IR 05000397/1986013

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-397/86-13 on 860407-10 & 0428-0502.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection, Refueling Activities,Qa & Followup Items
ML17278A912
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/1986
From: Johnson P, Qualls P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17278A911 List:
References
50-397-86-13, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-2, NUDOCS 8607010282
Download: ML17278A912 (12)


Text

,'.

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

"= REGION V Report No.

Docket No.

Iicense No.

50-397/86-13 50-397 l

NPF-21 Licensee:

Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:

Washington Nuclear Project No.

(WNP-2)

Inspection at:

WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted:

April 7-10, 1986 and April 28 - May 2, 1986 Inspector:

Approved by:

P.

ualls Re ctor Inspector P.

H. J son, Chief Reacto rojectsSection III Date igned 4 ((,g(

Date Signed Su~arur:

Xns ection on A ril 7-10 1986 and A ril 28 - Ma

1986 (Re ort 50-397 86-13)

Areas Ins ected:

Routine inspection by a region based inspector of fire protection, refueling activities, quality assurance and follow-up items.

During this inspection, inspection module 64704, 60705, 60710, 35701, 92703, 92701, 92712, and 30703 were utilized for guidance.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

860701,0282

PDR ADOCN, 0500 G

PDR

I I/

I t

r I

il Il(

(

I

'(I" I

/II I*

It

\\

,r I.

'I

,i ll ~

II I

II I'I I

I

,H

!'

~

V K

I C

II

'I d

I, r

I l

lf I*

I I,

!

I I I

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted oC d g

"C.

moD

~ L J p

""M.

"<R.

~ oD

  • S.

%G G.

"C.

~"A.

g;oB Powers, VNP-2 Plant Manager Baker, Assistant Plant Manager McGilton, Manager Assurance Programs Feldman, Quality Assurance Manager Harrold, Design Engineering Manager Powell, Iicensing Manager Bell, Manager Industrial Safety and Fire Protection Vuestefeld, Reactor Systems Supervisor, Plant Technical Barbee, Plant Engineering Supervisor, ISC Eggen, Fire 'Protection Engineer Allen, Fire Protection Engineer Brastad, Technical Specialist Freeman, Principal Engineer Van Hoff, Senior State Liaison Rapacz, BPA Plant Representative Fitch, Executive Secretary, EFSEC-Attended exit meeting April 10, 1986.

oAttended exit meeting May 2, 1986.

In addition, other members of licensee and contractor staff were contacted.

2.

Fire Protection Followu of Ins ection Re ort 50-397/86-05 Thermola Installation A close examination revealed a number of additional Thermolag installation discrepancies which were discussed at the April 15, 1986, enforcement conference (50-397/86-16).

Conduit and copper wire extend through the assembly unprotected on 522'est side near Tray Node 4380.

A large conduit (about l~g") going into a protected tray was not thermolagged on 501'orthwest corner.

Near Node 4380 on 522'est side a main 4" support member was not thermolagged and there was only 7" between the tray and the main member.

The 7" tray support steel was thermolagged.

Near the drywell entrance on 501'levation a primary support member was protected only about, 4" below the protected -tray.

I Near Node 3454 on 501'est side were<<3 angle iron tray supports not thermolagged even though the tray was required to be protected.

In addition, under Node 3454 during the Appendix R audit another angle iron tray support was found not,'oated.

The

'

l J

l

'

4

1I '

licensee subsequently fixed this.

This tray was thermolagged in 1985 and QA did not identify the discrepancy.

North of Node 4381 on,the 522'est side is a large pipe support for a 10" pipe unprotected which enters and is apparently attached to the steel inside of the barrier.

Subsequent to the Appendix R audit, the licensee identified a potential problem with the amount of protection needed for the steel imbed plates supporting the structural members.

The licensee is pursuing with NRR the proper corrective actions.

Subsequent to the Appendix R audit, the licensee performed a

reanalysis using 9" of thermolag on support steel.

The subsequent analysis used more realistic assumptions than the original Burns and Roe calculation.

The calculation used by the licensee was still conservative when calculated data were compared to actual test data taken by TSI using 18" of thermolag.

The new calculation showed that temperature in a one hour fire with,9" of installation would be about 360 F, still above the 325 F limit but well below the 800~F postulated by the Burns and Roe calculation.

b.

Cable S readin Room Se aration Subsequent to the Appendix R audit, the licensee provided information which showed that FSAR Amendment 31 documented the 20'able separation using a thermolag barrier in the cable spreading

. room.

This is documented in Table F.2-21 of the FSAR.

c.

Shield Mall Hei hts The SSER approving the shield wall specified that it be one foot, above the instrument components.

The wa11, though less than one foot above the metal frame of the rack, is one foot above the" instrumentation.

d.

ualit Assurance e.

The licensee appears to have an adequate quality assurance program to ensure that any future modifications are properly'inspected and design criteria are fol'lowed.

r S urious Si nal Anal sis The analysis reviewed by the inspection team was a first draft only.

The details had not been checked by the second review.

Licensee personnel stated that the review will be checked as part of the review process.

