IR 05000445/1989007
| ML20246P180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1989 |
| From: | Latta R, Livermore H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246P178 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-89-07, 50-445-89-7, 50-446-89-07, 50-446-89-7, NUDOCS 8903280149 | |
| Download: ML20246P180 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION v
NRC Inspection Report:
50-445/89-07 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/89-07 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 Construction Permit Expiration Dates:
Unit 1: August 1, 1991 Unit 2: August 1, 1992 Applicant:
TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),
Units 1 & 2 Inspection At:
Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted:
February 8 through March 7, 1989 Inspector:
Y 5/,.2 //e c/
R.
M.
Latta, Resident Inspector Date (paragraphs 2, 4, 7, 8, and 9)
Consultant:
J.
L. Taylor - Parameter (paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,
and 9)
Reviewed by:
f1 y L Mu ut 9,
3h 07 H.
H. Li~vermore, Lead Senior Inspector
'Date
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Inspection' Summary:
Inspection Conducted: February 8 through March 7, 1989 (Report 50-445/89-07; 50-446/89-07)
Areas Inspec'ted: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of action-on 50.55(e) deficiencies identified by the applicant,. Corrective Action Program-(CAP), general plant areas 1(tours), electrical.
equipment and cables, and instrumentation.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, a program strength was identified in the area of craft training for instrumentation installation. personnel relating'to flex: hose assembly and inspection, paragraph 3.a.
'Also, one unresolved item.was identified regarding thru-wall and thru-floor sleeve labeling discrepancies, paragraph 3.c and'one open' item was identified concerning the use'of color coding tape on the heated junction thermocouple system, paragraph 5.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R.
W.'Ackley, Jr., Director, CECO
- M.
Alexander, Manager of Materials Management, TU Electric
- R.
P. Baker, Licensing Support Manager, TU Electric
- D.
P. Barry, Sr., Manager, Engineering, Stone and Webster.
Engineering Corporation, (SWEC)
- H.
D. Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric
- R.
C. Byrd, Manager, Quality Control (QC), TU Electric
- W.
J.
Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric
- J.
T. Conly, APE-Licensing,.SWEC
- W.
G.
Counsil, Vice Chairman, Nuclear, TU Electric
- J.
C. Crnich, Project General Manager, Ebasco
- G.
G. Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item Coordinator, TU Electric
- D.
E. Deviney,. Deputy Director, Quality Absurance (QA),
TU Electric
- J.
C. Finneran, Jr., Acting Manager, Civil Engineering, TU Electric
- C.
A. Fonseca, Deputy Director, CECO
- J.
L. French, Senior Review Team
- T.
L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric
- J.
C. Hicks, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric
- C.
B. Hogg, Engineering Manager, TU Electric
- S.
D. Karpyak, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric
- J.
E. Krechting, Director of Technical Interface, TU Electric
- 0. W. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric
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M.
L. Lucas, Electrical Production Supervisor, TU Electric
- J. W. Muffett, Manager of Engineering, TU Electric
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- E.
F. Ottney, Program Manager, CASE
- A.
Pereira, Staff, QA, Ebasco
- D.
M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric
- C.
E.
Scott, Manager, Startup, TU Electric
- J.
C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric
- C.
L. Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric
- R.
D. Walker, Manager of Nuclear Licensing, TU Electric
- R.
G. Withrow, EA Systems Manager, TU Electric
- J.
E. Wren, Assistant Director QA for Administration, TU Electric The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection period.
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- Denotes personnel present at the March 7, 1989, exit meetin. _.
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2.
Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identified by the
Applicant (92700)
a.
(Closed, Unit 1 only) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-85-39), " Equipment Conduit Interface Discrepancy":
On January 11, 1988, the NRC was notified of a reportable event by TU Electric letter TXX-88035 involving conduit which was not installed in accordance with design documents.
Specifically, the identified interface concerns encompassed the following three issues:
(1)
Cable slack adequacy.
(2)
Conduit orientation within the vendor approved entry area.
(3)
Conduit-to-equipment interfaces outside the vendor approved area.
