IR 05000461/2013008

IR 05000461-13-008, May 20 - 24, 2013, June 3 - 7, 2013, and June 17 - 21, 2013, Clinton Power Station, Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI)

ML13207A077
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	07/25/2013
From:	Benny Jose NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2
To:	Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
Andrew Dunlop
References
IR-13-008
Download: ML13207A077 (27)

Text

uly 25, 2013

SUBJECT:

CLINTON POWER STATION COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION (CDBI) 05000461/20013008

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On June 21, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) inspection at your Clinton Power Station. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on June 21, 2013, with Mr. W. Noll, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Benny Jose, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000461/20013008; w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION III==

Docket No: 50-461 License No: NPF-62 Report No: 05000461/20013008 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Clinton Power Station Location: Clinton, IL Dates: May 20 - 24, 2013 June 3 - 7, 2013 June 17 - 21, 2013 Inspectors: A. Dunlop, Senior Engineering Inspector, Lead C. Brown, Engineering Inspector, Electrical G. ODwyer, Engineering Inspector, Mechanical R. Baker, Operations Inspector N. D. Greca, Electrical Contractor T. Tinkel, Mechanical Contractor Observer: David Oliver, Engineering Inspector, Electrical Approved by: Benny Jose, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000461/20013008; 05/20/2013 - 06/21/2013; Clinton Power Station; Component Design

Bases Inspection (CDBI).

The inspection was a 3-week onsite baseline inspection that focused on the design of components. The inspection was conducted by regional engineering inspectors and two consultants. No findings were identified by the inspectors. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)and determined using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process dated June 2, 2011.

Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned, in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated January 28, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC-Identified

and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection

.1 Introduction

The objective of the component design bases inspection is to verify that design bases have been correctly implemented for the selected risk significant components and that operating procedures and operator actions are consistent with design and licensing bases. As plants age, their design bases may be difficult to determine and an important design feature may be altered or disabled during a modification. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model assumes the capability of safety systems and components to perform their intended safety function successfully. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

Specific documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to the report.

.2 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The inspectors selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees PRA and the Clinton Power Station Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model. The inspectors selected the Division III systems for review, including the high pressure core spray system, shutdown service water system, and the associated power supplies for these systems. Based on this selection, a number of the systems risk significant components were selected for the inspection. In general, the selection was based upon the components and operator actions having a risk achievement worth of greater than 1.3 and/or a risk-reduction worth greater than 1.005. The operator actions or operating procedures selected for review included actions taken by operators both inside and outside of the control room during postulated accident scenarios that were associated with the selected system/components. In addition, the inspectors selected operating experience issues and modifications associated with the selected components.

The inspectors also used additional component information such as a margin assessment in the selection process. This design margin assessment considered original design reductions caused by design modification, power uprates, or reductions due to degraded material condition. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components. These included items such as performance test results, significant corrective actions, repeated maintenance activities, Maintenance Rule (a)(1)status, components requiring an operability evaluation, NRC resident inspector input of problem areas/equipment, and system health reports. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. A summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report.

This inspection constituted 22 samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.21-05.

.3 Component Design

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Technical Specifications (TS), design basis documents, drawings, calculations, and other available design basis information, to determine the performance requirements of the selected components. The inspectors used applicable industry standards, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards and the National Electric Code, to evaluate acceptability of the systems design. The NRC also evaluated licensee actions, if any, taken in response to NRC issued operating experience, such as Bulletins, Generic Letters (GLs),

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RISs), and Information Notices (INs). The review was to verify that the selected components would function as designed when required and support proper operation of the associated systems. The attributes that were needed for a component to perform its required function included process medium, energy sources, control systems, operator actions, and heat removal. The attributes to verify that the component condition and tested capability was consistent with the design bases and was appropriate may include installed configuration, system operation, detailed design, system testing, equipment and environmental qualification, equipment protection, component inputs and outputs, operating experience, and component degradation.

For each of the components selected, the inspectors reviewed the maintenance history, preventive maintenance activities including specified frequencies were consistent with vendor requirements, system health reports, operating experience-related information, vendor manuals, electrical and mechanical drawings, and licensee corrective action program documents. Field walkdowns were conducted for all accessible components to assess material condition and to verify that the as-built condition was consistent with the design. Other specific attributes reviewed are included as part of the scope for each individual component.

