IR 05000498/2019010
| ML19144A069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/2019 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Gerry Powell South Texas |
| Gaddy V | |
| References | |
| IR 2019010 | |
| Download: ML19144A069 (22) | |
Text
May 23, 2019
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS),
INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2019010 and 05000499/2019010
Dear Mr. Powell:
On April 11, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with you and members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000498/2019010 and 05000499/2019010
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000498, 05000499
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000498/2019010, 05000499/2019010
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0038
Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Wadsworth, Texas
Inspection Dates:
March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019
Inspectors:
W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team Lead
R. Smith, Nuclear Systems Engineer
W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector
S. Kobylarz, Contractor
B. Sherbin, Contractor
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance Inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in the Inspection Results at the end of this report.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Distribution Panel Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2019010-01;
NCV 05000499/2019010-01 Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation for the failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to completely correct a condition adverse to quality by performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in the engineering evaluation.
Failure to Incorporate Design Changes into Emergency Procedures and Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2019010-02;
NCV 05000499/2019010-02 Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation for failure to incorporate design changes into safety-related procedures and the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).
Specifically, the failure to incorporate these changes had a direct impact on operator actions associated with starting high-head safety injection (HHSI) pumps in the required time during a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) while shutdown in Modes 3 and 4.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
=
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following components and listed applicable attributes.
- (1) Emergency Diesel Generator Room Safety-Related Ventilation Fan Unit 1, Train B
a) Mechanical calculations for room heat generation and for fan sizing
b) Seismic qualification of fan and motor assembly
c) Fan and motor assembly vendor manual, airflow testing performed after equipment installation, and control scheme for fan starts and stops
d) Component walkdown to assess material condition, configuration, and consistency with drawings and calculations
e) Corrective action history and corrective/preventive maintenance records
f) Fan motor electrical thermal overload sizing
- (2) Refueling Water Storage Tank, Unit 2
a) Seismic qualification of tank and tank foundation
b) Calculations, procedures, and analyses associated with the tank water capacity and boric acid requirements for LOCA mitigation
c) Calculations, procedures, and analyses associated with the suction swap-over of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps from the tank to the containment sumps to verify concerns associated with air entrapment and vortexing were addressed
d) Component walkdown to assess material condition, configuration, and consistency with drawings and calculations
e) Records associated with operating experience and preventive and corrective maintenance
- (3) 120/208 VAC Distribution Panel DPA (B)(C) 235
a) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
b) Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow, voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits
c) Component walkdown and vendor document review to verify installed configuration, specifications and acceptance criteria, and design bases functions
d) Procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry standards and vendor guidance
e) Design bases documents, updated final safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities
- (4) Engineered Safety Features Load Sequencer Cabinet A, Unit 1
a) Component walkdown and visual inspection was performed to assess the material condition and configuration
b) Maintenance and testing procedures and performance history was reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry recommendations
c) Design bases documents, updated final safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities
- (5) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 11 Area Supply Fan Motor, Unit 1
a) Component walkdown and visual inspection was performed to assess the material condition and configuration
b) Component and area temperature requirements, alarm settings, and response procedures were reviewed and validated against vendor and plant design criteria
c) Component corrective actions and maintenance history was reviewed to validate continued operability and functionality
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following large-early-release-frequency component.
High-Head Safety Injection Valves 4A, B, C
a) Specific component design basis including required safety functions
b) Calculations for maximum torque, thrust, differential pressure for opening and closing, and degraded voltage
c) Maintenance history including motor-operated valve (MOV) testing and surveillance procedure implementation
d) Manufacturer recommendations for maintenance and valve setup
e) Walkdown of components to assess physical condition
Evaluation of Operator Procedures and Actions Related to Components and Permanent
Modifications (6 Samples)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors observed the following operator actions associated with selected components and modifications.
- (1) Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated small-break LOCA (SBLOCA) while the plant is in Mode 3, hot shutdown condition. From the receipt of associated alarms, actions to manually start both a low-head safety injection (LHSI)pump and high-head safety injection (HHSI) pump within 10 minutes. (Associated with the HHSI Valves 4A, B, C)
- (2) Control room and a plant operator actions to provide sufficient channel 1 battery capacity for a 4-hour duration following a simulated loss of all alternating current (ac).
