IR 05000397/1986018
| ML17278A917 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1986 |
| From: | Rebecca Barr, Dodds R, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278A916 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-86-18, NUDOCS 8607070360 | |
| Download: ML17278A917 (18) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No:
50-397/86-18 Docket No:
50-397 I.icensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0. Box 968 Richland, Wa. I99352 f
Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
April, 27 - May 31, 1986 Inspectors: ~
, ~R. T.
,R.
C.'pproved by:
p. Reacto odds,,
Senior,,Resident Inspector a r,, Resident Inspector nson, Chief Pr'oj'ects Section
4z EI, Date Signed
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Date Signed
~(z (gC Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on A ril 27 - Ma
1986 (50-.397/86-18)
Areas Ins ected:
This routine inspection by resident inspectors evaluated control room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports and special inspection topics.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 39701, 40700, 407047 60710
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61726
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90712, 92701, 92719 and 93702 were utilized for guidance.
Results:
No violations or significant deviations were identified.
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DETAILS A
4'
n Operations anager sor Persons Contacte'd I<
D. Mazur, Managing Director J. Martin, Assistant Managing Director for C. Powers, Plant Manager J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager R. Corcoran, Operations Manager R. Beardsley,'ssistant Operate.ons Manager K. Cowan, Technical Manager J.
Harmon, Maintenance Manager" R. Graybealg Health<Physics and Chemistry M
D. 'Feeldman, Plant Quality,Assurance, Manager J. Peters, Administrative Manager P. Powell, Eicensing Manager M. Wuesterfeld; Reactor En'gineering Supervi G. Soren'son, Manager",Regulatory Programs S. Davison,i,'Plant Compliance 'Engineer A. Hos3.er',
NSA Group, Manager W. Barney, Mgr. Maintenance tAlP-1 R.,'Patrick, Plant, Manager D. Williams, BPA Nuclear Engineer~
'.
Walker, Outage Mgr.
J. Little, Planning/Scheduling V. Shockley, HP/Chemistry R. Brown, Quality Assurance Engineer An Personnel in attendance at exit meeting on June 5,1986.
The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
Plant Status During this period, the plant was shutdown for the first refueling outage.
The outage had been scheduled to be completed by May 22, 1986, but approximately one week's delay was encountered due to the magnitude of outage work.
Subsequently, uninterruptible pover supply IN-1 developed a short that resulted in a fire in a constant voltage transformer.
The repair of the transformer and reassembly of the power supply were expected to be completed in time for startup on or about June 5,
1986.
Critical operations were expected to be conducted on June 4 for the training of licensed operator candidates.
0 erations Verifications The resident inspectors reviewed the control room operator and shift manager logs on a daily basis.
Reviews vere also made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and the licensee was actively
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pursuing corrections to conditions listed. Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The licensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's), particularly those dealing with engineered safety features (ESF)
and ESF electrical alignment, were observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the contxol panels and ascertained that the contxol room licensed personnel on duty at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance.
The inspectors observed access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments, and availability of onsite and offsite electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regul'atory requirements.
The inspectors, as part of the annual sampling program, verified that a substantial number of the primary containment manual isolation valves were closed, locked closed and lines capped in conformance with the licensee's surveillance procedure for containment integrity verification.
The inspectors observed an operating crew's response in extinguishing a small fire in an operating electrical inverter.
The response was timely and the fire was effectively contained and extinguished.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the inspectors observed portions of several detailed surveillance tests by operators and instrument and control technicians.
Specific surveillances examined included the following:
PPM 7.4.3.3.1.26-ADS, Trip System A, LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure,-CFT.
PPM 7.4.3.6.21-Control Rod Block Recirculation Flow C INOP, Upscale and Comparator-CFT PPM 7.4.5.1.19-HPCS Suction Transfer Test PPM 7.4.8.2.1.18 18-Month Battery Testing of E-B2-1 Ll No violations or deviations were identified.
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Monthl Maintenance Observation Station'aintenance activities related to the safety related systems and components li'sted below were obse'xved/reviewed using inspection procedures as a guide to's'certain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides and Technical Specifications.
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f The following maintenance,,'acti'willies were observed/reviewed:
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'B'eactor Recirculation Pump Testing Altern'ate Remote Shutdown Station Ins'tallation Repair of the RHR 'A'ump Seal Cooler During the repair of the, 'B'eactor recirculation pump, components securing the upper hub wearing ring were determined to be missing and presumed to be in the reactor system.
The licensee had General Electric Co.
(GE) perform an analysis of the potential impact the missing components could have on safety.
The detailed analysis showed that "safe reactor operation is not compromised by the presence of the lost parts.
It was concluded that there is no concern for fuel bundle flow blockage, interference with control rod motion or potential for chemical reaction".
The preliminary GE assessment was reviewed in a Plant Operations Committee (POC) meeting held on May 29, 1986.
The final GE analysis was reviewed and conclusions accepted in the prestart-up POC meeting held on June 3, 1986.
