meeting "Inaccessible or Underground Cable Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants." chaired by Staff witness, Mr. Roy Mathew, NRC/NRR.

Electric cables are one of the most important components in a nuclear plant to provide the various plant systems function to mitigate the effects of an accident and preserve the safety of the plant during normal, abnormal, and anticipated operational occurrences. If cable degradation from aging or other mechanisms remain[s] undetected, [it] can lead to deterioration.. .result[ing] in failure [of cables] relied on to mitigate design bases accidents and transients. In response to Generic Letter 2007-01, licensees provided data showing that the number of cable failures is increasing with plant age, and that cable failures are occurring within the plants' 40-year licensing periods. These cable failures have resulted in plant transients and shutdowns, loss of safety redundancy, entry into limiting conditions for operation, and undue challenges to plant operators. The staff's safety determination during plant licensing was based on licensees meeting the regulatory requirements cited above to ensure that components such as cables will perform its design functions during the design bases events.

B. Timely NRC Staff and Entergy say that NEC's motion to reopen should be denied because it is not timely. They largely confine their discussion to two arguments: (1) NEC did not file within 30 days of the issuance of the telltale NRC Inspection Report, 05000271/2010002, dated May 10, 7

2010 and, (2) NEC passed up many opportunities to take notice of that section of the LRA dealing with AMP for Middle Voltage Electrical Cables filed with NRC in March of 2006 and republished in the SER and FSER. NEC could have submitted a contention along the long way, but did not.

While the NRC Inspection Report was significant new information regarding a safety issue within the scope of LRA review, NEC's assessment of the report was that, while the implications of the report were alarming, alone it did not provide adequate basis to meet NRC's stringent standards for a new contention. Indeed, even though NEC has been diligent in pursuing additional information (basis) through a search of publicly available VY documents; and both regulatory and industry literature and has incorporated many of them into its filing, NRC Staff and Entergy complain, as NEC anticipated they would, that the basis for the proposed new contention was lacking or thin. NEC went so far as to raise the issue with top NRC officials in an effort to identify and track any responses Entergy or the regulators may have had to the report.

(June 22, 2010- Annual Assessment Meeting w/ Samuel Collins, Head of NRC Region 1) (July 14, 2010 - Stakeholders Meeting w/ NRC Commissioner Gregory Jaczko). Entergy VY representatives were in attendance at both meetings. These efforts were non-productive. A search of NRC's electronic document service, ADAMS, under the Vermont Yankee Docket Number 05000271 and the topic, "cables," between May 10, 2010 and August 20, 2010, produced no relevant documents.

One problem with the ROP that interfaces with NRC requirements for intervenors to produce documentation to underwrite the basis for contentions is that at nuclear power plants inspection findings (of low safety-significance) are routinely entered into the licensee's corrective action program, a kind of information "dark hole" from which anything rarely emerges. NRC 8

has access for their audit samplings, but citizens do not. Entergy and NRC report that things are 7

going to be okay; changes are being wrought, nut the public has no way to assay or confirm this.

NEC proposes that the fair measure of timeliness would not be, when did one notice a bird fly by, but rather when did enough birds fly by to make a pie8 . Some ASLB Panels have acknowledged similar dilemmas for intervenors. 9 As to NRC Staff and Entergy assertions that NEC has ample opportunity to file a contention on cable amp during more than four years of proceeding, it is not true. Entergy's cable AMP does not provide sufficient detail to conduct a review of its anticipated performance. What NEC saw in the May 1Oth NRC inspection report was a revelation of detail regarding Entergy's approach to the AMP that NEC could not have been expected to ascertain from the LRA or the SER and FSER. It was startling to discover from the inspection report that Entergy had no technical basis for establishing two years intervals of inspection of its most vulnerable cables, but of course not all of its most vulnerable cables, many of which will apparently never get inspected.

7A party's opportunity to gain access to information is a significant factor in a Board's determination of whether a motion based on such information is timely filed. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units I and 2), LBP- 85-19,21 NRC 1707,1723 (1985), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2), LBP-83-52,18 NRC 256,258 (1983). See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1369 (1984),

aftd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), affd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986).

8 In weighing the admissibility of a late-filed contention, the foremost factor in this appraisal is whether good cause exists that will excuse the late-filing of the contention. See Commonwealth Edison Co.

(Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241,244 (1986). And the good cause element has two components that may impact on a presiding officer's assessment of the timeliness of a contention's filing: (1) when was sufficient information reasonably available to support the submission of the late-filed contention; and (2) once the information was available, how long did it take for the contention admission request to be prepared and filed. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-99-3, 49 NRC 40, 46- 48 (assessing late-filing factors relative to petition to intervene), affd, CLI-99-1 0, 49 NRC 318 (1999). Private Fuel Storage. L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01 -13, 53 NRC 319, 324 (2001).

9 Generally a "good cause" finding based on "new information" can be resolved by a straightforward inquiry into when the information at issue was available to the petitioner. In some instances, however, the answer to the "good cause" factor may involve more than looking 'at the dates on the various documents submitted by the petitioners. Instead, the inquiry turns on a more complex determination about when, as a cumulative matter, the separate pieces of the new information "puzzle" were sufficiently in place to make the particular concerns espoused reasonably apparent. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15,44 NRC 8, 26 (1996).

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And this regimen is incorporated in the LRA AMP. Further, it was revelatory that Entergy had in place no plan to prevent submergence of cable for extended periods of time either under its current license or in the AMP. From NEC's perspective it appears that the current regimen and the AMP proposed in the LRA are largely indistinguishable.

Entergy invokes GALL, NUREG 1800, apparently as some sort ofjustification, at page 20 of its opposition.

In this regard,Section XI.E3 of the GALL Report states, "some cables may be exposed to condensation and wetting in inaccessible locations, such as conduits, cable trenches, cable troughs, duct banks, underground vaults, or direct buried installations." GALL Report at XI.E-7.

It states:

[I]f duct bank conduit has low points in the routing, there could be potential for long-term submergence at these low points. In addition, concrete raceways may crack due to soil settling over a long period of time and manhole covers may not be watertight. Additionally, in certain areas, the water table is high in seasonal cycles and therefore, the raceways may get refilled soon after purging.

Id. (emphasis added). It further states:

This program applies to inaccessible (e.g., in conduit or direct buried) medium voltage cables within the scope of license renewal that are exposed to significant moisture simultaneously with significant voltage.

Significant moisture is defined as periodic exposures to moisture that last more than a few days (e.g., cable in standing water).

Id. at XI.E-8 (emphasis added).

"In sum", Entergy says, "the potential for inaccessible cable to be exposed to water, including submergence, has been apparent from the outset of this proceeding. This information is not new."

It cannot be that Entergy understands the quote it has provided. Certainly, Entergy fails to grasp that "Significant moisture is defined as periodic exposures to moisture that last more than a few days (e.g., cable in standing water)." Is not the same as submergence for extended periods of up to two years as was reveal in the May 10th Inspection Report.

.Entergy argues in one of the grander non sequiturs of our times that because wetting is described in Gall, NEC should have have been aware somehow that Entergy intended to give the issue a gloss over in its AMPs 10

It is NEC's understanding, based on news articlesl° that appeared after NEC's filing of its proposed new contention that Entergy has undertaken to install high water alarms and automatic sump pumps, something NEC had publicly recommended back in June 2010, in its most troublesome cable-bearing manholes. NEC applauds this effort, but must also regard it as an admission that this common-sense protective feature should have been part of the plant maintenance regimen much earlier, before, according to press accounts, 17 of 81 site manholes bearing electrical cables were found to be flooded and requiring pumping.

The events described in the May 10W" Inspection report were NEC's first alert to details of Entergy's approach not included in its more broadly stroked, almost vague, AMP.

Some additional information has recently been made available. On September 3, 2010, Entergy VY filed what it styles a "supplement to its LAR'. NEC has yet to discover where in NRC literature such "supplements" and the process for incorporating them into licensing documents, such as the list of licensee commitments, may be found. This "supplement" represents the incorporation of an AMP for Low-Voltage Cables; more or less a duplicate for the AMP for Medium Voltage Cables. This production gives rise to a few questions for which NEC would appreciate answers, either from the parties or the Board. Can the supplement be taken as 10 Coalition files with NRC over wet cables at Vermont Yankee By Bob Audette / Reformer Staff Friday August 27, 2010 Brattleboro

...."It's now some 55 months since Entergy filed its (license renewal) application," stated Shadis. "The process has been painful and expensive for everyone and we sympathize, but at no time did Entergy ever offer to meet and see if we could settle any of these issues."

