IR 05000369/1981013
| ML20009D978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1981 |
| From: | Bryant J, Donat T, Graham M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009D942 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-81-13, NUDOCS 8107240549 | |
| Download: ML20009D978 (10) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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Report No. 50-369/81-13 Licensee: Duke Power Company
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422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility name: - McGuire Docket No. 50-369 License No. NPF-9 Inspection at McGuire site near Charlotte, NC Inspectors M
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T. J. Dona /
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$cA20l Oate S/gned Approved by
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J pya..;, Serfion Chie dent and Project Ins e/ Reactor Date Sfgned Re ction Civision SUMMARY Inspection on March 15 through April 21, 1981.
Areas Inspected.
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This routine, announced inspection involved 236 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of maintenance and surveillance activities, surveillance programs, IE Bulletins and Circulars, licensee identified construction items, followup of open items, plant modifications, licensee identified items and radwaste release.
Results Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in seven areas; one violation was found in one area (Violation - Unsampled release to the environment, paragraph 12).
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DETAILS 1.
. Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- M. McIntosh, Plant Manager
- T. McConnel, Superintendent of Technical Services
- d. Sample, Projects and Licensing
- C. Van Vynckt, Engineering
- T. Keane,' Station Health Physicist
"R. Propst, Chemistry Radwaste
- D. Franks, Quality Assurance
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- D. Lampke, Projects and Licensing N. McGraw, Operations H. Barrons, Operations
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M. Pacetti, Station Safety. Review Group
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Other Licensee employees contacted included techicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2;
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 21, 1981, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspection. scope and findings wereEsummarized at the exit interview with those persons lj sted above. -The licensee acknowledged the violation.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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LNot 1nspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
. Independent' Inspection The inspectors. toured the. ' f acil i ty at. var.ous times throughout the inspection interval. The inspectors observed maintenance and surveillance activities, ~ testing in progress, and control room activities. Shift logs wre' reviewed and-discussed with the operations staff.
Compliance with operations. technical specifications was verified using control room indi-cation, and illuminated annunciators were noted and investigated. No items of noncompliance.were identified.
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6.
Surveillance Program The inspector reviewed the surveillance program as a whole to verify that technical specification and technical specification related surveillance requirements were-being tracked and performed in a timely manner.
The licensee's computer tracking system and monthly, weekly, daily and semi-daily surveillance procedures were reviewed to confirm tracking of approximately.75% of - all surveillance requirements.
With the above procedures, the -shift logs, and the controlling procedure for start-up OP/1/A/6100/01, the timely performance of a 75% sample of all mode 3 and 4 surveillances was verified.
Only one problem area was identified, that of tracking conditional surveillance requirements. These required surveillances were performed as appropriate during initial heat-up, but no formal tracking system currently exists to assure compliance during subsequent heat-ups.
Examples of conditional technical specificatior, surveillances are recalibration of the source range instrumentation prior to entry into mode 4, if not performed in the~last seven days (normally a 31-day interval), and leak testing of personnel air locks prior to entry into mode 4 if both doors had been open at the same time while in mode 5 or 6.
Other conditional requirements have
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also been identified.
The licensee agreed that a tracking system for these requirements is necessary,. and has committed to present plans for such a system to the inspector by May 1,1981, and to have a system in effect by June 1, 1981.
(Inspection Followup item 81-13-01).
In addition to the overview of the surveillance program, one requirement was selected for review in depth.
The inspector monitored the performance of the reactor containment electrical'
penetration overcurrent protection surveillance test, PT/0/A/4350/09-as well as reviewing the completed procedure. The procedure differed from that used as the basis for the overcurrent data in technical specification 3.8.~3.1 Table 3.8-1.
The technical specification values were based on '200% overcurrent applied to all three phases simultaneously. The test procedure applied 300% overcurrc.-+ to only a single phase.
This procedure and the acceptable minimum / maximum trip time are specified in section 29160 of the Westinghouse catalogue for type HFB and type THED circuit breakers.
