IR 05000397/1987004
| ML17279A246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1987 |
| From: | Rebecca Barr, Bosted C, Dodds R, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A245 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-04, 50-397-87-4, NUDOCS 8705040167 | |
| Download: ML17279A246 (22) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No:
Docket No:
50-397/87-04 50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
February 15 - March 31, 1987 Inspectors:
.
Do s, Senior Ress ent Inspector
. C. Barr, Res>dent nspector Approved by:
. J.
oste
,
ess ent nspector
~
~
o nson, ief Reactor Projects Section
Summary:
Ins ection on Februar 15 - March 31, 1987 50-397/87-04 D
e sgne D te sgne 9 a-s a e
~gne te sg e
Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of control room operat ons, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, licensee action on previous inspection findings, refueling preparations,'work practices/procedure adherence, reactor trip and post trip review, management involvement, review of periodic and special reports, quality assurance program changes, and voluntary entry into technical specification 3.0.3.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 35701, 60705, 61720, 62703, 61726, 71707, 71710, 90712, 90713, 92700, 92701, and 93702 were covered.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8705040f67 8704i6 PDR ADOCK 05000397 Q
'0 DETAILS Persons Contacted 2.
D. Mazur, Managing Director J.
Shannon, Deputy Managing Director
- R. Glasscock, Director of Licensing and Assurance
- C. McGilton, Manager of Operation Assurance Program
- C. Powers, Plant Manager
<<J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
- R. Corcoran, Operations Manager S. McKay, Assistant Operations Manager K. Cowan, Technical Manager
- J. Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager
- R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- D. Feldman, Plant guality Assurance Manager
- J. Peters, Administrative Manager
- P. Powell, Licensing Manager
- N. Wuestefeld, Reactor Engineering Super visor
<<J.
Landon, Maintenance Manager
- J. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer
- S. Washington, Sr. Compliance Engineer
- Personnel in attendance at exit meeting The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
Plant Status Except for an outage and a manual scram, the plant operated at approximately 72K of rated power during the inspection period.
The plant was shut down for five days on February 20,'987 because of low turbine bearing oil pressure.
Inspection revealed a broken check valve in the bearing oil supply header which was repaired and the plant was
,,... returned to service on February 25, 1987.
On March 22, 1987, the plant was manually tripped following a loss of,feedwater when both 'feedwater
'umps tripped due to low suction pressure.
.The loss'f feedwater flow was caused, by the failure of a 1/4 amp fuse in.the=feedwater 'control system. 'his caused the control system, to call,'for maximum,feedwat'er flow, resulting in low suction.,pressure as only two of the, three condensate.:booster pumps were in"service."'he'plant'was
.ret'urned to poWer op'eration on March 25, 1987.
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-::0 erations.'Verifications The resident inspectors reviewed the control room operator and shift manager log books on a daily basis for this report period.
Reviews were also made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and that the licensee was actively pursuing corrections to conditions listed
in either log.
Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with control room personnel avai.lable at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The 1'icensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's), particularly those dealing with ESF and ESF electrical alignment, were observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that the control room licensed personnel, on duty at the time, were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and:its significance.
The inspectors observed access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments and availability of on-site and off-site electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulatory. "
requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the inspectors observed portions of several detailed surveillance tests by operators and instrument and control technicians.
PPN 7.4. 1.4.1.1 Rod Worth Minimizer Precritical Check (3/24/87)
PPM 7.4. 1.4.2.1 RSCS Operability Check Prior to Startup (3/24/87)
PPN 7.4.6.1.3.1 Personnel Airlock Door Seal Leak Test and Interlock Light Check (2/26/87)
(3/25/87-Data only)
PPN 7.4.6.1.3.2 Personnel Air Lock Door Interlock Test (2/23/87)
No violations or deviations were identified.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety-related systems maintenance activities (MWR's AU8237, AU8933, AV-1038, AU-2752, AU-1014, AV-1030, AU8237) were observed;
- By direct observation and review of records the inspector determined whether these activities *were consistent with LCOs; thatthe proper administrative controls and tag-out procedures were followed;'and that equipment was properly tested before return to service.
