IR 05000445/1989001

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Safety Insp Repts 50-445/89-01 & 50-446/89-01 on 890111- 0207.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Followup on Violations/Devations & Const Deficiency Repts
ML20235Y335
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 03/02/1989
From: Livermore H, Phillips H
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y324 List:
References
50-445-89-01, 50-445-89-1, 50-446-89-01, 50-446-89-1, NUDOCS 8903140075
Download: ML20235Y335 (15)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/89-01 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/89-01 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446

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Construction Permit l Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August 1, 1991 Unit 2: August 1, 1992 Applicant: TU Electric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),

Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: January 11 through February 7, 1989 Inspecto - h4U _ , _ _

3 -2~ d H. S. Phillips, Senior Resident Inspector Date n Construction Reviewed by: 54 euM --

3-2-99 H. H. Livermore, Lead Senior Inspector Date

8903140075 890302 PDR ADOCK 05000445 Q FDC

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i-Inspection Summary:

Inspection Conducted: January 11 through February 7, 1989 (Report 50-445/89-01; 50-446/89-01)

Areas Inspected:' Unannounced, resident safety inspection of applicant's actions on previous inspection-findings, follow-up on

.v o ai l tions/ deviations, action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) construction

. deficiency reports, allegation follow-up, safety-related piping, and general plant. inspection . Results: Within the areas. inspected, no violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identified. During the inspection, no strengths or weaknesses were identifie u--___--__-_--____-__--____- -_

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

  • R. Ackley, Jr., Director, CECO
  • J. L. Barker, Manager, Engineering Assurance, TU Electric
  • J. W. Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric
  • H. D. Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric
  • W. J. Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric
  • J. T. Conly, APE-Licensing, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
  • W. G. Counsil, Vice Chairman, Nuclear, TU Electric
  • D. E. Deviney, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance (QA),

TU Electric B. P. Garde, Attorney, CASE

  • W. G. Guldemond, Manager of Site Licensing, TU Electric
  • T. L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric
  • J. C. Hicks, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric
  • O. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric
  • J. Muffett, Manager of Engineering, TU Electric
  • E. Ottney, Program Manager, CASE
  • D. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric
  • J. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection perio * Denotes personnel present at the February 7, 1989, exit meetin . Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 49063) (open) Open Item (445/8847-O-03): The NRC inspector questioned TU Electric Purchasing Procedures which state that it is engineering's responsibility and not the quality organization's responsibility to determine what quality assurance requirements will be included in requisitions or purchase orders for safety-related items or services. This item was opened because engineering issued the requisition (procurement code V) for removing the coating from the service water piping and quality requirements were not established or fully described in Requisition 6R 35033 The NRC inspector reviewed procurement Procedures NEO 6.02, ECE-6.02-03 and other procurement procedure They state that the quality organization only reviews requisitions and purchase orders if engineering classifies them safety-related or seismic, category I or II (quality required). Engineering personnel, who are

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L involved with cost and schedule, indirectly make the L ^ decision about quality requirements in requisitions and purchase orders tG en' making a' decision of safety-related applicability of the part or~ servic The NRC inspector concluded that.there is a lack of checks and balances in such cases to assure that cost'and schedule. requirement are:not placed above. quality: requirement K The:NRC inspector found that Code V procurement are-not adequately described in procurement procedures to show how TU Electric will implement their QA/QC programs.in-lieu of contractor, vendor, or supplier programs. The inspector reviewed the referenced procedures to evaluate the changes made to Code-V procurement. Specifically, a

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Code V procurement is one where the contractor, subcontractor, vendor, or supplier.(onsite or offsite).

does not have a QA program in accordance with 10 CFR-part 50, Appendix B, and similarly is not required to meet 10 CFR part 21 defect reporting requirements. Whe simple items are purchased, it is not too difficult to understand how TU E2ectric may substitute their QA program for an offsite vendor or supplier; ) swever, it is not clear how this would work for the purchasing of

