IR 05000397/1987015
| ML17279A482 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1987 |
| From: | Bosted C, Dodds R, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A480 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-15, NUDOCS 8708200396 | |
| Download: ML17279A482 (8) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
'Report No:.
50-397/87-15 Docket No:
Licensee:
50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
May 24 - July ll, 1987
,Inspectors:~ R.
T.
dds, Senior Resident Inspector 7/3 /Z7 Date Signed 7/> /87 Approved by:
Summary:
C. J.
osted, Resident Inspector l4..
P.
.
ohnson, Chief Reac o
Projects Section
Date Signed
~/~-h.v Date Signed Ins ection on Ma 24 - Jul ll 1987 50-397/87-15 Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors of control room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 41400, 60710, 61707, 61720, 61726, 62702, 71707, 71709, 71710, 71881, 72700, 72701, 90712, 92700, 92701, 92702, and 93702 were covered.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8708200396 870731 PDR ADOCK 05000397'
DETAILS Persons Contacted J.
Shannon, Deputy Managing Director L. Oxsen, Assistant Managing Director for Operations
"C. Powers, Plant Manager J.
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager R. Corcoran, Operations Manager
"S.
McKay, Assistant Operations. Manager K.
Cowan, Technical Manager J.
Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager
- R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
- D. Feldman, Plant guality Assurance Manager
"J. Peters, Administrative Manager P.
Powell, Licensing Manager M. Wuestefeld, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- J.
Landon, Maintenance Manager
- Personnel in attendance at exit meeting The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
Plant Status At the start of the reporting period, the annual refueling outage was in progress.
The outage had been extended due to difficulties encountered during repair of the reactor recirculation (RRC) pumps.
An integrated leak rate test of the primary containment was conducted during the reporting period.
Additional startup delays developed when a leak on the
"A" RRC pump was discovered; the cause of the leak was determined to be an undersized gasket installed in the pump.
The undersized gasket was in accordance with specifications and drawings that were on site; however, unknown to the site, the gasket thickness specification had been increased by the vendor.
The RRC pump was taken apart, the gasket changed, and the plant made ready for'tartup on June 22, 1987.
After critical data were obtained, the reactor was shut down to allow containment integrity to be broken to.facilitate the repair of recirculation valve RRC-V-23A which was determined to be leaking.
The reactor was restarted on June 23 and during physics testing the traversing incore probe (TIP) indexer malfunctioned.
Several.
attempts to correct the indexer problems were not successful; successful repairs were finally made on June 29, 1987.
On June 26 while operating at approximately 57K power, a loss of normal power from transformer TR-Nl caused a reactor scram; The transformer tripped when the sudden pressure relay actuated.
Initial troubleshooting indicated that an electrical fault may
have occurred within the transformer.
The transformer was isolated and the plant restarted.
On June 27, approximately 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> after the previous scram, another scram occurred from approximately 58K due to a trip of.the sudden pressure relay for transformer TR-N2.
Troubleshooting of this trip indicated that the cause of trip was test valves installed on the transformers to check the sudden pressure relay.
The licensee determined that these valves were supplied with the transformers and should have been removed prior to initial plant operation.
The test valves were removed, and the nitrogen cover gas pressure was reset to a
- lower range.
Transformer gas and oil sample results indicated no damage had been experienced on either. transformer.
The plant was restarted on June 28, and at 7:33 PM that day, the reactor scrammed from approximately 60K power.
Earlier during the power ascension, a turbine governor valve oil pressure switch for the "B" reactor protection system (RPS)
was leaking and was placed in a tripped condition for switch replacement.
At 7:33 PM, an "EPA" breaker on the "A" RPS motor generator output opened.
'o reproducible cause for the breaker opening was determined; however, a.
material degrading (and possible misalignment) of the normally energized undervoltage trip coil was noted and repaired.
The plant was restarted on June 30 and power was raised to approximately 78K.
On July 2, at 12: 18 PM, while transferring deenergized RPS "A" power bus from the RPS motor generator to the backup power supply, a
failed transfer switch caused a loss of both RPS power busses and a
reactor scram.
The "A" RPS motor generator (MG) had previously failed due to a grounded and/or burned out winding in the motor.
On July 4, after the motor on the "A" RPS MG had been replaced, the reactor was taken critical at 8:00 PM.
