IR 05000445/1989005

Insp Repts 50-445/89-05 & 50-446/89-05 on 890111-0207.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Applicant Actions on Previous Insp findings,follow-up on Violations/Deviations, Action on 10CFR50.55(e) Deficiencies & Plant Tours

ML20235N133
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	02/23/1989
From:	Livermore H, Runyan M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20235N117	List: IR 05000445/1989005 ML20235N114
References
50-445-89-05, 50-445-89-5, 50-446-89-05, 50-446-89-5, NUDOCS 8903010051
Download: ML20235N133 (17)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION NRC-Inspection Report: 50-445/89-05- Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/89-05 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category:.A2 50-446 Construction Permi Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August 1, 1991

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Unit 2: August 1, 1992

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Applicant: TU Electric Skyway. Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81

. Dallas, Texa i Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),

Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Comanche Peak site,' Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: January 11 through February 7, 1989

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Inspector: . Auctw .l23 87 M. F. Runyad, Resident Inspector, Date Civil Structural (paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and.5) l Consultant: W. Richins, Parameter (paragraphs 2, 5, and 6)

Reviewed by: 6vPMW4 2 -

H. H. Livermore, Lead Senior Inspector /Date t 3010052 090gy3 G ADOCK 05000445 PNU j

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection Conducted: Januarv 11 through February 7, 1989 (Report 50-445/89-05; 50-446/89-05)

Areas Inspected: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of applicant's actions on previous inspection findings, follow-up on violations / deviations, action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiencies l

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identified by the applicant, Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP), and plant tour Results: Within the areas inspected, no strengths or weaknesses were identified. One unresolved item was identified involving QC inspection errors in two PCHVP structural steel platform packages (paragraph 5). One open item was identified involving the methodology used to evaluate Richmond inserts obscured by paint or ;

I baseplates (paragraph 5).

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g DETAILS l'. Persons Contacted

• R.'W. Ackley, Jr., Director, CECO

• M. Alexander, Manager of Materials Management, TU Electric

• J. L. Barker, Manager, Engineering Assurance, TU Electric

• D. P. Barry, Sr., Manager, Engineering, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) .

• W. Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric

• D. Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric

• Buck, Senior Review Team

• J. Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric R. Clem, CAP, Structural, SWEC

• T. Conly, APE-Licensing, SWEC

• G. Counsil, Vice Chairman, Nuclear, TU Electric

• G. Creamer, Instrumentation & Control (I&C) Engineering Manager, TU Electric

• G. Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item Coordinator, TU Electric

• E. Deviney, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance (QA),

TU Electri * C. Finneran, Jr., Acting Manager, Civil Engineering, TU-Electric

• A. Fonseca, Deputy Director, CECO

• W. Guldemond, Manager of Site Licensing, TU Electric Hammett, Engineering Assurance, Brown and Root (B&R)

• L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric

• C. . Hicks, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric

• B. Hogg, Engineering. Manager, TU Electric

• D. Karpyak, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric

• J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Operations, TU Electric

• J. LaMarca, Electrical Engineering Manager, TU Electric

• Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric

• W. Muffett, Manager of Engineering, TU Electric D. Noss, Licensing, Compliance, Daniel

• E. Nyer, Consultant, TU Electric

• E. F. Ottney, Program Manager, CASE

• S. S. Palmer, Project Manager, TU Electric

• W. J. Parker, Project Engineering Manager, SWEC/ CECO

• A. Pereira, Assistant to Deputy Director, QA, Ebasco

• D. M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric

• A. B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric

• C, E. Scott, Manager, Startup, TU Electric

• J. C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric

• C. L. Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric

• R. G. Withrow, EA Systems Manager, TU Electric

• D. R. Woodlan, Docket Licensing Manager, TU Electric The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection perio * Denotes personnel present at the February 7, 1989, exit meetin _ ____ -_____________-_-_-_ __ L

