IR 05000397/1986034
| ML17278B144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1986 |
| From: | Rebecca Barr, Dodds R, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278B143 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-86-34, NUDOCS 8612220212 | |
| Download: ML17278B144 (24) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A
REGION Y Report No.
50-397/86-34 Docket No:
50-397 d
R Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
ctober 5 - November 15, 1986 Inspectors:~
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Approved by:
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R student Inspector nson, hsef rojects Section
Date Signed J'gaff (
ate Sjgne Summary:
Ins ection on October 5 - November
1986 (50-397/86-34)
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room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30702, 30703, 40701, 61705, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92701, 92702, 92703 and 93702 were utilized for guidance.
Results; No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Mazur, Managing Director J.
Shannon, Deputy Managing Director
"C. Powers, Plant Manager J.
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
"R. Corcoran, Operations Manager S.
McKay, Assistant Operations Manager
~K. Cowan, Technical Manager'.
Harmon, Assistant Maintenance Manager
~R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
~D.
Feldman, Plant equality Assurance Manager J. Peters, Administrative Manager
~P. Powell, Licensing Manager H. Muesterfeld, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
~M. Jensen, Supervisor/Records
~J.
Landon, Maintenance Manager
~ Personnel in attendance at exit meeting The inspectors also inter viewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
2.
Plant Status 3.
At the beginning of the inspection period, the reactor was being operated at 93K power due to problems with 84 main turbine governor valve.
On November 9, 1986, due to higher than normal vibration in reactor recirculation pump 'A', power was reduced to 46K.
On November ll, 1986, reactor operation was shifted from two recirculation loop to single recirculation loop operation and power was increased to 72%%u.
0 erations Verifications The resident inspectors reviewed the control room operator and shift manager log books on a daily basis.
Reviews were also made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and that'the licensee wa's actively pursuing corrections listed in either log.
Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with'control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for significance to safety.
The licensee s adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) was observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on control pane'1s and ascer'tained that licensed personnel on duty at the time were familiar with the cause for each annunciator and its significance.
?n the past several months the inspectors have noted no decrease in the number of activated annunciators.
Additionally, the inspectors have observed a significant increase in the number of instrument deficiencies in the control roo lk 1,
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The inspectors observed access control, control room manni'ng, operability of nuclear instruments and availability of on-site and off-site power.
The inspectors made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the inspectors observed portions of several detailed surveillance tests by operators and instrument and control technicians.
Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) 7.4.3.7. 11.15 Turbine Building Floor Sump T-2 Radiation Monitor - Channel Check (CC)
PPM 7.4.5. 1.5, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Valve Lineup/AOS Inhibit - Channel'unctional Test (CFT)
PPM 7.4.3.7.11.5, Liquid Radwaste Service Water System Effluent Line Monitoring - CFT PPM 7.4.3.6.23, Control Rod Block Recirculation Flow Upscale, Inop and Comparator Channel C
PPM 7. 4. 3. 2. l. 79, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Isolation on RHR/RCIC Steam Supply Flow No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety-related systems maintenance activities were observed.
By direct observation and review of records, the inspectors determined whether these activities were consistent with Limiting Conditions for Operations; that the proper administrative controls and tag-out procedures were followed; and that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
The inspectors also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance.
Specific activities observed were testing of Static-0-Ring differential pressure instruments, calibration of recirculation flow sensors and torquing of diesel air-start motors.
The inspectors observed that quai lty control inspections were performed when appropriate, procedures were available and followed and calibrated instruments were used when required.
No violations or deviations were identifie ~
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6, En ineered Safet Feature Verification The inspectors verified the operability of the High, Pressure Core Spray-(HPCS) System, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop C and the Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the systems.
The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as built configuration and verified that valves were in the proper position and locked as appropriate.
The licensee's procedures were verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
RHR-A and Low Pressure Coolant In ection (LPCI) Su orts The licensee advised the inspector that the plant's architect/engineer (A/E) had designed one group of hangers and supports in the RHR-A/LPCI systems for only 114 degrees F operation.