The inspector also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine if the licensee -was giving priority 'to safety related-"'maintenance and verifying that backlogs.which might affect system performance were not developing.
- The inspector also witnessed portions of the repair of air compressor CAS-A.
During the operability check on the compressor after maintenance, the compressor tripped on high temperature.
The cause of the high temperature was determined to be due to
,
lg
cooling water valves to the compressor not being reopened after maintenance.
An investigation by plant personnel could not determine when the valves were shut.
The licensee is continuing to determine the cause of the valves being shut without being included on the tag out record.
A 'similar event happened on February '24, 1987.
A plant startup was delayed because a high temperature in the main generator exciter activated its CARDOX system.
The cooling water to the stator windings had apparently been valved out during the maintenance shutdown to preclude condensation in the stator.
This action had not been logged and was missed during the performance of the startup checks.
"The program for valve control during short shutdowns will be examined further.
(Followup item 87-04-01)
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
En ineered Safet Feature Verification The inspector verified the operability of the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS), Diesel Generator (Div. I), and Standby Liquid Control (SLC)
Systems by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the systems.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as built configuration.
The inspector also verified that valves were in the proper position, had power available, and were locked as appropriate.
The licensee's procedures were verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Refuelin Pre arations During the inspection period, the licensee received new fuel that is to be installed during the next refueling outage.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities to inspect the fuel bundles and channels, assemble the fuel bundles and fuel channels and store the assembled fuel bundles in the spent fuel pool.
The inspector compared the observed activities with the requirements of.the following plant.
procedures:
PPM 6.2.2, New Fuel Handling, Ra'i.lroad.Bay 'Activities PPM '6.2.3, New Fuel Handling on tlie Refueling Floor
"PPM 6.2.4, New Fuel Inspection PPM 6.2.5, Fuel Channel Preparation,"Inspection-and Installation-on New Fuel
"~ 'PM -6.3.9; Channeling and Dechanneling of Irr'adiated Fuel The inspector observed that the technicans performing these evolutions appeared to be well trained and familiar with the procedures.
The activities progressed with minimal problems and were completed in a timely manne No violations or deviations were identified; 8..
Work Practices Procedure Adherence The following items related to general procedural adherence were identified.
a ~
While performing a facility tour, the inspector found a craftsman's identification badge, keycard and dosimetry unattended at the east dressout station of the 501'urbine building.
The inspector attempted to notify security; however, their phone was busy.
Next, the inspector notified Health Physics which responded immediately.
A Health Physics technician took the keycard, badge, and dosimetry, and removed the worker from the radiologically controlled area.
Health Physics, per procedure, estimated the individual's dose by using the dose of adjacent workers and the general radiation levels of the area where the individual was working.
In addition, Health Physics filed a radiological occurrence report.
Due to oversight, security was delayed in being informed of the event until approximately thirty-six hours later.
A verification of the security computer was obtained to assure that the keycard was not used during the time it was out of the craftman's possession.
b.
While observing fuel duct measurements on the refueling floot on February 26, 1987, the inspector observed a serviceman using poor radiological work practices.
While standing in a clean area, the serviceman reached across a contami.nated area boundary, removed potent.ially contaminated protective clothing without frisking them, placed them in a poly bag and returned the material to the contaminated area.
Health Physics, upon notification, counselled the serviceman on the use of correct work practices, verified no contamination had been spread and issued a radiological occurrence report.
These examples illustrate the need for continued emphasis on use of good work practices and increased supervisor attention.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reactor Tri and Post Tr i Review On March 22, 1987, at approximately 7:40 PM,,the reactor,was manually scrammed following a loss of both reactor feedwater pumps (RFWPs).