. complex items that involve special processes, lot or batches ~ subject to change, and where the supplier purchases materials, items, and services from other suppliers who may not have QA/part 21 program designed to meet NRC requirements. TU Electric procedures do no define the. difference between complex and noncomplex prccurements or describe in detail how such procurement will work. This item remains open until checks and balances are established and procedures define noncomplex procurement and describe how this process will work and meet regulatory requirement In meetings held on February 2 and 15, 1989, TU Electric explained their procurement program that has been

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recently changed to address Code V procuremen It was clear to the NRC personnel present that nuclear utilities may need to purchase parts, items, and components from a specific vendor or vendors who do not commit to Appendix B or part 21 requirements and who may be the sole source for the item or service. It is not equally clear as to how TU Electric can accept part 21 requirements and responsibility during manufacture when individual workers and the officers of the vendor company do not accept such responsibility. That is, the workers, who are most likely to find defects, will not be required to report such defects under NRC Regulation 10 CFR part 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ - - . _ - _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _

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l 5 The review of the open item in paragraph 2.a and related matters did not provide a basis for closing out this matter, but increased the inspector's concerns about thi ite This item will remain open until TU Electric addresses the question on how Part 21 requirements will be met (445/8801-0-01). Follow-up on Violations / Deviations (92702, 52053)

(Open) Violation and Enforcement Conference (445/8727-V-01A):

Failure to take corrective action in June 1978 when advised by Ingersoll Rand's letter 031-36281 of a nonconforming condition in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) motors, and failure to correct Unit 1 motors after Test Deficiency Report 4870 dated June 20, 1986, identified the problem the second tim On May 19, 1987, the NRC inspector questioned whether the cooling fans in Unit 1 AFW motors had been corrected. After having been found to be reversed during testing in 1986,  ;

TU Electric engineering and test personnel assumed the fans in i Unit 1 were not reversed because they had not overheated  !

during preoperational testing. After the NRC inspector asked I for evidence to show they were properly installed, TU Electric work orders C870003442 and C870003441 were issued, the motors were examined, and the unidirectional blowers or fans were found to be installed backwards. The inspector also found an Ingersoll Rand letter dated 1978 that advised TU Electric of the potential problem and that no action and been take i on November 12, 1987, NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-27, 50-446/87-20 was issued. The report cover letter stated that the apparent violations were being reviewed for appropriate enforcement action and an enforcement conference'was scheduled for December 8, 1987. The enforcement conference was held and TU' Electric made a presentation which concluded that they had evaluated the deficiency and found it was not significan During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the TU Electric file that was presented to show that the subject violation (failure to take corrective action on deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances) was properly evaluated, corrected, ' chat the cause was determined, and that corrective action was taken to preclude repetitio (1) The NRC inspector considers the first part of the violation (failure to write a nonconformance after receiving the Ingersoll Rand letter) closed based on:

(1) the steps taken to control vendor correspondence which contains reported problems, and (2) the direction to issue nonconformances in such case .. - _ _ _ _ _ -

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(2) The NRC inspector found that the second example of the violation (failure to evaluate the reversed fans in Unit 2 AFW motors and assure Unit 1 fans were not reversed) could not be closed because the NRC inspector questions the completeness of the corrective action that TU Electric discussed at the enforcement conference'in their response to the apparent violation and in the 50.55(e) report made to the NRC. The questions concerned two nonconformance reports (PE-87-00621 and PE-87-00622).

The nonconformances written on September 9, 1987, against both AFW' motor fans stated: " Fans on rotor are heating enough to burn the paint off metal reinforcement rings due to eddy current flowing in fans. There is evidence of arcing between the fan and the brass ring on the rotor winding."