From the loss of all ac power, actions taken to shed loads from train A following an automatic load sequencing within 30 minutes of the event. (Associated with the Engineered Safety Features Load Sequencer Cabinet A, Unit 1)
- (3) Control room operator actions to lowering all steam generator (SG) power-operated relief valves (PORVs) setpoint to at least 1000 psig during a simulated SBLOCA.
From the receipt of associated alarms, actions to manually reduce the setpoint of the all SG PORVs to less than 1000 psig within 45 minutes. (Associated with Modification DCP 08-9595-10)
- (4) Control room operator actions to identify a simulated spuriously opened SG PORV during a SG tube rupture. From the receipt of the associated alarms, the crew will identify a spuriously opened PORV within 10 minutes. (Associated with Modification DCP 08-9595-10)
- (5) Control room and plant operator actions to isolate a simulated spuriously opened SG PORV during a SG tube rupture. From receipt of the associated alarms, the crew attempts to isolate the spuriously opened PORV from the control room and when unsuccessful will direct a plant operator to shut the manual steam isolation valve to the PORV within 15 minutes after having identified the failed open PORV.
(Associated with Modification DCP 08-9595-10)
- (6) Control room operator actions for a simulated large-break loss-of-coolant accident with a failure of one train of both low and HHSI valves to swap from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to containment sump. From receipt of the associated alarms, the crew will act to secure the low and HHSI pumps in the associated train that failed to swap from the RWST to the containment sump before the tank empty alarm is received. The crew will then follow procedural direction to realign the suction source for this train from the RWST to the containment sump and reestablish injection to the reactor coolant system (RCS) from this train. (Associated with the Refueling Water Storage Tank, Unit 2)
Permanent Modification (6 Samples)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following permanent modifications.
- (1) DCP 06-15147-40, Replace Essential Cooling Water Pump 2A
- (2) DCP 08-9595-10, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves Fail Closed Modification
- (6) DCPs 05-11049-1, 05-11049-2, Install Test Connections at Emergency Standby Diesel Generator Control Panels to Facilitate Surveillance Testing
Operating Experience (4 Samples)
From March 25, 2019, to April 11, 2019, the inspectors reviewed the following operating experience issues.
- (1) NRC Generic Letter 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves
- (2) NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power
- (3) NRC Information Notice 2013-18, Refueling Water Storage Tank Degradation
- (4) NRC Information Notice 2017-16, Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Corrective Actions for Distribution Panel Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2019010-01; NCV 05000499/2019010-01 Closed
[H.4] Teamwork 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation for the failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to completely correct a condition adverse to quality by performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in the engineering evaluation.
Description:
The 120/208 VAC Distribution Panel is a component in the Class 1E 120V vital ac system that is designed to provide a reliable source of 120 VAC control and instrument power to the engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment during all modes of reactor operation, including postulated design-basis events for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after a loss of all offsite and onsite power.
The inspectors reviewed calculations for the electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits, procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance.
During this review, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to completely correct an adverse condition by failing to perform electrical testing on ten
- (10) distribution panels on three trains DPA(B)(C)135 and DPA(B)(C)235. Specifically, in March 2016 inspectors identified that the licensee failed to demonstrate that the safety-related molded case circuit breakers would perform satisfactorily and within limits. In response, the licensee opened condition report engineering evaluation (CREE) 16-2166 to address the adequacy of molded case circuit breaker testing to include overcurrent testing to validate that the circuit breaker will open as expected during a downstream fault condition. This requirement was a corrective action from a previously identified performance deficiency for the molded case circuit breaker testing and methodology documentation.
During questions from this inspection, the licensee realized they had failed to completely correct the original adverse to quality condition. The electrical testing for the DC and upstream breakers were completed, but the condition report was closed before the recommended corrective actions in CREE 16-2166 were completed for all of the safety-related panels, ac breakers. Specifically, the licensee had failed to perform required testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers.