Following the scram, reactor pressure'essel (RPV) level decreased to approximately -54 inches also activating RPV level
engineered safety features at -50 inches.
The high pressure core spray (HPCS), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), and nuclear steam supply shutoff system (NSSSS),
group 1, all operated as designed.
The main steam isolation valves shut and the HPCS and RCIC restored RPV level.
The initiating cause of the loss of RFWPs was determined to be a blown fuse in a feedwater flow summer circuit in the RPV level
LER-83-01-00:
Rod Block Interlock on fuel handling system calibration was incorrect (Closed).
The inspector's examination of NCR-283-191 disclosed that the rod block interlock had been reset to trip on cable load rather than grapple load prior to proceeding with the initial fuel loading. Surveillance Procedure 7.4.9.6 was amended and the surveillance test redone on December 25, 1983.
LER-84-61-00-01 and 02:
Breach of fire barrier due to open floor drains from one area to another (Closed).
Floor drains were installed in the reactor building in accordance with Maintenance
.Work Request AX 1307 per Project Engineering Directive 5215-M-7479, which closed out NCRs 284-444, 499 and 552.
The work was completed on August 21, 1985 and verified by guality Assurance on September 5,.
'1985.
LER-84-87-02:
Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) did not initiate a select error signal when an out of sequence rod was selected; neglected to verify rod movement and pattern with a second licensed operator (Closed).
Surveillance Procedure 7.4. 1.4.1.2, paragraph 5, step 2 now requires a second qualified individual to verify the prescribed control rod pattern, should the Select Error function be demonstrated p
bi
.
Th p~
F11
<<,
"R d ib h Ni Operability Prior to Shutdown,"
Rev. 5, dated 6/30/86, requires the rod worth mini'mizer to be demonstrated operable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to RWM automatic initiation (ie., within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing core thermal power below the low power setpoint).
This test is now required to be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after RWM automatic initiation (receipt of low po.~ei. set light).
LER-86-12-00:
Reactor protection system actuation during recircu'lation pump start (Closed).
Plant Procedure 2.2.1 "Reactor Recirculation System" now cautions operators not to start the RRC pumps without the reactor protection system motor generator sets operating.
In addition to operations personnel, the technical support staff, including STAs, were required to read the subject NCR.
LER-86-20-00:
Reactor trip during turbine valve/governor valve transfer due to inadequate procedure (Closed).
Procedure 2.5.7,
.
"Main Turbine Generator,"
has been revised to caution the operator
'to 'insure that the speed has settled out at 'the reference speed of 1650 RPM prior to initiating TV/GV transfer.
'The licensee still plans to. perform anengineering study to evaluate'he use of main turbine. first stage pressure as the best source for determining the 305 power 'level.
This item is closed for NRC tracking purposes.
LER-86-21-'00:
Leak in reactor coolant system gre'ater than
gpm
,
.resulted in a reactor shutdown (Closed);
'The 'rea'ctor was shut down and RHR-'-53B valve was repaired by lapping the seat.
Leakage rate was checked and verified to be satisfactory prior to reactor restar t.
The licensee is still holding NCR 286-297 open pending implementation of a design change being worked out with the valve manufacturer to.limit vibration due to the high pressure/low
pressure interface when the RHR system is placed in shutdown cooling.
However, the item is considered closed as the leakage rate can easily be monitored from the control room by observing system pressure buildup during the routine inspection program.
LER-86-25-01:
Reactor high pressure scram due to a failed turbine generator valve stem anti-rotational pin causing damage to governor valve position indicator (Closed).
,Plant Procedure 1.3.5, "Reactor Trip and.Recovery,"
has been revised to require the Plant Manager'
approval prior to restart, unless specifically delegated.
The Shift Manager or Assistant Operations Manager is now required to chair the post trip review meeting with all involved personnel.
,Thereafter, they are required to obtain permission to start up from the Plant Manager.
