IR 05000445/1989008
| ML20236D335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1989 |
| From: | Phillips H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236D320 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-89-08, 50-445-89-8, 50-446-88-08, 50-446-88-8, IEB-80-24, IEIN-80-37, NUDOCS 8903230059 | |
| Download: ML20236D335 (9) | |
Text
--
--
.
,
_
f'
..
r hjL
'
'
,
.
.
'
<
f'1.
U.:S.' NUCLEAR: REGULATORY COMMISSION-
.
..
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION NRC.Inspectio'n Report:
50-445/89-08 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/88-08 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 construction Permit
' Expiration Dates:
Unit 1: August 1,,1991 Unit.2: August 1,E1992 Applicant:
TU Electric 1 Skyway. Tower-400 North' Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),
Units 1 & 2-
.
Inspection At:
Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted:
February 8'through March 7, 1989 Inspector:
__
')
'
3 - / f-T?
~.S.
Phillips, Senior Resident Inspector Date H
Construction
,
Reviewed.by:
)
_
h 6h
--
H.
HT ermore, Lead' Senior. Inspector:
Datb
'
8903230059 890315
-
"
y r
)
..
-
'
'
2'
j t
' $
l Inspection Summary:
Inspection Conducted:
February 8 through March 7, 1989'(Report-i 50-445/89-08; 50-446/89-08)
Areas Inspected: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of:
)
(1)-applicant action on'NRC Bulletins, (2) applicant action on
'
50.55(e) deficiency (Cp-89-01), (3) follow-up on auxiliary
.
feedwater pwnp motor' violations, ( 4 ) comparison of-as-built plant.
to FSAR description,'and.(5) general plant inspections.
Results: ~Within the areas' inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
One unresolved item-(documentation of analysis of u
two nonconformance reports'in conjunction with the reversed AFW-
- motor fan condition) and.three'open items (Westinghouse changing-l
!
' AFW. motor fan silicone-bronze bolts to carbon steel bolts, no NCR:
to. describe stripped threads in the AFW motor bearing, and no
documentation to show'that heat-input was controlled when: welding on the AFW motor rotor bar assembly) were identified while following'up on the auxiliary feedwater pump motor violation (paragraph 4).
One open item (missing instruments andl bent; tubing)
.
- were identified during a comparison of the as-built' plant'to the FSAR (paragraph 5).
!
!
4 i
j l
'
,
.
u _ ____ _ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. -. - ~ _ _
_
_ _ _ -
- _, _ - - _.
_.._
,
'
j
.
'
,
i DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted
- R.
W.
Ackley, Jr., Director, CECO
- M. Alexander, Manager.of Materials Management, TU Electric
- R. P. Baker, Licensing Support Manager, TU Electric
.
- D.
P. Barry, Sr., Manager, Engineering, SWEC l
- H.
D. Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric
.'
- W.
J. Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric
- J.
T. Conly, APE-Licensing, SWEC
- W.
G. Counsil, Vice Chairman,. Nuclear, TU Electric
- J.
C. Cruich, Project General Manager, Ebasco
- G.
G. Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item Coordinator, TU Electric
- D. E. Deviney, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance (QA),
TU Electric'
- J.
C. Finneran, Jr., Acting Manager, Civil Engineering, TU Electric
- C.
A. Fonseca, Deputy Director, CECO
- J.
L. French, Senic-Review Team
- T.
L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric
- J.
C. Hicks, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric
- C.
B. Hogg, Engineering Manager, TU Electric
- S.
D. Karpyak, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric
- J.
E. Krechting, Director of Technical Interface, TU Electric
- O.
W.
Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric
- J.
W. Muffett, Manager of Engineering, TU Electric
- E.
F. Ottney, Program Manager, CASE
- A.
Pereira, Staff, QA, Ebasco
- D.
M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric
- C.
E. Scott, Manager, Startup, TU Electric j
- J.
C.
Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric
- C.
L. Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric
- R.
D. Walker, Manager of Nuclear Licensing, TU Electric
- R.
