IR 05000498/2019010
| ML19144A069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/2019 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Gerry Powell South Texas |
| Gaddy V | |
| References | |
| IR 2019010 | |
| Download: ML19144A069 (22) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS),
INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2019010 and 05000499/2019010
Dear Mr. Powell:
On April 11, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with you and members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000498/2019010 and 05000499/2019010
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000498, 05000499 License Numbers: NPF-76, NPF-80 Report Numbers: 05000498/2019010, 05000499/2019010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0038 Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Wadsworth, Texas Inspection Dates: March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019 Inspectors: W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team Lead R. Smith, Nuclear Systems Engineer W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector S. Makor, Reactor Inspector S. Kobylarz, Contractor B. Sherbin, Contractor Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance Inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in the Inspection Results at the end of this report.
List of Findings and Violations Inadequate Corrective Actions for Distribution Panel Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross- Inspection cutting Procedure Aspect Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000498/2019010-01; Teamwork NCV 05000499/2019010-01 Closed The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation for the failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to completely correct a condition adverse to quality by performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in the engineering evaluation.
Failure to Incorporate Design Changes into Emergency Procedures and Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross- Inspection cutting Procedure Aspect Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000498/2019010-02; Teamwork NCV 05000499/2019010-02 Closed The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation for failure to incorporate design changes into safety-related procedures and the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).
Specifically, the failure to incorporate these changes had a direct impact on operator actions associated with starting high-head safety injection (HHSI) pumps in the required time during a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) while shutdown in Modes 3 and 4.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
=
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following components and listed applicable attributes.
- (1) Emergency Diesel Generator Room Safety-Related Ventilation Fan Unit 1, Train B a) Mechanical calculations for room heat generation and for fan sizing b) Seismic qualification of fan and motor assembly c) Fan and motor assembly vendor manual, airflow testing performed after equipment installation, and control scheme for fan starts and stops d) Component walkdown to assess material condition, configuration, and consistency with drawings and calculations e) Corrective action history and corrective/preventive maintenance records f) Fan motor electrical thermal overload sizing
- (2) Refueling Water Storage Tank, Unit 2 a) Seismic qualification of tank and tank foundation b) Calculations, procedures, and analyses associated with the tank water capacity and boric acid requirements for LOCA mitigation c) Calculations, procedures, and analyses associated with the suction swap-over of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps from the tank to the containment sumps to verify concerns associated with air entrapment and vortexing were addressed d) Component walkdown to assess material condition, configuration, and consistency with drawings and calculations e) Records associated with operating experience and preventive and corrective maintenance
- (3) 120/208 VAC Distribution Panel DPA (B)(C) 235 a) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation b) Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow, voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits c) Component walkdown and vendor document review to verify installed configuration, specifications and acceptance criteria, and design bases functions d) Procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry standards and vendor guidance e) Design bases documents, updated final safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities
- (4) Engineered Safety Features Load Sequencer Cabinet A, Unit 1 a) Component walkdown and visual inspection was performed to assess the material condition and configuration b) Maintenance and testing procedures and performance history was reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry recommendations c) Design bases documents, updated final safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities
- (5) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 11 Area Supply Fan Motor, Unit 1 a) Component walkdown and visual inspection was performed to assess the material condition and configuration b) Component and area temperature requirements, alarm settings, and response procedures were reviewed and validated against vendor and plant design criteria c) Component corrective actions and maintenance history was reviewed to validate continued operability and functionality Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following large-early-release-frequency component.
High-Head Safety Injection Valves 4A, B, C a) Specific component design basis including required safety functions b) Calculations for maximum torque, thrust, differential pressure for opening and closing, and degraded voltage c) Maintenance history including motor-operated valve (MOV) testing and surveillance procedure implementation d) Manufacturer recommendations for maintenance and valve setup e) Walkdown of components to assess physical condition Evaluation of Operator Procedures and Actions Related to Components and Permanent
Modifications (6 Samples)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors observed the following operator actions associated with selected components and modifications.
- (1) Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated small-break LOCA (SBLOCA) while the plant is in Mode 3, hot shutdown condition. From the receipt of associated alarms, actions to manually start both a low-head safety injection (LHSI)pump and high-head safety injection (HHSI) pump within 10 minutes. (Associated with the HHSI Valves 4A, B, C)
- (2) Control room and a plant operator actions to provide sufficient channel 1 battery capacity for a 4-hour duration following a simulated loss of all alternating current (ac).