'The inspector _was satisified that the two test methods are equivalent. The inspector also verified that the acceptable values of fuse resistance were those provided by the vendor, McGraw-Edison BUSSMAN, and that all installed fuses met the acceptance criteria. The inspector contacted CNRR concerning changing Table 3.8-1 to address specifically the use of the 300% single
. phase test and was told such a change is scheduled for the next revision.
This is identified as Inspector Foll-vup Item 81-13-0..
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4 7.
Followup on Bulletins and Circulars
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Closed -- 80-CI-17, Fuel Pin Damage Due to _ Water Jet from Baffle Plate Corner.
The inspector ' contacted licensee and vendor representatives concerning documentation on the baffle plate modification made following hot functional testing.
The NSSS supplied a copy of the interim and final reports concerning the baffle plate modification and guide tube pin replacement.
The interim report, QS-TR-0487, dated November 3, 1980, discusses work
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activities associated with FCN-DAP-10609, baffle joint gapping. Trip Report QS-TR-0512 cated February 1,1981, provided a more detailed review of the
_ program including final baffle - plate gap measurements.
The final QC approval was documented -in MRR-37145, which was also reviewed.
Based on these documents 80-CI-17 is closed.
8.
Followup on Licensee Identified Construction Items Closed - 80-10-07, ITE-Gould Overcurrent Relay SCR Failure. The inspector reviewed the licelsee's initial report, the correspondence from the breaker manufacturer to the Commission and I&E Vendor Report 99900743 21-01 on the breaker manufacturer.
Based on the last report it appears that adequate corrective action has been completed and item 80-10-07 is closed.
, 9.
Followup on Open Items
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Closed - 79-06-02, concerning documentation of completion of work requests on the diesel generators initiated during preoperational testing. This item was. initiated because of over two hundred work requests generated during the performance of. TP/1/A/1350/22A and 228.
The -inspector veirified that all systems associated with the diesel generators were retested subsequent to TP/1/A/1350/22A, B and performed as expected. These subsequents tests were:
'TP/1/A/1350/26A, B TP/1/A/1350/30A, B TP/1/A/1350/31A, B TP/1/A.'13eu/33 TP/1/A/1350/08A, B TP/1/A/1350,09A, B Based on the successful completion of these tests item 79-06-02 is closed.
Closed - Open Item 79-16-01 concerning revising MP/0/A/2005/01 and MP/1/A/7150/42.
MP/0/A/2005/01 was revised to include (1) a 5 megohm minimum megger. reading between field windings and ground, and (2) that the generator hi pot test be performed in accordance with AIEE-95, at 15KV for new windings and at reduced voltages for older 1,indings. This satisfies the inspectors comments for this test.
Procedure MP/1/A/7150/42, " Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement," was modified in change #3 to reouire the unit status to be " Refueling Shutdown". This is confirmed by a
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" Maintenance Rep" signature in Enclosure 13.1 step E.
Based on these actions item 79-16-01 is closed.
. Closed - Open. Item 79-16-03 concerning comments nn the station emergency procedures.
Subsequent to the report, the stations emergency procedures
. have 'been divided into emergency procedures and abnormal procedures as foilows:
EP/1/A/5000/01, Immediate A;tions'and Diagnostics EP/1/A/5000/02, Loss of Ret.ctor Coolant EP '1/A/5000/03, Secondary Line Rupture EP/1/A/5000/04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture
'AP/1/A/5500/01-
. Reactor Trip.
AP/1/A/5500/02 Turbine Generator Trip AP/1/A/5500/03 Load Rejection
- AP/1/A/5500/04 Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow AP/1/A/5500/05 Inadequate Core Cooling AP/1/A/5500/06 Loss of S/G Feedwater AP/1/A/5500/07-Loss of Electrical Power AP/1/A/5500/08
. Malfunction of RC Pumps AP/1/A/5500/25 Spent Fuel Damage
.(a) The originalLinspector comment on IND-15 not being opened during
' hot ~ leg recirculation has been incorporated in EP/1/A/5000/02, step 5.1.6.
