IR 05000397/1987011
| ML17279A290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1987 |
| From: | Caldwell C, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A289 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-11, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8706050204 | |
| Download: ML17279A290 (10) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report No.
Docket No.
License No.
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
50-397/87-11 50-397 NPF-21 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)R WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted:
April 27 - Nay 1, 1987 Inspector:
Approved By:
C.
W.
Ca we
,
rogect Inspector
.
Jqf nson, C le,
Reactor~ Projects Section
Da e igne
+6-d'7 Date cygne Ins ection Summar
Ins ect'ion on A ril 27 - Ma
1987 Re ort No. 50-397/87-11 A~d:
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df responses, monitoring of tool control and NATE, on-site review of events, IE Bulletin followup, QA/QC program change implementation, management involvement in activities, and followup of inspector identified items.
Inspection procedures 30702, 35750-1, 93702, 92701, 25573, 35701-1, 71707-1= and 30703 were covered.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Persons Contacted DETAILS Licensee Personnel C. N. Powers, Plant Manager J.
W. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager D. S.
Feldman, Plant guality Assurance Manager D. H. Walker, Plant Outage Manager A. G. Hosier, Nuclear Safety Assurance Group Manager K. D. Cowan, Plant Technical Manager J.
Landon, Plant Maintenance Manager S. L. NcKay, Assistant Operations Manager M. C. Bartlett, Plant gA Supervisor R. L. Koenigs, Plant Technical Staff S.
E. Cueto, t1aintenance Engineer R. L. Grindstaff, MSTE Engineer J.
D. Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager J.
W. Massey, ISE Supervisor S. L. Washington, Lead Compliance Engineer J. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer J. Grazzani, NSAG Engineer
- Denotes those attending the final exit meeting on Nay I, 1987.
The inspector also contacted licensee operators, engineers, technicians, and other personnel during the course of the inspection.
Followu of IE Bulletin 85-03 Motor 0 crated Valve Comon Mode Failures The inspector reviewed the licensee's program established in response to IE Bulletin 85-03, "Motor Operated Valve Co+non Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings,"
which was generated as a result of the Davis-Besse event.
The areas inspected included:
the program for implementing motor operated valve testing, procedures for performance of valve testing, and the status of implementing a training program for personnel performing valve testing.
The Bulletin specified that a review be performed of the design basis for the operation of valves required to be tested for operational readiness per
CFR 50.55a (g).
These valves are located in the high pressure core spray (HPCS)
and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems.
a.
Observation of Work The Bulletin specified that correct switch settings be established and maintained for those motor operated valves (NOVs) identified.
The inspector observed the motor operated valve analysis and test (MOVATS) equipment testing on RCIC system valve RCIC-V-59, a
6 inch wedge valve.
Testing of the valve was being performed by the Supply System under the guidance of MOVATS Inc. personnel.
MOVATS Inc.
has been contracted to aid the Supply System in performance of testing
on the valves identified in Bulletin 85-03.
After completion of those valves, the Supply System will perform testing of additional valves on their own. The inspector observed that the MOV testing personnel set the torque switches in accordance with the settings established by Engineering as a result of the calculations and pressure testing that was performed, with the concurrence of MOVATS Inc.
The information on switch settings was included on the electrical drawing for the valve.
The inspector verified that the MOV personnel changed the switch settings, when required, in accordance with the procedure.
Signature trace reading by Supply System and MOVATS Inc. personnel identified that valve RCIC-V-59, as found, was hitting its backseat and possibly hammering in the open direction.
At the conclusion of testing, the valve was demonstrated operable under zero dP conditions, to satisfy post-maintenance testing requirements.
The inspector also observed that there were no signs of rust or moisture within the operator housing, the torque and limit switch contacts were clean and free of oxidation, corrosion and pitting.
Procedure Review The inspector reviewed plant procedure manual (PPM) 10.25.74, Revision 4, "Testing Motor Operated Valve Motors and Controls," that personnel were using to perform valve testing.
The inspector verified that MOV testing personnel were using a current copy of the procedure at the work location.
The procedure was clearly written and followed by personnel.
It had been reviewed and approved by responsible licensee individuals and it required that the as-found and as-left switch settings be recorded.
In addition, the procedure provided clear instructions as to the specific values for the switch settings, and specified that the torque switches are to be set with the valve in the mid-stroke position and the belleville spring in a relaxed condition.
