IR 05000335/2001006
| ML021190096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/2002 |
| From: | Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3 |
| To: | Stall J Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-01-006 | |
| Download: ML021190096 (21) | |
Text
ril 26, 2002
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-335/01-06 AND 50-389/01-06
Dear Mr. Stall:
On, March 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 8, 2002, with Mr. D. Jernigan and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Randall A. Musser, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-335/01-06, 50-389/01-06
REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report No: 50-335/01-06, 50-389/01-06 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)
Facility: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates: December 30, 2001 through March 30, 2002 Inspectors: T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector D. Lanyi, Resident Inspector K. Van Dorn, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02, 1R17)
R. Chou, Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02, 1R17)
M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector (Sections 1R02, 1R17)
W. Sartor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, 4OA3.2)
J. Kreh, Health Physicist (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, 4OA3.2)
Approved by: Randall A. Musser, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000335-01-06, IR 05000389-01-06 on 12/30/01-3/30/02, Florida Power & Light Company, St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2, Resident Integrated Inspection Report.
This inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and five region based inspectors. No findings were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.
A. Inspector Identified Findings None B. Licensee Identified Violations None
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at essentially full power for the entire report period.
Unit 2 operated at full power for the entire report period except for a planned shutdown to implement repairs in the high voltage switchyard on February 5. The unit was restarted later that day and reached full power on February 6.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity (Reactor - R)
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection a. Inspection Scope During the week of January 3, the inspectors verified licensee actions in accordance with administrative procedure ADM-04.03, Cold Weather Preparations. This verification included physical tours of the licensees property and discussions with appropriate licensee personnel. During these tours, the inspectors examined selected critical systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to assess their vulnerability to cold temperatures, focusing primarily on the adequacy of installed insulation and/or temporary heating. The inspectors also reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Chapter 3), Individual Plant Examination of External Events, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP), and Technical Specifications (TS).
Furthermore, the completion of ADM-04.03 was reviewed, including walkdowns of specific areas and equipment to confirm the requirements of ADM-04.03 were adequately implemented. Compliance with Administrative Procedure (AP) - 0005753, Severe Weather Preparations, was also reviewed.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility or procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The inspectors reviewed evaluations for nine changes. The inspectors verified, through review of additional information, such as calculations, supporting analyses and drawings that the licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes could be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The nine evaluations reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed.
The inspectors also reviewed samples of design/engineering packages and procedure changes for which the licensee had determined that evaluations were not required, and verified that the licensees conclusions to screen out these changes were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The 17 screened out changes reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed.
The inspectors also reviewed the results of the licensees recent quality assurance audit and reports for engineering activities and two Condition Reports related to the 10 CFR 50.59 process.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Equipment Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted partial alignment verifications of the safety related systems listed below to review the TS operability of required redundant trains or backup systems while the other trains were inoperable or out of service. These inspections included reviews of plant lineup procedures, operating procedures, and piping and instrumentation drawings which were compared with observed equipment configurations to identify any discrepancies that could affect TS operability of the redundant train or backup system.
- 1B Intake Cooling Water (ICW)
- 2A EDG b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Equipment Walkdown a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed a detailed alignment verification of the 1A Component Cooling Water (CCW) system. This verification included a review of the system lineup per Operating Procedure OP 1-0310020, Component Cooling Water - Normal System Operation, and applicable plant drawings. The inspectors also reviewed all outstanding modifications, open and recently closed work orders, all recent applicable Condition Reports (CRs) and any outstanding Temporary System Alterations (TSA) or Plant Manager Action Items (PMAIs) that could affect system alignment and operability. The inspectors specifically examined the following aspects:
- System configuration, alignment and valve position
- Component and system leakage
- Electrical power availability
- Labeling, lubrication, and cooling of major system components
- Hangers and support installation and functionality
- Affect of any auxiliary equipment or housekeeping on system performance Furthermore, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee was identifying and documenting equipment alignment problems at an appropriate threshold in their corrective action program.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the fire areas and/or witnessed associated activities listed below to verify whether they conformed with AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan.
The inspectors specifically examined any transient combustibles in the areas and any ongoing hot work or other potential ignition sources. The inspectors also assessed whether the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features were in accordance with the Fire Protection Plan. Furthermore, the inspectors evaluated the use of any compensatory measures being performed per the licensees procedures and Fire Protection Plan.