These nonconformances were not acknowledged or discussed in the TU Electric presentation to the NRC given at the enforcement conference on December 8, 198 TU Electric responses (TXX-88192, -88353, -88488; and -88652 submitted be: ween February 1 through September 1, 1988) to tle Notice of Violation do not I acknowledge or discuss t.. nonconformances referenced abov Similarly no evaluation or discussion of these nonconformances were found in TU Electric's final construction deficiency report (CDR) (TXX-7063 dated December 14, 1987) on SDAR CP-87-33 that covered the improperly installed fans. See discussion in paragraph j During this inspection, the NRC inspector raised the following concerns: (1) why was the NRC not provided information about these nonconformances at the enforcement meeting (TU Electric had this information for three months prior to this meeting), and (2) were these nonconformances evaluated by Westinghouse in conjunction with their safety analysis of the motor fans being i installed backwards which influenced the outcome of i

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pending enforcemen Attachment 1 to both nonconformance reports (NCRs) are formal maintenance engineering evaluations and they I indicate that the arcing between fans and motor rings is directly related to fan installation. These evaluations stated, in part, that the nonconformances may be caused by: "(1) Rotation of the rotor in a direction opposite to normal direction of these fans, which caused an increase in the temperature across the blower due to a decrease in airflow, (2) the fans are not a bidirectional type of

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construction, (3) due to the construction-of these' fans, a current' loop may be~ set up between the inner and outer reinforcing ring which could result in. rise in the temperature of the iron due to a-electromagnetic field-being set upfin-this closed loop." Although the NCRs-document telephone discussions between Westinghouse and TU Electric about these conditions, no formal- ~

Westinghouse analysis of the safety significance of the nonconformances was referenced. There is no indication in the NCR Attachment 1 that the cause of the arcing problems was fully determine This-item will remain open until additional information is received to resolve the NRC questions and concern . Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identified by the Applicant (92700) (Closed) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-85-11):

Instrument fitting-improperly installed due to misinterpretation of-the drawing. The drawings were supposed to be interpreted that fittings were not. allowed between supports if the tubing between-bend radii exceeded 11 inches. The drawing note was incorrectly interpreted to not allow fittings between the bend radii if the length of tubing (between radii) was greater than 11 inche The NRC inspector previously reviewed this item in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/87-36; 50-446/87-27. It.was held open because the justification.for."use as is" was not supported by calculations.- The file has now been supplemented with calculations to support.the engineering

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disposition. The NRC inspector has no further question This item is closed, (Open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-33): AFW pump motor fan installed backward TU Electric evaluation (TXX-7063 dated December 14, 1987) concluded the incorrect installation of fans in Unit 1 motors would not cause the temperature of the motors to exceed the maximum allowed temperature. Therefore, the deficiency was not significant and was not reportabl During this inspection the NRC inspector requested the file which backs up the conclusion that this deficiency was not significant and not reportable. The two nonconformances described in paragraph 3 against the blower fans in the AFW motors were apparently not included in the evaluation of thic deficiency and in turn were not discussed as part of the corrective action in i

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TU Electric's final 50.55(e) report. This item will remain open.pending. receipt of additional informatio . (closed) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-124): Xomox )

(Tufline) plug or butterfly. valves (with limitorque 90 degree electric motor operators) may malfunction when the drive' train within the operator or between the operator.and valve stem does not properly engage. Valve operability and incorrect position feedback may-resul This was caused by improper design considerations. . These valves control the component cooling water flow to control room air conditioners and could. adversely affect-safe plant operation. This deficiency was found to be reportabl TU Electric corrected this condition by installing a-spacer in the drive train of the four valves. Work orders in the SDAR file showed that this work was completed. The NRC inspector has no further question This item is close (Open) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-88-42): Unit 1, 24-inch component cooling water line realigned by unauthorized uses of hydraulic jack. This item remains ope See paragraph . Allegation Follow-up (99014)

(closed) Allegation (OSP-88-A-0029): In letters dated June 14,.1988, and October 10, 1988, an alleger provided concerns that: (1) heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) work packages were not completed as required by procedure prior to being forwarded to.the alleger's office, (2) Ebasco managers were informed,.both verbally and in writing, that other offices were not including needed information, yet took no action to correct the backlog of ,

complete work packages furnished to-the alleger's office, !

