IR 05000440/1992026
| ML20128L868 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1993 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128L842 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-92-26, NUDOCS 9302220031 | |
| Download: ML20128L868 (14) | |
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f U. S. liUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10f4 REGI0ff 111 Report tio. 50-440/92026(DRP)
Docket tio. 50-440 License fio. NPF-58 Licensee:
Cleveland Electric illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Perry Site, Perry, Ohio inspection Conducted: December 29, 1992, through January 31, 1993 Inspectors:
A. Vegel 0. Kosloff E. Duncan J. Hopkins M. Bielby J. Smith S. Wu
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Approved By:
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2-ll Nil R. D. Latiksburi hh{
Dat'e Reactor Projec 3 4ec ~ Ton 3B Inspection Summan Inspection on December 29. 1992. throuah January 31. 1993. (Report No.
50-440/92026(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced safety inspection by resident, headquarters, and region based inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee event report followup, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, operational safety verification, event followup, and engineered safety features system walkdown.
Results:
In the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were noted.
The following is a summary of the licensee's performance during this inspection period:
Plant O efations t
The reactor plant was operated at or near full power during the inspection period until January 8,1993, when the plant was shut down for a mid-cycle maintenance outage. Operator control of the shutdown 9302220031 930212 PDR ADOCK 0500
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was good.
Poor operating practices were observed concerning operation
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of the solid radwaste crane with override switches mechanically-held in the override position with adjustable wrenches.
thintenance/surveiU ane The quality of, observed maintenance and surveillance activities was good.
Enaineerina and Technical Support Good engineering and technical support of daily plant activities was noted.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verific01]An
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The quality of reviewed event reports was acceptable. A weakness in the adequacy of corrective action efforts was identified due to the failure of the licensee to address equipment problems with the solid radwaste crane.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted a.
eveland Electric illuminatina Comnany R. Stratman, Vice President - Nuclear D. Igyarto, General Mancger, Perry Nuclear. Power Plant (PNPP)
K. Donovan, Manager, Licensing and Compliance
- M. Gmyrek, Operations Manager, PNPP S. Kensicki, Director, Perry Nuclear Engineering Department (PNED)
F. Stead, Director, Perry Nuclear Support Department (PNSD)
- H. Hegrat, Compliance Engineer, PNSD E. Riley, Director, Perry Nuclear-Assurance Department (PNAD)
- W. Coleman, Manager, Quality Assurance Section,. PNAD
- V. Concel, Manager, Technical Section, PNED
- D. Conran, CompItance_ Engineer, PNSD M. Cohen, Manager, Maintenance Section, PNPP P. Volza, Manager, Radiation Protection Section R._Tadych, Manager, Quality Control Section,:PNAD
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D. Cobb, Superintendent, Plant Operations, PNPP
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E,_S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission J. Hannon, Director, Project Directorate -III-3, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
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J. Hopkins, Sr. Project Manager, NRR f
S'. Wu, Reactor' Inspector, NRR
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- A. 'Vegel, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, RIII E. Duncan, Reactor Engineer, RIII J. Hopkins, Project Engineer, RIII D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector,_ RIII M. Bielby, Operator Licensing Examiner, RIII J. Smith, Reactor Inspector, RIII Denotes those attending the exit meeting held on February I, 1993.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701. 92702F
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a.
(Closedl_00en Item (440/91003-08(DRPll:
Review of administrative controls to assure draft procedure-revision requests were being acted on in accordance with plant' procedures. The licensee's quality assurance sect-ionL(QAS) conducted a review of the issue and documented the results in surveillance report numbers91-049 and 92-250. The licensee determined that change. requests were evaluated and incorporated into procedures correctly.
The-inspectors concluded that-the licensee's_ evaluation-was adequate and have no further questions at this time.
This item isl closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Report (LER) Followuo (90712. 921Q01
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Through review of. records, the.following event reports were reviewed to determine if reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective actions were accomplished in accordance with technical specifications (TS) and corrective action to prevent recurrence had-been-established:
a.
(Closed) LER 50 A40/91018-00:
On October 6, 1991, control rod
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46-23 exceeded its maximum scram time to position 43. Operators then took action to demonstrate that the eight adjacent control rods to control rod _46-23 could satisfy the maximum scram insertion time limits.
