IR 05000397/1987021
| ML17279A580 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1987 |
| From: | Bosted C, Caldwell C, Johnson P, Jim Melfi NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A579 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-21, NUDOCS 8710090099 | |
| Download: ML17279A580 (18) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No:
Docket No:
Licensee:
50-397/87-21 50-397 Mashington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Mashington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 Site near
'chland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
July Inspector:
C.
u 30, 1987 d
Resident Inspector 5'/i z
Date Signed 0 /~/z7 Approved by:
C.
W.
dwell, Project Inspector a F.
Me f', Reactor Inspector Ac~
P.
H. )oPnson, Chief Reactor@Projects Section
Date Signed r
~/~a Date Sig ed Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Jul 12 - Au ust 30 1987 50-397/87-21 Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident and region-based inspectors of control room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, audit program and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30702, 30703, 35701, 61726, 62702, 62703, 71707, 71709, 71710, 71881, 90713, 92700, 92701, 92702, 92703, 35701, and 93702 were covered.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
g7 $ 0090099 870'~<
pgp ADQCLC O>~
OETAILS Persons Contacted D. Mazur, Managing Director J.
Shannon, Deputy Managing Director
"L. Oxsen, Assistant Managing Director for Operations
~C.
Powers, Plant Manager
"J. Baker; Assistant Plant Manager
"R. Corcoran, Operations Manager S.
McKay, Assistant Operations Manager"
~K. Cowan, Technical Manager
~J.
Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
"D. Feldman, Plant guality Assurance Manager J. Peters, Administrative Manager P. Powell, Licensing Manager J.
Landon, Maintenance Manager
'he inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
- Attended the Exit Meeting on September 1,
1987.
Plant Status At the start of the inspection period, the plant was shutdown.
On July 25, the final actions addressed by the July 6 Confirmatory Action Letter had been accomplished and the reactor was taken critical at 11:56 PM.
The generator was synchronized to the grid on July 26 at 4:28 PM.
Power was raised in accordance with the fuel preconditioning guidelines, and, on July 27, 80K rated power was achieved.
Vibrations on main turbine governor valves ¹1 and ¹4 were noted during an 80K power level tour of the plant; manual control of the governor valves allowed valve ¹1 to be opened beyond its vibration range while valve ¹4 was closed.
This allowed power to be increased to approximately 92K.
High vibrations on condensate pump 2A caused it to be taken out of service on July 30.
On July 31, condensate pump 2A was balanced and test run successfully.
Power was raised to 99K on August 4.
Condensate filter/demineralizer (F/D) 'B'solation valves failed to isolate the F/D completely, preventing the correct backwash and precoating process from being completed.
This reduced the available F/Ds to five, the number needed for full power oper ation.
During the backwash/precoat cycle of a F/D, condensate flow is through the remaining F/Ds which limits total flow.
Reactor power was reduced to approximately 85K while renewing the F/D.
On August ll, power was reduced to approximately 86K while reactor water conductivity was near or above
.3 micromhos.
A change in the filter/demineralizer material on August 24 reduced the conductivity and power was returned to near 100K on August 26.
As a F/D needed to be renewed, power was reduced to 85', the cycle completed, and power was
then returned to 100K.
This cycling of power continued throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
3.
Previousl Identified NRC Ins ection Items The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings:
a 0 (Closed)
Followup Item 85-38-01:
Monitor Performance of HFA Relays The inspector had identified several HFA relays that appeared to be noisy and had questioned their potential reliability.
The licensee has examined the worst case relay pursuant to MWR 9873 to determine the apparent cause of the noise.
They found that the following three conditions contributed to the noisy HFA relay, all of which relate to the armature not seating properly against or lining up with the laminated pole piece.
(1)
Due to uneven spacing between the pole piece and the armature, contact was found to exist, producing noise.
Aligning the pole piece with the base prevented the pole piece from touching the armature when the relay was energized.
An even 3 mil air gap now exists between the pole piece and armature when the relay is energized.
(2)
Some of the pole piece laminations were a few thousandths of an inch higher than adjacent laminations.
Filing these high laminations even with those adjacent allowed the armature to seat against the face of the pole piece, reducing noise.
