IR 05000397/1986027
| ML17278B026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1986 |
| From: | Rebecca Barr, Dodds R, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278B025 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-86-27, NUDOCS 8610060117 | |
| Download: ML17278B026 (14) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Repor t No: 50-397/86-27 Docket No:
50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Ma.
99352 Facility Name:
Mashington Nuclear Project No.
2 (MNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
July 3 - August 31, 1986 Inspectors:
R.
T.
dds, Senior Res>dent Inspector Date Signed Approved by': Reac rr, Resident Inspector ohnson, Cglef Projects Section 3'ate Signed 0/<.$ 4, Date Signed jl ii Summary:
i Inspection on July 13 - August 31, 1986 (50-397/86-27)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection'y the resident inspectors of control room operations, engineered safety 'feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and licensee action on previous inspection.,findings.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 40700, 41400, 42700, 61702, 61706, 61726, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, 92701, 92702 and 93702 were utilized for guidance.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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D. Mazur, Managing Director J.
Shannon, Deputy Managing Director J. Hartin, Assistant Managing Director for Operations
- C. Powers, Plant Manager
"J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
"R. Corcoran, Operations Manager R. Beardsley, Assistant Operations Manager
- K. Cowan, Technical Manager J.
Harmon, Maintenance Manager
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Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
"D. Feldman, Plant equality Assurance Manager J. Peters, Administrative Manager
~P. Powell, Licensing Manager M. Muesterfeld, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
"D. Malker, Outage Manager
~S, Mashington, Compliance Engineer
"V. Shockley, HP/Chemistry Support Supervisor
"G. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs
"R. Patrick, Plant Administration Supervisor
" Personnel in attendance at exit meeting The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors, shift managers, engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relative to activities in progress and records.
Plant Status At the beginning of the period, the reactor was at 82K power returning to full power following a July 10, 1986 reactor scram.
On July 14, 1986, 100K power was achieved.
On July 21, 1986, the condensate booster pump 2C motor tripped due to an electrically shorted stator, necessitating a power reduction to 93K.
On July 25, 1986, while performing weekly governor valve surveillance, the reactor scrammed on high pressure due to the failure of an anti-rotation pin in a governor valve.
The reactor was restarted on, July 25, 1986, and achieved 93K power on July 27, 1986.
'On August 4, 1986, subsequent to the repair of condensate booster pump motor 2C, 100K power operation was resumed.
Power was subsequently reduced to permit the rewinding of condensate pump motor 2A; as it was subject to the same type of failure as 2C.
Full power operations were being resumed at the end of the report period.
0 erations Verifications The resident inspectors reviewed the control room operator and shift manager log books on a daily basis.
Reviews were also made of the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and that the licensee was
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actively pursuing corrections to conditions listed in either log.
Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with the control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The licensee s adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO s), particularly those dealing with ESF and ESF electrical alignment, were observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that the control room licensed personnel on duty at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance.
The inspectors observed access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments and availability of on-site and off-site electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.
A sampling of management access to vital areas of the plant was obtained from security for the months of March, May and June 1986.
The survey results indicated infrequent access by Corporate Management, while, with two exceptions, vital area access by Plant management was frequent.
The Managing Director acknowledged the need for and committed to greater management involvement at MNP-2 during a meeting in the Region V Office on August 28, 1986 (Inspection Report 86-31).
No violations or deviations were identified.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety-related systems maintenance activities were observed.
By direct observation and review of records the inspector determined whether these activities were consistent with LCOs; that the proper administrative controls and tag-out procedures were followed; and that equipment was properly tested before return to service.
The inspector also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine if the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and to verify that backlogs which might affect system performance were not develop'ing.
Specific activities observed included the replacement of a standby service water hanger and repair of a condensate booster pump.
It was noted that the licensee was treating the WR backlog with specific emphasis on annunciated items.
No violations or deviations were identified.
En ineered Safet Feature Verification The inspector ve) ified the operability of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as built configuration, and
, verified that valves were in the proper position, had power available, and were locked as appropriate.
The licensee's procedures were verified 'to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
No violations or deviations were identifie ~,
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Simulator Trainin for Plant Emer encies The inspectors participated in an emergency drill on August 6, 1986 in which the simulator was used in the technical evaluation process for the formulation of operational and management actions.
It appeared that previous training had been effective in that personnel generally responded as expected in the scenario.
The simulator did not appear to be as effective as it could be in that the scenario conditions wer e artificially placed on hold rather than continued at an expected pace for the proposed event.
However, personnel continued to propose appropriate corrective actions utilizing the current information.
Overall, the simulator has the potential to be a very useful tool in the training of personnel to respond to plant emergencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Periodic Review of Procedures The inspector examined the licensee's program for the periodic review of procedures, PPM-1. 2.6, and its implementation by a selective examination of a representative sample from each category of saf'ety-related procedure (e. g., Administrative, Operating, Emergency, Surveillance, Maintenance, etc.)
The Plant Operating Committee (POC),meeting on August 7, 1986 was attended to observe committee review practices.