Control rod 42-19 also exceeded its maximum scram insertion time to position 43.
Because control rods-46-23 and 42-19 were adjacent rods, the plant was required by technical specifications to be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within.12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
On-October 6, 1991, at 2:36 p.m., operators commenced a shutdown of the plant.
Licensee investiaation of Root Cause and Corrective Actions Root Causql L
The licensee determined the cause of the " slow" control rods was failure of the scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) for each of. the affected control rods. A combination of contaminants found on-the valve disk and seats was believed to have formed an adhesive which could have bound the valve seat. All of the suspect SSPVs were from the same vendor lot.
Corrective Action After shutdown of the plant, all-49 of the SSPVs from the suspect-lot were removed from their associated hydraulic control units (HCUs) and replaced. The-maintenance instruction for-HCUs was.
revised to ensure that potential contaminants were not used during maintenance. ' As part of the established requalification training'
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program, all plant licensed operators were instructed on the lessons learned-from tnis event,
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Insoectors' Review
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l The inspectors previously documented review of this event in l
Inspection Reports (IR) 50-440/91016(DRP) and 50-440/91023(DRP)
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dated October 21, 1991, and December 18, 1991, respectively.
u During this inspection period the inspectors reviewed licensee L-documentation to assess the adequacy-of corrective actions.
The inspectors concluded that licensee ~ actions appeared thorough and l
adequate in preventing recurrence.
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Part of the corrective action stated in the LER stated: " Generic
Maintenance Instruction (GMI-122), Hydraulic Control Unit Equipment Qualification Maintenance, will be revised to specify
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the use of teflon tape to seal the threads rather than a liquid threadlocker and will-specify the use of'only approved aqueous
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cleaning agents." Since^ teflon tape was not environmentally.
qualified for use in containment, the commitment could not be completed as stated. As_ a result, in; a memorandum from H. Hegrat, dated December 23, 1992, the licensee clarified the-commitment to ensure only approved tape-would be used for this applicat_ ion.
This item is closed..
b.
(Closed) LER 50-440/92013-00: On May 14,.1992, while in operational condition 4, COLD SHUTDOWN, maintenance on the #2 turbine stop valve (TSV) resulted in an unanticipated engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.
Four main steam line (MSL) drain valves isolated due to a low main condenser vacuum signal when the TSVs were opened to greater than 90 percent, immediate corrective action was taken to secure TSV maintenance until the cause was found and corrected.
Licensee's-Investiaation of Root Cause and Corrective Actions-Root Cause The licensee determined the root cause for this event to' be an inadequate procedure (work order).
The low main condenser vacuum trip function was bypassed when.the-condenser 1ow vacuum bypass switches were placed in " bypass" and the TSVs were less than 90 percent open.
The bypass switches were in " bypass" for this event. However, as part of the trip bypass logic, when the TSVs were opened to greater than 90 percent, a relay in the condenser low vacuum bypass logic deenergized and caused a condenser low vacuum trip to occur.
The work order (WO) to troubleshoot #2 TSV did not contain any precautions regarding TSV position or any steps to prevent-actuating the low condenser vacuum trip logic.
During this event-four MSL drain valves, which were open for MSL draining, isolated when the TSVs were opened to greater than 90 percent.
Corrective Actions Corrective actions included revising the TSV maintenance WO and adding a note to the generic TSV WO to alert planning personnel to-the loss of the trip bypass feature when the TSVs are greater than 90 percent open. Additicnally, all licensed operators, instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technicians, and I&C work planners were instructed 'on the lessons _ learned from this event.
Inspectors Review Initial review of this LER was documented in Inspection Report 50-440/92009(DRP), dated June-18, 1992. During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the applicable licensee-documentation and noted that all corrective action commitments were completed. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions appeared reasonable and adequate to prevent'
recurrence of this event. This item is closed.