- Unit 1 A Vital Switchgear Room
- Unit 1 B Vital Switchgear Room
- 1A EDG
- U2 Cable Spreading Room (hot Work)
- 2A EDG
- Unit 1 Mechanical and Pipe Penetration Rooms
- 2A ICW Pump (hot work)
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification - Routine Review a. Inspection Scope During the week of February 7, the inspectors observed and assessed simulator training for actions taken during a loss of offsite power. The inspectors specifically evaluated the following attributes related to operating crew performance:
- Clarity and formality of communication
- Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Correct use and implementation of procedures, specifically use of Annunciator Response Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures
- Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
- Oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan actions and notifications
- Effectiveness of the post training critique Furthermore, the inspectors witnessed and evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training administered to a reactor operator who had demonstrated unsatisfactory performance. The inspectors also met with the training supervisor to review the disposition of crew performance issues identified during the critique.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected a sample of equipment performance problems listed below, and assessed the effectiveness of licensee efforts in accordance with ADM-17.08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, The Maintenance Rule. Inspector reviews focused on maintenance rule scoping, characterization of failed systems or components, risk significance, determination of a(1) and (a)(2) classifications, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for systems or components classified as (a)(2), or goals and corrective actions for those classified as (a)(1). The inspectors also evaluated whether equipment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and being dispositioned appropriately.
- CR 01-3181 2AA Battery Charger Failure
- CR 01-2828 Unit 2 Shutdown Cooling Relief Valve V3483 Lifting
- CR 01-3302 2A ICW Pump Motor Failure
- CR 01-3174 2B EDG Voltage Regulator Failure
- CR 00-1920 Unit 1 Instrument Air Failure
- CR 01-3263 Unit 2 MV-09-1 (2A Main Feedwater Pump discharge valve)
Failure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the following emergent and planned maintenance tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee scheduling, configuration control, and management of online risk in accordance applicable program procedures such as ADM 17.16, Implementation of the Configuration Risk Management Program, and ADM 10.01, Critical Maintenance Management [CMM]. The inspectors also examined whether appropriate contingencies were taken to reduce risk and minimize unavailability, and that emergent work activities were properly planned per ADM-10.03, Work Week Management. The inspectors confirmed that problems with maintenance, risk assessments and emergent work were identified and appropriately addressed as part of the corrective action program.
- 1A CCW CMM equipment outage
- 2A EDG CMM equipment outage
- Failure of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) exhaust damper HVE-9B during 2B EDG CMM equipment outage
- 2B EDG CMM equipment outage
- 1A Qualified Safety Display System, 1C ICW Pump, and V3662 (Containment Spray to High Pressure Safety Injection System isolation valve) out of service b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions And Events a. Inspection Scope On February 5, the licensee shutdown Unit 2 to allow repair work to occur in the high voltage switchyard and the 2A Control Element Drive Mechanism motor generator set.
The inspectors observed that the shutdown was performed in accordance with NOP 2-0030125, Turbine Shutdown - Full Load to Zero Load and NOP 2-0030128, Reactor Shutdown.
Upon completion of the repairs described above, inspectors observed the Unit 2 reactor startup and power ascension per NOP 2-0030122, Reactor Startup and 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the interim disposition and operability determinations associated with the following CRs to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the SSC remained available to perform its safety function with no unrecognized increase in risk. Reviews of the UFSAR, applicable supporting documents and procedures, and interviews of plant personnel, were performed to assess the adequacy of the interim CR disposition.
- CR 01-3187 Unit 2 Containment Spray Penetration Valve Found with a Wooden Dowel Installed
- CR 02-0424 2A ICW Pump Low Head Pressure
- CR 02-0323 Operation Time of Unit 2 EDG Torsional Isolators (Past Operability)
- CR 02-0056 1A2 Safety Injection Tank Level Indication Accuracy
- CR 02-0323 Excessive Storage of Unit 1 EDG Torsional Isolators (Current Operability)
- CR 02-0145 1A CCW Heat Exchanger - Exceeded Tube Plugging Limits b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated design change packages for seven modifications, in all three cornerstone areas, to verify that the modifications did not degrade system availability, reliability, or functional capability. The inspectors verified inspection procedure attributes such as: energy requirements can be supplied by supporting systems; materials and replacement components were compatible with physical interfaces; replacement components were seismically qualified for application; Code and safety classification of replacement system, structures, and components were consistent with design bases; modification design assumptions were appropriate; post-modification testing established operability; failure modes introduced by the modification were bounded by existing analyses; and appropriate procedures or procedure changes had been initiated. For selected modification packages, the inspectors verified that the as-built configuration accurately reflected the design documentation.
Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modifications, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the living UFSAR, supporting analyses, Technical Specifications, and design basis documentation. The major documents reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) procedures and witnessed testing activities after maintenance of selected risk significant SSCs listed below. The following aspects were specifically inspected - (1) Effect of testing on the plant recognized and addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) Testing consistent with maintenance performed; (3) Acceptance criteria demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents (e.g., TS, UFSAR, etc.); (4)
Range, accuracy and calibration of test equipment; (5) Step by step compliance with test procedures, and applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) Control of installed jumpers or lifted leads; (7) Removal of test equipment; and, (8) Restoration of SSCs to operable status. The inspectors also verified whether problems associated with PMTs were identified and appropriately entered into the corrective action program.
- 2A ICW pump motor replacement
- 2A1 EDG fuel priming pump repair
- 1B EDG CMM equipment outage
- 2A Battery performance test replacement
- 2B EDG auxiliary time delay relay
- 2B Charging pump plunger box leak b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the conduct of the surveillance tests listed below in accordance with applicable operating procedures (OP), work order (WO)
instructions, operations surveillance procedures (OSP), and Instrumentation and Control procedures (ICP). Applicable test data was reviewed to verify whether it met TS, UFSAR, and/or licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors also verified that the testing effectively demonstrated the systems were operationally ready, capable of performing their intended safety functions, and that identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
- OP 2-07000502C AFW Pump Code Run
- WO 31021298 Unit 1 Containment Vacuum Breaker Functional Test
- ICP 1-220050 Unit 1 Linear Power Range Channels A & B Quarterly NIS Calibration
- OP 2-410026 2C AFW Steam Admission Valve Differential Pressure Test
- 2-OSP-68.02 Unit 2 Penetration 56 (Mini-purge Valve) Local Leak Rate Test
- ICP 2-1400160 & Unit 2 Nuclear Instrumentation System Delta-T and ICP 2-1400198 Variable High Power Quarterly Channel Calibrations b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed TSA 2-02-003, 2A EDG Auxiliary Time Relay Replacement.
This temporary modification was evaluated against system design basis documentation (e.g., UFSAR, drawings), TS operability requirements, and 10CFR50.59. Furthermore, the inspectors verified the TSA was installed in accordance with applicable design control documents, and configuration control was maintained.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario to determine whether they were designed to test major elements of the licensees emergency plan. The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensees performance in the exercise, conducted on February 20, 2002 from 8:00 a.m. to 1:38 p.m., as well as selected proceedings related to the licensees conduct of the exercise. Licensee activities inspected during the exercise included those occurring in the Control Room Simulator, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. The NRCs assessment focused on the risk-significant activities of event classification, notification of governmental authorities, onsite protective actions, offsite protective action recommendations, and accident mitigation. The inspectors also evaluated command and control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, and adherence to emergency plan implementing procedures. The performance of the emergency response organization was evaluated against applicable licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment process, as well as the presentation of critique results to plant management.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed changes to the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP), as contained in Revision 39, against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine whether any of the changes decreased REP effectiveness. Revision 39 included modifications to address the elimination (via previously approved TS amendments) of the requirement to have and maintain a post-accident sampling system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation a. Inspection Scope On January 23, the inspectors observed an emergency preparedness quarterly practice drill conducted by the site emergency response organization. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the main control room simulator and technical support center to assess whether emergency classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities were in accordance with the EPIPs.
Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the post drill critiques conducted in the simulator.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone a. Inspection Scope Inspectors verified the accuracy of the following performance indicators (PI) reported to the NRC in accordance with the criteria specified in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and ADM-25.02, NRC Performance Indicators:
1) Auxiliary Feedwater Safety System Unavailability; 2) Emergency Alternating Current Power System Unavailability; and,
3) Safety System Functional Failures Inspectors reviewed the PI data of both Units 1 and 2 for all four quarters of 2001.
Applicable operator logs, condition reports, Maintenance Rule history, and Licensee Events Reports were reviewed to verify the reported PI data was complete and accurate. Furthermore, the inspectors interviewed the responsible system engineers, engineering supervision, and licensing engineer.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone On February 20-21, 2002, licensee records were reviewed to determine whether the submitted PI statistics (through the fourth quarter of 2001) were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Section 2.4 (Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone) of NEI 99-02, Revision 1, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
.21 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill/Exercise Performance PI a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance (DEP) through review of a sample of drill and event records. Documentation was reviewed to verify the licensees reported data regarding successes in emergency classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations for an ERO drill conducted on October 3, 2001 and for Notification of Unusual Event declarations on April 2 and 4, and November 10 and 26, 2001. In addition, through direct observation, the inspectors assessed the accuracy of the licensee's determinations with respect to the eight DEP PI opportunities during the exercise on February 20, 2002 (see Section 1EP1).
