IR 05000397/1986009
| ML17278A874 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Rebecca Barr, Dodds R, Johnson P, Toth A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278A873 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-86-09, 50-397-86-9, NUDOCS 8605300678 | |
| Download: ML17278A874 (18) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No:
,50-397/86-09 Docket No:
50-397 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Wa.
99352 e
Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
Mar 17 - April 25, 1986 Inspectors: ~R.
T.
dde, Chief React Pro'ects Section
Date Signed
~A. D.
+~R.
C.
Approved by:
th,'enior Resident Inspector r, Resident Inspector
<figs i.
Date Signed
~/i4a i, Date Signed
+is(sf.
hnson.,
Chief React Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on March 17-A ril 25 1986 (50-397/86-09)
Areas Ins ected:
This routine inspection by the resident inspector and region based inspectors evaluated control room operations, engineered safety feature (ESF) status, the surveillance program, the maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 39701, 40700, 42700, 60710, 61720, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92701 and 93702 were utilized for guidance.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8b05300678 860515 PDR ADOCK 05000397
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted-C. Powers, Plant Manager
"-J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager R. Corcoran, Operations Manager R. Beardsley, Assistant Operations Manager K. Cowan, Technical Manager J.
Harmon, Maintenance Manager R. Graybeal, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager D. Feldman, Plant Quality Assurance Manager J. Peters, Administrative Manager P. Powell, Licensing Manager M. Wuesterfeld, Reactor Engineering Supervisor R. Mertens, QA/QC Compliance Engineer A. Hosier, Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG) Manager K. Worthen, Operations Engineer J. Little, Planning/Scheduling Supervisor
> Personnel in attendance at exit meeting Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift supervisors, engineers, mechanics and technicians.
2.
General The Resident Inspector and/or Regional Inspectors were on site March 17-21, 24-28, 31, April 1-4, 7-11, 14-18 and 21-25, 1986.
Backshift inspect'ions were conducted April 1, 4, 8, 10, 15 and 23, 1986.
Regional and NRR Headquarters personnel visited the site as follows Region V Reactor Projects Section 1 Chief (R. Dodds)
was on site March 17-21, 1986.
NRR Project Chief (E. Adensam)
and NRR 'Project Manager (J. Bradfute)
were on site March 20-21, 1986.
Senior Resident Inspector (A. Toth) was on site March 24-27 1986.
Region V Health Physics Specialists (M. Cillis and J.
Moore) were on site March 24-28, 1986.
Region V Office of Investigations Investigator (R. Meeks)
was on site March 24-27, 1986.
Region V Emergency Preparedness Inspectors (G. Temple)
and (G.
Brown) were on site March 24-28, 1986.
Region V Technical Assistant to Regional Administrator (J.
Crews)
was on site March 26-27, 198 l I
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Region V Enforcement Officer (A. Johnson)
and Reactor Safety Branch, Chief (R. Pate)
were on site April 4, 1986.
Region" V Project Inspector (P. Quails)
was on site April 7-10, 1986.
Region.V Reactor Inspector (D. Millett) and 3 contractor consultants were on. site April 7-10, 1986.
Plant Status During this inspection period the plant was in reserve shutdown from March 17-31, 1986, then commenced the first, refueling outage on April 1, 1986.
The outage was expected to be completed early June 1986.
0 erations Verifications The resident inspectors reviewed the Jumper/Lifted Lead Log and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical, Specifications and that the licensee was actively p'ursuing corrections to conditions listed. Events involving unusual conditions of equipment wer'e discussed with the control room personnel available at the time of the review and evaluated for potential safety significance.
The licensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (I,CO's),
particularly those'dealing with ESP and ESP electrical alignment, were observed.
The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that the control room licensed personnel:
on duty at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance.
The inspectors observed access control,'c'ontrol room manning, operability of nuclear instruments, and availability of on site and offsite electrical power.
The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment, conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulator'y requirements:
The resident inspectors reviewed the control room and shift manager's log books on a daily basis.
Generally, the logs met the intent of the licensee's p'rocedure PPM 1.3.4, Operating Data and Logs; however, on two occasions omission of significant plant activities occurred.
On April 16, 1986 the reporting of low level contamination in the reactor building was omitted from both the control room and shiit manager's log books.
On April 18, 1986 the unsuccessful removal of CRD 22-23 was not recorded in the control room log (the Official plant, operating record) but was addressed in the Shift Manager's log.
Concerns over log detail, NRC open item 84-15-,01, have been documented in previous inspection reports.
Plant Management acknowledged weaknesses in log keeping and will develop a plan to improve performance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Refuelin Activities The inspectors verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, surveillance testing required by technical specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the
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'eriodic thsting of refueling related equipment was being performed as required by technical specifications; observed five shifts of fuel handling operations (preparations, removal,'inspection and insertion);
verified that good housekeepipg was being maintained in the refueling area, and verified that staffing during the refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.
lt During the initial fuel receipt and inspection effort, the inspectors identified weaknesses in the coordination of activities and the operation of the refueling bridge.