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Evaluation of the effectiveness of licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence of similar events caused by personnel errors was documented in Inspection Report 50-440/92014(DRS) dated September 16, 1992.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
For the surveillance activities listed below, the inspectors verified one or more of the following: testing was performed in accordance with procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were properly accomplished; test results conformed with technical specifications, procedure requirements, and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
Surveillance Activity lille SVI-R43-1318 Division 11 Diesel Generator Start and Load PTI-N32-P0003 Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test SVI-C51-T0027-C APRM "C" Trips Channel functional No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior'to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and, to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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Specific Maintenance Activities Observed:
Work Order (W0)/ Repetitive Task No.
Titig WO-92-05148 IE51-F0068 - Addition of low pressure isolation signal, DCP 92-43
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WO-92-0066 Static MOVATS testing for IE12-F028A-.
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WO-92-0059 Dynamic M0 VATS testing for IE12-F064C No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Enaineered Safety Features System Walkdowns (71710)
In addition to routine observations made during regular plant tours, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the accessible portions of selected.
safety-related systems. During this inspection period the inspectors-conducted a walkdown of the residual heat removal (RHR)
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room ventilation systems. The inspectors verified system operability through reviews of valve lineups, system prints, equipment conditions, and control room indications.
As a result of.the walkdowns, the inspectors noted.that the general condition of the systems was good. The systems were aligned in accordance with the appropriate lineup and the components were properly l abeled. The inspectors concluded that the observed portions of-the RHR
"A" and the control room ventilation systems appeared capable of performing their respective safety functions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
0_perational Safety Verification (71707)
The_ _ inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control' room operators during this inspection period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and' verified tracking of limiting conditions for operation associated with affected components.
Tours of the pump houses, control complex, the intermediate, auxiliary, reactor, radwaste, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, ~ fluid _ leaks, and
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excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests-had been initiated for-certain pieces of equipment in need of maintenance.- The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that the-I physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
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The' inspectors observed plant housekeeping, general plant cleanliness i
conditions, and verified implementation of radiation protection-
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controls.- In addition, the inspectors observed construction of_the low L
level radioactive waste building.
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a.
Plant Shutdown Obseryations On January 9, 1993, the reactor was shut down for a mid-cycle maintenance outage. The inspectors observed control room activities during the shutdown to assess procedural compliance, communications, and general operator control of the evolution.
The inspectors noted that the operators appeared cognizant of changing plant parameters and maintained positive control of the shutdown.
The inspectors concluded that observed operator performance during the shutdown was good. The operators were knowledgeable of expected plant parameters and performed the shutdown in a deliberate and well-controlled manner.
b.
Shutdown Risk Manaaement The inspectors reviewed the licensee's planned activities for the mid-cycle maintenance outage to determine what actions or considerations were taken to maintain reliable decay heat removal and minimize shutdown risk. The licensee developed the outage schedule using Perry administrative procedure (PAP) 0115, " Outage Planning." That administrative procedure had guidelines regarding the minimum number of electrical power sources, emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), and decay heat removal systems desired during operational condition 5 (REFUELING).
Using the guidelines in PAP-0115, the outage schedule met or exceeded all technical specification (TS) requirements for operable AC power sources and ECCS. Daily outage )lanning meetings (twice a day) and control room pre-shift 3riefings (three times a day) identified the operable shutdown cooling system (s),
AC power sources, ECCS train (s) available, and alternate decay heat removal methods. Contingency plans were developed for providing temporary alternste power to the fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FPCC) system when it was the alternate decay heat removal system.
The materials necessary to implement the contingency plans (work orders, electrical cables, and other equipment) were in place prior to using FPCC for decay heat removal.
Based on the above review, the inspectors concluded that the licensee developed the outage schedule with adequate defense in depth to maintain reliable decay heat removal and minimize shutdown risk.
Evidence of a conservative operating philosophy was observed in both the development and initial implementation of the schedule. The inspectors will continue to observe the licensee's management of shutdown risk and will document the observations in subsequent reports, c.
Solid Radwaste Crane Ooeration On January 7, 1993, while conducting a routine inspection of the radwaste building, the inspectors noted that the solid radwaste overhead crane was being operated with two override switches mechanically held in the override position with adjustable wrenches. The inspectors informed licensee management of the observed poor operational practice and action was taken on
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January 8 to prohibit operation of the crane with the switches mechanically overridden.
Subsequently, on January 11, further
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management direction suspended the use of the solid radwaste overhead crane until the problems with the override switches were resolved.