The following 16 components were reviewed:

• Shutdown Service Water (SX) Pump 1C (1SX01PC): The inspectors reviewed performance data for the original pump and post modification test data for the 1995 repaired/modified pump to verify performance assumptions reflected in the SX Division III system flow balance calculation and subsequent surveillance test acceptance criteria. Calculations for normal and design basis accident (DBA)conditions were reviewed to verify that sufficient SX system flow and net positive suction head (NPSH) were available for worst case conditions including minimum lake level and maximum lake water temperature. Design procurement specifications and calculations were reviewed to verify the pump had adequate submergence to prevent vortices for operation at minimum lake level. A hazards analysis and screenhouse drawings were reviewed to assess the safety impact of having non-safety-related traveling water screens or sluice gate in the direct flow path connecting the safety-related ultimate heat sink to the SX pump suction.

System operating procedures were reviewed to determine whether design basis conditions were reflected in procedures. Inservice test (IST) procedures were reviewed to verify that specified acceptance limits for pump differential pressure (d/p) were consistent with SX system design requirements and pump performance total developed head/flow capability. Test results were reviewed to ensure pump performance was consistent with the IST acceptance criteria and results were monitored for signs of pump degradation. The inspectors reviewed control schematic diagrams to confirm that the operation of pump conformed to the design requirements and operating procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the instrumentation used for the automatic operation of the pump, including instrument loop diagram, power supply, and setpoint calculations. The review also verified that the circuit was adequately protected and that adequate control voltage was available for the operation of the starting contactor. The inspectors reviewed voltage drop calculations to determine whether the motors had adequate voltage for running and starting under degraded voltage conditions and that the circuits had adequate ampacity for all operating conditions.

• SX Pump 1C Strainer (1SX01FC): The inspectors reviewed performance data provided in the design procurement specifications and vendor documents for this full-flow automatic backwash strainer to verify performance assumptions reflected in the SX Division III system flow balance calculation. Calculations for normal and DBA conditions were reviewed to verify that sufficient SX system flow was available with and without backflush operation for worst case pressure drop associated with strainer plugging. System drawings and operating procedures were reviewed to determine whether design basis conditions were reflected and that a bypass option was available in the event of unacceptable plugging. The SX system surveillance procedures were reviewed to verify that strainer full-flow capability was determined during SX pump IST by establishing required system flow and achieving required pump performance. The inspectors reviewed control schematic diagrams and power requirements for the strainer and backwash valves to confirm that the operation of the automatic backwashing strainer conformed to design requirements and operating procedures. The inspectors also verified that the circuit was adequately protected and that adequate control voltage was available for the operation of the starting contactor. The d/p setpoints for the strainer motor, backflush valve, and high d/p alarm were evaluated to determine consistency with calculated results for strainer plugging.

• SX 1C Header Isolation Valve (1SX014C): The inspectors reviewed the motor operated valve (MOV) actuator sizing calculations for valve stem torque, MOV actuator characteristics, and weak link analysis to verify the butterfly valve was capable of performing its safety function of closing and isolating the SX header from the non-safety related service water system under worst-case line pressure and d/p conditions. Control schematic diagrams were reviewed to confirm that the operation of valve conformed to design requirements and operating procedures.

The inspectors also reviewed the circuit protection and the thermal overload application to confirm that the circuit was adequately protected. Voltage drop and degraded voltage calculations were reviewed to ensure that the valve was capable of performing its intended safety function during a DBA. System operating procedures were reviewed to identify steps for opening the valve with the actuator under normal conditions and with manual operator assistance in case of elevated d/p. The test procedure and test results for determining boundary leakage for this valve were reviewed to verify leak rates were within established limits. The diagnostic test results were reviewed to ensure valve degradation and stroke time performance were monitored. A Fisher Valve 10 CFR Part 21 Notification was reviewed to verify that the subject minimum wall condition did not affect the safety function of the valve.

• SX Pump 1C Discharge Check Valve (1SX01PC): System drawings and operating procedures for this tilting disc check valve were reviewed to determine whether design basis conditions were appropriately reflected. The IST procedure and test results were reviewed to verify valve disc freedom of motion; and to ensure the valve allows required flow in the open position and limits backflow in the closed position. Requirements for non-intrusive testing were reviewed to verify implementation of a condition monitoring program for this check valve.