G. Withrow, EA Systems Manager, TU Electric
- J.
E. Wren, Assistant Director QA for Administration, TU Electric The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees j
during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel present at the March 7, 1989,. exit meeting.
2.
Follow-up on NRC Bulletins (92701)
(Closed) IEB 80-24, " Prevention of Damage due to Water Leakage Inside containment":
This IEB was issued after IE Information Notice 80-37 described a leak into containment at another
_ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
__
.
.
,
,
'
nuclear plant which flooded the reactor vessel cavity and wetted the lower nine feet of the vessel during operation.
This was caused by service water leaks, inoperable sump pumps, operators who failed to note the significance of indicator-lights, no high water alarm, moisture level indicators that
'did not work, and other failures to detect the condition.
The IEB' required operating plants to describe where open cooling
water systems exist inside containment and methods for detection and isolation of water leakage, and experience with a closed system.
During a previous-inspection the NRC inspector reviewed this bulletin and TU Electric's file.
This issue was left open pending the receipt of additional information.
Information was provided which emphasized that Comanche Peak's plant design does not include open cooling water inside containment.
Several' applicant engineering groups concurred with this conclusion.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Applicant Action on 50.55(e) Construction Deficiency CP-89-01 (92700)
(Open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR-CP-89-01):
Namco limit switches with broken contact fingers.
On January 16, 1989, TU Electric reported this deficiency to the NRC and in TU Electric's letter (TXX-89083) dated February 15, 1989, made a report to the NRC.
On December 8, 1988, a nonconformance report documented Namco switch contact block assemblies that had broken and cracked contact extensions at four termination points (A, C,
F, and H).
These switches, Model EA18034302 with date Code 1882L28215 were mounted ~on Valves 1-HV-4165-2 and 1-HV-4165-3.
Site engineering letter (CECO-0164) dated February 14, 1989, stated that the root cause had not been determined, but is being analyzed by a laboratory.
The proposed corrective action was to replace the contact blocks in 99 Unit 1 and common switches.
This; item remains open
'
pending a final report and, if necessary, NRC inspection of selected switches that were either being replaced or were replaced.
No violations or deviations were identified.
)
4.
Follow-up on Violations / Deviations (92702)
]
(Open) Violation and Enforcement Conference (445/8727-V-01):
l Failure to correct Unit 1 motors after Test Deficiency Report j
(TDR) 4870 dated June 20, 1986, identified the problem a
second time.
j On May 19, 1987, the NRC inGpector questioned whether Unit 1 I
auxiliary feedwater pump motors had fans.'astalled backwards
'
as identified in Unit 2 test deficiency report, TDR 4870.
j Subsequently, they were found to be installed backwards.
An
l
'l
!
,
-
.
_
._
_ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
,
.
'
enforcement conference was held on December 8, 1987, in which TU Electric des <cribed their corrective action and presented information to show that escalated enforcement was not-warranted. -The.NRC considered this information/ corrective action and determined-that because of this'information a.
Level IV violation ~was appropriate.
In NRC Inspection Report'50-445/89-Ol; 50-446/89-01, the NRC inspector performed a follow-up inspection to close this item
,
out and found new information which was not provided to the-
'
NRC at the enforcement meeting.
The file contained two nonconformance reports (NCRs)'PE-87-00621 and PE-87-00622 which described the following deficient conditions:
" Fans on rotor are heating hot enough to burn the paint off metal'
reinforcement rings due to eddy current flowing in fans.
There'is evidence of arching between the fan and the brass ring on the rotor' winding."
This information was not
,
discussed at the enforcement meeting and'wasfnot included in i
the Westinghouse (W) analysis which was performed'to determine j
.
the safety significance of-fans installed backwards in motors during normal and accident conditions.
During this inspection, TU Electric provided more.information regarding the maintenance work that was done on the AFW motors to install the fans. correctly and address the arcing between fans and brass rings on the rotor winding.
TU Electric stated that the arcing between fans and rings was not discussed.at i
the enforcement because it was not considered to be directly related to the violation concerning fans that were installed-backwards.
