IR 05000369/1981022
| ML20032B643 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1981 |
| From: | Bryant J, Graham M, Myers D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B622 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-81-22, NUDOCS 8111050750 | |
| Download: ML20032B643 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
E REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 o
Report No. 50-369/81-22 Licensee: Duke Power Company 22 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369 License No. NPF-9 Inspection at 11cGuire site near Norman, North Carolina Inspectors: fd/$% O 6 (Ih/
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Date Signed D.fjyers Approved by:
xd f/$kW J. -Bryant, Section piief Division of Resident Date Signed y
and 4eactor Project Inspection SUf1?tARY Inspection on June 15, - July 17,1981 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 207 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety. maintenance, surveillance, LER review, license conditions and document review.
Resul ts Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in three areas; three items of noncompliance were found in three areas (Itaintenance - inadequate removal of equipment from service); Surveillance - lack of containment integrity; Operational safety -fire doors blocked open.
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DETAILS 1.
-Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- M. D. McIntosh, Station Manager
- G. W. Cage, Operations Superintendent -
- D. J. Rains, Maintenance Superintendent
- T. McConnel, Technical Services Superintendent
- M. E. Pacetti, Site Safety Review Group
- M. Sample, Projects and Licensing
- D. B. Lampke, Projects and Licensing
- G.: A. Copp, Nuclear Engineer, Duke. Corporate Offices
- P. B. Naidoci, Licensing Duke Corporate Office
- G.- D. Gilbert, Operations
- K. W. Reese, Jr., Ma 'tenance
- C. P. Rogers, Maintenarue
- D. Atkins, Contract Services Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 19, July 10, and July 15, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved. Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required tc, determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are
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discussed in paragraph 9.
5.
Operational Safety i
During the inspection interval the licensee completed an outage required to
correct safety injection system check valve leakage.
The system was heated and pressurized to operating conditions and precritical testing begun. On July 10, 1981, problems with the "D" reactor coolant pump seals required that the primary system be cooled, vented and drained to effect repairs.
The inspector observed operations.
Control room and tagging logs were
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reviewed, and the status of instrument calibration and equipment tags was verified.
Certain !icens.ae activities reviewed in greater depth, and areas where pr< blems were identified are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
The inspector also noted in the exit interview that housekeeping practices, while improving, had not yet reached an acceptable standard for an operating plant. Specialist inspectors identified a Violation (50-369/81-17-03) in this area in early June.
In particular, condensation on cool pipes during outages has resulted in large puddles on the floor which spread dirt into clean areas and which, after criticality, will contribute to the spread of surface contamination.
6.
flaintenance Selected maintenance activities were observed in progress to verify that appropriate procedures were in use, tagging had been placed as appropriate, calibrated instrumentation was in use, and cleanliness requirements were met.
In particular, performance of maintenance activities on the main feedwater isolation valves, decay heat removal pump, centrifugal charging pump, and reactor coolant pump "D" were observed in progress and reviewed.
Two activities in the maintenance area identified to be in violation of Techical Specification are discussed below.
a.
On Tuesday, July 7, 1981 the inspector witnessed an I&E technician enter the control room and inform the shift supervisor that he, the technician, had isolated certain auxiliary feedwater (CA) flow transmitters pursuart to work request WR 002065 but had not attained the pre-requisite authority to do so. These transmitters are required by Technical Specification 3.3.3.6; their removal from service placed the plant in an Action Statement with respect to the Limiting Condition for Operation.
The inspector questioned the I&E technician who stated that he had simply forgotten to attain the required clearance.
Operations personnel reported that to their knowledge, there is a relatively small number of cases in the recent past which reflect common circumstances.
Work request WR 002065 had been issued in order to safely allow and control the performance of instrument procedures; IP/0/A/3204/03 IP/0/B/3250/08 IP/0/A/3250/13C IP/0/B/3203/04 A pre-requisite to actually beginring work is the operation's shift supervisor or his designees permission or clearance to do so, as is discussed below. ficGuire flaintenance fianagement Procedure - 1.0 (Rev.