Representatives from the Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG) and Generation Engineering are now required to attend the Followup Review Committee meeting that verifies that all systems performed as designed, assures that the root cause(s)
have bee'n identified, and provides recommended corrective actions to prevent recurrence of identified problems.
With respect to main steam line flooding, guidance has been included in the requalification training cycle beginning in 1987 per Plant Operation Committee meeting 87-06, item 261.
This action also closes followup items 85-38-05 and 86-32-01 which related to strengthing the post trip review process and including NSAG as a member of the Followup Review Committee meeting.
LER-86-33-00, 01 and 02:
Utility Engineer ing and Burns and Roe personnel have completed the recalculation of power cable ampacity requirements and determined that all installed safety-related cables meet, the new requirements.
Further evaluation using a
computer pr'ogram to determine maximum operating temperatures shows that correctly installed cables have sufficient ampacity margins for a forty-year life.
No further corrective action is planned.
This LER is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.Licensee Actions On Previous NRC Ins ection 'Findin s The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed pers'onnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on the following previously
'identified inspection findings:
Followu'tem 85-02-02 Closed
, 'Potential problem of condensation 1n instrument nes or system.
The instrument tubing lines for main steam leakage control flow transmitters have been relocated above the process piping to preclude water buildup at the flow transmitters and subsequent false flow indication.
The work was completed pursuant to PMR-285-0486, MWR-AU4479 on December 22, 1986.
This item is close Foll owu Item 85-12-01 Closed, Supply System needs a procedure to define instrument setpoint trend and corrective action activity, and Followu Item 86-11-10 Closed
, management attention needed to have an e
ective mec an>ca tren sng program.
Administrative Procedure 1.5.9, "Plant Performance Monitoring Program,"
Rev. 0, dated 11/10/86, has been"issued tb'defi'6e '.the
"
program for periodic monitoring of all plant. systems-and equipment.,
-'equired to maximize plant efficiency, avai'lability, and safety.
. The pr'ogram enhances the "Technical Specification Surveillance Program".by providing for the trending of the, surveillance data and monitoring and trending of balance of plant systems and equipment.'-
The program includes the collection'and evaluation of performance;:.data, trending of the data, prediction of future performance and initiation of preventative and corrective measures.
The Lead Performance Engineer coordinates the program, provides guidance for its implementation, and does an integrated evaluation of the performance monitoring data.
The Trend Analyst inputs all surveillance data and generates trend reports which are forwarded to the responsible Technical Supervisor/Designee and to the Lead Performance Engineer.
The Lead Performance Engineer compiles a Plant Performance Report each month for submittal to the Plant Manager.
Examination of copies of this report indicates that the program objectives were being accomplished and adverse trends were indeed being identified.
These items are considered closed.
Followu Item 85-37-03 Closed
, Supply System action needed to reduce ac og o
o d Nonconformance Reports (NCR).
The inspector's examination of outstanding NCRs did not disclose any long-standing unresolved NCRs with significant safety implications that were not already being addressed consistent with material/component availability.
Corporate guality Assurance has been trending NCRs and including this information in the quarterly management report.
Responsible organizations and causative factors (recurring problems)
were being included in. the report.
The inspector noted that recently more NCRs were being closed than opened.
However, on a long term basis, it was not apparent that there has been a
.,
substantive
.change in outstanding..NCRs though it;does appear that Supply System management has been involved and.is.taking action to...
close ol', outstanding issues.
Mhile this item's considered closed;
'outstanding"NCRs'will continue to 'be monitored as part of the rout'ine"-"inspection program.
Followu Item"85-'38-02 (Open),
Long standing Control'Room
nnunc~ators-and Fo owu Item 86-06-03 Closed
, Operator Awareness of Annunciators.
The plant has embarked on a program to reduce the number of control
room annunciator s which are activated or deactivated because of equipment deficiencies.
A Control Room alarm status book has been created that is a listing of all lighted control room alarms, including a description of the cause.