From the loss of all ac power, actions taken to shed loads from train A following an automatic load sequencing within 30 minutes of the event. (Associated with the Engineered Safety Features Load Sequencer Cabinet A, Unit 1)
- (3) Control room operator actions to lowering all steam generator (SG) power-operated relief valves (PORVs) setpoint to at least 1000 psig during a simulated SBLOCA.
From the receipt of associated alarms, actions to manually reduce the setpoint of the all SG PORVs to less than 1000 psig within 45 minutes. (Associated with Modification DCP 08-9595-10)
- (4) Control room operator actions to identify a simulated spuriously opened SG PORV during a SG tube rupture. From the receipt of the associated alarms, the crew will identify a spuriously opened PORV within 10 minutes. (Associated with Modification DCP 08-9595-10)
- (5) Control room and plant operator actions to isolate a simulated spuriously opened SG PORV during a SG tube rupture. From receipt of the associated alarms, the crew attempts to isolate the spuriously opened PORV from the control room and when unsuccessful will direct a plant operator to shut the manual steam isolation valve to the PORV within 15 minutes after having identified the failed open PORV.
(Associated with Modification DCP 08-9595-10)
- (6) Control room operator actions for a simulated large-break loss-of-coolant accident with a failure of one train of both low and HHSI valves to swap from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to containment sump. From receipt of the associated alarms, the crew will act to secure the low and HHSI pumps in the associated train that failed to swap from the RWST to the containment sump before the tank empty alarm is received. The crew will then follow procedural direction to realign the suction source for this train from the RWST to the containment sump and reestablish injection to the reactor coolant system (RCS) from this train. (Associated with the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Unit 2)
Permanent Modification (6 Samples)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following permanent modifications.
- (1) DCP 06-15147-40, Replace Essential Cooling Water Pump 2A
- (2) DCP 08-9595-10, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves Fail Closed Modification
- (6) DCPs 05-11049-1, 05-11049-2, Install Test Connections at Emergency Standby Diesel Generator Control Panels to Facilitate Surveillance Testing
Operating Experience (4 Samples)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following operating experience issues.
- (1) NRC Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves
- (2) NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power
- (3) NRC Information Notice 2013-18, Refueling Water Storage Tank Degradation
- (4) NRC Information Notice 2017-16, Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Distribution Panel Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Inspection Aspect Procedure Mitigating Systems Green [H.4] Teamwork 71111.21M NCV 05000498/2019010-01; NCV 05000499/2019010-01 Closed The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation for the failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to completely correct a condition adverse to quality by performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in the engineering evaluation.
Description:
The 120/208 VAC Distribution Panel is a component in the Class 1E 120V vital ac system that is designed to provide a reliable source of 120 VAC control and instrument power to the engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment during all modes of reactor operation, including postulated design-basis events for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after a loss of all offsite and onsite power.
The inspectors reviewed calculations for the electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits, procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance.
During this review, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to completely correct an adverse condition by failing to perform electrical testing on ten
- (10) distribution panels on three trains DPA(B)(C)135 and DPA(B)(C)235. Specifically, in March 2016 inspectors identified that the licensee failed to demonstrate that the safety-related molded case circuit breakers would perform satisfactorily and within limits. In response, the licensee opened condition report engineering evaluation (CREE) 16-2166 to address the adequacy of molded case circuit breaker testing to include overcurrent testing to validate that the circuit breaker will open as expected during a downstream fault condition. This requirement was a corrective action from a previously identified performance deficiency for the molded case circuit breaker testing and methodology documentation.
During questions from this inspection, the licensee realized they had failed to completely correct the original adverse to quality condition. The electrical testing for the DC and upstream breakers were completed, but the condition report was closed before the recommended corrective actions in CREE 16-2166 were completed for all of the safety-related panels, ac breakers. Specifically, the licensee had failed to perform required testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers.