The inspector observed portions of the modification/repair of the seal water cooler for MR pump A. A pinhole leak had propagated into a circumferential pipe crack in the 1/2 inch seal water line adjacent to the seal water cooler.
The pipe size exiting the cooler was increased from 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch schedule 160, 304 stainless steel and then reduced back with a nipple to 1/2 inch.
The work was performed in accordance with ASliE Sections XI and III, C-2, 1977 edition.
The inspector verified that. all materials had been appropriately certified.
Welder and QC personnel qualifications and certifications were examined and found to be in order.
Appropriate visual, penetrant and hydrostatic tests were satisfactorily performed on the completed work.
The authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) had reviewed the initial work package but had not completed his review of the final package at the time of the inspector's review.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
En ineered Safet Feature Verification The inspector verified the operability of the 'C'esidual Heat Removal and Low Pressure Core Spray Systems by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the systems.
The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration and verified that valves were in the proper position, had power available and were locked as appropriate.
The licensee's procedures were verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event 'Re orts
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Regional inspectors performed an in-office review of the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) relative to timeliness, adequacy of description, generic implications, planned corrective actions, and adequacy of coding.
The resident inspectors reviewed the following reports and supporting information on site to verify that licensee management had reviewed the events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and,violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
LER-86-05 Operational Condition Change to Refueling Without Performing Required Surveillance LER-86-06 Reactor Protective Trip Due To Improper Installation of RPS Shorting Links During Refueling Outage LER-86-07 Spurious Control Room Emergency Filtration Actuation-Unknown Cause LER-86-08 inadvertent Diesel Generator Start While Calibrating Plant Oscillograph LER-86-09 Secondary Containment System Emergency Operation Initiation Due to Blown Fuses During Functional Test, LER-86-10 Low Fuel Oil Supply Tank Level for Diesel Generator The licensee informed the inspector of a low diesel oil supply tank level for DG-IA (48,000 vs 53,000 gallons) that was identified a day after declaring the emergency diesel generator operational following its 24-hour full load test on May 12, 1986.
The tank level was apparently overlooked, since the procedure for the 18 month surveillance test did not require the tank be refilled before placing the system back in service.
The violation was discovered by the operator on May 13 during daily surveillance, checks.
The inspector verified that the tank was pro'mptly filled to the required level.
A temporary procedure change was issued "to require the fuel oil. supply to be y'erified at, the completion of the test and the ta'nk refilled as 'necessary prior to declaring the system
',, operable.
A request'as been initiated to permanently change the pro'ceduie to include"'this requirement.
/I No violations or devia'tions were identified.
8.
Plant Startu From Re'fuelin Licensee procedures were reviewed. to verify administrative controls and che,'cklists were implemented;for returning safety systems and compon'ents to an operable status.
The plant startup procedures were reviewed against the li,censee's-Technical Specification to verify procedures incorporated, approved operating conditions.
Portions of the control rod drive, residual heat removal, high pressure core sp'ray and emergency power systems were evaluated to verify their return to service in accordance with approved procedures.
The walkdown of the HPCS diesel air start system identified two valves out of their required position.
Plant management investigated but could not determine the cause of the
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mispositioned valves.
Management noted that the valves had been last checked using the dual operator verification standard 4 weeks earlier and again checked during an operational surveillance test two days prior to the inspector's check.
The discrepancy had minimal technical significance but would have allowed both air start tanks to blow down in the event of a downstream pipe rupture rather than just one'.
The valves were verified to have been properly repositioned
'by the licensee following the inspector's observations.
Also, a caution tag was hung on the standby air start tank discharge valve since both of these valves are normally open on the air start tanks of the other two emergency diesel generators.
No violations or, other deviations were noted.
Su ression Pool Mater Level Indication The WNP-2 operating license was conditioned by License Condition No.
16 to require that the wide range level instrumentation be tested to verify operability under post-accident, environmental conditions prior to startup after the first refueling outage.
The temperature cycling tests showed that full range calibration was not possible and th'at level readings would need to be temperature
" compe'nsated.
Therefore,'-the licensee requested and NRC granted a
stay in, environmental qualification of the wide range suppression pool monitoring system unt'il the'econd refueling outage.
In the interim, the licensee agreed'o use the test data to provide a
correction curve for level indication in the emergency procedures.
The inspector'verified by a review of test data that the wide range level monitoring equipment
'had been appropriately calibrated in accor'dance with surveillance procedure 7.4.3.7.5.31.
The
',.calibration was accomplished on April 29, 1986 and results approved on May 1~
1986.
The temperature compensation correction curve obtained from the Eg testing was placed in Emergency Procedure 5.0.0,
"General Precautions",
as a
POC approved temporary procedure change.