The book was being updated by the duty Control Room Supervisor in accordance with a weekly preventative maintenance card.
Observations during shift turnovers indicated that, the'perators were knowledgeable about alarms.
(Followup Item 86-06-03 Closed)
A comprehensive alarm status computer program has been created.
It has been designed to track all known Control Room alarm problems.
This was being utilized by Plant Maintenance, Plant Operations, and Generation Engineering organizations to status the resolution of alarm problems.
Representatives from Plant Operations and Plant Technical status and update this program twice a month.
Currently there are about 90 annunciator drops, down from the 139 that existed a year ago.
From discussions with Operations and Plant management it appears that a commitment has been made to resolve many of the alarms involving broken sensors or hardware during the upcoming refueling outage.
Management has stated that PNRs needed to resolve nuisance alarms will be expedited.
Followup Item 85-38-02 remains open pending the outcome of activities during the upcoming refueling outage.
Followu Item 85-38-04 Closed
, Review of Revised Jumper and Lifted Lea Proce ure.
The inspector examined PPN 1.3.9,
"Control of Electrical and Mechanical Jumpers and Lifted Leads,"
Rev. 7, dated February 5, 1987 and determined that it provided additional controls, including independent verification, in accordance with the licensee s
commitments in response to Inspection Reports 85-38 and 86-21.
This item is closed.
Followu Items 85-38-05 and 86-32-01 Closed
.
The closure of LER-86-25-01
>n paragr aph 10 o t >s report satisfactorily resolves these two followup items.
Followu Item 86-21-03 Closed
, Plant Procedure Guidance per PPN 1.2.3 Nee s to e
va uate
.
Administrative Procedure PPN 1.2.3, "Plant Procedure Control,"
establishes the requirement for procedute use and compliance.
Step-by-step performance is used only when the procedure being used specifically states that sequenced step-by-step performance is required.
A reevaluation of the guidance provided in PPN 1.2.3 for using plant procedures was recommended.
The inspector reviewed a March 17, 1987 memorandum from the plant manager to the plant staff addressing the procedural compliance issue
I identified in the SALP report and the above inspection report.
The memorandum emphasized the need for plant personnel to ensure that
"procedures are followed during the performance of our duties".
This memorandum will close this item; but, the procedural compliance issue which is also addressed in paragraph 8 of this report will be monitored in all areas as par t of the routine inspection program.
This item is closed.
IC Followu I.tern 86-21-04 Closed, Improvement is Needed in the C ossng,o Long Stan ing In ormation Notices.
A computerized tracking system has been implemented to track IE
. Bulletins, Circulars and Notices.
However, little improvement has been noted in the closing of long standing open information notices.
The inspector reviewed Temporary Procedure 1.10.9, "Interim External Operation Review," which addresses the timely review of documents from the NRC, INPO and NSSSS vendor.
The procedure was generated to ensure that applicable documents receive proper distribution and review, and that commitments are developed and transmitted in a timely manner.
The inspector also reviewed data which indicated that the number of items has steadily declined during the previous six months.
Also, two IE Notices from 1985 were reviewed and closed elsewhere in this report.
Based on the decrease in work backlog and discussion with the NSAG manager, the inspector concluded that the IE Notices were being reviewed in a more timely fashion.
This item is closed.
Unresolved Item 83-53-01 Closed),
Prevention and correction of tu )ng eformation.
The licensee, in POC meeting 85-39, evaluated the action item that dealt with assuring the recognition, correction and prevention of tubing deformation.
The validity of this item was reviewed and no further action was found to be appropriate.
Tubing deformation has not been identified as a problem since the plant began commercial operation.
Therefore, this item is closed.
Unresolved Item 84-09-06 Closed
, Technical Specification nconssstency re at~ng to opera slity's. surveillance of offgas post treatment radiation monitor.
A'Technical Spe'cificaEion change request was submitted on August 12,
-1985 to clarify the operating conditions for which radioactive effluent monitoring is required.