To strengthen these areas Plant Management revised refueling procedure PPM 6.3.2, Fuel Shuffling, to require that refueling activities other than core alterations also be supervised by a licensed Senior Reactor Operator, and established qualifications and proficiency prerequisites for refueling bridge operators.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Pro ram Im lementation The inspectors ascertained that surveillance of safety-related systems or components was being conducted in accordance with license requirements.
In addition to witnessing and verifying daily control panel instrument checks, the inspectors observed portions of the following surveillance tests, by operators and instrument and control technicians.
PPM 7.4.3.7.5.2 PPM 7.4.3.2.1.80 PPM 7.4.3.1.3.3 PPM 7.4.3.6.3.7 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Reactor Vessel Pressure RCIC Isolation on RHR/RCIC Steam Supply Slow High Neutron Flux High APRM 'A'- Control Rod Block No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Monthl Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed using inspection procedure(s)
as a
guide to ascertain that, they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Changeout of control rod drive mechanisms HPCS and DG l disassembly, inspection, reassembly and testing Control Rod Drive Hydraulic system repairs"scram valve lapping and accumulator inspection
'B'eactor Recirculation Pump removal and replacement RCXC steam valve repair During the repair of the 'B'reactor recirculation pump, components securing the upper hub wearing 'ring were determined to be missing and presumed to be in the reactor system.
The licensee was examining the
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impact of the missing components on plant operation and will issue a
final analysis report. Examination of the final analysis will be included in a future inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
En ineered Safet Feature Verification The inspector verified the operability of the 'B'esidual Heat Removal System loop by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as built configuration, and verified that valves we'e, in the proper position, had power available, and were appropriately locked.
The licensee's procedures were verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSAR.
9.
No violations or devi'ations were identified.
I Procedure Generation And Review Effectiveness The inspector examined the program for generation and revision of plant procedures.
A detailed review was conducted of three system operating procedures which had been revised and issued January - March 1986.
Also considered were the licensee actions regarding previous NRC observations pertaining to the effectiveness of revi'ews, as tracked under NRC open item 84-22-02, and discussed jn reports 84-31, 85-11, 85-19, 85-24 and 86-04.
Open item 84-22-02 is considered closed.
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Annunciator Procedures (Volume 4 Series)
The licensee provided abbreviated criteria/guidelines for performance of the 2-year cycle review of procedures, including annunciator procedures.
More than 1200 of the 1700 annunciator'rocedures were due for Plant Operations Committee (POC)
consideration by January 1,
1986.
Actions assigned by the POC on November 29, 1985 included independent second level review of each procedure.
In addition, the Nuclear Safety Assurance Group (NSAG)
was to perform a review of technical adequacy of the criteria being used.
The Quality Assurance organization was to -verify adequacy of reviews against the criteria based upon a sampling review.
The inspector examined evidence that such reviews had been conducted.
Records and interviews showed that the QA organization reviewed about 10/ of the procedures.
The NSAG review assessed the guidelines and examined about 50 of the first 150 submitted procedure revisions.
Additionally, NRC inspection report 86-04 documented NRC inspector review of over 100 POC-approved procedures.
The NRC findings indicated that the licensee reviews had generally been effective, although some errors in "ancillary information in the procedures (such as panel locations and setpoint data) indicated that reviewers did not always give attentiou to details.
(As one example,
.NRC inspection, report 84-31 identified that procedure 4.601.A1-6.5 incorrectly directed the operator to panel P601 for the location of the control for valve SW-V-4C; the procedure reviewers
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did not independently oh through reference to the NRC report identify this minor discrepancy for the December 16, 1985 revision of the procedure).
The 5SAG review concluded that the criteria/guidelines were generally acceptable, but identified that some outstanding procedure deficiencies or upgrades noted on the Plant Tracking List were not, being incorporated.
Although the NSAG reviewer stated that he had provided a list of about six such items to, the annunciator procedure review coordinator, along with associated backup material, the coordinator stated that he had not received such material nor had he considered it in the review process.
At the exit meeting, the Plant
$1anager stated that such material had been discussed in a POC meeting and may have been considered in the review process in another context.
The inclusion of lessons. learned from industry operating experience reports appears to be a significant subject for consideration in the review process.
The particular items and the licensee's actions regarding these will be considered during a
future inspection.
(86-09-01)
b. 'ystem Operating Procedures (Volume 2 Series)
NRC inspection report 85-19 noted the licensee plans to accent the review,of system operating procedures, particularly the ECCS, Standby Service Mater and Reactor Core Cooling systems.
Plant operating crews were charged with'the responsibility to review and author revisions'to the existing procedures based upon operating experience since the early 1984 start of operations.
The inspectors
,, noted effo'rts in this area led by shift managers over the past few months'nd noted that the procedure revisions for systems described in inspection report 85-19 had been completed and issued.
The inspector examined in detail the procedure for the Residual Heat Removal System (MK), including checks of the valve lineup checklists and the procedure instructions.
The Low Pressure Core Spray System (IPCS)
and the Control Rod Drive System (CRD)
procedures were considered in less detail.
The procedures included content improvements in recognition of the NRC findings of inspection report 85-11.