Corrective Action: In response to this issue, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program to evaluate and correct this condition. The inspectors determined that this finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the last maintenance performed on these circuit breakers that did not receive electrical testing was completed for Unit 1, on April 4, 2017, and for Unit 2, on October 23, 2016. Because of these activities, there is a high confidence in the performance of the affected circuit breakers.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 19-3431
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality by not performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in an engineering evaluation was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee completed testing on all DC and upstream circuit breakers in accordance with CREE 16-2166, but closed the action without completing testing on all of the affected distribution panel circuit breakers.
Screening: The inspectors screened this performance deficiency using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affect the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the deficiency resulted in ten distribution panels not receiving the electrical testing as recommended in CREE 16-2166.
Significance: The inspectors determined this finding adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors reviewed the finding using the criteria specified in Figure 1 of IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in human performance associated with teamwork because the licensee did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained.
In this instance, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation and documented the need to do electrical testing but closed the condition report prior to ensuring that all of the tests were performed as required [H.4].
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from 2012 to April 11, 2019, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality by not performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in the CREE 16-2166.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
NCV 05000498/2019010-01; 05000499/2019010-01, Inadequate Corrective Actions for Distribution Panel Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing Failure to Incorporate Design Changes into Emergency Procedures and Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Inspection Aspect Procedure Mitigating Green [H.4] Teamwork 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000498/2019010-02; NCV 05000499/2019010-02 Closed The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to incorporate design changes into the plant design bases documentation and associated operating procedures. Specifically, the failure to incorporate these changes had a direct impact on operator actions associated with starting the high-head safety injection (HHSI) pumps in the required time during a SBLOCA in shutdown Modes 3 and 4.
Description:
The inspectors identified a performance deficiency for the licensees failure to update the design basis documentation and associated procedures with design change information. Specifically, the Westinghouse owners group had performed analysis of a SBLOCA while plants were in shutdown Modes 3 and 4. This analysis was incorporated in WCAP-12476, Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 Operation for Westinghouse NSSS, Revision 1, issued in November 2000. The analysis concluded that for a four loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor, during a SBLOCA accident while the plant is in Modes 3 and 4 that to ensure the 10 CFR 50.46 limits would not be exceeded that operators establish flow from both a high-head and a low head safety injection (LHSI) pump within 10 minutes.
The inspectors reviewed task three of Procedure 0PGP03-ZO-0057, Operator Time Critical Action Program, Revision 3, which required operators to start one LHSI pump within 10 minutes and a subsequent HHSI pump within 30 minutes of the shutdown SBLOCA event.
While reviewing the bases documents for this task, the inspectors identified that there was a difference in the licensees bases document and the WCAP-12476. The inspectors questioned the licensee about this difference in the required times to start at least one HHSI pump within 10 minutes in the WCAP-12476 and within 30 minutes in the licensees bases document. The licensee determined they had failed to incorporate the change from the WCAP-12476 into their bases document. By failing to evaluate the WCAP for applicability when it was issued, the licensee missed an opportunity to incorporate the most up-to-date design information into their design basis documents and procedures.
Subsequently, the licensee had not incorporated this change into their shutdown SBLOCA Procedure 0POP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA. In 2015 when the licensee was developing an operator time critical action (OTCA) procedure they failed to identify that their bases document was not properly updated with the correct times and, therefore, used 30 minutes to start a HHSI pump during a SBLOCA while in Mode 3 and 4. The licensee performed OTCA validation for this task in 2016 and had unacceptable results for some crews. The licensee performed training to improve performance of this task. The licensee again performed more OTCA validation for this task and still had unacceptable results for some crews.
Corrective Action: The licensee revised Procedure 0POP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA, Revision 19, to include an action on their conditional information page to start at least one of each high-head and LHSI pumps when one of the following criteria is met: RCS subcooling less than 35°F, pressurizer level less than 8%, or containment pressure greater than 3 psig.
The licensee again performed OTCA validation for this task and all of the results were acceptable.
The inspectors observed two crews performing a shutdown SBLOCA in the simulator and both crews were able to start at least one high-head and one LHSI pump within the required time of 10 minutes. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 19-4187. This action includes incorporating the WCAP-12476 analysis into their UFSAR for the shutdown SBLOCA and updating the 0POP03-ZO-0057, Operator Time Critical Action Program, changing the time limit to 10 minutes for starting a HHSI during a shutdown SBLOCA.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 19-4187
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to evaluate for applicability and incorporate the most up-to-date design bases information into the licensees bases document and operating procedures was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the failure to incorporate the change in design could have resulted in not starting a HHSI pump within the required time limit to prevent exceeding peak cladding temperature of 2200°F.