It was approved with Ammendment No. 32, dated
'-"November 6,* 1986.
This item is closed.
Unresolved Item 84-22-05 Closed
, Plant Training.Manual did not re ect FSAR and Tec naca Specs ications Training material for the main steam isolation valve leakage control system (MSIV-LCS).
The manual was
I ~
reviewed and found to contain discrepancies with the FSAR, system procedures and controlled system drawings.
A May 1985 revision of the MSIV-LCS section of the training manual was compared with FSAR Chapter 6.7,
"Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control System,"
(Amendment 36), issued December 1985.
No discrepancies were identified.
In addition to the above, the inspector also used a September 1985 revision of the training manual, to compare the manual chapters with the FSAR, plant procedure
- manual, Technical Specifications and controlled plant drawings for
- the SRVs, Main Steam system and the High Pressure Core Spray system.
No discrepancies were identified.
This item is closed.
PJ-86-01 Closed
, Part 21 report - Problems with Graver Reactor Water eanup s ter emineralizer control could permit high pressure on low pressure piping.
A potential exists to overpressurize the low pressure piping for the reactor water clean up (RWCU) system after precoating a filter demineralizer but before placing it in the hold mode.
The problem appears to be caused by single air operated valves which can leak.
The licensee is in the process of preparing a plant modification which would be based on a design by Graver Chemical Co, designer of the original system, and similar to a recent change preformed at the Susquehanna Nuclear Station.
Based on a review of Technical Evaluation Report 02-86-0561-0 which addressed the logic changes for this modification, the inspector considered this deficiency concern to have been addressed and concluded that an effective solution was being developed.
This item is closed.
IE Information Notice 85-72 Closed
, Uncontrolled Leakage of eactor Coo ant utsl e
ontasnment.
This notice was provided to alert licensees of an uncontrolled leakage of reactor coolant outside containment.
The leakage occurred at a
BWR plant following a reactor scram.
As part of the scram, the scram discharge volume (SDY) vent and drain valves were required to shut to contain the water released during the scram.
In this case, however, the two drain valves did not olose, allowing reactor coolant to drain to the reactor building equipment drain tank.
Approximately 500 gallons of reactor coolant flowed into the drain tank before.the scram system could'.be reset.
h-Supply System PPM 3.3.1,
"Reactor Scram,"..was revised to include
- steps to verify that the SDV ventand dragon valves are checked-shut after a scram and a caution statement gas included to. remind the operator that the RPV can blow down through, the SDV.
The Supply System is also in the process of working with the BWR owners'
group to determine a permanent solution to this problem.
The inspector reviewed procedure PPM 3.3.1 and concluded that the caution statement and valve check after the scram appear to be acceptable until the final solution can be implemented.
This item is closed.
IE Information Notice 85-75 Closed
, Improperly Installed Instrumentation, Inadequate qua >ty Control,,
and Inadequate Post Modification Testing.
The Notice describes several events that occurred due to incorrectly installed instrumentation, inadequate gC inspection, and improper post modification testing.
Members of the licensee staff reviewed this notice and compared the current practices that exist.
The Supply System's current practice is to remove only one ECCS division from service at a time.
The system engineer is used as the field engineer for plant modification; thus, the field change initiator is also the installation verifier.
The plant modification procedure, PPM 1.4.1, specifically defines the contents of the design change package which specifies the affected drawings.
In addition, all plant modifications are implemented by a Maintenance Work Request (MWR).
These MWRs are routed through the gC department for review of the DCP for conformance to plant procedures, review of plant design criteria and establishment of gC hold points.
PPM 1.5.7, Post Modification Testing, is used to specify the modification testing criteria following a plant change.
The inspector reviewed. the above conditions and considers the licensees'rogram to be adequate to meet the intent of 'the Notice.
This item is closed.
Mana ement Involvement The inspector attended a Plant Operations Committee (POC) meeting on March 18, 1987 in which the Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG) presented their semi-annual review of plant operations.