(3) It appeared that the back of the relay case was slightly distorted when tightening the four coil mounting screws to specification.
This prevented the armature from contacting the laminated pole piece squarely.
Adding a shim under one of the screws prevented this distortion, producing a quieter relay.
b.
The licensee plans to discuss these actions with the manufacturer to see if the modifications they performed affect the environmental qualification of the relay.
Once their methods are approved by the vendor, the licensee will then examine and correct additional relays that are considered to be noisy.
Operating experience to date has shown that none of the plant's HFA relays have been found to have loose contacts or terminations.
Relay performance will be monitored as part of the routine inspection program.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Followup Item 85-38-02:
Annunciator Deficiencies Need to be Reduced The number of activated/deactivated equipment alarms has steadily decreased, with a major reduction of problems during the most recent refueling outage.
The number of alarms deactivated and those alarming due to equipment problems was reduced from 94 prior to the 1987 refueling outage to 40 as of July 28, 1987.
The licensee plans
to continue with the annunciator reduction program.
In the meantime, the Control Room alarm status was being updated weekly by listing all alarms and their respective cause(s).
Alarm conditions continued to be part of the shift turnover routine.
Annunciator deficiencies will continue to be followed as part of the routine inspection program.
This item is closed.
C.
(Closed)
Followup Item 85-38-03:
Engineering to Review Final Evaluation of Defective Meld on Meldolet The inspector reviewed an Engineering memorandum dated May 27, 1987, which stated that they performed a review of the disposition of NCR 21952 and determined that it had been properly closed out.
Their evaluation included minimum wall calculations for the rejected fitting weld and field inspection of the reworked fitting installation, including wall thickness measurements.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed)
Followup Item 86-32-02:
Upgrade the Procedure Review Process Procedure quality has been upgraded by the addition of a full time Procedure Coordinator holding an SRO license.
A quality review program for operating and abnormal condition procedures has been initiated.
A procedure guidance document was issued in June 1987 that incorporates the applicable areas of INPO instructions for generating and reviewing procedures.
As a matter of reference, there were only four reportable events pertaining to plant operations which were attributed to defective procedures during the past year.
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed)
Followup Item 86-34-01:
Commitment Tracking System Closure of Items not Effective The Senior Compliance Engineer assigns a priority and establishes a
completion date with responsible individuals for NRC commitments.
The task is then placed on the computerized
"Plant Tracking Log" where compliance with the stated commitment can be monitored.
In addition, the Senior Compliance Engineer has established a
personalized commitment 'tracking list that he utilizes to assure that commitments are met on schedule.
Recent experience shows that the licensee has been tracking and assuring that commitments to the NRC are being met on schedule or that the NRC has been notified in advance and the reasons for any delays.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were 'identified.
Review of Plant Activities Plant Tours The following plant areas were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:-
0
0
0
0 Reactor Building Control Room Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Service Mater Buildings Technical Support Center Turbine Generator Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.
(2)
(3)
Monitorin Instrumentation.
Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
~i<<M i
.
hi for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
(4)
E ui ment Lineu s.
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
(5)
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
General Plant E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment was observed for indications of'ystem leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingtheir functional requirements.
,(7)
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.
Plant Housekee in
.
Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
Cleanliness inside the contamination/radiation barrier in RHR
'A'ump room was observed to be lacking.
Several items had been left within the area at the conclusion of previous wor Debris, hand tools, nails, a loose pen and a ladder had been observed to be scattered on the floor around the pump for several weeks.
The inspector had informed shift managers on several occasions that the area needed to be cleaned up.
Loose items used in apparent maintenance activities (nuts, bolts, washers, conduit clamps, and small fittings) were observed in the bottom sections of numerous instrument racks.
This matter was discussed with maintenance management, and the instrument racks were immediately cleaned.
Housekeeping will be further evaluated during the ongoing inspection program.
(10) Radiation Protection Controls.
Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, proper wearing of personnel monitoring devices, and personnel frisking practices.
Event Followu The inspector reviewed the Supply System's activities towards determining the root cause of the reactor trips and other events which occurred during the plant restart from the R-2 refueling outage.