It appeared that the LPCI system should be capable of operating at 180 degrees F and RHR-A system at 295 degrees F.
Apparently the A/E (Burns and Roe)
had presumed that RHR-B was the lead system for shutting down and the RHR-A system would never be operated above that temperature.
The licensee's analysis showed that only one support structure was affected by these restraints and that the system was capable of supporting 180 degree operation for the LPCI.
The licensee placed an immediate restraint on operating the RHR-A system above 114 degrees F.
Subsequent engineering analysis was performed that demonstrated that the RHR-A system could be operated satisfactorily at 295 degrees F and the operating restriction was lifted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation S stems The inspectors observed portions of the calibration of the Local Power Range Monitors (LPRMs) conducted on October 9, 1986 that was being performed in accordance with Table 4.3. l.l-l of the Technical Specifications (ie: every 1000 effective full power hours using the traversing incore probe (TIP) system).
All of the data collected and utilized in calibrating the LPRMs and Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) were subsequently examined and found to be in order.
The setpoint levels for alarms, permissives, and prohibitive interlocks were in compliance with appropriate Technical Specifications.
The calibration results were reviewed, approved and documented in accordance with th'e licensee's administrative control procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Off-Site Review Committee The regular quarterly meeting of the Corporate Nuclear Safety Review Board (CNSRB) was attended on November 14, 1986.
All but one of the regular members of the nine-man committee were present (quorum of five required).
Items evaluated during the meeting
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The Chairman informed the inspector that a
quorum of the CNSRB had attended the Plant Operations Committee (POC) meeting the previous day to evaluate three proposed changes to the Technical Specifications.
The Hoard then met in a closed session to evaluate acceptability of the changes.
Records of CNSRB activities will be examined during a future inspection.
lt No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Commitment Trackin and Cl osure Ouring this inspection period, significant time was allotted to assessing the status of previously identified concerns (open items),'nforcement actions and information notices and bulletins.
In briefly examining the commitment tracking system, it appeared the tracking system data base was essentially complete.
In most cases, the data base contained commitment dates and responsible organization/manager.
Of concern was the fact that items were not being closed on the committed dates or in a timely manner. It was not apparent that plant management had reviewed and followed up on the commitments and clarified their expectation to subordinate management and supervision.
Followup item (86-34-01)..
Watchstandin Ex ectations On October 30, 1986 the master reactor vessel water level controller shifted from automatic to manual and went undetected by the operators until approximately one hour later when the high reactor water level alarm annunciated.
A similar event occurred approximately three weeks earlier.
As followup inspection of this event, the inspectors ascertained that each operating crew appears to perform their routine watchstanding responsibilities differently and that plant management has not developed a standard expectation of watchstanding practices.
In this specific case, direction had not been given for increased attention to the previously identified equipment anomaly, The need for standardization of expectations for watchstanding was discussed with plant management during the exit interview.
12.
Licensee Event Re orts The resident inspectors reviewed the following reports and supporting information on-site to verify that licensee management had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
LER-83-01-00, Rod Block Interlock on Fuel Handling System Calibration Was Incorrect (Closed).
Examination of the surveillance tests for refueling outage R-1 showed.that the surveillance procedures had been revised and the rod block interlocks appropriately tested in accor'dance with PPNs 7.4.9. 1 and 7.4.9.6 pursuant to the licensee's stated corrective actio h 1th ER I I
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LER-84-08-01, Failure of Suppression Pool Level Indicator (Closed).
The inspector verified that a fuse list (E-555)
had been generated and inputted into the licensee's computerized tracking system to identify each load connected to a specific circuit breaker.
Recent experience indicates that craft, operations and engineering personnel may not be utilizing the system for one reason or another.
Therefore, the licensee plans to assure that the list is continually updated and provide training to encourage employee utilization of the program.