Screening: The inspectors screened this performance deficiency using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affect the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The inspectors determined this finding adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors reviewed the finding using the criteria specified in Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Appendix G, Shutdown Operations.
Cross-cutting Aspect: This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with teamwork in that individuals and work groups did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensees engineering group failed to evaluate for applicability and implement a change to their design bases document based on the WCAP-12476 and the operation group performed a procedure change to their shutdown SBLOCA procedure in 2017, and the engineering review using the licensee-based document did not correct the incorrect time for starting the HHSI pump within 10 minutes [H.4].
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, Measures shall be established for selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components.
Contrary to the above, from November of 2000 to April 11, 2019, the licensee failed to establish measures for selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Specifically, in November 2000 Westinghouse issued WCAP-12476, Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 Operation for Westinghouse NSSS, Revision 1. This analysis recommended that Westinghouse plants start HHSI pumps much sooner than what the licensee assumed in their analysis of record during certain accident conditions. However, the licensee failed to evaluate the guidance for suitability to their site and missed an opportunity to incorporate the most up-to-date design information into their design basis documents and procedures. The failure to incorporate this analysis in design could have resulted in not starting a HHSI pump within the required time limit to prevent exceeding peak cladding temperature 2200°F.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
NCV 05000498/2019010-02; 05000499/2019010-02, Failure to Incorporate Design Changes into Emergency Procedures and Design Documents.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On April 11, 2019, the inspectors presented the Design Bases Assurance (Teams) inspection results to Mr. G. Powell, Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
Calculations Revision
Number Title or Date
MC-5174 DG Building HVAC System Pressure Drop 3
MC-5285 DG Building Emergency Cooling Load 4
CC-6120 Anchor Bolt Design 0
EC-5002 Motor Load Report 17
MC-5037A Evaluation of RWST Vortex Breaker 0
MC-5037 RWST Volumes & Limits 9
ZC-7024 Loop Uncertainty Calculation for RWST Level 6
Monitoring Instrumentation
STI-512246 RWST Design Report (Seismic) E
2N129MC5815 RWST Vacuum Potential 0
V-EC-908 Motor Operated Valve GNL 89-10 01/22/1991
V-EC-909 Motor Operated Valve GNL 89-10 01/22/1991
V-EC-910 Motor Operated Valve GNL 89-10 01/22/1991
MC-6472 DVAC Calculation AC Motor MOVs 3
MC-6460 Minimum Thrust for GL 89-10 Gate MOVs 0
MC-6426 IVC/AFW Cooling Load and Room Heat-up 0
5V140MC5876 MSIVC Heating Load 1
5N049EB01118 Station Blackout 13
5N049EB01118 Station Blackout (SUPP# 0) 2
13-DJ-006 125 VDC BATTERY 4-HOUR COPING ANALYSIS 8
13-DJ-006 125 VDC BATTERY 4-HOUR COPING ANALYSIS 1
(SUPP# 0)
NC-6034 Steam Generator Tube Rupture for UFSAR 2
Chapter 15.6.3
NC-7069 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Mass Releases 0
WCAP-12476 Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 1
Operation for Westinghouse NSSS
WCAP-12476 Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 0
Operation for Westinghouse NSSS (SUPP# 0)
ZC-7020 3.0 Functional Description 5
EC5052 Degraded and Undervoltage Protection and 6
20/208 VAC Panelboard Voltage Analysis
