IR 05000397/1987026
| ML17279A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1987 |
| From: | Bosted C, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A613 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-26, TAC-66074, NUDOCS 8711060123 | |
| Download: ML17279A615 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No:
50-397/87-26 Docket No:
50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
August 31 - September 30, 1987 Inspector:
C.
. Boste
,
esident spector Approved by:
P.
H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Projects Section
Summary:
Da Signe D te Signe Ins ection on Au ust 31 - Se tember 30, 1987 50-397/87-26 R~l:
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f room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30702, 30703, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71709, 71710, 71881, 82301, 90713, 92700, and 92701 were covered.
Results:
Two violations were identified.
Main steam line tunnel high temperature setpoints were set less conservative than allowed by Technical Specifications (paragraph 3).
Keys to the locked high and high-high radiation areas were left unattended (paragraph 4).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted D. Mazur, Managing Director J.
Shannon, Deputy Managing Director L. Oxsen, Assistant Managing Director for Operations C. Powers, Plant Manager
- J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
- R. Corcoran, Operations Manager S.
McKay, Assistant Operations Manager K. Cowan, Technical Manager
"J.
Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager
- R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- D. Feldman, Plant guality Assurance Manager
- J. Peters, Administrative Manager P. Powell, Licensing Nanager J.
Landon, Maintenance Manager The inspector also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and 'records.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on October 1, 1987.
2.
Plant Status At the start of the inspection period, the plant was operating at approximately 100% power.
The plant operated at that power level throughout the inspection period with power reductions to approximately 85% about every four days while the condensate filter demineralizers were backwashed and precoated.
Near the end of the reporting period recirculation flow control valve, RRC-V-60A, position indication failed and the 'A'ydraulic control unit (HCU) was secured which locked the valve in a fixed position.
Trouble-shooting efforts isolated the problem to a failed linear voltage differential transformer which sends a
feedback signal to the HCU control system.
Plant engineers and technicians identified a higher than normal bus duct cooling temperature on the "B" phase just below the main generator.
An evaluation was performed which indicated that the approximately 300F temperature was due to eddy current resistance heating in the duct and low air flow from the cooling system.
The vendor was contacted and an improved duct was sent to the site to be installed at the next available outage.
The improved duct is designed to have lower electrical resistance and more air cooling in the affected region, and is expected to reduce the bus duct temperature.
The steam tunnel temperatures were determined to be higher than expected; see paragraph 3 for a description of this proble Main Steam Tunnel Tem eratures During a review of Control Room logs on August 31, the inspector noted that one temperature detector channel in the Steam Tunnel was 153F, which was above the Technical Specification trip setpoint.
Steam Tunnel temperatures are used to activate the Main Steam Isolation Valves in the event of a steam leak and are an Engineered Safety Feature with trip setpoints specified by the Technical Specifications.
Above normal ambient temperatures combined with higher cooling water temperatures and reduced cooling water flow to the steam tunnel air coolers had caused the steam tunnel temperatures to increase above expected values.
When questioned on why the temperature was above the Technical Specification trip setpoint without being in a tripped condition, the shift manager attempted to explain how the setpoint had been changed to a higher value.
During a followup conversation with the technical staff instrumentation supervisor, the inspector determined that the trip setpoints for the steam tunnel had been set at 156F on August 3, 1987 at the request of the shift manager.
This setpoint was allowed by the surveillance procedure which required the trip setpoint to be set at 150F plus or minus 6F.
The Technical Specifications specified the trip setpoint to be set at a value less than or equal to l50F.
Members of the technical staff explained the increased setpoint by their understanding of a caveat of the Bases for the Technical Specifications which stated that "operation with a Trip'set less conservative than'its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowed value is acceptable".
Following conversations with NRR and Region V, the licensee was informed that the Bases were stated as such to allow instrument drift above the trip setpoint without having to reset the trip setpoint.
However, the Technical Specification statement that the required trip setpoint be "set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column" means that the setpoints can not be knowingly set less conservatively than the values shown in the Technical Specifications.
The setting of the steam tunnel high temperature trip set points to 156F without prior Commission approval was a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.2 (Enforcement Item 87-26-01).
Formal relief from the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.2, which allowed the steam tunnel temperature trip setpoints to be set at 156F, was granted by NRR on September 8,
1987 for a period of 90 days while a request for a permanent Technical Specification change is considered by NRR.
0 erational Safet Verification a.
Plant Tours The following plant areas were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
o Reactor Building o
Control Room o
Diesel Generator Building
Radwaste Building Service Water Buildings Technical Support Center Turbine Generator Building Yard Area and Perimeter b.
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following items were observed during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Technica Specs icatson and administrative control procedure requirements.
Nonitorin Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
Findings associated with the main steam tunnel temperature instrumentation are documented in paragraph 3.
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d for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
E ui ment Lineu s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment was in the condition specified.
General Plant E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingits functional requirements.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were
'bserved for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
Plant Chemistr
.
Chemical analysis and trend results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.
Securit
.
Activities were observed for conformance with regu atory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures including vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
Plant Hou~sekee in
.
Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contaminatio (II)
Several specific housekeeping inspections were conducted during this inspection period with senior members of the plant staff.
These tours were focused on safety related system areas and included radiological controlled areas.
A large number of discrepancies were identified that included the evidence of eating and smoking in unauthorized areas, numerous water and oil leaks, evidence of corrosion on pipes and structural steel, unused tools lying about in the plant, and several drains which were susceptible to becoming plugged due to debris on the floor.
Plant management had taken aggressive actions by the end of the reporting period to correct these problems.