Corrective Action: In response to this issue, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program to evaluate and correct this condition. The inspectors determined that this finding does not represent an immediate safety concern because the last maintenance performed on these circuit breakers that did not receive electrical testing was completed for Unit 1, on April 4, 2017, and for Unit 2, on October 23, 2016. Because of these activities, there is a high confidence in the performance of the affected circuit breakers.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 19-3431
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality by not performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in an engineering evaluation was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee completed testing on all DC and upstream circuit breakers in accordance with CREE 16-2166, but closed the action without completing testing on all of the affected distribution panel circuit breakers.
Screening: The inspectors screened this performance deficiency using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affect the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the deficiency resulted in ten distribution panels not receiving the electrical testing as recommended in CREE 16-2166.
Significance: The inspectors determined this finding adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors reviewed the finding using the criteria specified in Figure 1 of IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in human performance associated with teamwork because the licensee did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained.
In this instance, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation and documented the need to do electrical testing but closed the condition report prior to ensuring that all of the tests were performed as required [H.4].
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, from 2012 to April 11, 2019, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality by not performing electrical testing on the distribution panel molded case circuit breakers as documented in the CREE 16-2166.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
NCV 05000498/2019010-01; 05000499/2019010-01, Inadequate Corrective Actions for Distribution Panel Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing Failure to Incorporate Design Changes into Emergency Procedures and Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2019010-02; NCV 05000499/2019010-02 Closed
[H.4] Teamwork 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to incorporate design changes into the plant design bases documentation and associated operating procedures. Specifically, the failure to incorporate these changes had a direct impact on operator actions associated with starting the high-head safety injection (HHSI) pumps in the required time during a SBLOCA in shutdown Modes 3 and 4.
Description:
The inspectors identified a performance deficiency for the licensees failure to update the design basis documentation and associated procedures with design change information. Specifically, the Westinghouse owners group had performed analysis of a SBLOCA while plants were in shutdown Modes 3 and 4. This analysis was incorporated in WCAP-12476, Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 Operation for Westinghouse NSSS, Revision 1, issued in November 2000. The analysis concluded that for a four loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor, during a SBLOCA accident while the plant is in Modes 3 and 4 that to ensure the 10 CFR 50.46 limits would not be exceeded that operators establish flow from both a high-head and a low head safety injection (LHSI) pump within 10 minutes.
The inspectors reviewed task three of Procedure 0PGP03-ZO-0057, Operator Time Critical Action Program, Revision 3, which required operators to start one LHSI pump within 10 minutes and a subsequent HHSI pump within 30 minutes of the shutdown SBLOCA event.
While reviewing the bases documents for this task, the inspectors identified that there was a difference in the licensees bases document and the WCAP-12476. The inspectors questioned the licensee about this difference in the required times to start at least one HHSI pump within 10 minutes in the WCAP-12476 and within 30 minutes in the licensees bases document. The licensee determined they had failed to incorporate the change from the WCAP-12476 into their bases document. By failing to evaluate the WCAP for applicability when it was issued, the licensee missed an opportunity to incorporate the most up-to-date design information into their design basis documents and procedures.
Subsequently, the licensee had not incorporated this change into their shutdown SBLOCA Procedure 0POP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA. In 2015 when the licensee was developing an operator time critical action (OTCA) procedure they failed to identify that their bases document was not properly updated with the correct times and, therefore, used 30 minutes to start a HHSI pump during a SBLOCA while in Mode 3 and 4. The licensee performed OTCA validation for this task in 2016 and had unacceptable results for some crews. The licensee performed training to improve performance of this task. The licensee again performed more OTCA validation for this task and still had unacceptable results for some crews.
Corrective Action: The licensee revised Procedure 0POP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA, Revision 19, to include an action on their conditional information page to start at least one of each high-head and LHSI pumps when one of the following criteria is met: RCS subcooling less than 35°F, pressurizer level less than 8%, or containment pressure greater than 3 psig.
The licensee again performed OTCA validation for this task and all of the results were acceptable.