EC 5000 Voltage Regulation Study 16
EC5031 Protection 480V Load Centers 10
EC05033 Protection Non 1E 48 VDC, 125 VDC & 250 VDC, and 7
Class 1E 125 VDC Systems
Calculations Revision
Number Title or Date
EC05018 Short Circuit Analysis Class 1E 125 VDC and Non-Class 9
1E 250, 125 and 48 VDC System
Drawings
Number Title Revision
5V139Z41621#1 Diesel Generator Building HVAC Emergency Vent Fans 10
Logic Diagram System: HG
JC1-1HG01-001 Johnson Controls-DG Building HVAC train A-Flow 1
Balance
5V139V00015#1 P&ID, HVAC Diesel Generator Building Normal and 14
Emergency System
5N129F05013#1 P&ID, Safety Injection System 33
77-0110015-1 RWST Vessel Drawing (Brown- Minneapolis Tank) 1
77-0110015-2 RWST Orientation Drawing (Brown- Minneapolis Tank) 4
5S109F00016#1 Piping and Instrumentation Drawing Main Steam 33
20-0100059WN Motor Operated Gate Valve MOD 06002GM87FHB2DO D
13-DJ-006 125 VDC Battery 4-Hour Coping Analysis 8
13-DJ-006 125 VDC Battery 4-Hour Coping Analysis (SUPP# 0) 1
088004-WD12- Wiring Diagram for MCC E2B2 CUB R3 0
2
088004-BM12-072 Bill of Materials for MCC E2B2 CUB R3 0
088004-WD11- Wiring Diagram for MCC E1B2 CUB R3 1
003
088004-BM11-003 Bill of Materials for MCC E1B2 CUB R3 2
088004-WD10- Wiring Diagram for MCC E2C2 CUB 01 0
2
08804-BM10-012 Bill of Materials for MCC E2C2 CUB D1 0
088004-WD9-032 Wiring Diagram for MCC E1A2 CUB L3 0
088004-WD9-032 Wiring Diagram for MCC E2A2 CUB L3 1
088004-BMB-032 Bill of Materials for MCC E2A2 CUB L3 1
08804-WD8-032 Wiring Diagram for MCC E2A2 CUB L3 1
088004-BM5-012 Bill of Materials for MCC E1C2 CUB D1 1
088004-WD5-012 Wiring Diagram for MCC E1C2 CUB D1 1
Drawings
Number Title Revision
00000E0AAAA Single Line Diagram Main One Line Diagram 29
Unit No. 1 & 2
00009E0DG01#2 Elementary Diagram Standby Diesel Generator DG22 5
4.16KV Feeder Breaker
00009E0VFAB#1 Single Line Diagram Class 1E 120/208V Distribution 13
Panel DPA235, DPB235, DPC235
00009E0VFAB#2 Single Line Diagram Class 1E 120/208V Distribution 13
Panel DPA235, DPB235, DPC235
00009E0PK04 Elementary Diagram ESF Transformer & 4.16KV Bus 14
E2A, E2B, & E2C Protection and Metering
0363-0100 System Internal Diagram ESF Load Sequencer N/A
9-E-PKAA-01#1 Single Line Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Switchgear E1A 12
(EAB)
9E0PMAK#1, Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor Control 22
Sht. 1 Center E1A4 (EAB)
9E0HC01#1, Elementary Diagram IVC AFW Pump Cubicle HVAC 12
Sht. 1 Supply Fans FN001, FN002, & FN003
5V149V25008 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram - HVAC Main Steam 19
Ventilation System
9E0AF01, Sht. 1 Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 10
No. 11, 12, & 13
9E0AAAB#1, Single Line Diagram Class 1E 125V DC & 120V Vital AC 27
Sht. 1 Non-Class 1E 48V, V, 250V, DC & 120V Vital AC Non-
Class 1E Inverter Power for Computer 208V/120V AC
Regulated Power
G5-253-202 Control Schematic (Generator) (Protective Relaying and HC0
Metering)
Procedures Revision
Number Title or Date
OPSP03-SP- SSPS Train C Quarterly Slave Relay Test Completed
0008C 03/16/2019
0P0P02-HG-0001 Diesel Generator Building HVAC 4
0PSP05-SI-0931L RWST Level Loop Calibration Completed
2/11/2019
0PGP03-ZE-0133 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 11
0PSP03-MS-0001 Main Steam System Valve Operability Test 51
Procedures Revision
Number Title or Date
0PMP04-SG-0007 Steam Generator PORV Hydraulic Actuator 25
Maintenance
0PGP03-ZO-0057 Operator Time Critical Action Program 3
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA 20
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA 19
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA 18
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA 0
0POP04-ZO-0001 Control Room Evacuation 45
0POP05-EO- Loss of all AC Power 32
EC00
0POP05-EO- Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 20