As delineated in the applicant's letter TXX-88035, items (1) and (2) were evaluated and based on field walk-downs and engineering dispositions were determined to be nonreportable.
The NRC inspector reviewed the supporting data for these items including the engineering evaluations and determined that the applicant's assessment was acceptable.
Relative to item (3), the applicant's engineering evaluation and validation program censisted of: a detailed walkdown of installed Class 1E equipment to establish the as-built configurations of conduit entry points, a review of vendor documents to identify approved Class lE conduit entry areas, and the analysis of identified discrepancies to assure seismic qualifications.
This process which evaluated over 500 pieces of equipment for conduit interface installation outside of the vendor provided entry area resulted in the identification of 9 discrepancies.
Of these 9 discrepancies which were transferred to nonconformance reports (NCRs),
were later determined to
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be acceptable without rework.
Completion of Unit 1 rework activities was documented in the applicant's letter TXX-88773 with Unit 2 corrective actions scheduled for completion prior to Unit 2 fuel load.
The NRC inspector evaluated the applicant's corrective actions involving problem definition, root cause analysis, and technical resolution.
Documents reviewed included the completed Impell report, concerning
" Equipment Conduit Interface SDAR Cp-85-39 Evaluation Summary," Specification 2323-ES-100, Appendix K,Section III; and the associated NCRs identified in the subject l
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SDAR close-out documentation.
Based on these reviews, the NRC inspector determined that appropriate corrective j
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actions had been implemented to. preclude future recurrence for Unit 1 activities.
However, pending the completion of required Unit 2 repair / rework for affected electrical cabinets, this item is closed for Unit 1 only.
b.
(Open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-60),
" Installation Configuration of ASCO Solenoid Valves":
On August 20, 1987, the applicant provided an initial notification to the NRC of a potentially reportable event
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involving the qualification of Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) solenoid valves which had been inadvertently installed in harsh environmental areas without exhaust port elbows.
This deficiency was initially identified by the applicant during the performance of engineering field validations.
These walkdowns indicated that numerous ASCO solenoid valves located both inside and outside of the reactor building were installed without 90 degree downward facing exhaust port elbows.
As stated in Texas Utilities Conference Memorandum Log TCO-905, preliminary analysis indicated that the elbows were required to preclude the accumulation of moisture and/or debris in the exhaust port to maintain the environmental qualification of the valves.
Subsequent to this event, the applicant conducted further environmental evaluations of the ASCO solenoid valves without the exhaust port elbows installed.
The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the test data contained in ASCO report AQS-21678/TR, Revision A, as well as the results of evaluations contained in Impell letter IMT 2674 dated August 18, 1987.
However, definitive test data establishing the environmental qualification of these valves without exhaust elbows installed was not available at the conclusion of this reporting period.
Therefore,'until test data is provided that defines the environmental qualification of these valves installed inside containment without exhaust port elbows, this item will remain open.
c.
(Open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-86-10),
" Electrical Penetration Assemblies":
During this reporting period, the N2e inspector reviewed the applicant's close-out documentation associated with electrical penetration replacement (EPA) activities for both Unit 1 and 2.
However, due to the complexity of the records associated with this process and the. necessity for additional information requested from the applicant, this item remains open.
The NRC inspector will continue i
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to evaluate the applicant's actions relative to EPA replacement and will document the results in future
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inspection reports.
d.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-80), " Fuse
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Sizing":
The applicant reported a potentially safety-significant deficiency in that the fuses installed in two emergency bus load shunt trip circuits were rated lower than design requirements.
The NRC inspector i
reviewed corrective action request (CAR)87-037, along
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with two applicable NCRs.-
Additionally, the inspector examined telephone conversation records between Stone and Webster Engineering. Corporation and Buss Fuses Company, as well as the relevant fuse time / current graphs.
As stated in CAR 87-037, the root cause of the deficiency was attributed to inconsistent design drawings.
The root
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cause analysis also indicated that the applicant's
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startup department was partially responsible for j
incorrect fuse installation; however, the NRC inspector j
considered this conclusion inappropriate, in that in j
order to replace the subject fuse, Startup would have-
referred to the above mentioned inconsistent drawings.