Item 50-397/86-05-11 is CLOSED.

A endix R Re-review Criteria The Appendix R re-review was basically a retabulation of the Appendix R design work done by Burns and Roe.

The actual work was performed to Burns and Roe criteria which include all criteria

t

required by the Supply System equality Assurance Manual.

Item 50-397/86-05-05 is CLOSED.

g.

Emer enc Li htin The Station emergency lighting design drawings and ratings were examined.

The 8-hour test and walkdown results were also examined.

No problems were noted.

item 50-397/86-05-08 is CLOSED.

h.

Fire Door The licensee provided evidence jn the form of a letter from the manufacturer which showed that the fire door is a three-hour door that had been mislabeled.

Th'e licensee is correcting this discrepancy.

Item 50-397/86-05-09 is CLOSED.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

Refuelin Pre arations and Refuelin Activities (MC 60705 and 60710)

Prior to refueling, the inspector verified that the licensee's procedures were adequate and that fabrication and receipt inspections were adequate.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's cycle 2 reload analysis, summary report and attachment, transient analysis and ECCS analysis'

50.59 review had been conducted. 'he inspector observed, refueling preparations on the refueling deck.

During refueling, the inspector observed that good housekeeping was maintained in the refueling areas and that plant conditions, fuel handling operations and licensee staffing were in accordance with Technical Specification guidance.

4.

No violations or deviations were identified.

I

>

Onsite Review Committee (MC,40700)

The inspector attended a

POC meeting and observed the review and analysis of two LERs, a review of current operations and activities, and the review of any proposals which might affect Nuclear Safety.

The inspector also reviewed the minutes for the first ten POC meetings of 1986 for content and attendance.

"

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

IE Bulletin Followu (MC 92703)

j IB-85-02 (CLOSED).

The, licensee has no DB-50 reactor trip breakers.

6.

Follow-u Items (MC 92701)

a.

IC-80-21 (CLOSED).

The licensee's refueling procedures appeared to meet the 'guidelines in IC-80-2 I IN I

,1 I

b.

IC-81-14 (OPEN).

The licensee has still not, completed his actions related to IC-81-14 concerning MSIV programs.

IC-81-14 is still OPEN.

c ~

83-39-20 (CLOSED).

The licensee has submitted a revised FSAR to document his safe shutdown methodology.

This item is CLOSED.

d.

83-39-21 (CLOSED).

The licensee has revised and updated his fire protection evaluation in the FSAR revision.

NRR is currently reviewing his analysis.

This item is CLOSED.

e.

83-50-02 (CLOSED).

The emergency lighting was inspected to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

No discrepancies were noted.

This item is CIOSED.

83-50-05 (CLOSED).

The remote shutdown panel was inspected during the

CFR 50 Appendix R audit and no deficiencies were identified.

This item was specifically questioned and resolved.

This item is CLOSED.

g.

83-55-01 (CLOSED).

The licensee's Safe Shut Down (SSD) Procedures were examined for adequacy.

No deficiencies were noted.

This item is CLOSED.

h.

86-05-12 (CLOSED)

~

The licensee has complied with SER recommendations concerning the RHR valves.

This item is CLOSED.

IN'-84-70 IN-84-83 IN-85-23 IN-85-66 and IN-85-74 (OPEN).

These Information Notices were reviewed to see if the licensee had completed the actions which he felt was needed for these notices.

At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not completed his actions.

These items are OPEN.

IN-85-09 (CLOSED).

The concern identified by this Notice was examined by the Appendix R Team.

WNP-2 had identified problems in an LER concerning lack of isolation for certain fires.

Repairs are to be complete in the current outage.

This item is OPEN.

k.

IN-85-91 (CLOSED).

The licensee completed all actions to satisfy this Notice.

This item is CLOSED.

l.

85-20-03 (CLOSED).

The licensee's housekeeping and material control program appears to be adequately implemented.

This item is CLOSED.

P LER Followu (MC 90712)

a

~

84-04 (CLOSED).

The licensee has corrected all areas where cables do not meet Appendix 3.

Appendix R will'e re-examined as identified elsewhere.

This item is CLOSED.

b.

85-04 and 85-04 Rev.

(CLOSED).

The licensee's corrective action has been effective in preventing further rec'urrence.

These items are CLOSE ~

QN V

g h

~

~

5, c.

85-15 (CLOSED).

The licensee has taken corrective action "to address this item.

This item is CLOSED.

The following LERs were closed based upon in-office review.

The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete.

86-01 86-02 86-07 86-08 86-09 8.

Plant Tour J

I The inspector toured the Turbine Building, Radwaste Building, Reactor Building (including the Drywell and the Refueling Deck),

and the Diesel Generator Building.

f Minor housekeeping problems were identified and corrected.

Equipment material condition overall seemed good.

No unsafe work conditions were observed.

Workers had procedures in use.

No violations or deviations were identified.

The inspector met with members of your staff on April 10, 1986, and May 2, 1986.

The items mentioned in this report were discussed at these meeting 'V

~

l'

N

\\

I J

'P4

"J