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2. Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Open Item (445/8607-0-29): This item addressed potential deviations regarding member location and undersized welds for structural steel member MK C9-22 (drawing MAB-0799-005, SH1). These conditions were identified by CPRT during an inspection of Verification Package'I-S-STEL-140, documented on CPRT Deviation Reports (DRs) I-S-STEL-140-DR1 and I-S-STEL-140-DR2, and incorporated into nonconformance report (NCR) M85-101955SX. This NCR was subsequently dispositioned "use-as-is" based on calculation SAB-134C Set 2, Revision 7, and design change authorization (DCA) 25206, Revision 0. The above calculation was-supplemented by SWEC calculation 16345-EM(B)-004, Revision 1. The NRC inspector reviewed the above documentation and supporting calculations, and concurred with the disposition of NCR M85-101955SX. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (446/8622-0-03): This item addresred damage and exposed rebar on the south face of the Safeguard building 2-9-S wall adjacent to the Unit 2 Reactor building. This damage was identified during activities to breakup and remove debris from the seismic ,

air gap between the above buildings. Parent concrete with dimensions of approximately 6 feet in length, 1.5 feet in width, and 4 inches deep broke free from the wal This condition was documented on NCR C86-202323, Revision 1, later superseded by NCR CC-87-588 NCR CC-87-5887 was dispositioned " repair" specifying that loose or foreign debris be removed, and that any exposed rebar and surrounding concrete be coated with both Carboline 191 primer and Imperial 1201 epoxy topcoat to deter corrosion and concrete spallin Calculation 16345-CS(S)-108-39B demonstrates that the structural adequacy of the wall is maintained even if the exposed ,

rebars are discounte The NRC inspector reviewed the above documentation and calculation for technical adequacy. The NRC inspector also reviewed inspection report (IR) 2-0133825 which documents that repairs have been complete This item is close (Closed) Open Item (445/8858-0-03): This item addressed ]

post-nut series Hilti bolts used for door embedments necessary for the installation of water tight door S1- '

The NRC inspector could not verify the existence and l location of all the bolts. DCA-13695, Revision 2, specified the use of 3/8-inch Hilti kwik-bolt NCRs M-84-00265 and M-82-01965 established that post-nut series bolts were used in lieu of the specified Hilti (

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5 kwik bolt In addition, NCR M-82-01965 identified that the installation of the bolts was not verified prior to installation of the door frame rendering some of the bolts inaccessible. The latter NCR was dispositioned use-as-is based on the fact that all loads on the door frame will be compression loads; therefore, no possibility of failure exist The NRC inspector reviewed the above documentation and discussed the unverifiable post-nut Hilti bolts with the applicant. The applicant referred to Overly Door ;

Calculation File 7068Q and stated that the post-nut series Hilti bolts that can be verified to exist (8 of 16) provide adequate support and will not fail under design loads. The NRC inspector concurred with this positio This item is close d. (Closed) Open Item (445/8858-0-04) This item addressed two of six existing Hilti bolts on pipe support CC-1-215-022-A53R in Unit 1 containment that were found by the applicant to be welded to the front surface of the baseplate. The welds had been covered by washers and nuts giving the bolts a normal external appearance. The original design of the pipe support required six 5/8-inch Hilti bolt DCA 49986 was issued to replace these bolts with 1-inch Super Hilti bolts to allow the attachment of an additional small bore pipe support. During implementation of the DCA, the two welded Hilti bolts were discovere The applicant documented this incident on NCR 88-5620 and informed the NRC. Since calculations showed the support to be adequate with only four of the six bolts, the applicant determined this issue to be not reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) or 10 CFR 2 corrective action report (CAR)-88-022 was issued on April 25, 1988, to address the root cause and generic implication SWEC reviewed construction /QC records for the support to identify the individuals who installed or inspected the suppor The crew foreman was the only such person still employed at CPSES. He was interviewed, but provided no information related to the root cause or the extent of the conditio SWEC also reviewed documents and procedures and concluded in CAR-88-022, Revision 0, that,

"This documentation review suggests that the only individuals cognizant of the deficiency, at the time of its occurrence, were the members installing the bolts and the foreman who should have been aware of their activities."