The inspectors observed two crews performing a shutdown SBLOCA in the simulator and both crews were able to start at least one high-head and one LHSI pump within the required time of 10 minutes. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 19-4187. This action includes incorporating the WCAP-12476 analysis into their UFSAR for the shutdown SBLOCA and updating the 0POP03-ZO-0057, Operator Time Critical Action Program, changing the time limit to 10 minutes for starting a HHSI during a shutdown SBLOCA.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report 19-4187
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to evaluate for applicability and incorporate the most up-to-date design bases information into the licensees bases document and operating procedures was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the failure to incorporate the change in design could have resulted in not starting a HHSI pump within the required time limit to prevent exceeding peak cladding temperature of 2200°F.
Screening: The inspectors screened this performance deficiency using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affect the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The inspectors determined this finding adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors reviewed the finding using the criteria specified in Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Appendix G, Shutdown Operations.
Cross-cutting Aspect: This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with teamwork in that individuals and work groups did not communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensees engineering group failed to evaluate for applicability and implement a change to their design bases document based on the WCAP-12476 and the operation group performed a procedure change to their shutdown SBLOCA procedure in 2017, and the engineering review using the licensee-based document did not correct the incorrect time for starting the HHSI pump within 10 minutes [H.4].
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part, Measures shall be established for selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components.
Contrary to the above, from November of 2000 to April 11, 2019, the licensee failed to establish measures for selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Specifically, in November 2000 Westinghouse issued WCAP-12476, Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4 Operation for Westinghouse NSSS, Revision 1. This analysis recommended that Westinghouse plants start HHSI pumps much sooner than what the licensee assumed in their analysis of record during certain accident conditions. However, the licensee failed to evaluate the guidance for suitability to their site and missed an opportunity to incorporate the most up-to-date design information into their design basis documents and procedures. The failure to incorporate this analysis in design could have resulted in not starting a HHSI pump within the required time limit to prevent exceeding peak cladding temperature 2200°F.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
NCV 05000498/2019010-02; 05000499/2019010-02, Failure to Incorporate Design Changes into Emergency Procedures and Design Documents.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On April 11, 2019, the inspectors presented the Design Bases Assurance (Teams) inspection results to Mr. G. Powell, Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
Calculations
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
MC-5174
DG Building HVAC System Pressure Drop
MC-5285
DG Building Emergency Cooling Load
CC-6120
Anchor Bolt Design
Motor Load Report
MC-5037A
Evaluation of RWST Vortex Breaker
MC-5037
RWST Volumes & Limits
ZC-7024
Loop Uncertainty Calculation for RWST Level
Monitoring Instrumentation
STI-512246
RWST Design Report (Seismic)
E
2N129MC5815
RWST Vacuum Potential
V-EC-908
Motor Operated Valve GNL 89-10
01/22/1991
V-EC-909