The licensee evaluated these events individually and assessed the root cause program in general as identified in the July 6,
1987 Confirmatory Action Letter.
The inspector focused on the licensee's efforts to determine a root cause for the reactor trips that occurred on June 28, July 2, and July 6, 1987 and a valve operator that burned up on July 20, 1987.
The June 28, 1987 reactor trip occurred due to the tripping of a Reactor Protective System (RPS) Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA)
breaker while the plant was already in a 1/2 scram condition.
The inspector observed the licensee's attempts to determine the source of the problem.
The spurious breaker trip could not be duplicated.
However, the problem was isolated to several potential components within the EPA breaker assembly.
Subsequent investigations indicated that there have been a number of failures of EPA breakers throughout the industry.
The Supply System is currently gathering detailed industry information on these breakers and will evaluate the reportability of these failures within the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.
The July 2, 1987 reactor trip occurred, in part, due to failure of a General Electric Model SBN reactor protection system (RPS)
power supply transfer switch.
The licensee's investigation indicated that the switch failed due to low cycle fatigue failure of the switch
"stop tab".
The broken tab allowed the operator to turn the switch beyond the desired position, which caused both RPS busses to become deenergized.
The vendor reported that similar failures of these SBM switches (in non-nuclear applications)
have been identified on two previous occasions.
However, the SBM switch which caused the trip did not come from the specific lots with which the previous failures
were associated.
The replacement stop tab plate installed by the licensee was an improved version which offers less susceptibility to tab failure.
The July 6, 1987 reactor trip occurred when operators attempted to transfer power from the startup power supply to the normal power supply for plant bus SM-2.
Immediately after closing the normal power supply breaker, N1-2, the breaker tripped open causing the bus to become deenergized.
The loss of bus SM-2 caused a loss of power to the main and auxiliary control oil pumps for the operating main feedwater pump, which resulted in the scram.
Licensee investigation revealed that a bent finger in the "C" phase disconnecting contact finger cluster prevented the breaker from being fully racked in.
The jarring motion of the breaker closing caused the floor tripping mechanism to trip the breaker.
Further evaluation indicated that all large frame Westinghouse breakers used on-site are susceptible to the same problem.
If the operator does not verify that the floor tripping plunger is fully reset while racking in the breaker, it may trip upon subsequent operation.
Licensee procedures for racking in these breakers were revised to incorporate a verification of trip plunger position.
The inspector considers that the licensee's efforts towards making root'ause assessments of these events were appropriate in conjunction with actions specified in the July 6, 1987 Confirmation of Action Letter.
On July 20, 1987, licensee personnel identified a problem in which the clutch for the valve operator on main steam leakage control (MSLC) valve lA would not allow for declutching and manual operation.,
As a result, the licensee issued vital maintenance wor k request (MWR) 1378 to troubleshoot/repair the declutch mechanism.
(Generally, the vital MWR is prepared and authorized by the shift manager when it is necessary to perform work in an expedited manner; e.g., backshift hours on equipment necessary for plant operation when there is insufficient time to wait for a standard MWR to be processed.)
After troubleshooting/repair of the clutch mechanism, the motor operator burned out during functional testing of the operator after it was reinstalled.
The inspector reviewed MWR 1378 and was concerned about the level of detail specified for work on the MWR and the apparent lack of strict controls for work performed on vital MWRs in general.
In particular:
MWR 1378 only specified that the craft troubleshoot/repair the component.
No details were given (e.g.,
valve operator disassembly instructions).
The shift manager or preparer may not have had knowledge of codes or special precautions that are in effect for components (e.g.,
Technical Manual requirements).
The mechanical/electrical craft interface was poor.
The motor operator was removed with the valve torqued closed.
This caused the operator spring pack to be compressed, which could
have affected the torque switch settings (and valve operability) when the valve operator was reinstalled.
The craft identified that a jumper was missing around the open torque switch in the operator and installed one.
Later, the shift manager directed that the jumper be removed after the motor burned up.
Without a review of the MWR by cognizant technical personnel, the need for a jumper could not be established per design requirements.
In addition, it was not apparent that the drawings for this valve would be revised to reflect the addition of the jumper.
The only gC involvement on this operator was a verification of parts and the jumper.