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.22 ERO Drill Participation PI a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation during the previous 8 quarters through review of the training records for 12 of the 72 individuals assigned to key positions in the ERO as of the end of the fourth quarter of 2001.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.23 Alert and Notification System Reliability PI a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the PI for the alert and notification system reliability through review of a sample of the licensees records of the biweekly silent tests and quarterly full-cycle tests conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2001.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jernigan and other members of licensee management on April 8, 2002. Interim exits by regional inspectors were held on February 22 and March 8, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Annual Assessment Meeting Summary On March 18, 2002, the NRC Branch Chief and Senior Resident Inspector assigned to St. Lucie met with Florida Power & Light to discuss the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the St. Lucie annual assessment of safety performance for the period of April 1, 2001 - December 31, 2001. The major topics addressed were: the NRCs assessment program, the results of the St. Lucie assessment, and the NRCs Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included St. Lucie site management, members of site staff, a local official from Martin County, a local official from St. Lucie County, and one member of the public.
This meeting was open to the public. Information used for the discussions of the ROP is available from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML020600179. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Bird, Protection Services Manager D. Calabrese, EP Supervisor R. De La Espriella, Site Quality Manager B. Dunn, Site Engineering Manager W. Guldemond, Operations Manager D. Jernigan, Site Vice President T. Patterson, Licensing Manager A. Pell, Training Manager R. Rose, Work Control Manager A. Scales, Operations Supervisor
R. West, Plant General Manager C. Wood, Maintenance Manager Other licensee employees contacted include office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation, and corporate personnel.
NRC B. Moroney, NRR Project Manager ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED None LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Plant Change/Modifications (PCMs), Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD)
- CGD Purchase Order 42729, Intake Cooling Water Pump 1C Overhaul and associated screening no. 058650 dated 03/02/2000
- PCM 01053, Hot Leg Instrument Nozzle (PDI-1121D) Replacement, Revision 0 and associated evaluation
- PCM 01059, Shutdown Cooling Relief Valve V3483 Set Pressure Increase, Revision 0 and associated evaluation
- PCM 99004, Deletion of Containment Spray Snubbers CS-832-118 and CS-878-115, Revision 0 and associated screening
- PCM 99013, Unit 1 Replacement of Main Feedwater Isolation Actuators and Addition of Condensate Pump Trip on MSIS, Revision 2 and associated evaluation
- PCM 01067, Use of Fiberglass Blanket Insulation Within PSL 1 Containment, Revision 0 and associated evaluation Evaluations [1R02]
- PSL-ENG-SENS-00-108, 2000 FSAR Review Findings Requiring Changes or Clarification to the FSARs, Revision 0
- PSL-ENG-SENS-01-040, Alternate Method to Determine Reactor Vessel Level, Revision 0
- PSL-ENG-SENS-99-038, Review of Unit 1 Shutdown Cooling System, Revision 2
- PSL-ENG-SENS-00-132, Operation of a Main Feedwater Regulating Valve with the Locking Pin Installed, Revision 0 Screened Out Items [1R02]
- PCM 00046, MV-21-2 &3 Actuator Gearing Modification, Revision 0
- PCM 00045, Actuator Gearing Replacement for Valves V3659 and V3660, Revision 0
- PCM 00080, Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Piping to the Main Feedwater Headers for Increased Pressure, Revision 0
- Item Equivalency Evaluation (IEE) 058975, Intake Cooling Water Pump Intermediate Shaft Replacement dated 03/27/2000
- IEE 063472, Engineered Power Supply Replacement dated 04/05/2001
- IEE 062298, 125V DC Bus 1B Breaker Replacement dated 03/19/2001
- Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 2-EOP-09, Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Forced Circulation, Revision 12
- EOP 2-EOP-10, Station Blackout, Revision 13
- EOP 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions, Revision 16
- EOP 1-EOP-02, Reactor Trip Recovery, Revision 16
- IEE 63843, Unit 2 Containment Spray Mechanical Seal Equivalency dated 05/30/2001 Procedures [1R02 & 1R17]
- ADM -17.11, 10 CFR 50.59 Screening, Revision 2
- ENG-QI 2.1, 10 CFR 50.59 Applicability/Screening/Evaluation, Revision 4
- Guidance for Performing 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, Revision 4 Self Assessment Documents [1R02 & 1R17]
- Site Engineering Functional Area Audit QSL-ENG-01-05, May 30-July19, 2001
- Quality Report 00-0277, Assess Implementation of the PSL 50.59 Screening Program, dated 11/10/2000
- Quality Report 01-0101, Replacement of Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Actuators, dated 05/16/2001
- Condition Report 00-1854, Evaluation of Pinning Main Feedwater Regulating Valve
- Condition Report 00-1121, Deletion of Internals Vibration Monitoring System from FSAR