Motor Operated Valve GNL 89-10
01/22/1991
V-EC-910
Motor Operated Valve GNL 89-10
01/22/1991
MC-6472
DVAC Calculation AC Motor MOVs
MC-6460
Minimum Thrust for GL 89-10 Gate MOVs
MC-6426
IVC/AFW Cooling Load and Room Heat-up
5V140MC5876
MSIVC Heating Load
5N049EB01118
Station Blackout
5N049EB01118
Station Blackout (SUPP# 0)
13-DJ-006
25 VDC BATTERY 4-HOUR COPING ANALYSIS
13-DJ-006
25 VDC BATTERY 4-HOUR COPING ANALYSIS
(SUPP# 0)
NC-6034
Steam Generator Tube Rupture for UFSAR
Chapter 15.6.3
NC-7069
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Mass Releases
Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4
Operation for Westinghouse NSSS
Evaluation of LOCA During Mode 3 and Mode 4
Operation for Westinghouse NSSS (SUPP# 0)
ZC-7020
3.0 Functional Description
Degraded and Undervoltage Protection and
20/208 VAC Panelboard Voltage Analysis
Voltage Regulation Study
Protection 480V Load Centers
Protection Non 1E 48 VDC, 125 VDC & 250 VDC, and
Class 1E 125 VDC Systems
Calculations
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
Short Circuit Analysis Class 1E 125 VDC and Non-Class
1E 250, 125 and 48 VDC System
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
5V139Z41621#1
Diesel Generator Building HVAC Emergency Vent Fans
Logic Diagram System: HG
JC1-1HG01-001
Johnson Controls-DG Building HVAC train A-Flow
Balance
5V139V00015#1
P&ID, HVAC Diesel Generator Building Normal and
Emergency System
5N129F05013#1
P&ID, Safety Injection System
77-0110015-1
RWST Vessel Drawing (Brown-Minneapolis Tank)
77-0110015-2
RWST Orientation Drawing (Brown-Minneapolis Tank)
5S109F00016#1
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing Main Steam
20-0100059WN Motor Operated Gate Valve MOD 06002GM87FHB2DO
D
13-DJ-006
25 VDC Battery 4-Hour Coping Analysis
13-DJ-006
25 VDC Battery 4-Hour Coping Analysis (SUPP# 0)
088004-WD12-
2
Wiring Diagram for MCC E2B2 CUB R3
088004-BM12-072 Bill of Materials for MCC E2B2 CUB R3
088004-WD11-
003
Wiring Diagram for MCC E1B2 CUB R3
088004-BM11-003 Bill of Materials for MCC E1B2 CUB R3
088004-WD10-
2
Wiring Diagram for MCC E2C2 CUB 01
08804-BM10-012
Bill of Materials for MCC E2C2 CUB D1
088004-WD9-032
Wiring Diagram for MCC E1A2 CUB L3
088004-WD9-032
Wiring Diagram for MCC E2A2 CUB L3
088004-BMB-032
Bill of Materials for MCC E2A2 CUB L3
08804-WD8-032
Wiring Diagram for MCC E2A2 CUB L3
088004-BM5-012
Bill of Materials for MCC E1C2 CUB D1
088004-WD5-012
Wiring Diagram for MCC E1C2 CUB D1
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
00000E0AAAA
Single Line Diagram Main One Line Diagram
Unit No. 1 & 2
00009E0DG01#2
Elementary Diagram Standby Diesel Generator DG22
4.16KV Feeder Breaker
00009E0VFAB#1
Single Line Diagram Class 1E 120/208V Distribution
Panel DPA235, DPB235, DPC235
00009E0VFAB#2
Single Line Diagram Class 1E 120/208V Distribution
Panel DPA235, DPB235, DPC235
00009E0PK04
Elementary Diagram ESF Transformer & 4.16KV Bus
E2A, E2B, & E2C Protection and Metering
0363-0100
System Internal Diagram ESF Load Sequencer
N/A
9-E-PKAA-01#1
Single Line Diagram 4.16KV Class 1E Switchgear E1A
(EAB)
9E0PMAK#1,
Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram 480V Class 1E Motor Control
Center E1A4 (EAB)
9E0HC01#1,
Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram IVC AFW Pump Cubicle HVAC
Supply Fans FN001, FN002, & FN003
5V149V25008
Piping & Instrumentation Diagram - HVAC Main Steam
Ventilation System
9E0AF01, Sht. 1
Elementary Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
No. 11, 12, & 13
9E0AAAB#1,
Sht. 1
Single Line Diagram Class 1E 125V DC & 120V Vital AC
Non-Class 1E 48V, V, 250V, DC & 120V Vital AC Non-
Class 1E Inverter Power for Computer 208V/120V AC
Regulated Power
G5-253-202
Control Schematic (Generator) (Protective Relaying and
Metering)
HC0
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
OPSP03-SP-
0008C
SSPS Train C Quarterly Slave Relay Test
Completed
03/16/2019
0P0P02-HG-0001 Diesel Generator Building HVAC
0PSP05-SI-0931L RWST Level Loop Calibration
Completed