During the plant heatup, an overpressure condition in the condenser occurred, causing a main turbine rupture diaphragm to fail. The reactor was taken to cold shutdown'to replace the
'upture diaphragm on all the low pressure turbines.
The plant was restarted on July 5 at 5:36 PM.
At 5:45 AM on July 6, while transferring house electrical loads from the offsite power source to the main generator output, the Nl-2 breaker from the auxiliary transformer closed, which normally opens the startup power breaker S2, and then the Nl-2 breaker immediately reopened and caused a partial loss of power within the plant.
The SM-2 load center deenergized causing a loss of a condensate booster pump and ultimately a loss of the running reactor feedwater (RFM) pump normal and backup oil pumps.
This caused a loss of RFM pump and under-feeding of the reactor.
A low reactor level scram occurred several seconds after the loss of the RFM pump.
Later that day, licensee management determined not to restart the plant until plant conditions were reassessed in light of the numerous reactor scrams and other conditions which had recently occurred at the plant.
This was established as a commitment to the Regional Administrator, and a
Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued by Region V on July 6, 1987.
This CAL addressed licensee commitments regarding reevaluation of the root cause assessment and post-trip'eview programs, reassessment of plant readiness for continued operation, and a meeting between Region V and Supply System management to discuss the results of the reevaluation prior to plant restar The plant remained shutdown through the end of the reporting period.
0 erations Verifi'cations The resident inspectors reviewed the control room operator and shift manager log books on a daily basis during this report period.,
Reviews were also made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and that the licensee was actively pursuing corrections to conditions'isted in either log.
Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with the control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The licensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's),
particularly those dealing with ESF and ESF electrical alignment, were observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that the control room licensed personnel on duty at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance.
The inspectors observed access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments, and availability of on site and offsite electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Refuelin Activities Reactor vessel head stud tensioning was observed and the results of the final stud elongation measurements examined.
The studs were tensioned and met the temperature and elongation requirements specified in PPM 10.3.5, Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Startu from Refuelin a 0 Control Rod Drive Scram Time Tests The inspector examined the computer printout'of control rod scram tests that were conducted at rated pressure and temperature pursuant to Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) 7.4. 1.3.2 on June 24, 1987.
All rods met the acceptance criteria of 3.497 seconds
'from the fully withdrawn position to position 5 for the average scram insertion time of all operable control rods.
The slowest rod scram time was 3.386 seconds, well under the individual scram time limit of 7 seconds.
The average rod scram time was 2.386 second b.
Local'ower Range Monitor (LPRM) Calibration The inspector observed portions of the initial traversing in-core probe (TIP) configuration verification relative to fuel position and the subsequent full-core flux mapping (performed at 60K percent power) that was used to determine the LPRM gain adjustments.
The test was conducted pursuant to PPM 9.3.3, LPRM Calibration.
- c.
Shutdown Margin Verification Review of the licensee's procedure, PPM 7.4. l. 1, showed it to be consistent with regulatory requirements based upon the in-sequence criticality method of shutdown martin determination.
The reactivity information contained in the "Startup and Operations Letter Report, WNP-2 Cycle 3" was also reviewed for consistency.
The shutdown margin calculations were based upon final Cycle 3 core loading and actual Cycle 2 exposure of 5201.7 MWd/MTU at a moderator temperature of 68'F.
Measurements recorded during performance of the shutdown margin verification test, corrected to 68'F, demonstrated a shutdown margin (with the strongest worth rod
'ully withdrawn) of 1.84K delta K.
This satisfied the minimum required shutdown margin of 0.38K specified in Technical Specification 3.1.1.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
New E ui ment Prep erational Tests During the refueling outage completed during the inspection period, a number of new equipment items were installed.
Several of these items provide essential data or control special processes.
Portions of the preoperational tests were witnessed and the completed tests were reviewed for the replacement of the process computer, rod worth minimizer, and. suppression pool wide range.
level instrument.
The preoperational tests reviewed were:
PPM 7.4. 3. 7. 5. 31 Wide Range Suppression Pool Level PPM 8. 6. 12 Plant Process Computer Replacement PPM 8.6. 11 Rod Worth Minimizer Preoperational Test In addition to the above, the inspector also reviewed the process computer factory test results conducted March 11, 1987 and the site acceptance test conducted May 16, 1987.'he inspector determined that the equipment was tested in an acceptable manner with approved procedures.