The solid radwaste overhead crane, located in the radwaste building above the liner storage area, was used to move solid radioactive material storage containers.
The crane was controlled
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remotely from the solid radwaste control panel located in a room adjacent to the liner storage area.
The operator can monitor the movement of the crane in the storage area with the use of closed circuit television monitors.
The override switches that were held in the override position with the adjustable wrenches were the hoist override and the bridge and trolley override switches.
The hoist override allowed for raising and lowering of the hoist in fast speed.
The bridge and trolley override allowed for lateral movement of the hoist in fast speed without the hoist being in the fully raised position.
did not function as designed.Due to equipment problems, the overrides The hoist override actually worked backwards, in that when not in override, the hoist would raise or lower in fast speed. As a result, the operators mechanically held the switch in the override position with the wrench, so that they could better control the hoist in slow speed.
The bridge and trolley override also did not function as designed.
The hoist would not indicate the fully raised position, therefore the operators could not move the hoist laterally in fast speed unless the override switch was held in overrido.
Based on the licensee's preliminary investigation of this problem, the equipment problems associated with the hoist and the practice of using wrenches to hold the override switches have existed since the crane was pre-operationally tested.
Though problems with the hoist were documented previously in engineering design change request (EDCR)-880071 was taken to correct the deficiencies.and condition report (CR)-89-0058, no action In addition, on December 7,1992, a licensee manager identified the use of wrenches on the override switches as a problem.
action was taken to correct the problem.Though the problem was noted, no The responsible manager for the radwaste crane was informed of the deficiency observed by the manager on January 7, at approximately the same time the inspectors identified the problem.
The use of adjustable wrenches to maintain override switches in the override position concerned the inspectors because it was a poor operating practice.
Of further concern was the long period of time, approximately 5 years, that the crane had been operated with equipment problems without corrective action being taken to repair the deficiencies.
In addition, since the radwaste facility was routinely used to train non-licensed operators, the practice of using wrenches to override switches was not consistent with good operating techniques that are vital to the safe performance of plant activities. The licensee initiated condition report CR-93-Oli to document investigation results and track corrective action efforts.
At the end of this inspection period, licensee
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efforts were in progress to incorporate permanent repairs to the radwaste hoist and the control panel to correct design and equipment problems.- The inspectors will review the results of-the licensee's investigation and assess the adequacy of licensee corrective actions in a future inspection report.
d.
Residual Heat Removal Strainers On May 22, 1992, during the third refueling outage (RF-03), an-inspection of the suppression pool floor and all suction strainers was performed by the licensee utilizing an underwater video camera mounted on a robotic submarine.
During this insaection, debris was noted on the suppression pool floor and on tie residual-heat removal (RHR) "A" and "B" suction strainers.
In addition, the strainers were observed to be slightly deformed in that the strainer screen was concave between the stiffener plates. The RHR strainers were conical type strainers with internal cross sattern stiffener plates. The strainer deformation was noted by tie engineering staff but no documented engineering evaluation was conducted. Concerning the debris on the strainers, the licensee concluded that cleaning the strainers could be deferred.
Two W0s (92-3157 and 92-3158) were generated'on July 29 to clean the -
strainers after RF-03. On September 3 the W0s were deferred until the next refueling outage due to safety concerns of cleaning the_-
strainers while_the plant was operating at power.
These safety concerns were not recognized by the licensee when the strainer cleaning was deferred from RF-03 to a post outage timeframe.
On January 16 and 18, during the mid-cycle maintenance outage, the strainers were cleaned with high pressure water.
During' post cleaning inspection of the strainers using a high powered underwater light, the system engineer again noted that the RHR "A" and "B" strainers were concave between the internal-stiffeners.
As a result, two nonconformance reports, NR 93-S-016 and-NR 93-S-017, were initiated to document and evaluate the-deformation. The nonconformance report. evaluations dispositioned the strainers as "use-as-is."
The disposition'was based on observed structural integrity of the strainers and the assessment
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that the strainers were still capable of performing their intended function of preventing 3/32-inch particles or' larger from entering their respective RHR pumps. The cause for the' deformation was determined to be high differential pressure across the strainer due to excessive debris on the strainer during pump operation.