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CAR-88-022 also states that Ebasco,.Impell, and SWEC-personnel were contacted to determine if'any similar deficiencies were identified during modification o various supports. Ebasco reported the modification'of approximately 3600 supports, with 1000 using Hilti bolt Impell reported'approximately 670 support modifications with an unknown number using Hilti bolts' . SWEC modifications affect approximately 6000 supports with 1000 using=Hilti bolts. No similar deficiencies were identified by Ebasco, Impell', or SWEC program Corrective actions stated in CAR-88-022 are:

(1) disposition of NCR 88-5620 to replace the nonconforming bolts per DCA-49986, (2) development of a sampling program to inspect other supports installed under the. supervision of the subject foreman, and (3) identification of tha population of supports with Hilti bolts installed by crews under the supervision of the subject foreman for the time period beginning one year before the subject support was installed (April 1980) to'one year afte The actual time period used was April 1979 through June 20, 1980, as the foreman was promoted to general foreman cn1 June 21, 198 The population included approximately 1150 support Sixty seismic category I or II supports using Hilti bolts were randomly selected from the population. The nuts and washers were removed or b'acked off of all Hilti bolts for each of the 60 selected supports to verify that no welds exist between the Hilti bolts and the front surface of the baseplate. The nuts were then retightened in accordance with Specification 2323-SS-30. The inspections were documented on construction traveler No welds were found by the above inspection CAR-88-022' states that preventive action was completed in August 1987 when Specification 2323-SS-30 was revise Attachment 11 to Appendix A of this specification now requires that 25% of the bolt holes in the concrete be inspected for each baseplate / membe previous requirements did not provide for inspection of all baseplates/ member The NRC inspector reviewed CAR-88-022 and supporting documents. The NRC inspector also interviewed SWEC personnel responsible for activities associated with CAR-88-02 The review and discussions with personnel covered development of the population, sample selection, inspection documentation and procedures, computer lists of support identification and generated random numbcrs, and correspondence between contractor The NRC inspector concluded that CAR-88-022 adequately addressed

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the subject welded Hilti bolts and demonstrated'via sampling techniques that the occurrence is isolated. -The NRC inspector noted that the conclusions reached by the CAR-88-022 sampling program only apply directly to Hilti bolts welded to the front surface of baseplates as the baseplates were not removed from the concrete surfac This item is close e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (445/8842-U-02): This item addressed four concerns regarding Hilti bolts spacing identified during plant tours by the NRC inspector. The concerns are:

(1) A 1 1/4-inch super Hilti bolt used foi support FW-1-097-034-C62R in the Unit 1 Reactor building was installed 5 3/4 inches from a 12-inch wall penetration. The current minimum spacing requirement per specification 2323-SS-30, Revision 4, " Structural Embedments," is 7 1/2 inche (2) A 3/4-inch Hilti bolt used for conduit support C23012547-03 in the Auxiliary building was installed 3 3/4-inches from a free concrete edg The current minimum spacing requirement between a 3/4-inch Hilti bolt and a free concrete edge per specification 2323-SS-30 is 10 1/2 inche (3) A 1-inch Hilti bolt used for support H-SI-1-RB-032-002-2 in the Unit 1 Reactor building was installed 2 1/2 inches from the center of an unused 1 1/2-inch Richmond inser The current minimum spacing requirement between an unused Richmond insert and a used Hilti bolt per specification 2323-SS-30 is 3 inches in this cas (4) A 1-inch Hilti bolt used for support RC-1-115-023C66R in the Unit 1 Reactor building was installed 2 1/4 inches from the center of an unesed 1 1/2-inch Richmond insert. Similar to case (3) above, the current minimum requirement is 3 inche The above concerns were evaluated by the applicant (SWEC Job Book 8-7) based on specification 2323-SS-30, Design Basis Document (DBD)-CS-015, and loadings provided by calculations for each support. The applicant concluded that the spacing violations are acceptable per design requirements. The applicant also stated that for cases (3) and (4) above, the Hilti bolts were torqued and inspected in accordance with the requirements of specification 2323-SS-30 without excessive displacement, thus the anchor clips on t3 e .iilti bolts were not sliding along the unused Richmond ,ert _ ____ __-

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The NRC inspector reviewed the aPnve evaluation, verified L _that the Hilti bolts for cases (3: and-(4)-were properly  ;

l ' torqued per QC documentation, and concurred with the l applicant's conclusions. This item'is closed.' Follow-up on Violations / Deviations (92702)_- (closed) Violation (445/8858-V-02): This violation