Larry Smith, director of communications for Yankee, said NEC's filing was under review by Entergy attorneys. But, he said, Entergy has a program for any electrical cable submerged in water. We have been aggressively following that fleet directive since last December." That month, said Smith, Yankee made an assessment of all of its electrical cables that might have been submerged.

"We have a dedicated engineer who inspected all of the 81 manholes at Yankee which contain electrical cables," he said. Of those 81, said Smith, 21 were found to have "some amount of water in them."

Of those 21, 17 required pumping, he said. Sump pumps are being installed to keep water out of those manholes, said Smith.

Bob Audette can be reachedat raudetted)reformer.corn or at 802-254-2311, ext. 160.

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new information to refresh and be absorbed into NEC's proposed cable AMP contention? Isn't the "supplement" properly an amendment to the LAR? Shouldn't it have been filed while the evidentiary record was open, or at the least, during the pendancy of the remand? How much of this did NRC Staff know and when did they know it ? Doesn't NRC Staff have an obligation to notify the Board at the earliest possible moment, when a change in LRA is looming?

C. Materially Different Result is Likely NRC Staff says that NEC has not demonstrated that a materially different result is likely. In fact NEC has filed ample testimony regarding the defects and omissions in Entergy VY's buried, underground, and difficult-to-access safety-related electrical cable AMP to the net effect that if we are given a hearing, full and fair, the Board will find it reasonable to conclude that the Entergy Aging Management Plan for buried, underground, and difficult-to-access safety-related electrical cables is wholly inadequate to assure protection of public health and safety and further that the Board will order Entergy to correct its deficiencies.

Mr. Blanch's Declaration is clear, based on his experience, observations, and review of the available documents, that the Entergy VY LRA is deficient in detail, does not provide a workable plan to prevent submergence, wetting, and dampness from reaching and prematurely aging the insulation on safety-related electrical cables.

Mr. Blanch makes it plain that, although Entergy's AMP talks about testing cable operability, insulation performance, material aging,and so on, it doesn't begin to suggest specific tests of a type that might be reliably employed.

Mr. Blanch recommends that a workable plan to address these issues, incorporated in the license via the LRA, is needed. Thus, if NEC's Petition is taken up, there is a fair expectation that the Board will accordingly amend its initial final decision.

H. NRC Staff insists that NEC has not met the Eight-Factor Balancing Test of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c). NEC responds that it has so and points first to good cause to file late:

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A. NEC has demonstrated good cause for untimely filing of a new contention. Please see NEC's discussion of the timing of its filing above.

B. Will not greatly broaden issues and delay Proceedings.

In contradiction to NRC Staff, granting NEC's Motion to File a New Contention Will Broaden not greatly broaden the issues., adding as it would, one discrete issue to five previously accepted contentions, of which four were litigated.

There is no reason that accepting this contention should unduly delay the proceedings if as Entergy claims, it has already started down the road to reforming its proposed AMP on electrical cables susceptible to wetting. Entergy has taken the occasion of NEC's filing to complain of the duration of this proceeding when in fact the length of review was for the large part Entergy's failure to get the LRA right, necessitating more than 32 amendments stretching over 30 months; with the latest minor amendment [supplement] filed on September 3, 2010.

III. NEC's New Contention is Inadmissible A. NRC Staff claims that NEC's new contention does not meet 10 C.F.R.

§2.341(f)(lXiii) because it raises ongoing compliance issues not subject to resolution in a License Renewal Hearing. NRC Staff can only get to that conclusion by misconstruing or simply twisting the meaning of NEC's Motion, Expert Declaration, and proposed contention. NEC's Motion falls squarely within the scope License Renewal Proceedings.

The scope of a proceeding, and, as a consequence, the scope of contentions that may be admitted, is limited by the nature of the application and pertinent Commission regulations. For example, with respect to license renewal, under the governing regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 54, the review of license renewal applications is confined to matters relevant to the extended period of operation requested by the applicant. The safety review is limited to the plant systems, structures, and components (as delineated in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4) that will require an aging management review for the period of extended operation or are subject to an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses.