(3) Ebasco managers. directed the alleger to violate procedures to expedite the correction and completion of work packages,

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and (4) Ebasco terminated the alleger because the alleger .

refused to violate procedure !

Background NRC letter dated October 19, 1988, acknowledged to the alleger the receipt of the concerns referenced above. The letters stated that the NRC staff would evaluate the results of TU Electric's investigation and inspect their actions, if any were required.

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TU Electric letter (TXX-88803) dated November 29, 1988, informed the NRC that the " allegations and technical concerns" had been investigated by TU Electric's Corporate Securit prior to this allegation, the NRC was reviewing problems #ith  !

work packages. NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-67; 50-446/88-63 dated October 27, 1988, discussed steps taken by-TU Electric to improve work package content and processin In order to do this, TU Electric staggered work periods to allow a stop work (No.88-002 dated January 19, 1988) and work package improvement. NRC inspection in this area revealed that the applicant war well aware of various problems with work packages and corrective action was in process. The scope of Stop Work Order No.88-002 initiated to deal with work documentation covered all work activities from the initiating of.HVAC work packages through the vaulting of completed work packages. The subject allegation relates to these matter Concern No. 1 Work packages were not completed, as required by procedure, prior to being forwarded to the alleger's offic Review The NRC inspector found that this allegation was not-specifically addressed in the investigation report because all parties agreed that the work packages did not include all of the documentation required to be in the package. After Ebasco managers agreed that a problem existed, they directed the alleger, an Ebasco supervisor, to obtain the necessary documents to correct deficient packages regardless of who was responsible for assuring that documentation was complet The following was extracted from the results of interviews: one of the Ebasco managers (No. 1, formerly the alleger's supervisor)

was promoted and manager (No. 2) took his place and became the alleger's supervisor. These two Ebasco managers met with the alleger and told him to get the information himself, write a new procedure, or do whatever was necessary to solve the problem. The alleger's subordinate, who the alleger said could confirm what the alleger said, provided negative support to the alleger. That is, the results of the subordinate's interview stated: (1) he never had been told to violate procedures, (2) the alleger had let work backup and ignored 1 the Fabrication Shop, and (3) that the alleger refused to draft a procedure and to expedite wor The NRC inspector (through an interview with the TU Electric investigator) confirmed that the alleger's concern that Ebasco construction engineering, Fluor Daniel fabrication shop, and Brown and Root / Fluor Daniel paper flow group did not assure

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that all necessary documentation was in the package supplied to the alleger's offic The NRC inspector found that work packages contained 16 sections which contained certain categories of work documents. At the time the alleger's office encountered missing documents, Section 6 of the work package was routinely

. separated from the remaining 15 sections in the package and was sent to the alleger's office to allow them to work on this Section while others worked on other parts of the packag Some documents that were missing from the alleger's package were in the larger package. Also, it was found that the entire package was reviewed.again for completeness after it left'the alleger's office. Technically, a procedural problem did exist; however, no NRC violation occurred because no evidence was found to show that those performing the work received incomplete work package Conclusion The NRC inspector concluded that an impasse developed between the alleger (a supervisor) and the Ebasco managers concerning correcting the identified problem, because the alleger would not develop a revised procedure, as directed. The impasse appeared to center around Section 5.0 of TU Electric Construction Department Procedure CH-V101, "HVAC-Detailing, Fabrication, Installation, Rework, and Repair," Revision The Ebasco managers delegated to the alleger the authority and directed him to change the procedure and in the meantime obtain documents neede It appears that the alleger refused to revise the procedure and obtain the necessary documents when directed by the second Ebasco manager. The alleger's basis for not performing these duties as directed appeared to be that they were not described as his responsibility in Section 5.5, but were listed as responsibilities of the Ebasco managers, No. 1 and 2, Fluor Daniel Fabrication Shop and Ebasco Construction Engineering. The alleger did not acknowledge the first sentence of the procedure which stated that such duties could be delegated to hi Concern No. 2 Ebasco managers were informed, both verbally and in writing, but took no action to correct the backlog of work packages in the alleger's office caused by incomplete work on packages furnished by other organization Review The NRC inspector reviewed TU Electric's investigation report and found that this aspect of the allegation was not specifically addressed, but was generally addressed by