Based on a review of the fuse manufacturer's time / current graphs, the NRC inspector concurs that this deficiency l
was nonreportable.
This item is closed.
l 3.
Corrective Action Program (CAP)
a.
Instrument Components (52051)
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l The NRC inspector attended a training class for l
instrumentation installation craftsmen on flex hose
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assembly installation and inspection.
The information l
imparted contained the critical attributes of flex hose
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installation from Specification CPSES-I-1018.
The instructor was knowledgeable and adept at presenting the proper methodology for inspection of installation I
configurations.
Additionally, the NRC inspector noted
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that appropriate emphasis was provided for measuring and inspection techniques and that training aids were effectively utilized.
At the conclusion of the training session, the instructor demonstrated his extensive knowledge of the subject during a question and answer period.
The NRC inspector considered this training a strength in this area of instrumentation installation.
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b.
Electrical Cables (51063)
The NRC inspector observed cable pulling in progress for design change authorization (DCA) 80416-01. Discussions
i with craft involved in this activity revealed that they
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were knowledgeable of cable protection specification requirements.
The NRC inspector also ascertained that'
the' latest approved pull cards were available11n the package, that the pulling attachments and tensions used'
were acceptable, that raceway completion and condition-were adequate, and that cable identification was properly
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Additionally, the inspector noted that the spec' fied bending radius was maintained, that QC inspectors were present during installation activities, and.that activities in progress were being properly documented.-
c.
Bisco Thru-Floor Conduit Seals (51063, 42051C)
During a walkdown of Field Verification Method (FVM)-023,
"Thru-wall and Thru-floor Sleeves," the NRC inspector noted two thru-floor conduits not shown on the BISCO seal map, drawing AB-810-201-5, sheet 5, Revision.3 dated March.12, 1984.- Subsequent investigation determined that the conduits had been installed by DCA 446620, Revision 12, but that conduit C12G34559 had been mislabeled as C12G34529 in four places.
The applicant initiated:NCR 89-2081 to address the problem.- Pending further inspection activities to determine if deficiencies exist.in interdisciplinary reviews of DCAs and how BISCO. drawings are updated, this item is identified as.an unresolved item (445/8907-U-01).
One strength and one unresolved item were' identified.
4.
Plant Tours (51063, 42051C)
The NRC inspector conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period which included evaluation of work in progress as well as completed work'to determine if activities involving safety-related electrical systems and components j
including electrical cable were'being controlled and
accomplished in accordance with regulatory requirements, industry standards, and applicant procedures.
The NRC inspector also observed fire protection and prevention activities in areas containing combustible materials.
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particular, the inspector selectively verified that wood scaffolding and shoring were treated with flame retardant, that there were no unnecessary accumulations of combustible materials, and that adequate ventilation was used to prevent the accumulation of fumes.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Electrical Equipment and Cables (51053, 51063)
During an inspection of the heated junction thermocouple (HJTC) system, the NRC inspector observed that green tape had
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'been wrapped around the HJTC stainless steel sheaths at various points within the reactor building.
At the conclusion of this reporting period, the acceptability of this material for use inside the containment, the compatibility of this tape with the HJTC stainless steel environs, and the extent to which this tape may extend into the reactor vessel upper head, remained indeterminate.
Until these concerns can be resolved, this issue will be identified as an open item (445/8907-o-02).
6.
Instrumentation (52053)
The NRC inspector observed portions of the safety-related work in progress and reviewed the associated documentation for modification of pressure transmitter 1PT-2326 instrument tubing and supports.
The operational function of this transmitter is to sense main steam line pressure.
During the conduct of this activity, the inspector determined that the work activities were adequately controlled and that the instrument craft personnel involved demonstrated a good understanding of the scope of work and of the applicable procedures.
7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 3.c.
8.
Open Items open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both.
One open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.
9.
Exit Meeting (30703)
An exit meeting was conducted March 7, 1989, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report.
No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting period.
The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
During this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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