(b) The verification of D/G Start, AFW Start, FW Isolation has been incorporated into EP/1/A/5000/01 steps 2.1.5, 2.1.4 and 2.1.3 respectively.
(c) The determination if the plant is undergoing a "LARGE" or a
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"SMALL" LOCA is provided in steps 3.1 through 3.7 and 3.9 of EP/1/A/5000/01 and steps 3.1 through 3.44 of EP/1/A/5000/02.
(d) The containment ~ ventilation is verified secure in step 2.1.8 of EP/1/A/5000/01.
4(e)- AP/1/A/5500/19, " Loss of Residual Heat Removal", in ste'ps 2.1 and 2.2 verify that automatic -isolation of the ND system occurs if plant pressure is greater than 475 PSIG.
~(f) The-event is announced 'over the plant paging system in step 3.3 of
.EP/1/A/5500/19.
(g); The procedure in step 3.11.6 refers to use of charging and letdown per OP/1/A/6100/02 and 6200/01 in the event temperature ar.d pr essure cannot
'be adequately controlled using the steam generators.
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5 (h) _AP/1/A/5500/24, " Loss of Containment Integrity" does require in step 3.5 that HP be notified to determine whether 'any activity has been reclosed.
(i) 'Immediate action 2.1.3 verifies whether or not permissive C-9, " Loss of Steam Dump to Condenser" is lost on a Loss of Condenser Vacuum Alarm.
(j)Immediate action steps 3.4 and 3.5 provide for'offsite notification of-plant personnel of the nature of the emergency and plant nature of the emergency and plant status.
(i.e. Turbine. Trip, Reactor Trip, Diesel
- Generator Startup).
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(k) The Subsequent Action portion of EP/1/A/5000/03-steps 3.1 through 3.9 provides the logic for determining if it is a steam line or a feedwater line break and isolating the effected suction.
-(l)-The inspector reviewed all twenty-nine emergency procedures and
' abnormal procedures and references to specific applicable technical
- specifications parameters have been added.
Based on the above review open item 79-16-03 is closed.
Closed - Open. Item 79-16-04 concerning the need for check lists in complex instrumentation procedures.
The inspector reviewed the discussion in IE Reports 79-16 and 79-36 and reviewed the following:
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'IP/0/A/3000/01:
IP/0/A/3000/03, 03A, 038, 03C, and 030
- IP/0/A/3000/05~
IP/0/A/3000/09,09A'
IP/0/A/3001/01 IP/0/A/3001/02 IP/0/A/3002/01 IP/0/A/3002/03,03A
=IP/0/A/3002/03,03A
.IP/0/A/3007/02,02A IP/0/A/3007/03 IP/0/A/3009/01,01A IP/0/A/3010/06 1TP/0/A/3010/05
' Based on the' above review the inspector. concluded that adequate checkoffs
- had been incorporated into _ the.IP procedures and open item 79-16-04 is closed.
Clos'ed 1 Inspector-Followup. Item S1-10-01 concerning adequate training of personnel used as fire watches. The licensee issued a memorandum on 3/13/81 to al1 Station Personnel re-emphasizing'the role of a fire watch. Specific discussions yof the responsibilites of a fire watch and what actions are expected in the event of a fire were also discussed in group safety meetings
' held the week of March 16 and 23. The inspector reviewed the attendance
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roles for the safety meetings and considers that adequate actions have been
.taken with respect to normal plant staff. The inspector has also talked to several security force members and they appear aware of what to do in the event of a fire. Therefore, Inspector Followup item 81-10-01 is closed.
(Closed) Licensee Identified Item 79-22-03, Improper insulation of electrical leads was inadvertently omitted from report 81-08. Based on the inspection of the licensees response to valcor solenoid valve failures as described in that report item 79-22-03 is closed.