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investigating the broader allegation that the alleger was asked to violate procedures. .The NRC inspector considered this to be an additional part of the allegatio The TU Electric investigation file contained evidence that Ebasco managers were informed by the alleger that deficient work packages were causing problems. This is supported by the results of interview of Ebasco manager (No. 1) which states that he received a letter from the alleger. This interview also stated that Ebasco manager (No. 1) and manager (No. 2)

met with the alleger to discuss the problem and told the alleger to write a draft procedure or take whatever action was necessary to solve the proble Conclusion The NRC inspector found no evidence to confirm this allegation. The direction to the alleger was to do whatever was necessary to solve the problem of missing document Meetings were held to solve the problem. Although these were not the type actions the alleger wanted implemented, action was taken to solve the problem as evidenced by a stop work order and a new procedure CHV 11 Concern No. 3 Ebasco managers directed the alleger to violate procedures to expedite the correction and completion of wor Review The NRC inspector found that TU Electric technical and QA personnel were contacted by the investigator, but they had not reviewed all alleged deficient packages that were listed in the alleger's October 10, 1988, letter. To correct this, the NRC inspector requested a review of these packages and the results of their evaluation were summarized in writing to the inspector. This evaluation concluded that the missing documents were in other parts of the work package, but at any rate the package would have been reviewed again for completeness after they were recombine The NRC inspector also requested TU Electric technical personnel to determine if deficiency reports were written against the packages identified by the alleger. None were written by the alleger; however, NCR 88-6198 was written by someone else to identify a situation where the incorrect drawing and design change authorization (DCA) was referenced in the packag _ - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -

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Conclusion This allegation was not substantiated. Although information was missing from packages (that were in process) submitted to the alleger's office, there was no evidence that violations of NRC regulations occurre Concern No. 4

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Ebasco terminated the alleger because he refused to violate

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procedures.

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The NRC inspector reviewed the TU Electric Investigation Report and found that this part of the allegation was not considered separately and accordingly was not specifically addressed in the repor The NRC inspector considered it separately and reviewed the alleger's letter and the TU Electric investigation fil The j

alleger provided names of the Ebasco managers who had allegedly directed him to violate procedures and then told him he was to be removed. The alleger's letter dated June 14, 1988, stated that the Ebasco managers met with him on Thursday, April 21, 1988, and advised him that he would be .

replaced and depending on his performance would be terminated, I allowed to resign, or transferred, which is unlikely. The letter also stated that earlier in April the entire HVAC ;

engineering staff were told that if they did not get the job i done they would be fired and the manager would start with the supervisor Page 4 of the alleger's letter states, in part, "On April 24, 1988, I chose not to return to work . . . . I waited it out at home, and on April 28, 1988, acting on the advice of my l attorney, I reported my absence through him."  :

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Conclusion This allegation was not substantiated. After learning that he l would be replaced the alleger chose not to return to work )

(absence without leave) when other options were availabl The NRC inspector questioned the SAFETEAM manager to determine 4 if the alleger had contacted them to give them the alleged violation. They.were not contacted. The NRC inspector found that the alleger initiated no deficiency report which any site employee may initiate.