2/11/2019
0PGP03-ZE-0133 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
0PSP03-MS-0001 Main Steam System Valve Operability Test
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
0PMP04-SG-0007 Steam Generator PORV Hydraulic Actuator
Maintenance
0PGP03-ZO-0057 Operator Time Critical Action Program
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA
0POP04-RC-0006 Shutdown LOCA
0POP04-ZO-0001 Control Room Evacuation
EC00
Loss of all AC Power
EC11
Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation
EO00
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
EO10
Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
EO30
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
ES12
Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization
ES13
Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation
01M2
Annunciator Lampbox 1M02 Response Instructions
C-1 RWST LEVEL HI/LO
D-1 RWST LO-LO/EMPTY
FSG07
Loss of Vital Instruments or Control Power
0PMP04-SG-0007 Steam Generator PORV Hydraulic Actuator
Maintenance
ES12
Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization
EDMG
Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline
06M3
Annunciator Lampbox 6M03 Response Instructions
0POP04-MS-0001 Excessive Steam Demand
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
0POP03-ZO-0057 OTCA Validation Record Task #3, Manually Initiate
LHSI and HHSI Pumps (7 Time Validations)
11/29/2016, to
03/09/2017
0PSP03-ZQ-0028 Operator Logs
151
Plant Procedures (Form 1, Rev 0 - Screening for
0POP04-RC-0006, Shutdown LOCA, Rev 19)
0POP04-AE-0005 Offsite Power System Degraded Voltage
0PGP04-ZA-0307 Preparation of Calculations
0POP03-ZG-0002 STP Coordinator Operations
0PGP03-ZO-0045 CenterPoint Energy Real Time Operations Emergency
Operations Plan
0PGP03-XS-0001 Switchyard Management
0PGP04-ZA-0108 Vendor Technical Information Revision Cover Sheet
0PMP05-PK-1001 4160 Volt Class 1E Switchgear Maintenance
0PGP05-ZE-0001 PRA Analyses/Assessment
Annunciator Lampbox 22M01 Response Instructions
0PMP05-NA-0004 Molded Case Breaker Test
03M3
Annunciator Lampbox 3M03 Response Instructions
0PSP03-DG-0007 Standby Diesel 11(21) LOOP Test
0PSP03-DG-0013 Standby Diesel 11(21) LOOP - ESF Actuation Test
0001A
Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A
Performed
04/20/2011
0001A
Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A
Performed
10/22/2015
0001B
Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train B
Performed
11/18/2012
0001C
Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C
Performed
03/20/2014
0001C
Unit 1 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C
Performed
10/10/2018
0001A
Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A
Performed
2/09/2013
0001A
Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train A
Performed
07/06/2016
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
0001B
Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train B
Performed
11/17/2011
0001B
Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train B
Performed
10/26/2016
0001C
Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C
Performed
04/18/2010
0001C
Unit 2 ESF Diesel Sequencer Timing Test Train C
Performed
04/21/2015
Vendor Manuals
and Documents
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
VTD-J127-0002
Vendor Manual, Joy Axial Fans, Adjustable Pitch
S-222
Vendor Seismic Report, Joy Axial Fans
07/20/1979
VTD-P095-0046
Installation, Operation & Maintenance Manual for (8)
Linear Valve Modulating Operator Assembly
VTD-R369-0014
Model 1153 Series D Alphaline Pressure Transmitters
for Nuclear Service
VTD-R369-0041
Rosemount Model 1154 Series H Alphaline Nuclear
Pressure Transmitter
VTD-A348-0014
Vendor Technical Document for Agastat Nuclear
Qualified Control Relays - Series EGP/EML/ETR
VTD-E945-0001
Seismic Qualification of Signal Isolator DEVAR P/N
18-119-M31 ESI-SR-06-158
VTD-P319-0003
Instruction Manual Three Phase Thyrister Controlled
from Power Conversion Products Model