EC11
0POP05-EO- Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 24
EO00
0POP05-EO- Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 23
EO10
0POP05-EO- Steam Generator Tube Rupture 27
EO30
0POP05-EO- Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 19
ES12
0POP05-EO- Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation 12
ES13
0POP09-AN- Annunciator Lampbox 1M02 Response Instructions 34
01M2 C-1 RWST LEVEL HI/LO
D-1 RWST LO-LO/EMPTY
0POP12-ZO- Loss of Vital Instruments or Control Power 2
FSG07
0PMP04-SG-0007 Steam Generator PORV Hydraulic Actuator 25
Maintenance
0POP05-EO- Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 19
ES12
0POP10-ZO- Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline 6
EDMG
0POP09-AN- Annunciator Lampbox 6M03 Response Instructions 41
0POP04-MS-0001 Excessive Steam Demand 13
Procedures Revision
Number Title or Date
0POP03-ZO-0057 OTCA Validation Record Task #3, Manually Initiate 11/29/2016, to
LHSI and HHSI Pumps (7 Time Validations) 03/09/2017
0PSP03-ZQ-0028 Operator Logs 151
0PAP01-ZA-0102 Plant Procedures (Form 1, Rev 0 - Screening for 16
0POP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA, Rev 19)
0POP04-AE-0005 Offsite Power System Degraded Voltage 15
0PGP04-ZA-0307 Preparation of Calculations 8
0POP03-ZG-0002 STP Coordinator Operations 6
0PGP03-ZO-0045 CenterPoint Energy Real Time Operations Emergency 3
Operations Plan
0PGP03-XS-0001 Switchyard Management 7
0PGP04-ZA-0108 Vendor Technical Information Revision Cover Sheet 3
0PMP05-PK-1001 4160 Volt Class 1E Switchgear Maintenance 13
0PGP05-ZE-0001 PRA Analyses/Assessment 4
0POP-AN-22M1 Annunciator Lampbox 22M01 Response Instructions 25
0PMP05-NA-0004 Molded Case Breaker Test 38
0POP09-AN- Annunciator Lampbox 3M03 Response Instructions 34
03M3
0PSP03-DG-0007 Standby Diesel 11(21) LOOP Test 45
0PSP03-DG-0013 Standby Diesel 11(21) LOOP - ESF Actuation Test 46
0PSP02-SF- Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A Performed
0001A 04/20/2011
0PSP02-SF- Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A Performed
0001A 10/22/2015
0PSP02-SF- Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train B Performed
0001B 11/18/2012
0PSP02-SF- Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C Performed
0001C 03/20/2014
0PSP02-SF- Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C Performed
0001C 10/10/2018
0PSP02-SF- Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A Performed
0001A 12/09/2013
0PSP02-SF- Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A Performed
0001A 07/06/2016
Procedures Revision
Number Title or Date
0PSP02-SF- Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train B Performed
0001B 11/17/2011
0PSP02-SF- Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train B Performed
0001B 10/26/2016
0PSP02-SF- Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C Performed
0001C 04/18/2010
0PSP02-SF- Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C Performed
0001C 04/21/2015
Vendor Manuals
and Documents Revision
Number Title or Date
VTD-J127-0002 Vendor Manual, Joy Axial Fans, Adjustable Pitch 0
S-222 Vendor Seismic Report, Joy Axial Fans 07/20/1979
VTD-P095-0046 Installation, Operation & Maintenance Manual for (8) 0
Linear Valve Modulating Operator Assembly
VTD-R369-0014 Model 1153 Series D Alphaline Pressure Transmitters 0
for Nuclear Service
VTD-R369-0041 Rosemount Model 1154 Series H Alphaline Nuclear 0
Pressure Transmitter
VTD-A348-0014 Vendor Technical Document for Agastat Nuclear 0
Qualified Control Relays - Series EGP/EML/ETR
VTD-E945-0001 Seismic Qualification of Signal Isolator DEVAR P/N 0
18-119-M31 ESI-SR-06-158
VTD-P319-0003 Instruction Manual Three Phase Thyrister Controlled 2
from Power Conversion Products Model
No. 3SD-130-300
VTD-S345-0008 Square D Company 8501XDO80V62 Control Relay Data 0
Sheet
VTD-S637-0009 ESF Load Sequencer for South Texas Project Electric 1
