IR 05000397/1987028
| ML17279A726 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1987 |
| From: | Caldwell C, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A725 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-28, NUDOCS 8712160047 | |
| Download: ML17279A726 (7) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COYiYiISSION REGION V
.Report No.
Docket No.
License Ho.
Licensee:
Facility Name:
50-397/87-28 50-397 NPF-21 Washington Public Power'upply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)'
nspection conducted:
C.
W.
Ca dw
,
Prospect nspector October 26 - October 30, 1987 Inspector:
Approved By:
P.
H.
hnson, Chic
,
Reac o
Projects Section
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington cP c~P a
e Signed
"/~W zv Date Signed Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on October 26 - October 30, 1987 Re ort No. 50-397/87-28 A~Id:
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f'nspector identified items, non-licensed staff training, licensed operator training, and design changes and modifications.
Inspection procedures 30703, 41400, 41701, and 37700 were covered.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
PDR g
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1.
Persons Contacted DETAILS Licensee Personnel C.
J.
- R.
- J D.
- A.
- K.
- W
- J
- N.
R.
R.
- J S.
J.
M. Powers, Plant Manager W. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager L. Corcoran, Assistant Plant Manager (Acting)
E. Wyrick, t~ianager, Licensed Operator Training S.
Feldman, Plant guality Assurance Manager G. Hosier, Nuclear Safety Assurance Group Manager D. Cowan, Plant Technical Manager D. Shaeffer, Assistant Operations Manager (Acting)
D. Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager C. Bartlett, Plant gC Supervisor L. Koenigs, Plant Technical Supervisor J.
Barbee, Plant Engineering Supervisor T. Little, Scheduling Supervisor L. Washington, Lead Compliance Engineer D. Arbuckle, Compliance Engineer
- Denotes those attending the final exit meeting on October 30, 1987.
The inspector also contacted licensee operators, engineers, technicians, and other personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Actions On Previous NRC Ins ection Findin s
a.
Closed)
Followu Item 87-25-02
, Review of Jum er and Lifted ea ro ram D)sere ancses This item identified discrepancies in the control and implementation of temporary modifications.
One discrepancy was the use of
"temporary modifications" for long periods of time.
For example, four jumpers have been in place since March 20, 1984, due to an identified design problem.
Another problem identified was that some modification control forms had no documentation to indicate that the need for a
CFR 50.59 review was considered (most jumper control sheets specify that a 50.59 review is not required).
The third discrepancy identified that a lifted lead tag was issued and still in use, although the jumper/lifted lead log specified that this lifted lead was to have been removed by the end of the R-2 refueling outage.
The final discrepancy concerned the Technical Manager's not reviewing the jumper/lifted lead log for that quarter and reporting the findings to the Plant Manager.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's action on these discrepancies and found that the Supply System has made all long term temporary modifications high priority items by virtue of their length of time in effect.
These will be worked as soon as possible.
The procedure has been revised with a new checklist for 50.59 and engineering
b.
evaluations and a
memo to all personnel on distribution was sent
'rom the Technical Manager on PPM 1.3.9 implementation.
'The checklist will be performed for each temporary modification and will be used to determine if a 50.59 evaluation is required for that modification.
The inspector also found that the Technical Manager completed the review of the jumper/lifted lead log and reported the findings to the plant manager.
In addition, the licensee was evaluating the need for establishing criteria for performance of functional testing upon restoration from a temporary modification.
The inspector considered that the licensee's action to correct these discrepancies was satisfactory.
In addition, the licensee revised procedure PPM 1.3.9,
"Control of Electrical and Mechanical Jumpers and Lifted Leads," to reflect enhancements recommended by INPO good practices.
Therefore, this item is closed.
Closed Followu Item 87-25-03
, Timeliness and Ade uac of Res onses to Surve>
ance Fsndin s
This item identified a concern dealing with examples of untimely response to gA identified discrepancies.