The POC appeared to adequately evaluate the scope of review and changes to the procedures.
It was verified that all procedures were being periodically reviewed and'approved in accordance with the Procedure Tracking System.
A sampling of the controlled copies of procedures in the Control Room and Technical Support Center were examined and found to be current.
No deviations or violations were identified.
Plant 0 eratin Committee POC The inspectors attended POC meetings on July 30 and August 7, 1986, as part of the continuation of the evaluation of POC activities.
The Committee'-appeared to beerforming an in-depth review of items in accordance with its responsibilities as required by the techqical specifications pursuant to its charter as defined in PPM 1. 1.5.
Attendance complied with program requirements.
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I Licensee Event Re orts The resident inspectors reviewed the following reports and supporting information on site to verify that licensee management had reviewed the events, cor'rective action,had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identifie H E
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10.
LER-86-23 (Closed) - Reactor scram due to opening incorrect circuit breaker during electrical ground isolation.
LER-86-24 (Closed)
Standby DG auto start due to condensate booster pump electrical fault.
LER-86-25 (Closed)
High pressure scram due to failed turbine generator valve stem anti-r'otation pin.
LER-86-26 (Closed)
RWCU system inadvertent containment isolation due to high differential flow indication.
No unreported violations or'eviations were identified.
I Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation-The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the inspectors observed portions of <several surveillance tests by operators arid instrument and control technicians.
PPM 7.4. 2. 1 Power Distrib'ution Limits PPM 7.4. 5. l. 8 RHR Pump Operability Test-PPM 7.4.5. 1.7 LPCS System Operability PPM 7.4. 3. 7.10. 3 Loose Parts Detection System-CFT PPM 7. 4. 3. 2. 1. 79 RWCU Isolation on RHC/RCC Steam Supply Flow-CFT While observing PPM 7.4. 2.1, Power Distribution Limits, the inspector also reviewed and attempted to perform the surveillance procedure, Manual Core Heat Balance, PPM 9.3. l.
In some instances the procedure referred to incorrect panels or TDAS Tag Numbers (e.g.
Recirc Motor Power, Feedwater Temperature)
for obtaining the required data.
The Supply System plans to revise the procedure to correct these discrepancies.
However, it had not been necessary fo the licensee to utilize this procedure to obtain required surveillance data.
The inspector's hand calculation of reactor power level was in close agreement with the plant computer output.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee Actions On Previous NRC Ins ection Findin s
The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings:
a.
(Closed) Follow-up Item (84-26-01) - Assess broken seal wires impact on system flow capacity alarm or surveillance detection.
NRC inspection report 84-26 identified several room cooler flow
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control valves which had seals broken or absent.
The POC officially closed its review of this concern after the performance of surveillance PPM-7.4.1.1.1 conducted on March 8, 1985, during which it was verified that the broken seals in the specified flow control valves had been replaced and that syst: em operation was satisfactory and had not been impacted by the broken seals.
Operations was tasked with continuous monitoring of valve seals.
b.
(Open) Follow-up Item (85-02-02)
General problem of condensation in instrument lines.
The slope of instrument lines for flow indicators for the vent lines of the standby gas treatment system allows condensation to collect in the lines, giving a false flow indication.
Currently the lines are being checked daily by an I&C technician and drained if necessary. 'MR 85-175 has been issued to correct the slope of the lines.
Implementation of the modification was expected shortly according to the responsible system engineer.
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Follow-up Ite'm (84-26-03) - Leakage rate testing of branch valves in ECCS.
During the containment integrated leakage rate test, suppression pool wa'ter was found to be flowing through the HPCS pump suction valve, the pumps and a partially open test valve to the condensate storage tank.
Leak tightness of the test line was questioned following closure of the suction valve.
The licensee subsequently issued NCR-284-202 to obtain additional engineering evaluation and corrective action, 'if necessary.
The licensee determined that the most'robable cause of this leakage was that HPCS-V-10 and ll were not'fully closed. 'he effect of this was to provide an additional leakage, path.
The valves were then closed and the leakage rate 'determined to be '0.04 gpm (1.0 gpm limit).
As these valves obtain a'losure signal on HPCS initiation,'hey would 'fully close, if open, 'for test purposes.
Since these valves and other ECCS bypass valves cou'ld be opened partially by manual operation, PPM-1.3.1 Standby Orders/Night Orders was revised on February 26, 1985 to require throttle-type motor-operated valves to be closed with a continuous motion rather than a fogging motion.'o assure their ful1 closure.
IE Bulletin 86-02: Static "0" Rin Differential Pres'sure Switches
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On July 31, 1986 the inspector examined the Supply System's compensatory measures that were being implemented in response to IEB 86-02 as stated in the licensee's response to the Commission dated July 29, 1986.
A Special Operation Bulletin (SOB) that contained all of the pertinent information including special operating instructions, was issued on July 25, 1986 as "Priority Reading All Licensed Personnel".
With a few exceptions, all personnel who had stood or were on watch had examined the SOB and
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