.(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 80-39-01 concerning the calibration and operational verification of the loose parts monitoring system prior to operation of any reactor coolant pumps.
The inspector observed licensee technicians performing IP/0/A/3000/09N and TP/1/B/1600/02 on the loose parts monitoring system installation on the bottom of the steam generators, and on the reactor vessel bottom and reactor vessel head a 2as.
The inspector
.noted -that amplitude response was verified, base line noise levels were determined, and the alarm bistables were set in accordance with the test procedure.
Based on these observations the inspector determined that the followup actions had been completed and item 80-39-01 is closed.
10.
Plant Modifications The inspector followed the installation of the reactor coolant system isolation valve back leakage measurement system. This instrumentation was required by surveillance requirement 4.4.7.2:2 prior to entering mode 3.
The system was installed per 0.P.C. Special Project 55 and site NSM number MG-00002 and MG-00003. The mechanical installation, filling and calibration oof the backleakage flow meters and the filing of updated drawings in the control room and master file was monitored. The inspector found no problems in the installation or calibration of the system.
A 11.
Followup on Licensee Identified Items The following-significant equipment failures occurred during the inspection interval. The inspector followed the licensee's analysis of the problems, investigation for probable causes, corrective actions, and compliance with technical specifications and reporting requirements.
a.
Reactor Coolant System Blowdown to Pressurizer Relief Tank.
On March 20,.1981, while the plant was operating in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), the safety valve on
"A" drain decay heat removal system opened and stuck in that position. Normal actuation of the valve occurs at - 600 psi.
RCS pressure dropped from approximately 350 psi to approximately 310 psi. PRT level increased accordingly. An inspector r
in the control room observed the licensees response to the transient and noted that the operations crew performed in accordance with procedure in identifying the cause, controlli g the transient, and
returning the plant to normal operating conditions. Operation was in compliance with technical specification limits throughtout the even te,
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The inspector also noted that the shift supervisor controlled access to-the control room in accordance with post-TMI guidance.
Subsequent to the event, the licnesee bench tested the faulty valve, but was unable to cause repetition of the problem, and the valve was returned to service. The inspector has no further questions in this area.
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Upper Head Injection Diaphram Rupture On April 12, 1981, while the plant was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), the diaphram between the nitrogen and water OHI accumulators ruptured. The rupture occurred while the UHI system was being aligned for service prior to exceeding 1900 psi RCS pressure.
In accordance with alarm
_ procedure, - the operators assumed a small diaphram puncture, wrote a work request for investigation of the alarm, and increased pressure above 1900 psi.
Several hours later, the diaphram was found to be ruptured.
Based on a conservative chemistry estimate of entrained nitrogen, the system was declared inoperable, and RCS pressure was reduced below 1900 psi.
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The cause of the diaphram rupture was inadequate venting between the UHI isolation valves, causing a pressure fluctuation when the system was valved in service. The inspector re /iewed the licensee procedure
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change to aleviate the - venting problem, a'd also noted that the sub-sequent return of UHI to service was successful.
The inspector. expressed a co:.cern that the licensee's procedure for response to the diaphram leakage alarm was not conservative in that it
. allowed passage from a condition where UHI was not required, into a condition 'where it was required, without investigating a leakage alarm.
The licensee committed to review and revise the alarm procedure. This is Inspector Followup Item 81-13-03.
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c.
RCS Leakage !!ia'Oecay Heat Removal System Valve on April 16, 1981.
The first isolation valve of the decay heat removal system hot leg suction line was found tc be. leaking via the valve bonnet.
The inspector observed the valve in the containment and reviewed the licensee's methods of estimating the rate of leakage. The leakage was within Technical Specification limits for identifeid leakage.
-The inspector discussed with the licensee the preliminary plans for repair of the decay heat removal isolation valve.
The repair of the valve will require draining of the reactor coolant system and isolation of both trains of decay heat removal at the common suction line.
As the reactor has not yet been critical, no decay heat was beng produced.