. addressed the failure, within the PCHVP, to inspect a safety-related watertight door _for location and orientation as well as for site-installed weld size, ,

I length, and location. The applicant stated in response to the violation (letter TXX-88735, dated Octcber 21, 1988) that the door in question'had.been incorrectly inspected as a structural embed for which only an inspection of base metal damage / defects is required. At the time of the response,'7'of a total of 12 watertight doors subject to the PCHVP had'been inspected. The u applicant-identified inspection scope discrepancies with j

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two additional watertight doors wherein welding _was inspected to the exclusion of base metal damage / defect Based on a review of-PCHVP packages encompassing pipe whip restraints, platforms, monorails, and electrical equipment,_the applicant considered.the violation to b limited to the inspection of embedded watertight door In response to the three known discrepancies, DR.C-88-04499 was issued to ensure that all applicable attributes for these doors would be properly inspecte To prevent recurrence, training specific to this violation was conducted for all QC personnel involved in the inspections of watertight door The'NRC inspector reviewed DR C-80-04499, an office memorandum dated October 18, 1988, documenting the QC training, and other information provided in the file and concluded that the applicant had taken satisfactory measures to correct the original problem and prevent its recurrence. This violation is close (Closed) Violation (EA 86-09, Appendix A, Item I.B.4):

This violation addressed the failure to properly analyze stresses on Seismic Category I piping resulting from interactions with non-Category I piping and structure Specifically, the technical review team (TRT) identified a Category I to non-Cateogry I interaction for which no analysis existed demonstrating compliance with the CPSES FSAR requirements. This issue was addressed by CPRT in ISAP V.c and was included within the Design Adequacy Program as DSAP IX. CPRT actions included identification and review of all seismic /nonseismic interfaces in Unit 1, Unit 2, and common area piping. No major findings were identified. ISAP V.c was reviewed by the

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NRC and was found to satisfactorily resolve this issu The ISAP V.c review is summarized in SSER 20, Appendix A, pp. 55-56. This item is close . Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identified by the Applicant (92700)

l (Closed) SDAR-CP-87-125, " Service Water Piping Support Hilti Bolt Failure." Previous NRC review of this issue is documented in NRC IR 50-445/88-82; 50-446/88-78. Two concerns identified in this previous review are addressed belo (1) The subject Hilti bolt yielded and failed at less than design torque during a QC inspection. The QC inspector observed that the head of the bolt was not flush with the nut as required by Specification 2323-SS-30. The applicant surmised that the craft ,

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had previously overtorqued the bolt in an effort to align it with the nut. The bolt then failed as the QC inspector was attempting to verify that it had been correctly torqued. The NRC inspector's concern was that other bolts may have yielded in the manner of the subject bolt, and thereafter not identified by Q The NRC inspector met with the applicant and concurred with the reasoning that since QC has been required to check the torque on all bolts installed, then any bolt which yielded in the manner of the subject bolt would have failed to meet minimum torque and, therefore, have been rejecte (2) ' Specification 2323-SS-30 had been revised to remove wording requiring the bolt installer to attain "at least" the minimum torque, but the new wording which i specifies tightening the bolt to the required torque does not explicitly prohibit exceeding i ,

i In discussions with the applicant, it became clear that this requirement is essentially a schedule concern (to prevent breaking more bolts) rather than a quality concer If the bolt when checked meets the minimum torque, it should provide reliable servic The NRC inspector concurred with the applicant's reasoning on this issu With the resolution of these two concerns, this SDAR is !

close (Closed) SDAR-CP-86-66, "Non-Contact Lap Splices in the Auxiliary Building." Previous NRC review of this issue is documented in NRC IR 50-445/88-82; 50-446/88-78. Two

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concerns identified in this previous review are discussed belo (1)- Within Calculation 16345-C3(S)-238, Revision 0, the horizontal length used to analyze the existing reinforcing steel was 6' feet 3.3/4 inches for a wall j