See 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.21 (a) and (c), 54.29,and 54.30 Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18 (July 28, 1998) [63 Fed. Reg. 41872 (Aug. 5,-1998)]

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NEC is amply aware that present conditions and operations are not to be the subject of license renewal hearings, however we cannot know the future, we can only be instruct about what we might expect by observing the course of the present. Current events at Vermont Yankee have tolled events to come, just two years hence and during extended period of operation. More importantly and with greater relevance to the scope of this proceed, current events have informed us of the consequences of omissions, vagaries, and non-conservative assumptions shared between present Vermont Yankee inspection and maintenance initiatives and the cable amps proposed in the LRA. Here, says industry experience at Vermont Yankee, is how the proposed AMPS play out in real life.

C. NRC Staff says that NEC's New Contention Does Not Meet the Requirements of 10 C.F.R.§ 2.309(f)(1)(v) Because It Does Not Contain a Sufficient Factual Basis. To the contrary NEC has provided through the declaration of its expert and citation to regulation and technical papers more than ample specifics to place the applicant on notice as to what to defend against. NEC has raised in its motion sufficient credible documented and referenced information on a grave safety issue embedded in LRA cable AMP to meit further inquiry by the Board."

i. The Staff says that Vermont Yankee LRA Contains AMPs that address low and medium voltage cables. This is true now that low voltage, typically instrumentation and control, cables have been added in Entergy's September 3, 2010 supplement. However, NEC claims them to be wholly inadequate with regard to managing the aging effects of moist or wet environments on cable and cable insulation.

"A contention's basis is set forth with reasonable specificity if there has been sufficient foundation laid to warrant further exploration of the proposed contention and if the applicants are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know, at least generally, what they will have to oppose or defend against.

Kansas Gas &,Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit -1), LBP-8471, 19 NRC 29, 34 1984), citing'Peach Bottom, sunra, 8 AEC at 20-21; Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC 1732, 1742 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986). See Public 'Service Co; of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-942, 32 NRC 395, 427-28 (1990).

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ii. The Staff says that NEC has not demonstrated that the AMPs in the LRA are inadequate to manage the effects of aging. But NEC has provided the testimony of an expert to point out that the AMPs in the LRA are but a slight variation on in place programs that have empirically been shown to be non-protective of below-grade cables. Further NEC has show through expert testimony and regulatory and industry documents that biennial inspections are insufficiently frequent to prevent long periods of immersion, wetness, and repeated cycles of dampness and drying; all known to hasten aging and eventual failure of cable insulation.

iii. The Staff says in contradiction of NEC's witness that the LRA relies on adequate tests to ensure adequate management of the effects of age related degradation. This is patently false. Entergy advertises only that it will rely on commercially proven tests without specifuing which tests exactly. In the meanwhile all sources cited by NEC say that tests are being developed. NEC's expert points out that no test yet proposed will test cable insulation under accident conditions and with load durations anticipated during accidents.

Entergy does provide one telling argument which NEC must now address.

Page 15 at 1. The Declaration and Affidavit of Paul Blanch (Aug. 20, 2010)

("Blanch Decl.") does not satisfy 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b). That Section requires a supporting affidavit to separately address each of the criteria in Section 2.326(a) and provide a specific explanation of why each has been met. Mr. Blanch's Declaration does not even mention the relevant criteria, let alone provide a specific explanation why each has been met.

Mr. Paul Blanch is a technical expert; not a legal expert. NEC's pro se representative of course addressed the §2.326(a) criteria in the body of the motion, but had no idea that this was expected of a technical witness. Surely, at this point the Board must look to the possible harm this omission has done to its ability to review the content of the motion and the parties' oppositions.

Trusting that under the circumstances of pro se representation this is not a fatal flaw nor one to divert the Board from its consideration of a grave safety issue, NEC respectfully requests direct of the Board as to how a cure may be affected.

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Entergy make one further criticism of Mr. Blanch's testimony to which NEC must absolutely reject as entirely false.

Entergy continues:

Page 15 at 1 Nor does Mr. Blanch's Declaration provide factual or technical bases sufficient to satisfy the criteria in Section 2.326(a). This defect is alone sufficient grounds to reject the Motion to reopen.

Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 N.R.C.

62, 76 (1992), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-89-1, 29 N.R.C. 89, 93-94 (1989).