The inspector's check of the printed fuse list for panel H13/P601 indicated that the printed list per se was not "user friendly" in that one had to check 6 pages to assure that all circuits related to a particular breaker had been identified.
However, a computer printout for a specific breaker (E-PP-8AA/03/P680/JB-2)
was accurate and correctly identified all associated fuse circuits (23).
Utilization of this program will be followed as part of the routine inspection program.
LER 84-26-01, Deluge System Admitted Water Into Standby Gas Treatment
'System (Closed).
The examination of NCR-284-226, NCR-284-383, PMR 02-84-716, and PED 5215-M-7376 disclosed that a design change had been implemented to preclude pipe surges on fire pump starts by the installation of surge reducing valves in the pump discharge lines.
Methyl iodide and iodine filter efficiency tests by Environmental Engineering and Testing Inc.
showed that the charcoal beds had not bee'n damaged.
LER 84-19-00, Inadvertent Start of ESF Control Room Air Start System (Closed).
This item was previously identified as 84-19-84.
It was reviewed and closed in inspection report 84-09.
LER 84-31-01, 02, 03, 04, and 05, Appendix R - Cable F'ire Protection (Closed).
A revision 6 has been issued to this LER.,
The licensee's actions on this item will be reviewed in conjunction with LER 84-31-06
'which will remain open.
LER-84-33-01, 02 and 03, Conservative Initial Temperature Setp'oints Had Caused Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolations (Closed).
The inspector verified that the licensee had reset the temperature sensor setpoints to 160 +/- 6 degrees F on September 19, 1985 per Technical Specification Amendment No.
12.
Previously they were set at 130 degrees F until the amendment request was approved as stated in the licensee's final report dated January 14,: 1985.
LER-84-34-00, Ol, 02, 03, 04 and 05, Drywell Temperature Exceeded 150 degrees F (Closed).
The inspector's review of completed Project Engineering Directives (PEDs)
(S 216-M-1286, 1292, 1294 and 1296)
and Plant Modification Records (PMRs) (84-1134, 1192 and 1126)
showed that the licensee had implemented the design changes as stated in the subject LERs.
Current experience indicates that high drywell temperature during routine operations does not appear to be a problem.
The licensee did perform analyses of cabling and equipment subject to temperatures greater than 150 degrees F and confirmed that, due to the short duration of each, of the six
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events, there were no adverse effects (Memoranda dated April 3 and September 13, 1985).
LER-84-88-00, Failure to Sample Standby Service Water (Closed).
Examination of Nonconformance Report NCR-284-0584 disclosed that the immediate corrective action manual sampling program was initiated and the faulty pump seals were replaced by August 31, 1984.
The plant modification to intertie the sample rack/pump operation to standby service water pump operation was completed and the NCR closed on April 23, 1986.
LER-85-01-00 and 01, Non-Conservative Assumptions for High Energy Line Break Analysis for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and Reactor Water Cleanup Calculation (Closed).
The examination of records pertaining to these calculations disclosed that the corrective actions stated in LER-85-01-01 had been completed as follows:
- Initially the stroke times of RWCU and RCIC isolation were adjusted by limiting valve opening.
RW-CU-V-1 and V-4 worm shaft clutch gear ratio was changed to decrease stroke time.
RCIC-V-8 Limitorque actuator and gearing were replaced in accordance with PMR-02-84-0623-0 on June 13, 1984.
Pursuant to engineering memorandum SS-2-PE-86-937, RCIC-V-63 was not reworked but was left blocked as the valve operator to effect the required change was too large to put in the available space.
Impell Corporation was notified of the licensee's Part 21 report of the non-conservative assumptions for environmental qualification of equipment in a memorandum dated January 22, 1985.
LER-85-05-00, RPS Actuation During Surveillance Testing (Closed).
Examination of NCR-285-0024 and Instrument and Maintenance Shop memoranda and training records dated March 5, 1985 and September 19, 1985 disclosed that craft personnel had been appropriately instructed on operations involvement in the resetting of scram circuits.