Condition report CR 93-022 was initiated to investigate the root cause and-provide recommendations to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation, interviewed engineering staff personnel, and observed the videotape of the May 22, 1992, suppression pool inspection.
Based en the cbservation of debris on the, strainers and suppression' pool floor
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and the-resultant deformation of the suction strainers due to debris buildup, the inspectors were concerned that the potential existed for strainer _ clogging. To address the inspectors concerns, and i_n response to condition report CR 93-022, an
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engineering report was assembled summarizing RHR strainer
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performance.
The licensee reviewed RHR pump suction pressure and strainer differential pressure historical data to determine if a trend of declining pump performance occurred.
Based on review of this data, a slightly decreasing trend in pump suction pressure-was indicated.
In addition, after strainer cleaning in July 1989, suction pressure dropped further. Though suction pressure indicated a declining trend, the minimum net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for the RHR pumps were met.
The minimum dynamic suction pressure obtained was 5.6 psig, equivalent to approximately 13.2 feet of water. The minimum NPSH required by the RHR pump manufacturer was approximately 4 feet of water from suction nozzle centerline.
Prior to completion of the mid-cycle maintenance outage, the licensee planned to vacuum the suppression pool floor and conduct an underwater inspection with a video camera of the RHR "A" and
"B" strainers to document the as-left condition.
In addition, pump performance surveillances were planned to evaluate the effect of strainer cleaning on pump suction pressure. The inspectors will review licensee investigation results and assess the adequacy of licensee corrective actions in a future inspection report.
No deviations or violations were identified.
8.
Onsite followup of Events at Goeratina Power Reactors (93702.)_
a.
General The inspectors performed onsite followup activities fc, events which occurred during the inspection period.
Followup inspection included one or more of the following:
reviews of operating logs, procedures, and condition reports; direct observation of licensee actions; and interviews of licensee personnel.
For each event, the inspectors reviewed one or more of the following:
the sequence of actions, the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, licensee actions to verify consistency with plant procedures and license conditions, and verification of the nature of the event. Additionally, in some cases, the inspectors verified that the licensee's investigation identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel errors and the licensee was taking or had taken appropriate corrective actions. Details of the events and licensee corrective actions noted during the inspector's followup are provided below, b.
Details (1)
Reactor Water Cleanuo (RWCU) Isolation On January 9, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m. (EST), with the reactor in operational condition 3 (HOT SHUTDOWN), an unexpected isolation of the RWCU system occurred.
At the time of the event, a plant shutdown was in progress. The (
Rh'CU system was operating in " reduced feedwater temperature" mode when the RWCU high differential flow timer annunciator al armed.
Plant operators verified that an actual system
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= leak was not the reason for the high differential flow signal'and attempted to isolate the RWCU system in accordance with plant procedures. The 45-second timer for the high differential flow signal timed out before the RWCU isolation valves stroked shut and a valid engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred. The RWCU system was returned to service at approximately 7:50 p.m.
The licensee informed the NRC operations center of this event via the emergency notification system (ENS) at about 9:45 p.m. on January 9.
The licensee initiated condition report CR 93-006 to document the investigation and corrective action taken.
The licensee planned to s'abmit an-LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors will review that report in a future inspection period.
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Containment Purae Supply Penetration Leakaae On January 9, 1993, at about 11:19 p.m., with-the reactor in HOT SHUTDOWN, the licensee discovered that the secondary containment bypass leakage technical spe
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limits were exceeded as a result of the tailure of a local leak rate test (LLRT) of containment purge supply'
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penetration V-313. At the time of the event, a plant shutdown was in progress. The licensee entered TS 3.0.3 and continued to shut down in accordance with. plant procedures.
The plant entered operational conaition 4.(COLD SHUTDOWN) at-11:52 p.m. and exited TS 3.0.3.
The licensee informed the NRC operations center of this event via the emergency notification system (ENS).at about 11:26 p.m. on January 9..The licensee initiated condition report CR 93-007'to document the investigation and corrective action taken.- The licensee planned to submit 'an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors will c
L review that report in a future inspection period.