Training The inspector discussed the status of a MOVATS testing training program at WNP-2.
During these discussions, personnel indicated that the Supply System has not prepared a formal training program for MOVATS testing as of this inspection period, but will do so as time permits.
A mockup of equipment for training purposes has been established on-site and all personnel involved with MOVATS testing have been trained by MOVATS Inc. on the use of the equipment at the MOVATS Inc. training facility.
In addition several engineers and technical staff members have attended the signature trace reading class.
The procedure only allows the MOVATS test engineer to read the signature traces.
Accessibility of Valves Ouring tours of the plant, the inspector observed that there are numerous motor operated valves that are not easily accessible due to their location in the overhead.
This condition could pose problems should the valves fail to operate automatically and manual
repositioning be necessary by the plant operators in a timely manner.
This concern was discussed with the licensee management who identified to the inspector that they wou'id evaluate the situation and determine if the need for additional measures are warranted.
In general, discussions with the NOV testing group indicated that seven valves had been tested to date.
Of those valves tested, two had torque switches that were not operating properly, one had a cracked rotor, and one had grease in the spring pack which had apparently leaked in from the valve operator.
Thus, MOVATS testing has been successful in identifying problems with NOVs.
The test personnel indicated that maintenance work requests (MWRs) had been written against these valves to correct the deficiencies identified.
The licensee stated that current plans are for a specific crew to be established to perform valve testing and that all safety related valves in the plant will be tested.
The inspector noted that the on-site gA organization has performed two observations of MOYATS testing under the "Observation Program" (discussed in paragraph 3) but was concerned that there has been no gC inspection of MOVATS testing.
gC only gets involved if a repair or replacement problem is identified.
The inspector will review the performance of additional valve testing (without NOVATS Inc. personnel),
the implementation of a NOVATS training program, the methodology for preparing the valve thrust calculations, and the need for gC inspections of valve testing as part of a future inspection effort.
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Review of A
C activities The inspector held discussions with the gA/gC manager and supervisors to determine changes to the program that have been implemented since the enforcement conference of August 28, 1986.
During that conference, several deficiencies with regards to quality programs were identified.
In addition, the inspector reviewed several completed surveillances and reviewed the gA master schedule in order to review the effectiveness of the on-site quality organizations.
a.
gA/gC Organization and Program Enhancements Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the on-site quality organizations have increased their staff since the enforcement conference.
The current staff consists of 8 gA engineers, 9 gC inspectors, and 3 personnel in the quality planning section.
The planning staff of one analyst and two engineers do the program development, standardize the gC inspection planning, and process the NWRs as an interface between the plant technical and the gC staffs by adding inspection points to the MWRs.
The gA surveillance program is performed to an annual plan.
From this, a
quarterly schedule is prepared.
Approximately 6 audits are scheduled per quarter per person at which time an informal or formal review is performed.
The formal audit consists of a walkthrough of activities with a checklist of audit items.
The. informal audit
consists of a walkthrough of activities without a checklist.
Of a total of 228 survei llances performed, approximately 12Ã were unscheduled and 20% were observations.
The remainder were scheduled survei llances.
Other examples of enhancements to the QA/QC programs on-site are as follows:
The licensee is currently developing a trending program for quality class components and systems.
This program will be used to develop increased reliability by establishing holdpoints that are component 'specific.
Personnel are in the process of developing a data base for all quality class components that will contain the information relating to the failures or problems that have been experienced with a particular type of component.
The QC planners will be able to determine a set of holdpoints for QC inspectors that will factor in the failures or problems that have been experienced both on-site and throughout the industry for that type of component.
The licensee has added the Observation Program to the QA surveillances (scheduled and unscheduled)
that are performed.
This program consists of a checklist of items that is used by QA engineers during their tours of the plant or for any activity of which a review is desired (e.g.,
NOVATS testing as identified in paragraph 2).
After the QA engineer reviews the activity and documents his findings on the checklist, the shop supervisor of the activity under scrutiny receives a copy of the QA observation report.
In addition to that report, a
monthly summary report of discrepancies identified by QA engineers is provided to the supervisors.
Feedback on items identified by the program is performed by the activity that was reviewed and proposed corrective actions are returned to QA for review.
b.
Review of QA Surveillances The inspector reviewed the master QA schedule to determine the types of reviews that have been performed for the last year.