'2 feet thic The accepted convention for . ,

j evaluating the adequacy 'of. reinforcing steel is to . 1 use'a horizontal length twice the wall thicknes In response to the NRC inspector's concern, calculation 16345-CS(S)-238, Revision 1, was issue This calculation evaluates a horizontal distance of 4 feet, or twice the wall thickness, and'

demonstrates the' adequacy of existing; reinforcement-(contingent on the qualification of noncontact lap splice No. 3 as discussed in (2) below). The NRC inspector concurred with the revised calculatio ( 2 ). Two of the existing noncontact lap splices exceeded the 6-inch lap splice spacing limit as allowed by ACI Code 318-71. Of particular concern was lap splice No. 3 from calculation 16345-CS(S)-238, since it is needed to demonstrate reinforcement adequacy-for the revised calculation discussed in (1) abov The applicant provided for review a Cornell University Department of Structural Engineering report entitled " Wide Spacing of Non-Contact Lap-Splices and the Effect of Transverse Reinforcing Steel," November 1987. This report evaluates test results of noncontact lap splices with clear spacings of 8 bar diameters and concludes that this configuration provides the same nominal strength of an unspliced bar (providing adequate transverse reinforcement and an adequate development length).

Eight bar diameters in this case equates to approximately 9 inches.. Calculation 16345-CS(S)-238, Revision 1, incorporating this information, qualified noncontact lap splices No. 3 and No. 4. The NRC inspector reviewed the Cornell report and the revised calculation and concurred with the applicant's conclusion Based on the resolution of the two previously identified concerns, this SDAR is close l

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11 Post-Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) (46053, 46055, 46071, 48053, 48055) Concrete Attachments (CPE-SWEC-FVM-CS-075)

(1) C-AB-790-0171-WO2, wall surface, Auxiliary buildin The conclusion of this PCHVP package was that all attachments to a portion of the south wall in room 171 are qualified to withstand calculated extreme anchor loads. The package filed under calculation 16345-CS(S)-505 includes field walkdown sketches as prescribed by Field Verification Method (FVM)-075, determination of interactions which violate spacing requirements, and calculations evaluating discrepant spacing configuration The NRC inspector checked in detail approximately 50 percent of the information presented on the field walkdown sketches. The following three errors were identified:

(a) On sketch 3, two unused Richmond inserts located close to Hilti bolts supporting angle

"D" were not shown. It was later determined that these embedments were obscured by paint at the time of the walkdown. They were revealed by chipping paint at a later date as part of the applicant's effort to locate inconspicuous Richmond (b) On sketch 3, one of the two 1/4-inch Hilti bolts supporting attachment "Q" was documented as having an "E" stamp. The NRC inspector determined that this bolt was actually stamped with a "B". This error was nonconservative inasmuch as the "B" bolt is shorter in lengt However, this bolt was not involved in any spacing discrepancies and the error was of no consequence in the calculatio (c) On sketch 4, attachment "D", the pipe being l supported was designated as 3 inches in diameter. The NRC inspector determined that the pipe is 3 1/2 inches in diameter. This error, likewise, was of no consequence in the calculatio The NRC inspector visually surveyed the entire surface of the wall and determined that all major attachments were reflected on the sketche Considering the number of identified errors against

' the total number of measurements and observations,

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the NRC inspector determined the field sketches to be an acceptably accurate depiction of the as-built condition. Methodology and tolerances of this effort met the requirements of FVM-07 The location of each Hilti bolt and penetration was listed on a computer printout in local coordinates which were then tied to the overall grid via global coordinates. The NRC inspector' spot-checked the listed coordinates against the measurements presented on the field sketches. One error out of'a total sample of 60 was identified. A 6-inch diameter penetration "C" (from sketch No. 1) was located at coordinates describing the intersection of two tangents to the penetration instead of the cente This error was the result of failing to add the penetration radius (3 inches) to the "X" and "Y" coordinate measurements defining the free edg This appeared to be an input rather than computer-process error. Because of this error, all seven other penetrations in this package were checked and found to be properly located within the coordinate gri The computer program compared the position of each bolt and penetration to the spacing requirements of Specification 2323-SS-30 and produced a list of spacing problems assuming a' tolerance of 1 1/2 inche The NRC inspector spot-checked this list by performing independent calculations and found no errors. The NRC inspector determined that the process of identifying spacing deviations for Hilti bolts to penetrations was sufficiently accurate to reliably conclude that all such deviations were identifie For unused Richmond inserts, the methods used were less convincing. The applicant, in this case, l superimposed a grid pattern of as-designed Richmond insert locations (corrected in a best-fit manner to as-built locations from the sketches) on the walkdown sketch to locate areas where Hilti bolts  !

may be in close proximity to a hidden Richmond insert (painted over or underneath a baseplate).