The change was put in the General Precautions since they are applicable to all emergency procedures and the wide range suppression pool level indication is utilized in a number of the emergency procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Plant 0 erations Committee (POC)
The inspector attended POC meetings on May 7, 12 (special),
21 and
(refueling outage start-up status),
1986, to determine if the on-site review committee (POC)
was fulfillingits functional responsibilities in accordance with the technical specifications and the licensee's administrative procedures 1.1.5, Plant Operations Committee.
The inspector verified that appropriate personnel were present and quorum requirements were met for all meetings.
It appeared that an appropriate level of review was
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being given to each item without any being short changed and that the POC was meeting its responsibilities in accordance with section 6.5.1.6 of the Technical Specifications.
POC meeting minutes were being kept, and appropriately distributed.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11.
Miscellany a
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Bulkhead Doors b.
During a facility tour on May 13, 1986 the inspector found that approximately 2 inches of water had collected in the hatchway separating the LPCS and HPCS pump rooms.
The LPCS pump zoom had been flooded the previous day with approximately 6 inches of water due to a 3/4 inch test connection shearing off during a pump test run. Followup by licensee management indicated that both doors of the hatch had been used during cleanup operations and that the water was apparently spilled during the cleanup rather than there being a
leaking bulkhead door seal.
Nevertheless, licensee management stated that they would pursue the issue and assure proper sealing of the doors.
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Loose Leads
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The Shi'ft Ma'nager,'s log indicated that two loose leads were found in panel CS-2 that affected the operation of standby service water valve SSW-'PCV-38B.
Discussions" with the principals indicated that one lead had been dete'rminated to locate and repair a short in the lead and the other was a permanent jumper wire attached to the same terminal.
According to the electrician and his foreman, these wires had been properly reconnected following the wire repair.
Xn an unrelated incident, a control relay (K59) for emergency diesel generator DG-II-B had been improperly terminated causing its failure.
Licensee management investigated these incidents and evaluated the system testing program.
This area was reviewed by all system engineers and it was not apparent that a generic problem existed.
It was believed that the startup tests for modifications and maintenance were sufficiently comprehensive to identify these type of deficiencies.
Nevertheless, the licensee committed, as part of the lessons learned program, to revisit this area in the future to reduce the reliance on dynamic testing to identify such errors.
This effort will be followed as part of the routine inspection program.
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Master Completion Lists
(Attachment 1 to Iicense NPF-21)
The inspector examined the status of the completion of items identified on the Project Master Completion List dated December 19, 1983.
The list showed that all items had been completed in accordance with the approved schedule except for two modifications
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in the "nice to do" category that were being deferred until necessary maintenance lends itself to their application.
The inspector sampled the records pertaining to six items that had been accomplished during the current refueling outage and determined that this work had been performed as shown in the MCL.
Therefore, based on this and previous inspections, the inspector believes the licensee has satisfactorily completed the actions required by Attachment 1 to Operating Iicense NPF-21 in accordance with paragraph C.(1) of the license.
Housekeeping Emergency diesel generator room DG-IA was toured following a declaration of "operability" after its 6 year overhaul.
The entire area appeared in need of cleaning.
There were oil laden sop-blotters around the diesel and a substantial quantity of oil on the floor on the south side of the generator.
Other maintenance debris was scattered-about.
Operations Management independently brought up the issue the following day in the morning plant management meeting.
All agreed, in conformance with administrative procedures, that responsible craft personnel should police their own jobs.
This was subsequently accomplished.
As a follow-up, the inspector checked DG-IIB following its return to service and found housekeeping conditions to have been better maintained.
Refueling Deck Observations The inspector observed the replacement of some of the upper reactor vessel internals that were installed in accordance with procedure 10.3.6, Reactor Vessel Steam Dryer and Moisture Separator Removal/Replacement.
Torquing of stud nuts for the steam separator was observed to have been accomplished in accordance with the approved procedure.
This work was constantly monitored by a QC inspector who was working to an approved gC inspection plan.
The inspector also observed the removal of the canal gate that, was accomplished pursuant, to procedure 10.3.2, and verified that crane movement conformed to procedure requirements for heavy loads.
Fitness 'for Duty
The licensee's fitness for duty program was examined.
The program has been defined in corporate policy, administrative procedures and nuclear operations standards.
The program requires that. employees, visitors and agency/contractor employees abide by the general provisions of, the policy with respect to fitness for duty, be free
'fsubstance abuse problems, and not be intoxicated or under the influence of,~alcohol, or drug'ubstances while on Supply System facilities or property.
Possession of controlled substances can result, in disciplinary action yp to and including termination.
The
'licensee's "policy'in, this "regard has been addressed in several Supply System Newsline publications, the most recent being issued on May 28, 1986.
'Zhe licensfeels policy appears consistent with the industry standard.
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I No violations or deviations were noted.
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Mana ement Meetin The inspector met with the Plant Manager and/or Assistant Plant Manager weekly during this period to discuss inspection finding status.
On June 5,
1986 the inspectors met with the Assistnat Managing Director for Operations, the Plant Manager and members of his staff as noted in paragraph 1 to discuss the inspection findings during this perio P
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