The inspector considered that these examples may have been indicative of a lack of sensitivity or commitment by various organizations within the Supply System to gA efforts to identify problems.
This concern was also discussed with the Supply System management during past meetings with the Regional Administrator.
guality Assurance/guality Control Instruction (PgA-03), "Plant Surveillance Activities" specified that plant responses to deficiencies should be returned to gA within 10 working days.
This procedure also required that a memorandum or NCR of unacceptable corrective action be prepared by gA, signed by the gA Manager, and sent to the next higher level of management responsible for action if the response was not received within the allotted time.
Ouring this inspection, the inspector found that in addition to these program controls, the licensee had instituted additional corrective actions.
The Plant Manager had become actively involved with all items that were outstanding for more than thirty days.
The Administrative Manager was tracking all audit findings (e.g.,
gA and Nuclear Safety Assurance Group) to provide a status of the corrective actions for these items.
The licensee believed that this method of handling audit deficiencies should prevent fur ther occurrences of overdue plant responses.
The inspector considered that the licensee's efforts were appropriate.
Therefore, this item is closed.
kithin this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Non-Licensed Staff Trainin The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for non-licensed staff training by selecting several recent operating events to determine if they might have been caused by deficient training.
In addition, the
ins'pector reviewed the program to determine if these events were factored into the training program if.necessary.
The inspector noted that the licensee's non-licensed staff training program was accredited by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) on August 27, 1987.
The inspector selected several licensee event reports (LERs) that were identified as due to personnel error.
The inspector found that maintenance personnel were trained on these LERs and other "Operating Experience Review (OER)" problems that had been identified throughout the industry.
These OER items were covered in required reading and, if appropriate, were discussed in shop lectures.
The licensee also has an 18 month training cycle that factors in OER items when necessary.
As examples, repair of fire terminations (barriers)
and another utility's experience with drain plugs on valve operators were discussed during recent training.
'he licensee indicated that a quarterly training plan was being established which would discuss repetitive problems in addition to other items.
The lesson plans were in place for this training and it was expected to start in early 1988.
The inspector also verified that the technicians were trained on outage items in preparation for the R-2 refueling outage.
Examples of training items that were covered for electrical maintenance technician training were breakers, terminations, and limitorque valve operator equipment qualification upgrades.
The inspector had one concern over non-licensed staff training.
This was with regard to refresher training for journeymen maintenance technicians.
The 18 month training cycle was established primarily for in-grade technician training and also serves as a refresher course for journeymen.
However, the work schedule at WNP-2 has been such, that journeymen usually do not get a chance to attend these classes.
The inspector reviewed plant procedures manual (PPM)-1.8.5,
"Maintenance Department Training" which was the controlling document for maintenance training. It specified that refresher training on selected topics shall be provided as necessary.
However, the inspector found that no criteria were provided for determining who would go to this training, what the contents would be, or how often it would occur.
Therefore, it was possible that some journeymen would never receive refresher training if the work schedule did not permit.
This item is identified as inspector followup item (87-28-01).
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Licensed 0 erator Trainin The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for licensed operator training by selecting several recent operating events to determine if they might have been caused by deficient training.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the program to determine if these events were factored into the training program if necessary.
The inspector noted that the licensee's operator training program has been fully accredited by INP The inspector selected several licensee event reports (LERs) that were identified as due to personnel error.
The inspector found that Operations personnel were trained on these LERs and other OER problems that have been identified throughout the industry.
These OER items were covered by memorandum from the Operations Manager to all licensed operators and equipment operators through required reading and requalification training lectures if appropriate.
The inspector reviewed the training attendance record and interviewed personnel to verify that the training occurred.
The inspector attended a requalification training class concerning the licensee's new root cause evaluation program.
This program was changed as a result of the events that occurred upon restart from the R-2 refueling outage and the subsequent Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL)
issued by the NRC on July 6, 1987.
One of the items specified in the CAL was that the licensee assess the effectiveness of their root cause evaluation program.
