IR 05000440/1992007

Insp Rept 50-440/92-07 on 920413-14,29-30 & 0506-08.No Violation or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Inservice Insp Activities,Review of Programs,Data,Procedures & Observation of Work Activities

ML20198D677
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	05/15/1992
From:	Jeffrey Jacobson, Ward K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198D667	List: IR 05000440/1992007 ML20198D663
References
50-440-92-07, 50-440-92-7, NUDOCS 9205210113
Download: ML20198D677 (7)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

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' Report No.: 50-440/92007(DRS)

Docket No.: 50-440 License No.: NPF-58 Licensee: The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company 10 Center Road P9rry, OH 44081 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Unit 1 Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH Inspection conducted: April 13-14, 29-30, and May 6-8, I c .~

Inspector: - V .Id&/ ' /

K. D. Ward b O T~ ^

Approved By: Rb & l" M. Jacobson, Chief Date 6ff 6ht Materials and Processes Section

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Inspection Summary Inspection on April-13-14, 29-30, and May 6-8, 1992 (Report N /920R (DRSi)

hreas-Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of inservice inspection (ISI) activities including review of programs (73051), data (73755), procedures (73052), observation of work-activities (73753), and review of.the erosion / corrosion (E/C) program (73051, 73052, and 73755).

Results: No violations or deviations were identifie Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC inspector noted the following:

• The implementation of the ISI complied with the requirements of ASME Section XI and the licensee's progra 'a Licensee staff and contract personnel performing ISI were knowledgeable.and competen *

Management involvement and commitment to a quality E/C effort was considered weak.

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QETAILS T '. - Persons Contacted Cleveland Electric Illuminatino Company (CEI)

• Stratman, General Manager

• M. Gmyrek, Manager, operations

• K. Donovan', Manager, Licensing and Compliance

• J. Eppich, Manager, Mechanical Design

• S. Kensicki, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department

• H. Walls, Nondestructive Examination Supervisor

• Dervay, Inservice 1 Inspection / Erosion / Corrosion Supervisor

• J. Lausberg,_ Supervisor, Technical Quality Unit

• C. Wirtz, Inservice Inspection-Engineer

• D. Conrcn, Compliance Engineer

• R. Portmann, Nondestructive Examination Engineer U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)

• Vegel, Resident Inspector P. Hiland, Senior Resident Inspector Siemens Fuclear Power Services, Inc. (SNPS)

M. Dalichow, Level III

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' Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Cot _gany ( H. S). Zimmerman, ANII-The NRC_ inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.

L L * Denotes those present at the exit interview on May-8, 199 . Inservice Inspection I ' Procram Review (73051) Personnel from SNPS' performed the ISI in accordance with the111censee's--program and ASME Section XI, 1983

Edition, Summer 1983 Addenda, The. sampling inspection plan for' addressing intergranular stress corrosion

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cracking was in accordance with Generic Letter

- (GL) 88-01. The welds examined in accordance with GL 88-01 'dere found to . be acceptabl Where ASME requireme Js were determined to be impractical,

' specific relief requests were submitted to th- Office l

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of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) in writin The

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NRC inspector reviewed the specific relief requests including the related-correspondence between-the licensee and the NRC. The NRC inspector reviewed CEI-Surveillance Reports No.92-032 and No.92-069 of ISI program activities. These surveillance efforts were found to be acceptable . In addition, the inspector verified that the_sers'ces of an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) were procured from Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Compan Precedure Review (73052)

All applicable ISI procedures were approved by the ANII and were reviewed by the NRC inspector. The ISI-

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procedures were found to be acceptable and in accordance with ASME Section V, 1983 Edition, Summer L 1983 Addend Data Review (73755)

(1) General The examination data was found to be in accordance with-the applicable ISI procedures and ASME Code requirements. The NPC inspector reviewed documents related to nondestructive examination equipment, data, and evaluation (2) Feedwater Nozzles All six feedwater nozzle to safe-end welds were ultrasonically examined (UT) during the last refueling outag Four of the nozzle to safe-end welds were found to be acceptabl Unacceptable indications were detected in nozzles No.-N4E and No. N4 The indications were oriented in a circumferential-direction and were located near the' junction of the feedwater nozzle to safe-end and the.Inconel 182 buttering. The nozzle to safe end wall thickness is 1.2" and the inside circumference is 38.45". The flaw sizes were determined to be acceptable in accordance with ASME Section XI, Tables IWB 3641-5 and IWB 3641-6, for the full duration of the last operating 18 month cycl During this outage, a manual and an automated UT projection imaging scanning (P-Scan) system was performed prior to a mechanical stress improvement process (MSIP). (MSIP improves the residual stress distribution in a weldment by reducing-or eliminating the residual tensile stresses at

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welded regions subject to stress corrosion cracking. MSIP is accomplished by slight permanent contraction of the pipe in the vicinity of the weldment. This is achieved by_using hydraulically activated tools.) The pre-MSIP manual-and automated depth sizing of the No. N4C and No. N4E nozzle'to safe-end. weld flaws found '

them to be'within 2% (of wall) of that reported in the last outage. -The manual and automated depth sizing data correlated well, indicating essentially the same depths. With the good correlation, and for ALARA considerations, only automated sizing was performed following MSI The data analysis determined there to be no appreciable difference between the pre and post MSIP sizin As a result of successful MSIP, these welds are