TU Electric also stated that the two nonconforming conditions were not part of the W analysis of AFW' motor fans being installed backwards because the AFW pumps passed preoperational testing without exceeding the motor's maximum
,
operating temperature.
TU Electric provided Problem Report (PR)87-385 in response to initial questions and concerns raised by the NRC inspector in May of 1987.
Attachment 1 of the problem report contains'the results of an engineering review while Attachment 2 of the problem report is an office memorandum which documents a conversation with a-W engineer.
TU Electric had asked W what i
caused the arcing, was the problem' serious, and how it might
,
he eliminated.
No formal W-analysis was documented.orLsent to TU Electric.
The W engineer stated that the problem'was caused by the squirrel cage design and construction which under-high' current / load conditions acts as a separate rotor on the shaft and sets up a potential' difference between the mating surfaces on the fans,and the rotor which can cause arcing and burning.
Westinghouse also stated that-such arcing can be minimized by properly installing the fan surface to'the mating rotor face.
The NRC inspector concluded that these I
conditions should have been part of the original W analysis i
_ _ _ _ _. -. _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
'e
'
'
]
.
'
~
concerning fans installed backwards.
This item is open pending the receipt of information which documents an analysis of the nonconforming conditions (arcing and heating) in conjunction with the reversed fan condition (445/8808-0-01).
j l
The NRC inspector identified an additional technical concern while reviewing PR 87-385.
Attachment 2 t o the problem report also documents a discussion regarding how the AFW fans were secured with bolts and a change of bolt material from silicone bronze to Grade 5 carbon steel.
The maintenance records and i
PR 87-385 revealed that a W representative verbally directed the change to carbon steel.
Past W experience had found that silicone bronze bolts were cracking and failing because of fatigue.
On February 8, 1989, the NRC inspector asked for the W field design change or W technical bulletin that directed the change.
The NRC inspector questioned whether a 10 CFR Part 21 defect report was received.
At a meeting on i'
February 22, 1989, TU Electric informed the NRC inspector that the bolt material change was made without a W field design change.
It was also stated that they had contacted W, in i
writing, to determine if this item is reportable under 10 CFR Part 21 because of the defects described in PR-87-385.
The i
TU Electric inquiry also asked for a W technical bulletin.
This item is unresolved pending receipt of additional information from TU Electric (445/8908-U-02).
The NRC inspector identified another concern while reviewing the maintenance file which documented the reworking of AFW
!
fans.
Threads were stripped out of the back left bolt hole for the outboard lower half bearing of the AFW motor.
TU Electric personnel stated that an NCR had been written, but there was no NCR in the corrective action file to. describe the l
,
.
stripped threads.
This item is open pending review of the NCR
)
(445/8908-0-03).
j The NRC inspector identified a third open item concerning work to reverse the fans on the AFW motors.
Attachment 3 to NCR PE-87-00621 provides instructions for fan removal /
installation.
Part of the instruction directs the worker to grind off a weld around the retaining bolt head and reweld around the bolts when they were replaced.
The instruction cautioned that extreme care must be taken not to concentrate an excessive amount of heat on the rotor bar assembly.
No inspection report was in the file to show that QC witnessed the control of heat input to the rotor bar assembly.
This item is open pending receipt of additional information to show
the process was controlled (445/8908-0-04).
l
_- -
,
_.
._
..
i b-
.
-
,
,
!
l S.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description a.
Reactor Coolant System (37051, 49063, 50073, 51053)
The NRC inspector reviewed Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Figure 5.1-1 Sheet 1 (2323-M1-0250) which depicts the as-built reactor coolant
,
system piping.
Reactor coolant (RC) loops 1, 2, 3, and 4 j
in the reactor building were completely walked down to compare the as-built condition to drawing 2323-M1-0250 of Amendment 67 (dated February 5, 1988) of the FSAR.
This inspection included walking down the pressurizer, safety injection, residual heat removal, and injection accumulator lines back to the penetrations that leave the reactor building and enter the safeguards building 1.