Additional elements of independent verification of critical valve positions, precautions and limitations, definition of important setpoints and process variable limits were included:
The IPCS procedure was particularly thorough in verifications'f system status via referral to status of annunciators, and inclusion of verification and actions associated with automatic and manual actuation.of the system.
The RHR procedure did not include these elements.
Additionally, the prior revision of the RHR procedure included appropriate procedure steps to assure complete filling and venting of all RHR piping.
The revised procedure for filling and venting the system would result in voided piping (approximately 80 feet) in each TPCX and shutdown cooling line, between the check valve and motor operated containment isolation valve.
Assurance of filling and venting of this portion of the lines relied upon a separate surveillance procedure (PPM
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7.4;0.5.8) which.had an independently scheduled frequency of every 90 days when the plant is shutdown.
Reference to this procedure (in the RHR procedure)
appeared to be warranted to avoid mis-scheduling and assure its performance prior to declaring the LPCI system in
"Standby" status.
The licensee agreed to assure proper cross referencing.
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The CRD procedure included some minor discrepancies; e.g.,
step 26.d required venting through specific valves, but overlooked that downstream valves had been verified shut; step 7;1 required closure of the incorrect valve CRD-V-125/HCU (in lieu of CRD-HCV-126/HCU);
the lineup checklist specified verification or setting valve CDR-V-61 as "throttled", with no guidance for the operator as to how to 'assess the acceptable amount of throttling.
The operations staff accepted these observations and agreed to take corrective measures.
The potential consequences of the noted errors appeared to be of little significance, but were a reflection on the thoroughness of the procedure review process.'o violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Part 21 Followu For the Part 21 reports listed below, the inspector verified that licensee management was notified of applicability and appropriate corrective actions had been taken or were scheduled to be taken.
TY"85-P TY-85-P3 TY-85"P5 84-02-P 85-15"P National Valve and Manufacturing Company Paul-Munro Hydraulic Operators Lube Oil Modification on Diesel Generator Cable Protection of Dedicated Safe Shutdown Systems TEC Model 914-1 Detectors 11.
Licensee Event Re orts e
A regional inspector performed an in-office review of the following Licensee Event'eports (LERs) relative to timeliness, adequacy of description, generic implications, planned corrective actions, and adequacy of coding.
The resident inspectors reviewed the following reports and supporting information on site to verify that licensee management had reviewed the
" events, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
LER-86-02 Spurious Control Room Emergency Filtration Actuation LER-86-03 Reactor Scram During Surveillance of APRM's LER-86-04 Reactor Scram Due to Upscale IRM During Critical Cooldown No violations or deviations were identifie e r'
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Actions On Previousl Identified NRC Xindin s a
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Accuracy and adequacy of procedures.
Prior inspection reports identified various procedure discrepancies which indicated a need for additional attention to detail in the review process focused through the POC.
Continued review of the procedure review effectiveness culminated with a focused inspection this period, as documented elsewhere in this report.
Improvements have been noted in the guidance provided to the procedure authors and reviewers, and procedures appear to have been upgraded Xn view of the absence of findings with significant safety impact, the quests.on of general effectiveness. of procedure reviews is closed.
b.
(Closed) Noncompliance (85-36-01)
Covers on terminal boxes in the reactor building were not refastened to retain environmental qualification of equipment after maintenance or surveillance activities.
Subsequent to the initial finding, the inspector noted similar loose fasteners in the drywell (during a November 1985 maintenance outage)
and then on an electrical penetration terminal box in the reactor building.
The licensee took prompt corrective action on these specific matters at the time of identification.
The inspector reviewed general corrective actions described in the MPPSS letter to NRC dated December 19, 1985.
This included inspecting instrument racks in the reactor building, interviewing technicians,,viewing a training film and examining associate training 'records for engineering, technical, maintenance and surveillance personnel.
Equipment qualification managers stated that the Plant Manager had invited them to have equipment qualification engineers contact plant maintenance supervisors directly to obtain prompt corrective actions for any discrepancies identified by the engineers during routine visits to the plant.
A training film for all engineering, technical and plant personnel has been prepared by the equipment qualification staff.
The film was a short, concise and effective presentation to sensitize staff to environmental and seismic qualification consideration of plant equipment.
Training records showed that most engineering, technical and maintenance and surveillance personnel had viewed the film.
During the a plant tour, the inspector noted loose fasteners on a terminal box of HPCS instrument rack H22-P005.
This condition existed for the next two days, until instrument technicians were observed performing work in the terminal box.
The technicians stated that they had noted the loose fasteners when they arrived to perform their work, and were aware that these should be fastened.
The technicians demonstrated that they were familiar with the concerns over terminal box cover fasteners and planned corrective action when their work in the box was complete.
The inspector noted
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no other discrepancies on instrument racks throughout all levels of the reactor building.
The licensee's corrective actions appeared acceptable; however, this inspection indicated that further efforts could 'be productive to sensitize licensee staff members to degraded or compromised equipment status.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Mana ement'Meetin The inspector met with the Plant >1anager approximately weekly during this period, to discuss inspection finding status.
On April 25, 1986 the inspector met with the Plant Manager and members of his staff to discuss the inspection findings during this perio h Ct