• High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Pump (1E22-C001): The inspectors reviewed the design basis hydraulic analysis/calculations to verify that required total developed head, required NPSH, and potential for vortex formation had been properly considered under all DBA/event conditions. The HPCS pump IST procedures, test results, and test data trends were reviewed to verify that component performance remained consistent with design basis requirements.

The IST reference values were also reviewed to verify appropriate correlation to accident analyses conditions, taking into account setpoint tolerances and instrument inaccuracies. The inspectors reviewed the control logic and control schematic diagrams to confirm that the operation of pump conformed to design requirements and operating procedures. The review included an evaluation of the control voltage to verify that adequate voltage was available for the operation of the circuit breaker under limiting conditions. The inspectors also reviewed voltage drop calculations to determine whether the motors had adequate voltage for running and starting under degraded voltage conditions. Protective relaying calculations were reviewed to determine whether the motors were adequately protected and immune to spurious tripping. The inspectors reviewed the instrumentation associated with the operation of the pump, including setpoints, power supplies, and environmental qualification of transmitters.

• HPCS Injection Valve (1E22-F004): The inspectors reviewed MOV calculations and analyses to ensure the valve was capable of functioning under design conditions. These included calculations for required thrust, maximum d/p, and valve weak link analysis. Diagnostic testing and IST surveillance results, including stroke time and available thrust, were reviewed to verify acceptance criteria were met and performance degradation could be identified. The inspectors reviewed control logic and schematic diagrams to confirm that the operation of valve conformed to design requirements and operating procedures.

This included the procedures used to override the actuators seal-in circuit such that the valve could be throttled to control reactor vessel level to ensure the valve would continue to be able to perform its design functions in this mode of operation. The inspectors also reviewed the circuit protection, the thermal overload application, and the environmental qualification of the Limitorque motor operator to confirm that the circuit was adequately protected and that the valve was capable of performing its intended safety function during a design basis accident. Voltage drop calculations were reviewed to determine whether the motor and its associated control circuits had adequate voltage under degraded voltage conditions.

• HPCS Minimum Flow Valve (1E22-F012): The inspectors reviewed MOV calculations and analysis to ensure the valve was capable of functioning under design conditions. These included calculations for required thrust, maximum d/p, and valve weak link analysis. Diagnostic testing and IST surveillance results, including stroke time and available thrust, were reviewed to verify acceptance criteria were met and performance degradation could be identified. The instrumentation setpoint calculation and opening time tests were reviewed to ensure the valve would open with the required time and allow sufficient flow to protect the pump from inadequate flow. The inspectors reviewed control logic and schematic diagrams to confirm that the operation of valve conformed to design requirements and operating procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the instrumentation associated with the automatic operation of the valve, including power supply and setpoint calculations. The inspectors reviewed the circuit protection, the thermal overload application, and the environmental qualification of the Limitorque motor operator to confirm that the circuit was adequately protected and that the valve was capable of performing its intended safety function during a design basis accident. Voltage drop calculations were reviewed to determine whether the motor and its associated control circuits had adequate voltage under degraded voltage conditions.

• HPCS Suppression Pool Suction Valve (1E22-F015): The inspectors reviewed MOV calculations and analyses to ensure the valve was capable of functioning under design conditions. These included calculations for required thrust, maximum differential pressure, pressure locking, seismic qualification, and valve weak link analysis. Diagnostic testing and IST surveillance results, including stroke time testing, were reviewed to verify acceptance criteria were met and performance degradation could be identified. The inspectors also reviewed the issue reports in which the licensee identified that the valves seismic qualification calculations had errors, the operability evaluation that determined the valve was operable but non-conforming, and the new calculations that restored the valves full seismic qualification. Control logic and schematic diagrams were reviewed to confirm that the operation of valve conformed to design requirements and operating procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the instrumentation associated with the automatic operation of the valve, including power supply and setpoint calculations. The inspectors reviewed the circuit protection, the thermal overload application, and the environmental qualification of the Limitorque motor operator to confirm that the circuit was adequately protected and that the valve was capable of performing its intended safety function during a design basis accident. Voltage drop calculations were reviewed to determine whether the motor and its associated control circuits had adequate voltage under degraded voltage conditions.

• Division III Battery (1E22-S001D): The inspectors reviewed the battery sizing calculation to verify the capability of the battery to support momentary and continuous loading for the duration of the duty cycle. The voltage drop calculation was also reviewed to confirm the capability of the battery to supply adequate voltage to the loads under limiting conditions for the duration of the duty cycle.