Considering the variation from the predicted locations, it appeared that many unused Richmonds located under baseplates could be located directly adjacent to a loaded Hilti bolt. The NRC inspector perceived the applicant's review of this issue to be less conservative than other portions of the analysi Further review of unused Richmond inserts will be included in NRC reviews of additional calculations to determine if this initial perception

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is_ accurate. This issue will be tracked as an open item (445/8905-0-01).

Free edge spacing requirements were checked by the applicant engineer independently from the computer program. The engineer reviewed the sketches and-identified by hand the violations of Specification 2323-SS-30 free edge spacing criteria. A caution to this approach is that the sketches are not to scal Nevertheless, the NRC inspector did not identify any errors in a detailed review of this effor Several engineering calculations were included in the package for Hilti bolt to Hilti bolt, free edge, and Richmond insert spacing problems. The NRC inspector reviewed portions of these calculations using as source material Specification 2323-SS-30, DBD-CS-015, and SWEC calculation 16345/6-CS(S)-45 No errors were identified in this revie (2) C-EC-854-150A-W-11, wall surface, Electrical Control building. The NRC inspector performed a field inspection of the completed as-built drawings generated from a field walkdown per FVM-075 for package C-EC-854-150A-W-11, a concrete wall surface filed under calculation 16345-CS(S)-536. The drawings in the package contained details and locations of all concrete attachments to the wal The NRC inspector identified two concerns regarding details on the as-built drawings:

(a) The baseplate for conduit support C23G09153-7 was listed on drawing C-EC-854-150A-W-11-11 as 1/4-inch thick. The actual thickness is 1/2 inc (b) The bracket for an instrument tube support was listed on drawing C-EC-854-150A-W-11-04 as '

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1/2" x 1" x 1 3/4". The actual size is 3/4" x 7/8" x 2 5/8".

The NRC inspector was informed by the applicant that the baseplate size for concern (a) above was measured incorrectly by the QC inspector, but was not required for evaluation of the adequacy of the concrete attachments. The baseplate dimensions are used primarily for identification purposes and, for some 1/2-inch and 3/4-inch Hilti bolts, to evaluate embedment length. The embedment lengths of the two 1/2-inch Hilti bolts used in the baseplate were evaluated in calculation 16345-CS(S)-536 and found

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to be adequate and unaffected by the error in plate I thickness measurement. The NRC inspector concurred j with this conclusio l The NRC inspector was informed by the applicant that the bracket for concern (b) above was replaced subsequent to the PCHVP inspection. This was 1 verified by the NRC inspector, j The NRC inspector reviewed calculation 16345-CS(S)-536, Revision 0, which identifies and evaluates concrete attachment spacing violations for i the wall. The NRC inspector reviewed the {

methodology, load combinations, assumptions, and l I

conclusions identified in the calculatio Numerical values were spot checked for arithmetic accuracy. The NRC inspector identified that:

(1) the spacing between embedded anchors B2'and C1 on drawing C-EC-854-150A-W-11-07 (page 14 of the calculation) was not field verified and (2) no justification was stated for assumed loads used to calculate the interaction ratio for anchor Al on page 29 of the calculation. The applicant subsequently has field verified the spacing in the former concern and revised the calculation in the later concern to reflect actual loading condition The two errors identified above represent an error rate of less than one percen The NRC inspector verified that the calculation has been revised and concurs with the applicant's conclusion that all spacing violations had been identified and the concrete attachments are adequat Containment Liner (CPE-SWEC-FVM-CS-089)

The PCHVP inspections of the containment liner encompassed engineering walkdowns (no QC involvement) of overlay plates and attachments connected to the line The inspection attributes consisted of location, orientation, and size of each attachmen (1) CS-89-Z/A-S/1-LINER 1, Zoge A (8g0' - 6" to 832' -