The new root cause program entitled
"Human Performance Evaluation System" (HPES)
was based upon INPO efforts to aid utilities in improving human performance and identifying the root cause of human errors by means of a structured approach.
This program was designed to identify problem situations in which human performance could or has contributed to an error affecting operations, to determine the root cause and contributing factors associated with the identified human errors, and to recommend corrective actions to management to prevent further recurrence of the identified problem.
The lecture was well constructed and attended by Operations and other individuals who will be involved with the program.
Many site specific examples of human error and how HPES can be applied to these events were contained in the lecture.
In addition, class participation was stressed with exercises to aid personnel in using HPES.
The inspector considered that this training was effective in responding to the CAL and detailing the responsibilities of the personnel who will participate in the HPES program.
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Desi n
Desi n Chan es, and Modifications The inspector completed a review of the design change and modification programs at WNP-2.
This effort supplemented the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI),
and the inspector's previous inspection in this area.
The SSFI (inspection report 50-397/87-19)
team inspected the design change program, design changes in effect, permanent modifications, and jumpers and lifted leads in use.
The previous inspection (inspection report 50-397/87-25)
focused on the prograomatic controls and implementation of temporary modifications.
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's program to ensure that operator training programs were revised, prior to the modification being declared operable, to reflect the design change or modification that was implemented.
The inspector found that design changes and modifications from the R-2 refueling outage were incorporated in the licensee's training program.
Examples of changes made during R-2 were the addition of a hydrogen dryer to the main generator cooling system and a generator radio-frequency monitor.
The inspector reviewed the training documentation and
interviewed personnel to verify that required personnel attended the training sessions.
The lesson plans were prepared per the procedure, independently reviewed by another instructor, and approved by the training supervisor.
No discrepancies were identified.
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Tour The inspector'onducted a tour of the reactor building on October 28, 1987 to assess the licensee's hous'ekeeping activities.
In general, the building cleanliness was adequate.
However, the inspector identified several discrepancies as identified below.
The inspector found a number of air hoses and electrical extension cords that were connected to fittings or electrical outlets in clean areas and used in contaminated areas.
Some of these items were wrapped in yellow poly sleeving beginning.at the point where they entered the contaminated area.
However, most were not.
In addition, the hoses and cords were not secured at the point where they entered the contaminated area.
The inspector questioned this practice and found that there was no requirement to wrap hoses or cords when using them in contaminated areas.
The inspector was concerned that the lack of a policy on sleeving or securing items used in contaminated areas could lead to the spread of contamination due to mishandling of the equipment.
The inspector discussed this concern with plant management who stated that they would evaluate the need for a more clearly defined policy for sleeving hoses and cords when used in contaminated areas.
The inspector was concerned over the location of three tool boxes,
"gang boxes," that were located near safety related equipment.
One was located on elevation 522'ear a leak detection thermocouple, one was located on elevation 572'ear the standby gas treatment system (SGTS),
and the third was located on elevation 548'ear a Division 1 heat trace junction box.
The boxes on elevations 522'nd 572'ere slightly within the required boundary established by PPN 10.2.53, Rev. 2, "Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding, Ladders, Tool Gang Boxes, and Metal Storage Cabinets."
However, the gang box (Crew Box 11)
on elevation 548'as stored only 2 feet away from the Division 1 heat trace junction box for the containment sampling system.
A sign was posted on the box which specified that the gang box shall not be stored within 6'f safety related equipment.
The inspector identified this concern to the Instrumentation and Control Maintenance Department who promptly moved the
.
three gang boxes discussed above to locations away from safety related equipment.
These observations are related to similar concerns identified recently during the SSFI team inspection as discussed in inspection report 50-397/87-19.
The inspector will follow the licensee's corrective actions with regards to control of gang boxes (and other equipment)
near safety related equipment along wi-th the item identified in report 50-397/87-19.
Within this area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie On October 30, 1987, an exit meeting was held with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.
The inspector summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in this report.