The inspectors reviewed battery testing procedures to verify that periodic tests conformed to the TS requirements and industry standards; and to confirm the inter-cell resistance was maintained sufficiently low to have minimal impact on the voltage drop calculations. The inspectors reviewed the battery charger sizing calculation to confirm its capability to maintain the battery in a charged state and to recharge the battery in a timely manner following a loss of offsite power event.

The battery charger testing procedures were also reviewed to confirm they conformed to the TS requirements and that test results supported operability.

• 125Vdc Bus (1E22-S001C): The inspectors reviewed the Division III DC system loading and short circuit calculation to determine system loading and available short circuit current under faulted conditions. The inspectors also reviewed the bus, breaker, and cable ratings to confirm their capability to carry maximum loading and interrupt maximum faulted conditions. The cable separation design was reviewed to confirm compliance with single failure and Appendix R criteria.

The inspectors reviewed voltage drop calculations to determine whether adequate control voltage was available for the 4160Vac and 480Vac circuit breakers.

Breaker coordination was reviewed to ensure that overloads and faulted conditions were properly interrupted.

• Division III Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (1DG01KC) and Associated Output Breaker (1E22S004103): The inspectors reviewed selected electrical components for the Division III EDG. The design basis documentation, USAR, and TS surveillance tests were reviewed to ensure design and licensing bases were met. The inspectors reviewed the ability of the EDG to start at the end of a station blackout using starting air and to close the output breaker at the lowest battery voltage. The voltage drop, degraded voltage, and short-circuit calculations were reviewed to ensure the EDG would perform during a design-basis event.

• EDG 1C Heat Exchanger (1DG13A): The inspectors reviewed the design requirements from procurement specifications and vendor documents, operating procedures, and calculations to determine whether the shell and tube heat exchanger was capable of transferring the DBA heat load under worst case temperatures and flow conditions. Performance test procedures, test results, and calculations were reviewed to verify normally expected heat exchanger fouling was consistent with design heat transfer fouling factors. Additionally, calculations were reviewed that determined heat transfer margin available based on tube plugging. Work history was reviewed including a modification to install zinc anodes in the heat exchanger and an operability determination for a pinhole leak in the SX piping. The inspectors reviewed procedures for eddy current inspection and criteria for plugging tubes. The licensee GL 89-13 program was reviewed with respect to implementation for this safety-related heat exchanger.

• 4160Vac Bus (1E22-S004) including the HPCS Transformer (1E22-S003): The inspectors reviewed bus loading calculations to determine whether the 4160Vac system had sufficient capacity to support its required loads under worst case accident loading and grid voltage conditions. The inspectors reviewed the degraded voltage protection design scheme to determine whether it afforded adequate voltage to safety-related devices at all voltage distribution levels. This included review of degraded voltage relay setpoint calculations and voltage calculations for downstream equipment such as MOVs. The inspectors reviewed the overcurrent protection scheme for the 4160Vac buses including drawings and calculations to determine whether loads were adequately protected and immune from spurious tripping. The inspectors also reviewed maintenance schedules and procedures for the 4160Vac bus, its associated circuit breakers, and the system transformer to determine whether the equipment was being properly maintained.

This included reviewing acceptance criteria in procedures for consistency with vendor recommendations and design calculations.

• 480Vac Motor Control Center (MCC) 1C (1E22-S002): The inspectors reviewed bus and control circuit loading calculations to determine whether MCC 1C had sufficient capacity to support its required loads under worst case accident loading and grid voltage conditions. The inspectors reviewed the overcurrent protection scheme for the MCC including drawings and calculations to determine whether loads were adequately protected and immune from spurious tripping. The inspectors reviewed maintenance schedules and procedures for the 480Vac bus and its associated circuit breakers to determine whether the equipment was being properly maintained. This included reviewing acceptance criteria in procedures for consistency with vendor recommendations and design calculations.

• Shutdown Service Water 480Vac MCC 1C (1AP31E): The inspectors reviewed bus and control circuit loading calculations to determine whether MCC 1C had sufficient capacity to support its required loads under worst case accident loading and grid voltage conditions. The inspectors reviewed the overcurrent protection scheme for the MCC including drawings and calculations to determine whether loads were adequately protected and immune from spurious tripping. The inspectors reviewed maintenance schedules and procedures for the MCC and its associated circuit breakers to determine whether the equipment was being properly maintained.