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addition, the inspectors will assess the adequacy of the
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licensee's corrective actions for the.recent failures of
penetration V-313. The penetration failed a LLRT on November 5, 1992, as documented in IR 50/440-92022(DRP) and
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LER 50/440-92022-00, j
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Excessive Leakaae Throuah Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIVY Penetrations i
l On' January 12, 1993, at 1:50 p.m., while-in COLD SHUTDOWN for a refueling outage, the licensee identified MSIV penetration leakage in excess of technical specification l
limits (25 standard cubic feet per hour (SCFH)).
As'noted in licensee condition report CR 93-012, the "A". main-steam line containment-penetration failed-to meet the.25 SCFH acceptance criteria when tested in accordance~with.the applicable test procedure.
Subsequently, the "0" MSIV penetration and the "B" MSIV penetration also failed to meet the 25 SCFH acceptance criteria. The licensee initiated
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corre pa ths.ct ive Inspectionaction to troubl perfor by an NRCmance for the of eshoot subjectthe licensee'and r pair t inspectionRegion 111 speci 50-440/93002(DRS)
e MSIV were to be documen alist. penetrationss leak-r te testhe a
The licensee ini ted The
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esults as performed this January 19,199ent via the ENStially notified in Inspection R of ev that eport (4)
Eqac.ht_Engl at about the NRC 3:00 O
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corrective action to troubleshoot and repair the leakage paths.
Inspection of the licensee's leak-rate test performance for the subject MSIV penetrations was performed by an NRC Region 111 specialist. The results of that inspection were to be documented in Inspection Report 50-440/93002(DRS).
The licensee initially notified the NRC Operations Center of this event via the ENS at about 3:00 p.m. on January 19, 1993.
(4)
Reactor fuel Rod Leakast During the mid-cycle maintenance outage, the licensee conducted an inspection of all 748 fuel bundles in the reactor vessel as a result of indications of leaking fuel (previously documented in inspection Report 50-440/92024(DRP), dated January 21,1993). As a result of these inspections, a 24-inch crack was identified on one of the fuel rods.
In addition, the inspection effort initially identified up to 62 fuel bundles that indicated potential leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Operations Center via the ENS at approximately 10:10 a.m. on January 19, 1993, of the significant number of fuel bundles that were being evaluated as potential leakers.
On January 21 and 22, three regional inspectors and one headquarters inspector conducted an inspection of licensee fuel inspection activities. The inspectors interviewed licensee and vendor personnel, observed fuel inspection activities, and reviewed fuel inspection results. The inspectors concluded that the licensee s efforts were conducted in accordance with procedures and that inspection equipment appeared to be operating properly.
At the end of this inspection period, based on re-inspection of the 62 suspect fuel bundles, nine fuel bundles remained unresolved, in that the fuel inspection results were still under evaluation. The inspectors assessment of licensee efforts in determining the root cause for the confirmed fuel failures and review of the disposition of the nine unresolved fuel bundles will be documented in Inspection Report 50-440/93003(DRS).
(5)
InoDerable Containment Isolation Valve 1821-F0019 On January 21, 1993, at about 5:15 a.m., with the reactor in operational condition 5 (REFUELING), the licensee identified a potential operability concern with the motor operator on the inboard MSIV drain line outboard isolation valve IB21-F0019. During valve testing, the licensee. determined that the torque switch in the motor operator for valve IB21-F0019 opened when the thrust applied to close the valve was 2526 pounds. The design thrust required to close the valve was 5284 pounds. As a result, the ability of the
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valve to isolate under design conditions was evaluated.as.
indeterminate.
The licensee informed the NRC operations center'of this event via the emergency notification system (ENS) at about 5:52 a.m. on January 22.
The licensee initiated condition report CR 93-018 to document the investigation and-corrective action taken.
The licensee 31anned to submit an LER in accordance-with-10 CFR 50.73. Tie inspectors will review that report in a future inspection period.
No violations or deviat;ons were identified, 9.
Exit Interviews The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph I throughout the inspection period and on January 31, 1993.
The inspectors summarized the scose and results of the inspection-and discussed the likely content of tie inspection report.
The licensee did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
During the report period, the inspectors attended the following exit interview:
Jnspeq1gr Exit Dat.g M. Kunowski 1/9/93
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