2) requires in part that for all Safety-Related Work Requests, Control Designated Work Requests, ano ihn-Safety-Related Work Requests that may
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3-affect station operation or operating indications in the form of-alarms, signal. light indications or instrument response, the respons-ible flaintenance, I&E supervisor or designee should obtain clearance from. the Operation's Shift-Supervisor or his designee, prior to beginning work. This requirement is embodied in the work request process in the fonn of a signoff step.
As a result of this failure to complete the Work Request Procedure, OP/0/A/6100/09 Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment was not implemented as required prior to removing the safety-related instru-mentation from service.
ficGuire Technical Specification 6.8.1. requires in part that written
. procedures be established, implemented and maintained for safety-related activities, including surveillance and test activities, and the administrative control of station equipment.
Failure to follow liaintenance Procedure 1.0 or to implement OP/0/A/6100/09, Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment, resulting, ultimately, in the unauthorized isolation of station equipnent is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
b.
On July 10, 1981, while the plant was at normal operating pressure and temperature, instrumentation and control technicians completed main-tenance on an RTD on the "A" reactor coolant loop cold leg RTD manifold. Work was being performed in accordance with Work Request WR #103824 on a manifold removed from service under OP/0/A/6100/09, Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment, R&R Check sheet #4617.
R&R Checksheet #4617 step 5.1.15 required the following actions be taken in order prior to returning the RTD manifold to service.
Each required double verification.
INC-66 RTD manifold drain Closed 1NC-63 RTD manifold vent closed 1NC-64 RTD outlet isolation valve open 1NC-62 RTD inlet isolation valve open The two isolation valves had been tagged shut, requiring operations approval to operate.
Contrary to the above, the I&C tecnnician operated INC-64 without operations administrative removal of the tag, without double verif-ication, and without closing the vent and drain valves as required by the restoration procedure.
As a result of this failure to follow procedure, a direct path was opened from the primary system to the containment atmosphere.
Flow from the primary system was estimated to be 50 gpm.
The technicians
- were forced to evacuate the containment by the blowing steam. The plant began an immediate controlled cooldown, which was terminated
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after personnel'in protective clothing were able to enter:and close the
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_ vent and drain vahes.
Technical Specification 6.8.1Lrequires' that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained for safety-related activities, including the administrative control of the status-of station equip-
ment. OP/0/A/6100/09 Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment has been established to control the removal and restoration of equipment removed for maintenance-and surveillance. On July 10, this procedure was inadequately implemented.
This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
These two examples of fail"re to follow procedures while performing preventive and corrective.uaintenance on safety-related equipment-constitute a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. (Violation 50-369/81-22-01), In=dequate removal of equipment from service).
In both cases the root cause appears to be technicians exceeding their authority in making changes to plant status.
It is this root cause which should be addressed in response to the violation.
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7.
Document Revieu Selected procedures and drawings in the master vault were compared with those in use in the control room in order to detennine that they were provided to the work area in a timely manner, obsolete drawings were controlled, and to identify discrepancies in the as-built drawings and the facil ity. The following documents were scrutinized:
Drawing, Title MC 74 3.0 Chemical and Volume Control MC.5 8 7.0 Ice Condenser Refrigeration MC 15;2 2.1 Safety Injection MC 1562 3.1 Safety Injection MC 1573 3.1 Component Cooling MC 1592 1.1 Auxiliary Feedwater MC_1592 1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater MC 1599 2.0 Fire Protection MC 1601 2.2 Demineralized Water MC 1602 1.0 Nitrogen System MC 1605 1.2 Instrument Air MC 1609 3.0 Diesel Generator Procedure Title AP/1/A/5500/01 Reactor Trip AP/1/A/5500/07 Loss of Electncal Power AP/1/A/5500/19 Loss of RHR OP/0/A/6100/09 R&R Station Equipment OP/1/A/6150/02A RC Pump 'oeration
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OP/1/A/6200/10 Upper Head Injection OP/1/A/6400/05 Component Cooling OP/1/A/6350/06 125 VDC D/C Auxiliary Power OP/1/A/6350/02 Diesel Generator OP/1/A/6350/01 Normal Power OP/1/A/6150/08 Rod Control Within the areas inspected no problems were identified.