Contrary to Entergy's assertion, Mr. Blanch cites NRC Regulatory and Enforcements Documents, the LRA, the SER, NUREG 1800, NUREG 7000, various sections of 10 CFR 50, EPRI Documents, and a number of observations based on his training as an Electrical Engineer and 40 years in the nuclear industry. His testimony more than serves to put Entergy on notice as to the terms and bounds of NEC's dispute with the Entergy VY LRA.

NEC's witness Mr. Paul Blanch addresses uncertainties and fallacies in the testimony of NRC Staff and Entergy Affiants in the attached declaration.

CONCLUSION In sum neither Entergy nor NRC Staff raise sufficiently credible objections to disqualify NEC's proposed new contention from investigation by the Board. As demonstrated above, the issue that NEC brings forward is one of the gravest of nuclear safety concerns; the very real potential for a commercial; nuclear power plant to in a critical moment lose instrumentation and control, or power to, its safety and accident mitigation equipment, with a root cause of a failed NRC-approved aging management plan for its vital safety-related electrical cables.

16

For all of the good reasons above, NEC now confirms its petition to the Board to take up this contention.

NEC appeals to NRC Staff and to Entergy to pro-actively reexamine the LRA cable AMPS to see if, for the sake of safety, we can do better.

NEC is ready to meet and discuss with Entergy and NRC Staff how we might work together to satisfy our mutual and individual concerns.

Respectfully Submitted, Raymond Shadis Pro se Representative New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801 17

DECLARATION OF PAUL BLANCH I, Paul Blanch, under penalty of perjury depose and state as follows:

1. I have been retained by the New England Coalition ("NEC") to provide expert services in connection with the application by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively Entergy) for a renewal of Vermont Yankee nuclear power generating facility located Vernon, Vermont. I hold a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and I have more than 40 years of engineering, design, operations, maintenance, engineering management, and project coordination experience for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. I have provided a Declaration with a full listing of my credentials and experience in company with NEC's Motion to Reopen (August 20, 2010).

2. I have reviewed Vermont Yankee's License Renewal Application and the subsequent submittals by Entergy to renew the operating licenses for Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3. I have also reviewed pertinent sections of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report dated May 2008 (NUREG 1907).

3. With respect to Entergy's Reply, I take issue with statements in the Declaration of Norman L. Rademacher and Roger B. Rucker in Support of Entergy's Answer Opposing New England Coalition's Motion To Reopen:

At 23, Rademacher and Rucker state, The NRC Inspection Report found that VYNPS did not implement timely corrective actions to address the submerged cables that VYNPS had identified in its November 28, 2009 inspections of underground cable access points. While this finding does not relate to actions under the Non-EQ Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cable Program, the corrective action that YNPS took in response to the discovery of water in the manholes included developing a pumping frequency, so that the conditions to which the cables will be exposed will remain consistent with the cable specifications."

4. The cables, to which Rademacher and Rucker refer are not designed or specified for

i submerged operation and m exposure to submergence may cause failure of these cables when required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4.

5. The statement "so that the conditions to which the cables will be exposed will remain consistent with the cable specifications." is unsupported. The proposed program will not prevent the cables from being submerged and the cables may be submerged for a period of up to two years.

6. In addition to cables not qualified for submergence, there are likely to be cable splices that are also inaccessible and not qualified to operate after being submerged.

7. Based upon the NRC's NUREG/CR-7000 there is no testing presently available that will conclusively demonstrate the capability of these cables and splices to perform their functions.

8. Periodic testing of some of these cables as required by the plant's Technical Specifications does not demonstrate the cable's capability as the duration of the testing is less than the required duration of operation of the powered devices during an accident.

9. At 24, Rademacher and Rucker state, Moreover, the non-cited violation in the NRC Inspection Report was determined by the NRC Staff to be "of very low safety significance.

10. The statement of "of very low safety significance" may have been made in this instance in the cited inspection report; based on some mysterious determination of operability, however the implied notion that submergence of unqualified safety-related cables is of low safety significance is false, dangerous, and totally unsupported by other industry and NRC documentation.

11. For example, on August 19, 2010 the NRC conducted a public meeting on "Inaccessible or Underground Cable Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants." This public meeting was chaired by Mr. Roy Mathew, of NRR.