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considered to be mitigated in accordance with NUREG-0313, Revision 2. These welds will continue

.to be monitored in the futur d. Observation'of Work Activities (73753)

The NRC inspector observed work activities and had discussions with personnel during the ISI activitie These observations included the following:

(1) SNPS-performing ultrasonic examinations on pipe weld No. 003AO-1B33. This weld was in the recirculation system. Ultrasonic examinations being performed using the P-scan system were also observed on feedwater nozzle to safe-end weld N N4 (2) SNPS performing liquid penetrant examinations on pipe weld No. 0123-82 This weld was in the main steam syste Liquid penetrant examinations were also observed on pipe weld No. 003AO-1B3 This weld was in the recirculation syste (3) ANII performing a surveillance inspection on pipe welds-No. 0123-B21 and No. 003AD-1B33. This effort included observing ultrasonic and liquid penetrant examinations and review of related record .

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(4) GE personnel performing visual examinations of reactor vessel internals using an underwater TV camera in conjunction with the use of videotape recorders. The tapes of the following examinations were reviewed in part by the NRC inspector:

(a) Top portion of the upper core spray sparger; J)) Lower portion of the upper core spray sparger; (c) Bottom portion of the lower core spray sparger; and (d) Downcomer pipin The NRC inspector reviewed the qualifications and certifications of all inspection personnel periorming ISI to ensure conformance with SNT-TC-1 No violations or deviations were identifie . Erosion / Corrosion Activities (73051, 73052, 73755)

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company began their erosion / corrosion (E/C) program in 198 In 1988, a formalized procedure and administrative controls were established to ensure continued long term implementation of an E/C monitoring program for piping and components. This program consists of ultrasonic examinations of wall thickness and is applicable to both safety related and nonsafe r v related components. Various references were used to estau2ish the program, including EPRI-NP-3944,

" Erosion / Corrosion in Nuclear Plant Steam Piping," and NRC Bulletin 87-01, " Pipe Wall Thinning."

An inspection sample is selected prior to every refueling autage utilizing the repetitive task system. This program considers such variables as the effects created by poor ,

geometry, previous inspection results, engineering review, and history of other generating units. Starting with the next refueling outage, CEI will select the inspection sample utilizing the EPRI Chec, Checmate Computer program. When a piping component is found that has exhibited wall thinning due to E/C, an engineering analysis is performed. This analysis determines if the degraded component is acceptable for continued use or if repair / replacement is require To date, minor thinning has been found and no repair / replacement was required. During this outage, 176 examinations were scheduled but, because of availability of funding and oatage scheduling, only 30 examinations were

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performe The majority of the postponed examinations were to be " baseline" examinations (a first time UT for reference in various components).

The-NRC inspector reviewed the program, procedures, data and CEI surveillance report No._92-134. This surveillance was conducted.to evaluate the overall effectiveness and implementation of the E/C program. The results of this surveillance determined that some requirements of the E/C program were not being adhered t Action request (AR)

No. PS92134-001 was issued to CEI's System Engineering Section as a result of this surveillanc The intent of the AR was to-identify sections of the program that were not being implemented and to provide a vehicle for program review / updating._ The reviewed surveillance was considered very comprehensive and well written. However, management support and interest in the E/C program was not evident in that implementation was weak. The E/C program is expected to play a major-rnle in maintaining plant safety, efficiency, and reliabilit No violations or deviations were identifie . Feedwaterc Samnle Probe Incident During-a visual examination (VT) of the feedwater spargers, GE found a feedwater sample probe protruding from the spray nozzle on the No. N4D feedwater sparger. A 3/4"x15" broken probe was recovered and removed from the piping system. -The licensee stated ". . . although potential errors in representative sampling of the Corrosion Product Monitor due to:the broken / missing sample probe can be in error by a factor.of 2-4, this error is not considered safety significant.- The true valbe,'even with this much of a discrepancy, would not suggest u fuel performance problem based _upon past operacional_ data. The probe failure only affects insoluble corrosion product data which provides diagnostic information in evaluating fuel failure."

The sample probe failure appeared to be caused by flow induced vibration. During the next outage, another probe will.be installed with a new design. The corrosion product monitor is considered a nonsafety related item by the licensee and-has no effect on cystems/ components that are relied upon to mitigate an accident or which are important to safety.

! The probe originally was approximately 22" lon It broke off'at the welded boss and went through a 36" feedwater line

("B" loop), that consisted of pipe, elbows and a 36"x20" i reduce From the reducer, the probe went through another

[ elbow, inboard and outboard isolation valves, may have hit

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an end cap, through a sweepolet, and into the sparge Radiography was performed on the boss to verify that the sample probe was missing. VT was performed within the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) annular region to identify any foreign parts that may have been expelled from the area

.here the probe was welde T was performed on the RPV wall due to potential cracks resulting from thermal shock

. caused by spray from the area where the probe broke of An elbow, reducer, sweepolet and end cap near the sparger was of concern because it was not known how long the probe was in those area ISIS were performed on the welds and ultrasonic examinations were also performed to examine for minimum wall thickness and inside surface anomalie All areas were found to be acceptabl The NRC inspector reviewed the videotape of the feedwater sample probe protruding from the spray nozzle, drawings, NDE reports, including review of the radiographs of the boss, work orders, nonconformance reports and other related documentatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this repor The NRC inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during tha inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar _

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