8.
License Conditions The following license conditions in the Mduire operating license were reviewed for completion prior to the required milestones.
a.
License Condition (8)(b), Stack flow testing. The inspector reviewed the licensee's test procedL/es, results and conclusions and has no further questions at this time. This item is closed. This also closes Inspector Followup Item 78-41-02.
b.
License condition (8)(c).
Effluent flow monitor. The inspector verified that repairs to the effluent flow monitor were complete and the instrument in service. This item is closed.
c.
License condition (8)(c) Radwaste Systems.
The only remaining portion of radwaste system testilig not reviewed previously was the accept-ability of residerce times in the charcoal filters.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's calculations, results and conclusions, and has no further questions. This item is closed.
d.
License condition (11) (dated requirements) (b). Training for liitigating Core Damage. The inspector reviewed the course summary and l
attendance sheets, and interviewed a sample of attendees to verify that
training had been conducted as required.
This item is closed. This
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also closes TMI Action Item II.B.4 (80-RD-14).
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9.
Control Room Door Inoperability l
l On 6-17-81 at 0949 the inspector discovered that the access door (CAD 501)
to the control room was unlocked and unmonitored. The inspector notified I
I security who verified the door inoperable and by 0955 stationed a guard in the area as e compensatory measure.
Investigation of the incident revealed that the door had been verified operable at 0840 on 6-17-81. A test for a completed work request had been performed. Another Work Request was issued and by 10:15 the same day the
defect, a misaligned plunger strike plate, was repaired and tested satis-I factorily. During this period of inoperability the forced entry alarm for
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the door was operable and monitored.
The licensee was cognizant of design deficiencies of this vital area access l
door and had initiated a Nuclear Station Modification (NSM 0113) Part 2
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Access Control Upgrade) to replace the current modified unit with a more suitable design.
The expected completion date for the NSM is about 6-82 due to the delay in receiving materials. For the interim period the licensee had developed a program to train security guards in inspection techniques for verfying operability of controlled and vital area access equipment (Procedure EXAT-04 PA/VA Inspection). The program is expected to be underway by July 1981.
Furthermore the licensee committed that a change would be initiated to procedure EXAT-04 Patrol Duties and Surveillance that would place the affected doors on an increased surveillance frequency, futher reducing the probability of a long period of unmonitored door inoperability.
The inspector will carry the issue of this inoperable vital area barrier as an unresolved item until the specified interim corrective actions already initiated are implemented and accessed to provide compliance with 10 CFR 73.50(f)(1).
(URI 50-369/81-22-02)
10.
Fire Doors During tours of the Unit 1 facility, the followli.g fire doors were found to be Mocked open without a fire watch posted. The control room staff was anaware in each case that the doors were open and could not determined how long they had been bl,cked.
Door Location Date 801 F 750' Cable Spreading Room 7/9/81 891 G 750' Cable Spreading Room 7/10/81 723 E 733' Pipe Chase 7/13/81 Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires that "All fire barrier penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, firedoors, and fire dampers) in fire zone boundaries protecting safety-related areas, shall be functional... at all times." The limiting condition for operation permits a door to be blocked open if a continous fire watch is implemented or the operability of fire detectors in the area is verified and an hourly fire watch established.
Failures to comply with the Limiting Condition for Operation is a violation (Violation 50-369/81-22 r3, Fire doors blocked open).
The problem of blocked ' ire doors with no fire watch was previously discussed in IE Inspection Report 50-369/81-10.
On march 13, 1981, the licensee issued a memo to all station personnel on the purpose of fire doors and required actions when blocking a door open. This corrective action was apparently not adequate to prevent recurrence. Therefore, the licensees response to this violation should exceed a staff memo.