Of those surveillances that were performed, the inspector selected the following QA completed reports for examination:
2-86-139, "Administrative Control of Plant Operating Keys" 2-86-116,
"Control of Electrical and Mechanical Jumpers and Lifted Leads" 2-87-012,
"Design Control" 2-85-165, "Plant Records Control" The inspector found that these completed surveillance reports provided a detailed description of the purpose, scope, and results of the surveillance.
Deficiencies were identified and specific details of the inspection were presented.
In addition, reviews of
the findings were performed by responsible personnel and followup of corrective actions for deficiencies identified was performed in a
timely manner.
Discussions with the QA staff indicated that some significant discrepancies have been identified in the past year by the QA surveillance program.
Feedback on items identified by this program is done by monthly reports and weekly meetings with Supply System management.
c.
Qualifications of QA/QC personnel The QA and QC organi.zations appear to have an extensive amount of experience.
The QA organization has an individual with operations background as a senior reactor operator and another individual with numerous year of experience in the health physics and chemistry areas.
QC inspectors are crosstrained through an informal training and qualification process.
The Supply System has developed a
QC qualification process that will be reviewed by INPO to determine if it meets their certification requirements.
In general, the QA organization appears to have increased its effectiveness with regards to quality verification. It appears to be more aggressive in searching for, identifying, and following up on problems.
Steps have been taken towards standardization of criteria for inspection of equipment.
Both the QA and the QC staffing has been increased to facilitate more attention on plant activities.
Some significant problems have been identified by these organizations and there has been an increased effort towards scheduling.
The inspector noted that there has been no QC inspection effort of MOVATS testing (identified in paragraph 2) nor has there been any QC inspection of operator watchstanding.
The inspector identified these as examples to the licensee management for consideration as enhancements towards assessing plant performance in all areas.
However, it does appear that the Supply System has been responsive to NRC concerns and discrepancies previously identified with regards to the on-site quality organizations and that efforts towards increasing their effectiveness are being realized.
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Control of Work Activities and MRTE The inspector made several plant tours during this inspection period to assess licensee activities to maintain control of work on open systems, housekeeping, and control of measuring and test equipment (MSTE).
In general, work activities were being performed in a satisfactory manner.
a.
Control of Work Activities Work on open systems in the drywell was observed by the inspector to be performed using controls to prevent the entry of foreign material into the systems.
In addition, the inspector did not observe any combustible materials in non-designated area Work areas were in most cases clean, but the inspector identified several areas that had tools and equipment lying around after the completion of work.
These items were identified to the licensee.
b.
Control of MSTE On a tour conducted on April 28, 1987, the inspector found an oxygen monitor, ID No. 42470, lying in front of the hatch into the wetwell.
The inspector found that this 02 monitor had been signed out of the equipment issue on April 20, 1987 and should have been signed out again on April 27, 1987.
The inspector discussed this with the MSTE issue room and found that the monitor had been identified as overdue.
An overdue report was sent to the responsible foreman as required by procedure 1.5.4, Revision 9, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment."
Upon followup, the inspector found that the 02 monitor had been signed out again on 4/29/87.
During observations of MOVATS testing, the inspector noted that MOVATS equipment is not under MITE control (see paragraph 2).
This concern was identified to the licensee and the inspector will review the requirements and the licensee's determination of the need for this equipment to be under MSTE control as followup item (87-11-01).
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Actions On Previous NRC Ins ection Findin s
Closed Followu Item 86-33-01 Seismic and Securit Re uirements for t e
>re rotectlon stem This item identified the inspector's concerns with regards to the ability to lock the doors to the structure that houses the fire pumps and the ability of the fire system to withstand a seismic event.
The inspector reviewed National Fire Protection Association code (NFPA)-20 which specifies the requirements to protect the fire pumps and fire protection system from vandalism and seismic activity.
The inspector discussed these requirements with licensee personnel who detailed Supply System's methods for meeting the requirements of the code.
The inspector also noted during a plant tour that the crane used in the pump house was parked directly above the battery for the starting circuitry of the diesel fire pump.
The inspector was concerned that a crane failure could damage this battery or other fire protection equipment.
The inspector discussed this concern with personnel who identified that the crane is required to have a holding brake that is sufficient to handle the weight of the hoist and that it is applied automatically when power is removed.
This brake is designed to be of sufficient strength to prevent release, which could result in damage to equipment below, if a seismic event should take place.
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie On tray 1, 1987, an exit meeting was held with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.
The inspector summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in this report.