12. The view slides (ML092460425) presented at this meeting clearly identified that these 2

cables were of high safety and high risk significance.

13. The slides further stated:

"Inaccessible or underground cables within the scope of Maintenance Rule are subjected to environments they are not designed or qualified for. Inaccessible or underground cables within the scope of Maintenance Rule are not being monitored by the licensees to demonstrate that the cables can perform their design functions when called upon.

NRC regulations require that cables be able to perform their design function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions, such as moisture, flooding, heat, and radiation. Further, the design should minimize the probability of power interruption when transferring power between sources. The cable failures that could disable safety-related or risk-significant equipment are expected to have monitoring programs to demonstrate that the cables can perform their design funiction when called upon."

Electric cables are one of the most important components in a nuclear plant to provide the various plant systems function to mitigate the effects of an accident and preserve the safety of the plant during normal, abnormal, and anticipated operational occurrences.

If cable degradation from aging or other mechanisms remain undetected, it can lead to deterioration of cable performance or result in cable failure when it is relied on to mitigate design bases accidents and transients.

In response to Generic Letter 2007-01, licensees provided data showing that the number of cable failures is increasing with plant age, and that cable failures are occurring within the plants' 40-year licensing periods. These cable failures have resulted in plant transients and shutdowns, loss of safety redundancy, entry into limiting conditions for operation, and undue challenges to plant operators.

The staff's safety determination during plant licensing was based on licensees meeting the regulatory requirements cited above to ensure that components such as cables will perform its design functions during the design bases events.

Recommendations Licensees must be in full compliance with NRC regulatory requirements specified above for cable systems. If cable systems (i.e., cables, splices, connections, trays, supports, enclosures, etc.) have been exposed to conditions for which they are not designed or qualified, licensees must demonstrate qualification for the plant-specific application.

Licensees then must demonstrate, through adequate testing or condition monitoring, that the cable systems can perform their intended design function for the duration of its expected service life. Nuclear industry [is] to develop and implement a cable monitoring program to comply with Commissions regulatory requirements.

14. It is the NRC/NRR position that vital cables are "not being monitored by the licensees to demonstrate that the cables can perform their design functions when called upon."

15. The safety significance is reinforced by the NRC statement "These cable failures have 3

resulted in plant transients and shutdowns, loss of safety redundancy, entry into limiting conditions for operation, and undue challenges to plant operators."

16M The NRC also stated:

If cable systems (i.e., cables, splices, connections, trays, supports, enclosures, etc.) have been exposed to conditions for which they are not designed or qualified, licensees must demonstrate qualification for the plant-specific application. Licensees then must demonstrate, through adequate testing or condition monitoring, that the cable systems can perform their intended design function for the duration of its expected service life.

17. At 25, Rademacher and Rucker state, Based on our review, it is our opinion that (1) the VYNPS Non-EQ Inaccessible medium-Voltage Cable Program is an adequate program that will manage the effects of aging on inaccessible non-EQ medium- and low-voltage cables subject to aging management review in a manner providing reasonable assurance that such cable will continue to perform its intended function in accordance with the CLB during the period of extend operation;

18. However, the NRC stated in its meeting slides:

"The NRC inspection reports for the last 10 years identified cable performance issues at various facilities. It identified violations of NRC regulations 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III "Design Control," Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," Criterion, XI, "Test Control," Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions,"

10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," and other performance issues."

19. In my opinion, it is clear from the NRC stated position that the cables are not in compliance with the NRC regulations as stated above. The CLB is clearly defined within 10 CFR 54.3(a)l and includes 10 CFR 50.

20. I take issue with portions of the Affidavit of Roy K. Mathew, witness for Staff. Mr.

Mathew states in his declaration:

The Green finding in the Inspection Report does not demonstrate a significant safety issue with respect to aging management of safety-related electric cables at Vermont Yankee.

The CLB indudes the NRC regulations contained in 10 CFR parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30,40,50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, 100 and appendices thereto; orders; license conditions; exemptions; and technical specifications 4

21. This statement is in direct conflict with Mr. Mathew's view slides that were presented during the NRC/NRR meeting on August 19, 2010. According to Mr. Mathew slides this is a very safety and risk significant situation on August 19, 2010 but on September 14, 2010 he testifies the gross example revealed in the NRC Inspection Report "does not demonstrate a significant safety issue with respect to aging management of safety-related electric cables at Vermont Yankee."