Also, the dispositioned NCR showed that gA had verified the installation of APRM channel identification labels.
LER-85-06-00, Equipment Operator Error Resulted in Reactor Protection System Scram (Closed).
Examination of the operators'eading file (Procedure Signoff Log) showed that all Reactor and Equipment Operators had reviewed this particular event.
This L'ER was previously closed in Inspection Report 86-29.
LER-85-09-01, Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup (Closed).
NCR-285-0025 was appropriately dispositioned and provides evidence showing, the reduction of cleanup water flow and the resetting of the isolation signals for reactor water cleanu k I \\ I
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7'ER-85-10-00, Isolation of Reactor Mater Cleanup (Closed).
This, event required the same action as LER-85-09 'except that it became required reading for operations personnel in an effort to preclude future isolations.
This was verified by Project guality Assurance.
This item was previously closed in Inspection Report 86-29.
LER-85-11-00 and Ol, Reactor System Pressure Boundary Leakage from 3/4" Drain Lines (Closed).
NCRs-285-0046 and 0047 and maintenance work requests NW1833 and 1828 showed that the lines had been appropriately replaced and tested.
Failure analysis by T.
M. Erwin, and D.
M. Bo'si dated June 20, 1985 indicated that the lines failed because of low load high cycle fatigue.
Liquid penetrant examination of similarly configured lines did not disclose any other anomalies.
LER-85-14-00, Reactor Scram from Spurious Low Condenser Vacuum Interlock During Turbine Bypass Valve Testing (Closed).
Field charge request No.85-035, completed on February 15, 1985 by maintenance work request MW7007, showed the change of the vacuum interlock pressure switch to the condenser side of the orifice located in the turbine low vacuum trip sensing device line.
An evaluation, pursuant to 10CFR50.59, was performed on the relocation of the line.
The Manager, Plant Technical Staff, issued a memorandum on May 31, 1985 to all Plant Technical Staff that discussed this event and reemphasized the precautions necessary during the investigation of malfunctioning equipment.
LER-85-20-00, Excess Flow Check Valve Bypass Alignment Errors (Closed).
The inspector verified that all of the excess flow check valves that had been left off the startup list as indicated in NCR-285-0018 have now been included in Startup Procedure 3.1. 1.
gA verified that all corrective actions required by the NCR had been completed on August 21, 1985.
LER-85-28-00, Unsealed Penetrations Through Fire Barrier in Floor of Reactor Building (Closed).
The unsealed penetrations were resealed pursuant to PED 85-0037 by implementation of maintenance work requests AU 0192, 0747 and 0792.
NCR-28-00231 was closed on June 23, 1985.
LER-85-29-00, Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) Failed to Auto Initiate at 20X Power (Closed).
The inspector verified by examination of the required reading list that all licensed personnel had read the LER during the period of May 31 to June 30, 1985 (ie: prior to or coincident with starting duty).
The annunciator to alert operators to 20K power operation was installed pursuant to PMR-02-84-1268 which was implemented by work request AW-2368.
A precautionary note on RSCS operability was added to plant procedure 3. 2.1,
"Normal to Cold Shutdown".
LER-85-34-00, Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation With the Plant in Cold Shutdown (Closed).
It was verified that procedure PPM 7.4.3.3.3.2 had been changed to require verification of the logic being properly reset.
In addition, alpha-numeric designation had been added to the control room front panel switch labels for the logic reset switches, thereby making them consistent with the labeling practices for control room back panel switche l~
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LER-85-36-00, Inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature Actuation.qf,-,a Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit (Closed).
The procedure for surveillance tests of equipment that actuate the control room emergency filtration units was examined and found to have been changed to require the Instrument and Control Department to independently verify logic reset status prior to the continuation of testing.
The PMR to provide positive indication of 1/2 scram reset status in this circuity for the operators has been cancelled and will not be implemented.