Several members of the Corporate Nuclear Safety Review Board (CNSRB)
attended the meeting.
NSAG found that the Plant had been responsive to previous NSAG observations.
Current concerns relate to annunciators and labeling.
NSAG also reviewed the status of their activities, noting that the backlog of OERs (Operating Experience Reports)
has been reduced significantly.
Several plant assessments have been completed.
The Human Performance Evaluation System has been implemented and appears to have'een well received by management; 28 reviews have been completed to date with 4 in process.
NSAG plans for the future were"also described.
Corporate and Plant Management's presence in the plant has been observed on a number of occasions.
The Deputy'anaging Director has been observed in the control room and performing plant walkdowns with the extra Shift Manager on days.
Tours of the plant indicate that housekeeping has been improved
0'
13.
significantly.
Area coordinators conduct weekly inspections and initiate cleanup as necessary.
The Plant Manager has held discussions with the crafts on expectations.
Positive response from the staff has been apparent.
No violations or deviations were identified.
V Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts The licensee's
"Annual Operating Report 1986" was examined and found to,summarize the information required by sections 6.9.1.4 and 6,9.1.5 of, the Technical Specifications.
The operating history appears to accurately reflect the inspector's observations fot the past year.
The licensee's monthly reports have been reviewed when issued and again in conjunction with.the Annual Report.
Actions taken pursuant to 10CFR50.59 will be examined subsequently in conjunction with a routine inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
ualit Assurance Pro ram Chan es 15.
The inspectors have met periodically with corporate and site guality Assurance management and staff to examine program changes.
The licensee's current proposal to place the corporate audit group under the Construction guality Assurance Manager was reviewed during a meeting on March 4, 1987.
Per this change, the Construction gA Manager v.ill also function as the Audit Manager.
The change, which will be reported to the Commission pursuant to 10CFR 50.54, was being initiated to reduce the number of managers in the Licensing and Assurance group.
PgC-01 "Plant QC Inspection Activities", Rev. 5, dated 12/01/86, now provides additional detail on the inspection of corrective and preventative maintenance activities for critical plant components.
A sampling inspection program for other-than-critical components was being developed and is expected to be finalized by September 1987.
The full complement of permanent gC inspectors (ll) is now onboard.
Additional inspectors will be utilized during the forthcoming refueling outage.
gC will be working two 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> shifts,
days per week during the outage.
...,
V I,
The licensee stated that.the biennih1 review of the quality
.assurance.
program will be performed 'in May of this year by Western Utilit'ies'Audit.,Group.
Utilization of this group will provide a
,thorough,independent assessment of program activities.
No violations oi'eviations were ide'nti'fied.
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V Voluntar Entr into Technical S ecification 3.0.3 During followup of an event at another utility, an inquiry was made into the practice of operators voluntarily entering into
Technical Specification 3.0.3 as an operating convenience.
The inquiry also questioned whether plant safety equipment was ever bypassed to prevent unwanted system actuations.
The inspector interviewed an experienced Shift Manager and the Assistant Operations Supervisor (former Shift Manager)
who stated emphatically that a safety channel would not be bypassed to avoid,a trip.signal.
Plant procedures also do not provide for voluntary entry into -Technical
Specification 3.0.3.
They could not recall a voluntary entry into 3.0.3
, ever having been made, although this Technical.Specification had been entered due to equipment inoperability.
The.Shift Manager pointed out that a limiting condition for operations,(LCO)
form is used whenever an LCO is entered and exited.
The form also notes how the condition was resolved.
The inspector concluded that voluntary entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 and the bypassing of plant protective trips were not practiced at this facility.
16.
Mana ement Meetin The inspectors met with the Plant Manager or his assistant approximately weekly during this period, to discuss inspection finding status.
On March 31, 1987, the inspectors met with the Plant Manager and members of his staff to discuss the inspection findings during this period.