22. Mr. Mathew in his declaration also states:

Licensees are expected to demonstrate that cables whose failures could disable risk-significant equipment can perform their safety function when needed during the current operating period and the requirements will be carried forward to the extended period of operation under the current licensing basis in accordance with 10 CFR 54.33"

23. While it may be accurate that licensees are expected to demonstrate the capability of the cables to perform their functions neither the NRC nor Vermont Yankee have provided any specific information related to testing or qualification that demonstrates that these cables can perform their safety function at the present time or during the period of the proposed period of extended operation.

24. The NRC's own funded study, NUREG/CR-7000 at Section 5, Conclusions and Recommendations, clearly outlines a program that will assist in the identification of degraded cables. Unless these recommendations are implemented or all cables are visually inspected and/or replaced there is no assurance that these low and medium voltage cables will perform their required functions as required by 10 CFR 54.21 (a)3)2

25. While it is admitted that NUREG/CR-7000 is not a requirement, there are no other studies, either industry or NRC that will assure the submerged cables can meet the requirements of 10 CFR 54.

2 (3) For each structure and component identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.

26. Yankee's aging management programs for electric cables are inadequate to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the current licensing basis during the proposed period of extended operation.

27. Until Vermont Yankee can develop a detailed program to inspect and monitor all cables within an Aging Management Plan and within the scope of 10 CFR 54.4, there is no assurance that cables vital to safety will not be exposed to environments for which they were not designed and therefore no assurance that they will perform their safety function when called upon.

This Declaration was executed this 20& day of September, 2010 at West Hartford, Connecticut, Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Road West Hartford, CT 06117 860 -236 -0326 6

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, LLC September 21, 2010 AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

Docket No. 50-271-LR (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) )

ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND ENTERGY OPPOSITION TO NEC'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND ANSWER TO NEW CONTENTION" and "DECLARATION OF PAUL M. BLANCH "in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following as indicated by an asterisk, by electronic mail, with copies by U.S. mail, first class, this 21 ' day of September 2010.

Alex S. Karlin, Chair Administrative Judge Office of Commission Appellate Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: O-16G4 Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: ask2@nrc.gov Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: OCAAmail@nrc.gov Office of the Secretary Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Peter C.L. Roth, Esq*

Mail Stop: O-16G4 Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 33 Capitol Street Washington, DC 20555-0001 Concord, NH 3301 E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov E-mail: peter.roth@doj.nh.gov William H. Reed* Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.*

Administrative Judge National Legal Scholars Law Firm Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 84 East Thetford Rd.

1819 Edgewood Lane Lyme, NH 03768 Charlottesville, VA 22902 E-mail: aroisman@nationallegalscholars.com E-mail: whrcville@embarqmail.com Sarah Hofmann, Esq.*

Ann Hove, Law Clerk Director of Public Advocacy Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Department of Public Service Mail Stop: T-3F23 112 State Street - Drawer 20 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Montpelier, VT 05620-2601 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: sarah.hofmann@state.vt.us E-mail: ann.hove@nrc.gov

David R. Lewis, Esq.*

Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Esq Matthew Brock*

Elina Teplinsky, Esq Assistant Attorney General, Chief Blake J. Nelson, Esq Environmental Protection Division Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP Office of the Attorney General 2300 N Street, NW One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor Washington, DC 20037-1128 Boston, MA 02108 E-mail: david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com E-mail: matthew.brock@state.ma.us matias.travieso-diaz@pillsburylaw.com elina.teplinsky@pillsburylaw.com Mary B. Spencer blake.nelson@pillsburylaw.com Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-15D21 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mary.Spencer.nrc.gov Raymrond Shadis New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556 shadis@prexar.com

New England Coalition I VT NH ME MA R1 CT NY POST OFFICE BOX 545, BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT o5302 September 21 , 2010 Office of the Secretary Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 RE: Docket No. 50-271-LR, ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Remand)

Please find attached for filing in the above captioned matter, NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND ENTERGY OPPOSITION TO NEC'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND TO FILE A NEW CONTENTION" and "DECLARATION OF PAUL M.

BLANCH Thank you for your kind attention, for New England Coalition, Inc.

Raymond Shadis Pro Se Representative Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556