The vital MWR procedure did not provide for gC review or implementation of hold points.
More preplanning may have prevented the motor from burning up.
These concerns were identified to licensee management who acknowledged that an evaluation of the vital MWR program may be warranted.
The inspector will review further the work that was performed under MWR 1378 and the licensee's use of vital MWRs in general.
(Inspector fol 1owup item 87-21-01).
As a result of the missing jumper in the operator for valve MSLC 1A, the licensee sampled other valves in the MSLC and found that valve operators for MSLC 1B-D, 2A-D,and 3A-D also did not have jumpers.
Thus, 12 of 16 valves in the MSLC system did not have jumpers.
The Supply System addressed the generic applicability of the missing jumpers to other valve operators by performing a 100K walkdown of all safety-related valves that are required to open to determine if jumpers were installed around the open torque switches.
As a result of this effort, the licensee found that valves SW-V-90 and RHR-V-6A did not have jumpers installed as required.
In addition, SW-V-2B had a jumper that was of a non-qualified material, SBGT-5A configuration did not agree with the top tier drawing, and MSV-68A and B did not have jumpers as a result of a design error.
The inspector considers that the licensee's methodology for determining the proper use of these valve jumpers was appropriate.
However, due to problems identified above, the inspector considers that further review of the licensee's configuration control program is necessary.
(Inspector followup item 87-21-02).
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdown Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical power supplies, cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable
and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves were in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated date.
~Sstem Diesel Generator Systems, Divisions 1, 2, and 3.
Low Pressure Coolant Injection, Trains "A", "B" and "C" Date July 31, 1987 August 24, 1987 August 19, 1987 Low Pressure Core Spray High Pressure Core Spray Standby Liquid Control System 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Divisions 1 and
August 19, 1987 August 5, 1987 August 21, 1987 August 23, 1987 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testin a ~
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that: 1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test
'esults satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector on the dates shown:
Procedure Dates Performed PPM 7. 4. 7. 3. 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Valve Lineup Verification July 26, 1987 PPM 7.4.2.1 Power Distribution Limits August 5, 1987 P
PM 7. 4. 1. 3. 1. 2 P PM 7. 4. 3. 8. 2. 1 Rod Exercise Weekly Turbine Valve Tests August 21, 1987 August 21, 1987
PPM 7. 4. 7. 9. 1 Meekly Bypass Valve Test August 21, 1987 b.
The following completed surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspector:
Procedure Dates Performed PPM 7.4. 11. 1.1.1 Determination of Radio-July 26, 1987 activity in Liquid Mater PPM 7.0.0 Shift and Daily Instrument Checks August 21, 1987 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Maintenance During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified that reportability for these activities was correct.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Descri tion Preventative Maintenance per PPM 10.25.87, Feedwater Turbine Governor Troubleshooting, Calibration and Maintenance Dates Performed July 28, 1987 Troubleshooting Main Turbine Governor Valve Vibration July 28, 1987 EHC Testing per PPM 8.3.62 Clean and Inspect Safety Relief Valve Flow Indicator per NWR AT 1088 Condensate Pump 2A Vibration Testing per MWR AV 1399 July 28, 1987 July 31, 1987 July 31, 1987 August 18, 1987 Repair of Spurious Alarm on Steam Jet Air Ejector Exhaust Radiation Monitor per NWR AT 1045 No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie s.
Radiolo ical Practices The inspector peri'odical ly observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspector verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted frequent plant tours to observe activities in progress and were generally aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radiological conditions and/or challenges.
ALARA consideration was given to each job that was performed during maintenance activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Ph sical Securit The inspector periodically observed security practices to ascertain that the licensee's implementation of the security plans was in accordance with site procedures.
The inspector observed that the number of guards was adequate for the requirements of the security plan; that the search equipment at the access control points was operational; that the protected area barriers were well maintained without breaks; and that personnel allowed access to the protected area were badged and monitored and that monitoring equipment was functional.
Night illumination inside the protected area was observed and obstructions were lighted adequately.
Surveillance equipment was also observed during this inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Followu The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspector.
Based on the information provided in the reports, it was concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The below LERs are considered closed.