The inspector will follow closely the license's repair efforts, and report them in subsequent inspection reports.
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d.
Personnel Air Lock Seal Failures From April 14 to 21, 1981, the licensee experienced difficulties with
. the per'sonnel air lock inflatable seals and the interlocks on April 14, one seal on the inner door of the lower personnel air lock failed,
. while the outer door of the lower personnel air lock failed while the outer-door was opan, rendering both doors inoperable, and breaching containment integrity.
Due to the design of the door hydraulics and interlock system, the outer door locked in its open position, remaining immobile until a key.could be brought from the control room to override the interlock.. Containment integrity was restored within the limits allown.d by the Technical Specifications.
On April 15, before the lower door could be repaired, one seal on the outer door.of the upper personnel air lock failed. ' No seals remained in stock, so both air locks were inoperable. An emergency Technical Specification change authorized by NRR, permitted entry into the lower containment to complete repairs on the lower airlock.
On April 21, while the lower airlock was'in use, the inner door bounced on closure, fulfilling the permissive for opening the outer door, but in reality the inner door was being held open by the locking mechanism rather than
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The outer door was opened, breeching ' containment integrity.
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Containment-integrity was ' restored with the required time limits.
The inspector has three areas of concern with resp ~ect to the personnel air locks.
(1) -Seal failure
. (2) Nonconservative interlocking
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Erroneous satisfaction of permissive.
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- At the close of the inspection interval, the licensee was actively pursuing resolution of all three concerns.
Site personnel are conferring with both the vendor and corporate and corporate design
engineering. Specific 14 ensee committments have not yet been decided upon.
~12.
Radwaste Release-
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On April'13, 1981, the licensee's operations staff noted a high level alarm for the ventilation unit condensate drain tank (VUCDT), and cumped its content to the environment. As the required composite sampling instrumen-tation.had not yet been installed, this release was contrary to technical
- specification requirements. The resident inspector and reaion'.1 office were informed of the event on April 14.
After the release was complete, the residual fluid in the tank was sampled and found to be uncontaminate '
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' incident occurred as a result of failure to follow technical specifications
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a.
Technical specification 4.11.1.1.3 requires in part that continuous, flow proportional composite samples be taken of all releases from the VUCDT.
Because the samples had not been installed, no samples were taken of the release itself.
b.
. From the issuance of the license until April 13, 1981, after the release, the radwas:e subsystem used to pump out the VUCDT was left in service, even though it was inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications. Failure to tag the system out of service constitutes failure to follow OP/0/A/6/00/09 Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment.
c.
Duke' procedure OP/0/A/6500/01 " Liquid Waste System" requires in section 2.4 that the transfer and handling of all radwaste be coordinated with the Chemistry Radwaste Group.
This coordination was not performed.
' Failure to follow procedures constitutes violation of Technical-Specification 6 3.1, which requires that for such activities, written procedures be (stablished, implemented and maintained.
Failure to follow technical specification requirements constitutes a Violation 81-13-03, Unsampled release to the environmert.
d.
The inspector also noted that procedure OP/0/A/6500/01 Liquid Waste System was.vther sketch. In particular, two concerns were raised.
1.
The procedure described operation of several radwaste subsystems, but-included only one. valve line-up enclosure.
Each section of the procedure -called for its subsystem to-be aligned per the enclosure, with ' no differentation provided to determine which portions of the enclosure were applicable.
The inspector felt
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that tF. required excessive judgement on the part of the indiv aal performing the procedure.
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' The inspector als,c noted that for all releases to the environment,
. certain instrumentation is required to be operating and operable.
Ia this procedure, no precaution or initial conditian is included co verify the operability of required instrumentation, apparently permitting some future unmonitored release.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector comments and committed to review all radwaste release procedures in the control of both chemistry and operations.
Changes will be made as appropriate to alleviate the inspector's concerns.
This item will be reviewed at a later date (Inspector Followup Item 81-13-04).
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