LER-85-46-00, Reactor Manual Scram Due to Fire in Operating Feedwater Pump (Closed).
The cause of the pump failure was attributed to the failure of the thrust bearing which may have overheated due to a lack of lubricating oil.
The feedwater pump was repaired by replacement of the pump bearings, seals and rework of the outboard bearing housing pursuant to plant procedure PPM 10.8.3 and work requests AV0187 and AU1042.
The completed repairs were verified by a guality Assurance Engineer.
The bearings on the other feedwater pump were examined by maintenance in accordance with maintenance work request AU1021 and found to be in satisfactory condition.
The startup strain'ers were removed from lube oil piping as they were no longer necessary and were considered to have been a contributing factor to low lube oil flow.
LER-85-51-00, Improper Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Flow Biased Trip Setpoint Change During Single Recirculation Loop Operation (Closed).
It was verified by a review of surveilance test data (PPM 7.4.3.1.43, 7.4.3. 1.45 and 7.4.3. 1.47) that the APRM, RPS flow biased thermal power trips for Channels A,
C and E had been reset to single loop values on July 22, 1985.
As stated in the LER, plant procedure PPM 7.4.4. 1.1. 1 has been changed (R-2 dated January 21, 1986) to address single recirculation loop operation.
Attachment 3 to the procedure identifies all procedures that need to be "deviated" (actions to be taken) prior to entering single recirculation loop operation.
Adherence to these requirements was verified for the current single loop operation.
This LER was previously closed in Inspection Report 86-29.
LER-85-61-01, Reactor Scram During Cold Startup from High Upscale IRM (Closed).
The licensee amended the corrective action statement of LER-85-61 to remove the commitment for preparing a procedure to require an estimated critical position on reactor startups.
Rather, the licensee found other more effective means to elevate operator awareness of the most reactive control rods in a group and believes reliance on monitoring subcritical multiplication to be a more effective means of approaching a critical condition.
Therefore, PPM 9.3.9, Control Rod Withdrawal Sequence Development and Control, under precautions, had a requirement added for the STA to
"emphasize high worth rods" and, under step 6.A.2, requires the identification of high worth rods to be included with the Control Rod Withdrawal Order Sheet.
The procedure also provides a graph of rod worth verus position in the group.
LER-86-30-00, Reactor Scram Caused by Spurious Feedwater Turbine Trip (Closed).
A preventive maintenance procedure to perform RRC flow control valve position control loop alignment checks will be implemented
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during future refueling outages.
The failed reactor feedwater pump turbine electronic overspeed trip unit and associated circuits have been replaced.
The inspector observed portions of the recalibration and all of the retesting of the recirculation flow control valves.
LER-86-32-00, Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Channel Calibrations Not Performed (Closed).
The inspector verified the licensee has implemented a change to their procedure (PPM 1.5. 1) that administratively controls the scheduling of surveillances which, if followed, should eliminate the non performance of those surveillance required as a result of a mode change.
It should be noted, however, that this has been a recurring problem and requires close monitoring for effectiveness.
LER-86-33-01, Incorrect Sizing of Underground Cables (Open).
The licensee identified that electrical cables to the standby service water (SM) pump motors were routed via an underground duct bank, but were not derated as required in the design process.
An analysis reviewed by the inspectors determined that, as a result of not derating the cables, the cabling was of insufficient ampacity.
The analysis also determined that the standby service water system would not be affected as a result of this oversight until after the Spring 1987 outage.
Further data taking and analysis are being performed prior to formulating a corrective action plan.
The following LERs are closed based on in-office review:,
84-61-01 84-72-02 84-84-00 86-31-00 No unreported violations or deviations were identified during the review of the above LERs.
IE Bulletin Followu For the IE Bulletins listed below, the inspector verified the bulletin was received by licensee management, that a reviewed for applicability was performed, and that if applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or scheduled to be taken.
IB-85-03 (Open)
Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Setting.