11.
Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector performed an in-office review of nonroutine event reports to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the
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identified cause, and adequately addressed the event and any generic implications.
In addition the inspector examined selected operating and maintenance logs, and records and internal incidents investigation reports.
Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to assure completion, and that the event was
. reviewed by the licensee, as stipulated in the Technical Specifications.
The following event reparts were reviewed:
Report Number Title 81-01 Fire Protection System 81-02 Containment Integrity 81-03 Waste Gas Flow Honitor 81-04 Fire Stops 61-05 Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation 81-06 ND Pump 1A 81-07 Nuclear Review Water Train Inoperable 81-08 Control Room Air Incperable 81-09 Valve ND 14 Failed Closed 81-10 Low Flow ND System L
81-11 Personnel Air Lock Seals 81-23 Fire stops.
81-24 Undersiged S-G Closure Steel Wedge Plates 81-25 Cable Tray Hanger Seismic Qualification 81-26 EMF-43A Inoperable 81-30 High Groundwater Level 12.
Followup on Vendor Part 21 Report On May 15, 1981 the General Atomic Company reported pursuant to an apparent defect in instrument cable supplied to Duke Power. The Rockbestos cable was found to apparently fail at 300* F rather than 340* F as certified. Duke identified the affected cables as those to the containment high radiation monitor. The monitor is required for the LOCA event. Analysis of the LOCA lower containment temperature transient indicates a peak of approximately 240* F, which is substantially below the 300 F capability of the cable. On that basis, Duke concluded that use of the cable was acceptable.
The inspector has no further questions in this area.
13. Surveillance and Startup Testing The inspector witnessed and reviewed selected portions of the following periodic or startup tests.
PT/0/A/4601/01 Protection System Channel 1 Functional Test PT/1/A/4252/01 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
.PT/1/A/4252/01 Reactor Coolant System Flow Test Deficiencies noted during testing were resolved by the licensee.
TP/1/A/4252/01 RCS Flow Test, did not meet the full flow acceptance
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criteria. The test is required at the 50% power plateau and is run at this time for infonnation only. The licensee anticipates no problems at that time. The test will be reviewed again when it is repeated. The inspector has no further questions in this area.
The inspector also reviewed in, reater depth the licensee's discovery that, due to inadequate surveillance, containment integrity had never been completedly verified.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires primary containment integrity to be maintained whenever the plant is in modes 1-4.
Additionally, TS.4.6.1.1 requires containment integrity to be confirmed monthly by verifying the closure of all containment penetrations not capable of being closed by automatic isolation valves. When core alterations are in progress or irradiated fuel is being moved in the containment, penetrations providing direct access from the containment t tmosphere to the outside atmosphere are required by T.S.3.9.4 to be closed.
T.S.4.9.4.1 further requires these penetrations to be verified closed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to initiating core alterations and every 7 days thereafter.
10 CFR 50 Appendix J further requires that Type C leak testing be performed on containment isolation valves on lir.es providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.
10 CFR 50 Appenoix J also requires local leak rate testing to be performed on portions of the containment boundary opened and resealed after the Type A ILRT had been completed.
On June 15, 1981, the licensee determined that three valves in instrument lines connecting the containment atmosphere to temporary pressure detection instrumentation outside the containment had never been Type C tested and were not included in the containment integrity surveillance verifications for modes 1-4 or Core Alterations. When identified, the valves were open.
In the resulting review of other penetrations, the licensee found that the ice loading penetrations to the ice cendenser had not been locally leak tested following ice lcading.
Ice loading occurred after the containment integrated leak rute test was complete. As a result of failing to identify
these four penetrations for required surveillance, there is no assurance l
that containment integrity existed either during core alterations or those times prior to June 15, 1981 that the plant operated in Modes 3 and 4.
This is a violation (50-369/81-22-04, lack of containment integrity).
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reactor had not yet been critical at this time).
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