6"), Segment 1 (Azimuth O to 45 ). This PCHVP package documented 28 attachments to the containment liner within Zone A, Segment 1. No unsatisfactory attributes or NCRs were documented as a result of this inspectio The NRC inspector checked all attributes associated with 14 (of 28) attachments. The location of each

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attachment inspected was within i 1/8 inch as required by FVM-89. Where visible, mark numbers were identical to those documented in the PCHVP packag The NRC inspector generally surveyed the ,

I liner area under consideration and did not locate any attachments which were not included in the i

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package. The NRC inspector concurred with the results of this PCHVP inspectio (2) CS-89-Z/D-S/1-LINER 1, Zone D (8g8' - 6" to 905' - 9"), Segment 1 (Azimuth O to 45 ). This PCHVP package documented two attachments to the containment liner within Zone D, Segment 1. No unsatisfactory attributes or NCRs were documented as a result of this inspectio The NRC inspector checked all attributes associated with both attachments. As in (1) above, the NRC inspector did not identify any discrepancies with this PCHVP inspectio Structural and Miscellaneous Steel (CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE/

ME/IC/CS-086 AND CPE-SWEC-FVM-ME/EE/IC/CS-090 (1) SG1-77N-01, Platform, Safeguards building, Unit 1:

The NRC inspector reviewed the PCHVP package and inspected the platform. The QC inspector had previously identified unsatisfactory conditions related to base metal damage and bolt hole locatio NCR 88-07790, Revision 0, was issued to address j these conditions. The NRC inspector requested QC to verify dimensions on Section 1-1 of drawing 2323-S1-0637. The QC inspector determined that an error had been made in one dimension and issued an NCR to address the condition. The NRC inspector identified no additional hardware or documentation problems with this packag (2) AB-0241-01, Platform, Auxiliary building, Unit 1:

The NRC inspector reviewed the PCHVP package and inspected the platform. The QC inspector had previously identified unsatisfactory conditions j related to: (1) item location and orientation, (2) alterations, (3) bolt hole location, (4) base metal damage / defects, (5) weld size, length, and location, and (6) various Hilti bolt parameter ,

These conditions were primarily due to inaccessibility and/or the issuance of DCA 62581, Revision 0. When the QC inspector found the items inaccessible, he was required to reject any associated attributes. The design changes specified on the DCA have not been implemented; however, the i

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DCA was used for the PCHVP inspection. The.NRC inspector discussed this situation with the applicant-and determined that while invalid NCRs were generated, the inspection methods, i.e.,

inspecting to an unimplemented DCA, were conservativ The NRC inspector identified two concerns during inspection of the platform:

(a) A 3" x 4" angle shown in section c-c, page 5 of DCA 62581, appeared to be installed incorrectl (b) A 6" x 3 1/2" angle shown in Section F-F, page 14 of DCA 62581 is specified to be 3 feet 9 inches in length. The actual length is 3 feet 10 inche The resolution of the above concerns identified for both platforms is an unresolved item (445/8905-U-02).

6. Plant Tours (46053, 48053, 42051C)

The NRC inspectors made frequent tours of Unit 1, Unit 2, and common areas of the facility to observe items such as housekeeping, equipment protection, and in-process work activities. The NRC inspector observed work in progress related to the closure of a temporary access opening used for cleaning and removal of debris from the seismic air gap. The access opening was approximately 8 feet x 8 feet in the Auxiliary building outer wall. The closure work was being performed under Traveler CCE-88-1239-8404A, package 02C-8904A-1855-3. The work included concrete chipping, cleaning, grouting, installation of concrete forms, and cad-welding. The NRC inspector will continue observation of related work during subsequent inspection period No violations or deviations were identified and no items of significance were observe ;

7. Open Items open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both. An open item disclosed during the I inspection is discussed in paragraph I

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' Unresolved Items Unresolved-items are matters about which more information is-required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, o: deviations. One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.c.

, : Exit Meeting (30703)

An exit meeting was conducted. February 7, 1989, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report. No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting perio The applicant .

did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provide to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection, i During this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio i l

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