The licensee in an October 1, 1986 letter to the Regional Administrator, acknowledged the Bulletin's applicability to MNP-2, listed actions taken and committed to actions required to prevent improper switch settings on motor-operated valves.
The licensee plans to establish a maintenance and testing program for assurance that motor operated valves will operate as designed by December 1987.
The bulletin will remain open pending implementation of the progra ~
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IB-86-01 (Closed)
Minimum Flow Logic That Could Disable RHR Pumps.
In a May 30, 1986 letter to the Regional Administrator, the licensee stated that the bulletin was not applicable to WNP-2 since each RHR loop has a
separate minimum flow control valve and logic.
The inspector verified that WNP-2 RHR loops have separate minimum flow control valves and logic and do not share components or logic signals.
This item was previously closed in Inspection Report 86-29.
IB-86-02 (Closed) Static 0-Ring Differential Pressure Switches.
The testing required by this Bulletin has been completed.
The testing identified that the Static-0-Ring devices, when tested at normal operating pressure, exhibited a non-conservative shift of up to approximately 7 inches of water.
To correct, for this change, the level
setpoints were raised and retests were conducted a month later at pressure.
The inspector witnessed a portion of this testing.
The data were consistent and confirmed that the channels would trip as specified.
Because the reason for the shift was not clearly understood, the licensee agreed to consider a sample test of the device be reperformed in approximately one year to assure the drift was constant.
IB-86-03 (Closed) Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in the, Minimum Flow Recirculation Line.
The licensee in an October 25, 1986 letter to the Regional Administrator stated the, bulletin was not applicable to WNP-2 since each RHR loop has a separate minimum flow control line.
The inspectors verified that WNP-2 RHR loops have minimum flow control systems that are not shared from loop to loop.
No violations or deviations were identified.
IE Information Notices For the IE Information Notices listed below, the'inspector verified that
'he notices were received and an applicability review was conducted.
IN-85-72, (Open) Uncontrolled Leakage of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment Due to Scram Discharge Outlet Valves Not Closing IN-85-75, (Open) Improperly Installed Instrumentation, Inadequate equality Control and Inadequate Post Modification Testing The inspectors reviewed the program for receiving; determining applicability and dispositioning applicable notices.
The results of the review were documented in inspection report 86-,21.
The review noted that the program was effective but its implementation was not, in that notices were not being closed out in a timely manrier.
The review conducted this period indicates that, while actions have been taken to improve implementation, notices continue not to be dispositioned in a timely manner.
Further inspection effort will be dedicated to tracking this item.
(86-21-04)
No violations or deviations were identifie A J
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15.
Licensee Actions On Previous Enforcement Findin s The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on previously identified.
inspection findings:
(Closed)
Enforcement Item (86-06-01)
Compressed Gas Cylinder Storage.
An inspector verified procedure PPM 1.3.19 has been revised to address proper storage of compressed air bottles that are permanently stored at the facility.
All permanently stored compressed gas cylinders must be located in an approved storage rack.
All crafts have been trained on proper in-plant storage of compressed gas cylinders.
The inspectors have observed for the past several months the proper handling and storage of compressed gas cylinders.
(Closed)
Enforcement Item (86-21-01) Controls to Prevent Entry of Foreign Material into Open Systems.
The corrective actions of the Supply System's response to the Notice of Violation letter dated August 2
, 1986 were completed on November 20, 1986.
(Closed)
Enforcement Item (86-21-02) Contamination Control Work Practices.
The corrective actions of the Supply System's response to the Notice of Violation dated August 22, 1986 were completed on November 20, 1986.
16.
Mana ement Meetin The inspectors met with the Plant Manager or his assistant approximately weekly during this period, to discuss inspection finding status.
On November 20, 1986, the inspectors met with the Plant Manager and members of his staff to discuss the inspection findings during this period.
Specific items discussed at the exit meeting included management expectations of watchstanders (para. 11) the timely closure of'pen items and commitments (para. 10),
and testing of Static-0-Ring devices (para. 13).
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