• 120Vac Power Distribution Panel C Bus (1C71-P001C): The inspectors reviewed the bus design capabilities and bus loading calculation to confirm that the bus rating was not exceeded. The review included circuit breaker protection to confirm that the equipment was adequately protected and that the load breakers were adequately sized and properly coordinated to prevent spurious tripping. The inspectors also reviewed the inverter vendor manual for design, maintenance, and testing requirements to verify capability of the source to provide quality power to the instrument bus. The inspectors reviewed bus maintenance and breaker testing procedures to confirm that they were conducted in accordance with industry standards and manufacturer recommendations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six operating experience issues to ensure that NRC generic concerns had been adequately evaluated and addressed by the licensee. The operating experience issues listed below were reviewed as part of this inspection:

• GL 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment;

• IN 1984-20, Service Life of Relays in Safety-Related System;

• IN 1992-27, Supplement 1, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of ITE/Gould A.C. Relays Used in Safety-Related Applications;

• IN 2006-29; Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-Operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear;

• IN 2010-25, Inadequate Electrical Connections; and

• 10 CFR Part 21, 2012-07; Potential Minimum Wall Violation on Seismic Plate Valve Bodies.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three permanent plant modifications related to selected risk significant components to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the components had not been degraded through modifications. The modifications listed below were reviewed as part of this inspection effort:

• D22869, Rebuild the SX Pump C;

• EC 369611, Address Concern with Location of Division 3 EDG Grounding Resistor; and

• EC 364556, Install Anodes in Channel Covers for EDG Heat Exchangers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Operating Procedure Accident Scenario Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of the procedures listed below associated with operation of the HPCS system. The procedures were compared to the USAR, design assumptions, and training materials to ensure consistency. For identified time critical operator actions and other significant operator actions, the inspectors performed a detailed review and walk through of associated procedures, including observing the performance of some actions in the stations simulator and in the plant for other actions, with an appropriate plant operator to assess operator knowledge level, adequacy of procedures, and availability of special equipment where required. In addition, the inspectors also reviewed selected operator actions performed during the portions of selected simulator scenarios, which could require use of the HPCS system to control reactor pressure vessel level. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the following events:

the loss of coolant accident, station blackout, and anticipated transient without scram.

The following operating procedures were reviewed in detail:

• Clinton Power Station (CPS) 4001.01, Reactor Coolant Leakage;

• CPS 4200.01, Loss of AC Power;

• CPS 4401.01, EOP-1, RPV Control;

• CPS 4404.01, EOP-1A, ATWS RPV Control;

• CPS 4411.02, Terminating and Preventing Injection; and

• CPS-4411.04, Throttling ECCS Flow.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the selected component problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the Corrective Action Program. The inspectors reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the Corrective Action Program. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The inspectors also selected five issues that were identified during previous CDBIs to verify that the concern was adequately evaluated and corrective actions were identified and implemented to resolve the concern, as necessary. The following issues were reviewed:

• Action Request (AR) 1088124; J10 Environmental Qualification Program Enhancement Opportunities;

• Non-Cited Violation (NCV)05000461/2007008-01; Continuously Submerged Cables Design Deficiency;

• NCV 05000461/2007008-02; Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Neutral Ground Resistor Design Inadequacy;

• NCV 05000461/2007008-05; Inappropriate SX Pump Test Acceptance Criteria; and

• NCV 05000461/2010006-02; Inadequate Test Control of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meeting(s)

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On June 21, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. W. Noll, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. Several documents reviewed by the inspectors were considered proprietary information and were either returned to the licensee or handled in accordance with NRC policy on proprietary information.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

W. Noll, Site Vice President

B. Taber, Plant Manager

P. Bulpitt, Mechanical Design Engineering

J. Coombs, MOV Engineer

C. Culp, GL 89-13 Engineer

J. Cunningham, Operations Director

C. Dunn, Training Director

R. Frantz, Regulatory Assurance

M. Gandi, Design Engineer

M. Heger, Mechanical/Structural Design Engineering Manager

D. Kemper, Site Engineering Director

S. Kowalski, Senior Manager Design Engineering

B. Kuhn, Electrical Design Engineering

S. Lakebrink, Design Engineering

A. Lane, Plant Engineering

S. Mohundro, Engineering Programs Manager

J. Peterson, Regulatory Assurance

R. Schenck, Work Management Director

D. Smith, Electrical Design Engineering

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector

D. Lords, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None.

Attachment