Generating Station
JCI-IHZ11-001 Johnson Controls, Inc. MSIVC Building Emergency
Supply Air All Elevations
Engineering
Changes Revision
Number Title or Date
DCP No.13- RHR Low Flow Trip Energize to Actuate Modification Supplement 0
15128-5
04-7140-45 Replace ESF E2B Agastat Relays and add Load Cell 09/16/2014
Switch Contract
09-809-27 Replace Obsolete RCS Wide Range Pressure 09/27/2010
Transmitters
DCP 05-11049-1 Install Test Connections at Standby Diesel Generator Supplement 0
Control Panels to Facilitate Surveillance Testing
Other Revision
Number Title or Date
EOPT-03.10 STPEGS EOP Technical Guidelines 12
4Q019MS1044 Seismic Floor Response Spectra (Bechtel Document) 5
3R289NS0012 Specification Essential Cooling Water Pumps 2
5E329ES1002 Specification for Valve Electric Motor Actuators 4
NLO 300.61 NLO-300 - Outside Design Bases Procedures 0
POR 182.07 Loss of all AC Power EC00/Station Blackout 0
POR 182.06 0POP10-ZO-EDMG, Extensive Damage Mitigation 1
Guideline
LOR175.06 Requiring Reading Completion Information Attendance 11/14/2017, to
Record 01/08/2018
POR182 POP-10-EDMG/Respond to Station Blackout, 2018-1 05/08/2018, to
Training Attendance Records 06/05/2018
LOR161.02 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Review 0
LOT201.10 Emergency Core Cooling Systems 22
NOC-AE- Response to Request for Additional Information 01/30/2007
07002109 Regarding Resolution of NRC Generic Letter 2006-02:
Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the
Operability of Offsite Power, (TAC Nos. MD1035 and
MD1036)
NOC-AE- 60-Day Response to NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid 03/30/2006
06001979 Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the
Operability of Offsite Power
INT02-249A South Texas Project Interconnection Agreement 08/15/2002
Amended and Restated South Texas Project Nuclear 08/01/2018
Plant Interface Coordination Agreement
Other Revision
Number Title or Date
Owners Communication Plan (Rev. 1) 12/16/2014
NOC-AE- Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transmitter 05/18/2010
10002532 Replacement
South Texas Project (STP) Steady-State Voltage, Short- 12/05/2018
Circuit, and Stability Studies
PRA-17-010 Evaluation pf Switchyard Maintenance Update to 0
Include the 2015 Annual STP Stability Assessments and
the CenterPoint Energy data 06/01/15 through
06/30/2017
PRA-17-009 Risk Management Actions for North and South Bus 0
Maintenance
20-00004DJA Induction Motor Data Sheet 3V141VFN001, 06/12/1984
3V141VFN002, & 3V141VFN003
20-00030AJA Joy Report No. X-1076, Performance and Sound Test 07/18/1984
on Joy Series 1000 Axivane Fan
Condition Reports (CRs)
96-11944 00-12147 03-14686 04-5149 04-5585
06-1696 16-2166 16-6008 18-7604-1 09-12490
08-9595 08-9382 08-12982 17-15954 17-16576
17-24605 18-12630 01-17582 07-16631 09-7179
2-6770 13-6461 13-11008 04-7140 06-15147
09-5680 09-809 13-15806 13-556 13-6869
13-6991 13-8784 14-13030 15-10558 15-16042
15-16559 15-24053 15-5477 15-5857 16-1127
16-1137 16-1201 16-1281 16-1293 16-1308
16-1381 16-1694 16-1794 16-1985 16-2117
16-2197 16-2214 16-2220 16-3944 16-6008
17-12447 17-21537 17-22052 17-22335 18-14470
18-14621 18-7604
Condition Reports (CRs) Generated during the Inspection
19-3431 19-3603 19-3604 19-4170 19-4187
19-4201 19-3497 19-3512 19-3569 19-3605
19-3607 19-3614 19-3422 19-4182 19-4201
Work Orders (WOs)
96014189 566224 526825 543585 359558
360514 9700667 8612181 419379 109650
209980 99000649 1300171 405613 370940
396888 468808
SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword: NRC-002
By: WCS Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive
OFFICE RI:EB1 RI:EB2 NSE:RCB SRI:EB1 C:PBB C:EB1
NAME WCullum SMakor RSmith WSifre NTaylor VGaddy
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 05/16/2019 05/17/2019 05/15/2019 05/15/2019 05/23/2019 5/23/2019