No. 3SD-130-300
VTD-S345-0008
Square D Company 8501XDO80V62 Control Relay Data
Sheet
VTD-S637-0009
ESF Load Sequencer for South Texas Project Electric
Generating Station
JCI-IHZ11-001
Johnson Controls, Inc. MSIVC Building Emergency
Supply Air All Elevations
Engineering
Changes
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
DCP No.13-
15128-5
RHR Low Flow Trip Energize to Actuate Modification
Supplement 0
04-7140-45
Replace ESF E2B Agastat Relays and add Load Cell
Switch Contract
09/16/2014
09-809-27
Replace Obsolete RCS Wide Range Pressure
Transmitters
09/27/2010
DCP 05-11049-1
Install Test Connections at Standby Diesel Generator
Control Panels to Facilitate Surveillance Testing
Supplement 0
Other
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
EOPT-03.10
STPEGS EOP Technical Guidelines
4Q019MS1044
Seismic Floor Response Spectra (Bechtel Document)
3R289NS0012
Specification Essential Cooling Water Pumps
5E329ES1002
Specification for Valve Electric Motor Actuators
NLO 300.61
NLO-300 - Outside Design Bases Procedures
POR 182.07
Loss of all AC Power EC00/Station Blackout
POR 182.06
0POP10-ZO-EDMG, Extensive Damage Mitigation
Guideline
LOR175.06
Requiring Reading Completion Information Attendance
Record
11/14/2017, to
01/08/2018
POR182
POP-10-EDMG/Respond to Station Blackout, 2018-1
Training Attendance Records
05/08/2018, to
06/05/2018
LOR161.02
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Review
LOT201.10
Emergency Core Cooling Systems
NOC-AE-
07002109
Response to Request for Additional Information
Regarding Resolution of NRC Generic Letter 2006-02:
Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the
Operability of Offsite Power, (TAC Nos. MD1035 and
MD1036)
01/30/2007
NOC-AE-
06001979
60-Day Response to NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid
Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the
Operability of Offsite Power
03/30/2006
INT02-249A
South Texas Project Interconnection Agreement
08/15/2002
Amended and Restated South Texas Project Nuclear
Plant Interface Coordination Agreement
08/01/2018
Other
Number
Title
Revision
or Date
Owners Communication Plan (Rev. 1)
2/16/2014
NOC-AE-
10002532
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Transmitter
Replacement
05/18/2010
South Texas Project (STP) Steady-State Voltage, Short-
Circuit, and Stability Studies
2/05/2018
PRA-17-010
Evaluation pf Switchyard Maintenance Update to
Include the 2015 Annual STP Stability Assessments and
the CenterPoint Energy data 06/01/15 through
06/30/2017
PRA-17-009
Risk Management Actions for North and South Bus
Maintenance
20-00004DJA
Induction Motor Data Sheet 3V141VFN001,
3V141VFN002, & 3V141VFN003
06/12/1984
20-00030AJA
Joy Report No. X-1076, Performance and Sound Test
on Joy Series 1000 Axivane Fan
07/18/1984
Condition Reports (CRs)
96-11944
00-12147
03-14686
04-5149
04-5585
06-1696
16-2166
16-6008
18-7604-1
09-12490
08-9595
08-9382
08-12982
17-15954
17-16576
17-24605
18-12630
01-17582
07-16631
09-7179
2-6770
13-6461
13-11008
04-7140
06-15147
09-5680
09-809
13-15806
13-556
13-6869
13-6991
13-8784
14-13030
15-10558
15-16042
15-16559
15-24053
15-5477
15-5857
16-1127
16-1137
16-1201
16-1281
16-1293
16-1308
16-1381
16-1694
16-1794
16-1985
16-2117
16-2197
16-2214
16-2220
16-3944
16-6008
17-12447
17-21537
17-22052
17-22335
18-14470
18-14621
18-7604
Condition Reports (CRs) Generated during the Inspection
19-3431
19-3603
19-3604
19-4170
19-4187
19-4201
19-3497
19-3512
19-3569
19-3605
19-3607
19-3614
19-3422
19-4182
19-4201
Work Orders (WOs)
96014189
566224
26825
543585
359558
360514
9700667
8612181
419379
109650
209980
99000649
1300171
405613
370940
396888
468808
SUNSI Review: ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword: NRC-002
By: WCS Yes No
Publicly Available
Sensitive
OFFICE
RI:EB1
RI:EB2
NSE:RCB
SRI:EB1
C:PBB
C:EB1
NAME
WCullum
SMakor
RSmith
WSifre
NTaylor
VGaddy
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
DATE
05/16/2019
05/17/2019
05/15/2019
05/15/2019
05/23/2019
5/23/2019