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13 Safety-Related Piping (49063) The NRC inspector met with Billie P. Garde of Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) on January 17, 1989, to discuss CASE concerns with the NRC handling of the Service Water System piping coating remova In general, CASE believes the NRC should have issued a civil penalty based on the violations of regulatory requirements identified by the NRC in Inspection Reports 50-445/8834, 50-446/8830; 50-445/8847, 50-446/8842; and in the Notice of Violation dated January 9, 198 Hydraulic Jacking of 24-inch Component Cooling Water (CCW) Lin On December 6, 1988, at a TU Electric meeting, the NRC inspector learned of an instance where construction had used a hydraulic jack to force a 24-inch component cooling water pipe back into line. This incident began on October 30, 1988, when a startup engineer encountered difficulty removing valve 1HV-4514 and, as a result, the flanged pipe sprung 3/8-inch out of lin The. pipe struts were then unpinned and the pipe misalignment increased to 1 1/8 inches. On November 3, 1988, Startup and engineering considered six options and finally decided to cut the pipe ou No NCR was written at this point, but DCA 78216R0 and a traveler were issued to construction to allow pipe section remova At the evening shift turnover on November 3, 1988, all personnel understood that the pipe was to be removed. Late in the evening shift the project manager found no one working at the work site. He gathered the general superintendent and Brown & Root (B&R) superintendents and others to discuss the matter. After this discussion, they decided to attempt realignment rather than cutting the pipin On November 4, 1988, engineering learned that the pipe segment had 'ot been cut out and rewelde Upon questioning tie work, engineering found that construction had jacked the piping back into place with a hydraulic jack without being authorized by engineering (as was required by procedures). Engineering estimated that it took 15-20 thousand pounds to force the piping back into alignment. Finally, an NCR was issued on November 7, 1988, because of the unau'.horized jackin The NRC inspector believes that a nonconformance should have been written before the DCA was issued. The quality of the product was certainly indeterminate at that poin Among other things, the NCR would have prohibited construction from attempting to realign the pipin This matter will be reviewed further by the NR At a February 2, 1989, meeting, TU Electric made a presentation to the NRC relative to their corrective

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action concerning this and a second instance where a jack was used to move a pipe and damage occurred. A stop work order was issued following the second event. Corrective actions included discussions with involved individuals, training of craftsmen and supervisors authorized to use hydraulic jacks, and disciplinary action for the individuals involved in the second event. TU Electric believes this will prevent repetition of such actions on the backshif At the February 2, 1989, meeting, the NRC inspector discussed the concern that the DCA only corrected the specific problem, but did not determine the cause of the misalignment and determine if such stresses still exist upstream of the anchors. The NRC is concerned about this because in TU Electric's draft report on this issue and in discussions at a December 5, 1988, meeting TU Electric indicated that the stresses were present in the first place because the piping was jacked into line when originally installed. Although TU Electric engineering stated in this case the stresses are within code allowables, this item will remain open pending further TU Electric and NRC review and will be tracked under the reported construction deficiency SDAR CP-88-4 . General Plant Inspections (42051C, 50053, 50073, 50090, 50100, 51053, 51063, 52053)

At various times during the inspection period, the NRC inspector conducted independent and planned inspections (regular and backshift) of the Unit 1 reactor containment, safeguards, auxiliary, electrical control, and diesel generator buildings. All accessible rooms in these buildings were inspected to observe current work activities with respect to .najor safety-related equipment, electrical cable / trays, mechanical components, piping, welding, and removal of debris from seismic gap between buildings. The housekeeping, storage, and handling conditions inside these buildings and various outside storage areas were also inspected. Fire prevention / protection measures were observed during the subject inspection A special inspection was performed to inspect the reactor vessel while it was opened for a modification. The NRC l inspector verified that access was properly controlled into the vessel while the modification was in process. The inside of this vescel and piping was also inspected to determine the condition. No violations or deviations were identified.

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8 .- Open Items open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant,lwhich will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which. involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant.or both. One open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraphf , Exit Meeting (30703)

An exit meeting 1was conduct'ed February 7, 1989, with the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report. No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting period. . The applicant-did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided l to_or reviewed by_the inspectors during thislinspection.- ,

During this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope I and findings of the inspectio i l

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