A letter was issued to plant personnel on September 25 to plant personnel that reemphasized the company policy on eating, drinking, and smoking within the power block.
The report period ended without the inspector completing an evaluation on whether the housekeeping practices followed the administrative procedure.
This item will be evaluated during a future inspection (Unresolved Item 87-26-02).
Radiation Protection Controls.
Areas observed included control point operation, records o
)censee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, proper wearing of personnel monitoring devices, and personnel frisking practices.
During a tour of the Reactor Building on-September 9, the inspector found a set of controlled keys on a table on the 471-level.
After several attempts to determine where the keys had been issued, the keys were claimed by a health physics (HP)
technician.
The inspector later determined that the keys were issued and used by the HP's to unlock doors and access high-high radiation areas.
(A high-high area dose rate is greater than 1000 mrem/hr.)
The above mentioned HP technician had left the keys on the table after he had exited an area that he had surveyed.
It was determined that the keys had been left on the table for 10-15 minutes.
During the time that the keys were left unattended, the inspector did not consider the keys to have been in the control of the HP organization and administrative control of access to the high-high radiation areas was therefore not maintained.
This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.12.2 (Enforcement Item 87-26-03).
The licensee subsequently verified that all affected doors were locked.
During a review of procedure PPM 1.7.1
"Access Key Control",
the inspector made the observation that the procedure did not delineate the individual's responsibility for controlling special keys used in the plant.
The procedure covered the issuance of keys, maintenance of records, inventories of keys, lost or missing keys, but did not specify what the individual was responsible for when issued a key.
This was discussed with plant management staff, who stated that they would review this issu.
-En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdown Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical power supplies, cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated date.
~Ss tern Diesel Generator Systems, Divisions 1, 2, and
Hydrogen Recombiners Low Pressure Coolant Injection, Trains "A", "B", and "C" Low Pressure Core Spray Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Standby Liquid Control System Standby Service Water System 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Divisions 1 and
250Y DC Electrical Distribution Date September 9, 25,
September
September
September 3, 28 September
September
September
September
September
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testin Survdillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2)
a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the Technical Specifications
- and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
I
~P 7.4.6.5.3.1 Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test Dates Performed September
7.4.8.3.2 Division 1, 2, 3 Weekly Breaker Alignment Check September
7.4.7.7.2.4 Unlocked Fire Door Operability Test September
7.4.3.2.1.50 RCIC Isolation on Turbine September
Exhaust Pressure Test 7.4.3.2.1.9 RCIC Isolation on Low Pressure 7.4.6.1.4.25 Main Steam Leak Control Heater Test September
September ll 7.4.1.3. 1.2 Control Rod Operability Test September
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Maintenance During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required gA/gC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportabi lity for these activities was correct.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Descri tion Control Rod Timing trouble-shooting Replacement of Strip Heaters on the"A" Standby Gas Treatment System per MWR AT1656 Repair of leaking valves HS-V-RGA, B per MWR AU2500 Troubleshooting of RRC-V-60A position indication per AV1458 Dates Performed September
September
September
September
The inspector reviewed 21 completed maintenance work requests (NWRs)
associated with the residual heat removal (RHR) system.
Of these NWRs, the inspector observed three vital work requests which were performing the same task at different times.
The work that was performed was pertaining to the installation of a spoolpiece between the condensate system and the RHR system.
On two of the three occasions, the quality control (gC) department was contacted to observe the work.
The gC department was not contacted in the other instance.
This inconsistency was brought to the attention of licensee management, who stated that the vital NWR procedure was changed, subsequent to the inspector's example, to require gC to be notified if a vital NWR affected a Class 1, ASME, or radiologically involved system.
The inspector also noted that since this evolution is performed as a routine activity, plant management should consider including this activity in an approved procedure rather than being performed via a vital work request.
Management agreed to review this item for inclusion in the plant procedure manual.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Radiolo ical Practices The inspector periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspector verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted frequent plant tours to observe activities in progress and were generally aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radiological conditions and/or challenges.
ALARA consideration was given each job that was performed during maintenance activities.
One violation related to radiological practices was noted during a plant tour, as discussed in p'aragraph 4.b(11).
Ph sical Securit The inspector periodically observed security practices to ascertain that the licensee's implementation of. the security plans was in accordance with site procedures.
The inspector observed that the number of guards was adequate for the requirements of the security plan; that the search equipment at the access control points was operational; that the protected area barriers were well maintained without breaks; and that personnel allowed access to the protected area were badged and monitored and the monitoring equipment was functional.
Night illumination inside the protected area was observed and obstructions were lighted adequately.
Surveillance equipment was also observed during this inspection.
No violations of NRC requirements or deivations were identified.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Followu The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspector.
Based on the information provided in the report it was
concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The below LERs are considered closed.
LER NUMBER DESCRIPTION LER 87-04-00 LER 87-04-01 Missed Fire Door Surveillance and Improper Identification of Fire Seal Penetration.
~
LER 87-13-00 LER 87-13-01 Improper RHR System Minimum Flow Valve Operation Due to Mislanded Wire in the Valve Control Logic.
LER 87-23-00 Reactor Protection System Component Surveillance Procedures not in Complete Compliance with Technical Specifications Due to Personnel Error.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
11.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the,report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.
o Monthly Operating Report for August 1987.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
12.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations.
An unresolved item is addressed in this inspection in paragraph 4 of this report.
3. ~Ei N
The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to discuss inspection status and an exit meeting was conducted with, the indicated personnel on October 1, 1987.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representatives.