It
also included the verification that pumps, valves, and
'
other compoenents were installed in the system.
Flow transmitters 424, 425, and 426 and their instrumentation lines were traced.
The location of transmitters 414, 415, 416, 434, 435, 436, 444, 445, and 446 was verified and instrumentation lines were partially traced.
The plant configuration was as described in the FSAR with minor exceptions and such deviations were controlled.
i Temperature measuring devices on the cold legs of RC loops 2 and 3 were missing.
Loop 3 conduit C14RB0935 and 14RB30943 contained no instrumentation wiring and the temperature measuring devices were missing.
One RTD (
(1TE-423F) was not tagged to identify the device.
)
Another device was tagged as nonconforming.
One flow
]
transmitter (FT-425) had conditional release tag NCRI-86-103414X attached.
The NRC inspector met with the TU Electric field engineer to discuss the missing temperature detectors.
Detectors 410B, 411B, 420B, 421B, 430B, 431B, 440B, and 441B are narrow range detectors that were removed and will not be replaced until construction is near completion.
These were being tracked on work orders C87-1998, 2000, 2001,
.
2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 and the TU Electric management information tracking system.
While tracing instrumentation tubing for flow
'
transmitters, the NRC inspector observed that the tubing had been stepped on and was slightly bent.
In discussions with the field engineer, it was learned that these type defects are not tagged by TU Electric; therefore, there is no easy way to determine if nonconformances had been written.
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
n_
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
_ _ -
__
.,.
~
-
,..
'
1 This item is open pending receipt of additional
'
information from'TU Electric (445/8908-o-05).
b.
Residual Heat Removal System (37301, 37051)
.The NRC inspector walked down Train B of the residual
.
heat removal system.- This inspection was done under the NRC operations inspection programs and was documented in l
NRC Inspection Report 50-445/89-09; 50-446/89-09'.- No concerns were identified concerning.this configuration versus the FSAR. description.
No violations or deviations-were identified.
f 6.
General Plant Inspections (42051C, 50073, 50090, 31053', 51063, 52053.)
At various times during the inspection period, the NRC
' inspector conducted independent and planned regular backshift and weekend' inspections of the Unit l' reactor containment, safeguards, auxiliary, electrical control, and diesel generator buildings.
Selected accessible. rooms'in all'of these' buildings;were inspected.to observe current work activities with respect to. major safety-related equipment,.
electrical cable / trays, mechanical components,. piping,
.;
. welding, coatings, Hilti bolts, and removal of debris from l
seismic gap between buildings.
The NRC inspector observed some decline in the general'
housekeeping as compared with previous inspections-that showed a steady improvement in this area.
TU Electric construction management were alerted to this observation.
Specifically,.
the inspector pointed out that much of the. cleaning effort
!
!
appears to'be concentrated ~on.the main paths (which are very clean) while areas that are hard to get to receive much less attention.
The result is that these areas have a lot of dirt, grime, trash, and in some cases loose hardware.
In:the same area, food (candy) was found in no eating zones underneath the steam generator.
Until room turnover occurs the NRC' inspector understands that it may be difficult to maintain cleanliness i
areas to turnover standards while work is ongoing.
Loose nuts, bolts, and other hardware should be returned to the warehouse or otherwise be controlled if'they are to be j
temporarily stored'in a storage area inside the safety-talated
,
,
buildings.
Otherwise identification and traceability to-
material / chemical certifications and work documents may become
questionable.
The inspector will continue ~--to inspect'this
'
~
area.
t l
7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable-j
__________________)
....7
.
\\
'
l items, violations, or deviations.
One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 4.
8.
Open Items l
'
I open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, l
and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or i
applicant or both.
Four open items disclosed during the l
inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4 (three items) and S
'
(one item).
9.
Exit Meeting (30703)
-
'
An exit meeting was conducted March 7, 1989, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report.
No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspector during this reporting period.
The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
During this meeting, the scope and findings of the inspections were summarized.
t
.