LER NUMBER DESCRIPTION LER 87-07 SRM Channel
'A'noperable during Core LER 87-07-01 Alterations No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the reported information appeared vali Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.
o Monthly Operating Report for July 1987.
o Semi Annual Effluent Report for January 1 - June 30, 1987.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Audit Pro ram The inspector reviewed the licensee's corporate Quality Assurance (QA)
program relating to audits of WNP-2 activities to assure that the audit program was in conformance with the regulatory requirements, commitments in the application, and industry standards.
The licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide 1.44, Revision 1, which endorses ANSI 18.2. 12-1977.
The scope of the audit program for operations (referenced in Section 17.2 of the FSAR) is documented in the Operational Quality Assurance Program Description (OQAPD).
The requirements and responsibilities for the audit program described in the OQAPD were noted in Nuclear Operation Standard (NOS) 20, "Audits".
The audit program was consistent with section 6 of the technical specifications.
The required frequency of audits of the corporate staff was defined in NOS-20 and the licensee was implementing the required frequency of these audits.
The audit program implementation was reviewed previously in inspection report 50-397/87-13.
The following Quality Assurance Instructions (QAIs) were reviewed by the inspector:
Instruction Number
"
QAI 18"1 QAI 18-2 Tit1e Qual ity Assurance Audits Qualification of QA Program Audit Personnel Revision Effective Number Date
3-14-84
1"11-83 QAI 16-1 Preparation and Processing Quality Finding Reports (QFRs)
10-15-84
By reviewing the above QA program instructions the inspector verified that responsibilities were assigned in writing for overall management of the audit program including:
a.
Determining the adequacy of the qualifications of audit personnel.
b.
Ensuring corrective actions taken for deficiencies identified during audits.
c.
Determining when reaudits are required.
d.
Issuance of audit reports to managemen e.
Periodic reviews of the audit program to determine its status and adequacy.
The audit program also requires preliminary findings to be discussed with the audited organization during an exit interview.
A response is required from the audited organization within 30 days.
Distribution requirements for audit reports and corrective action responses had been defined in the instructions.
Checklists or marked up procedures were used in the performance of all audits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Plant Startu from Refuelin
/
Following the Startup on July 25, 1987 the licensee performed reactor core physics tests to ascertain core thermal power limits at each power plateau while power was increased to 100K.
The inspector witnessed core power distribution limit checks at selected power levels and discussed the results with the reactor engineers and shift technical advisors.
The inspector observed calibration of the traversing incore probe (TIP),
local power range monitors (LPRMs), and the average power range monitors (APRMs) at these selected power levels.
The inspector also reviewed the calculations for the reactor shutdown margin determination.
During the performance of the physics tests, the inspector reviewed plant procedures and compared the data with the requirements of the procedure.
The procedures appeared to be adequate and the results obtained during the testing appeared to meet the requirements of the procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to discuss inspection status, and an exit meeting was conducted with the indicated personnel (paragraph 1) on September 1, 1987.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative e.
Periodic reviews of the audit program to determine its status and adequacy.
The audit program also requires preliminary findings to be discussed with the audited organization during an exit interview.
A response is required from the audited organization within 30 days.
Distribution requirements for audit reports and corrective action responses had been defined in the instructions.
Checklists or marked up procedures were used in the performance of all audits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Plant Startu from Refuelin Following the Startup on July 25, 1987 the licensee performed reactor core physics tests to ascertain core thermal power limits at each power plateau while power was increased to lOOX.
The inspector witnessed core power distribution limit checks at selected power levels and discussed the results with the reactor engineers and shift technical advisors.
The inspector observed calibration of the traversing incore probe (TIP),
local power range monitors (LPRNs),
and the average power range monitors (APRMs) at these selected power levels.
The inspector also reviewed the calculations for the reactor shutdown margin determination.
During the performance of the physics tests, the inspector reviewed plant procedures and compared the data with the requirements of the procedure.
The procedures appeared to be adequate and the results obtained during the testing appeared to meet the requirements of the procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. ~iM The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the report period to discuss inspection status, and an exit meeting was conducted with the indicated personnel (paragraph 1) on September 1,
1987.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representatives.