Test exceptions were noted and dispositioned in an acceptable manne Performance of the process computer during the reactor trips experienced in the process of plant startup following the annual outage was marginal in the area of post-trip data analysis.
On some occasions, the computer was not able to provide all the data retrieval that the system was capable of providing.
On, two of these occasions the computer was being used to perform plant tests and, at the time of the July 6 event, an electrical switch that controlled the manual mode of
. data storage failed.
In these instances, one sample per second data storage was available; however, the 4 and 50 millisecond data-were not available.
The manual switch was repaired arid the computer system was operational at the.end of the report period.
Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation-
'The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the inspectors observed portions of the following detailed surveillance tests by operators and instrument and control technicians.
PPM 7.4.0.5.8, Local Leak Rate Test of Valves RHR-V-53B, 50B and 3B (May 30, 1987)
PPM 7.4.0.5. 11, Safety/Relief Valve Discharge Vacuum Breaker Operability (June 1,1987)
PPM 7.4. l. 1.63, Average Power Range Monitor Channel B (July 6, 1987)
PPM 7.4. 1. 1.65, Average Power Range Monitor Channel D (July 6, 1987)
PPM 7.4. 1.3.2, Control Rod Drive (CRD) Scram Timing (June 25, 1987)
PPM 7.4.3. 1. 1.9, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure Scram Function (June 23, 1987)
PPM 7.4.3.6.4.8, Control Rod Block Monitor Intermediate Channel B
(May 30, 1987)
PPM 7. 4. 3. 6. 10, Flow Functional Test Channel A (July 6, 1987)
PPM 7.4.5. 1.9, Residual Heat Removal Loop B Operability Test (May 30-31, 1987)
PPM 7.4.6. 1.3. 1, Personnel Airlock Door'Seal Leak Test (June 26, 1987)
PPM 7. 4. 7. 3. 3, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operability Test (June 24-25, 1987)
PPM 7.4.8. l. 1.2.5, Standby Diesel Generator Loss of Power, Test (June 3-4, 1987)
No violations or deviations were identifie Monthl Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety-related systems maintenance activities were observed.
By direct observation and review of-. records the inspector determined whether these activities were consistent with.LCOs; that the proper administrative controls and tag-out procedures were followed; and that equipment was properly tested before return to service.
The inspector also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine if the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and to verify that backlogs which might affect system performance were not developing.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed.
AV1291, MSV-1 Packing Leak (June 24, 1987)
AV1296, RRC-V-23A Valve Flange Leaks (June 24, 1987)
AV1298, RCIC Woodward Governor (June 25, 1987).
AU8200/AV1212, DG-Engine Cylinder Repair (June 2, 1987)
AU9871, Replacement of Airlock Door Seals (June 26, 1987)
Replacement of RPS "A" MG Motor (July 2-3, 1987)
Repair of RPS Power Switch (July 2, 1987)
Troubleshooting Westinghouse High Voltage Circuit Breaker (July 6-7, 1987)
No violations or deviations were identified.
En ineered Safet Feature Verification The inspector verified the operability of the Standby Service Water, High Pressure Core Spray, Low Pressure Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal A,
B, and C Systems by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the systems.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration, and verified that valves were in the proper position, had power available, and were locked as. appropriate.
The licensee's procedures were verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radiolo ical Protection The inspectors periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted frequent plant tours to observe activities in progress and were gener ally aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radiological conditions and/or challenges.
ALARA consideration was found to be an integral part of each RWP (Radiation Work Permit).
No violations or deviations were identifie ll.
Ph sical Securit Security activities were observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures including vehicle and personnel access.
screening, personnel badging, site security force manning, compensatory measures, and protected and vital area integrity.
- Exterior lighting was checked during backshift inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Licensee Event Re ort (LER) Followu A review of LERs 87.-01, 87-02, and 87-04 through 87-12 determined that licensee followup actions were still in progress.
These LERs will be reviewed further during a future inspection.
13.
Mana ement Meetin The inspectors met with the 'Plant Manager or his assistant approximately weekly during this period to discuss inspection finding status.
On July 9, 1987, the inspectors met with the Plant Manager and members of his staff to discuss the inspection findings during this period.