ML20032B627
| ML20032B627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B622 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111050729 | |
| Download: ML20032B627 (4) | |
Text
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- DUKE POWER COMPANY
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POWER UU1GING 422 SocTu Cnuncu Srazzi, CiuawrTz, N. C.2a242
$ [ [II EO Ai0.. tf WILLIAM C, PARMER,.J R.
' VC PREsectNt TELEPMOwg; AmE4 704 -
ser. p#ooxrso September 23,.1981 373..o.3
.Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Subject:
.McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369
Reference:
RII:MJG-50-369/81-22
Dear Mr.70'.leilly:
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Please find attached a response to violations 50-369/81-22-01, 50-369/81-22-03 and 50-369/81-22-04 which were identified in the above referenced inspection report. Duke Power Company does not consider any information contained in this.
report to be proprietary.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth here'in are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
V truly you.s, l
LA 4'w be William O. Parker, Jr.
PBN/smh Attachment 8111050729 811016 gDRADOCK 05000369 PDR
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McGuire Nuclear Station Response to I.E. Inspection Report 50-369/81-22 Violation 50-369/81-22-01, Severity Level V:
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained for safety-related activities including surveillance and test activities and the administrative control of station equipment. The Maintenance Manual has been established, including Maintenance Procedure 1.0, which establishes a program for work requests. Processing of Maintenance Pro-cedure 1.0 requires that all work requests on safety-related equipment be signed by the shift supervisor.
OP/0/A/6100/09, Removal and Restoration of Station Equipment, has been established to administrative 1y control equipment undergoing maintenance or surveillance and to establish procedures for removal and restora-tion of particular components.
Contrary to the above, Maintenance Procedure 1.0 and OP/G/A/6100/05 were not im-plemented in that:
On July 7, 1981 an instrument and electrical technician removed safety-a.
related auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters from service without having the work request signed by the shift supervisor or without having OP/0/4/6100/05 implemented for the equipment.
b.
On July 10, 1981, an instrument and electrical technician failed to follow the restoration procedure outlined in OP/0/4/6100/05 while restoring an RTD on the primary system to service. As a result of this failure to implement established procedures, a 50gpm leak was opened from the primary system to the containment atmosphere.
Response
1.
Duke Power Company admits to the violation.
2.
The reasons for the above violations were errors in judgement by plant per-sonnel.
3.
The technicians involved have been counseled on the need to follow procedures carefully. A training session was given to all IAE technicians, on which valves they are allowed to operate and the entire tagging procedure. Addi-tionally, a red tag log has been established for instrument and root valves controlled by IAE.
4.
No further corrective action is planned at this time.
5.
The station is presently in full compliance.
l Violation 50-369/81-22-03, Severity Level V:
l Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires that "All fire barrier penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors, and fire dampers) in fire zone boundaries protecting safety-related areas, shall be functional at all times."
The Limiting Condition for Operation permits a door to be blocked open if a con-
O tinous fire watch is implemented or the operability of fire detectors in the area is verified and an hourly fire watch estat11shed.
Contrary to the above, the following fire doors were found blocked open without meeting the provisions of the action statement in that a continous fire watch was not present and the operability of the fire detectors had not been verified or an hourly watch established.
Door Location Date 80lG 750' Cable Spreading Room 7/9/81 80lG 750' Cable Spreading Room 7/10/81 723F 733' Pipe Chase 7/13/81
Response
1.
Duke Power Company admits to the violation.
2.
This violation was caused by the failure of personnel working in the area to either inform the control room or to post a fire watch.
3.
Operators were dispatched to close the doors when the control room persontel were informed of the situation. Additionally, a memo cosigned by the Plan.
Manager and the Project Manager was sent to all Steam Production and Con-struction personnel reiterating the requirements in this area.
4.
A modification which would add an alarm device to all fire doors is being considered. This device will be installed on approximately ten fire doors on a trial basis.
If the device proves to be useful, it will be installed on all fire doors.
5.
The station is presently in full compliance.
Violation 50-369/81-22-04, Severity Level V:
Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires containment integrity be maintained in Modes 1-4.
Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 requires monthly verification of pene-tration closure during Modes 1-4.
Technical Specification 3.9.4 requires closure of penetrations between the containment atmosphere and outside during core altera-tions. Technical Specification 4.9.4.1 further requires verification of closure of those penetrations every seven days during core alterations. PT/A/4300/02/A, Monthly Containment Integrity Verification and PT/1/A/4200/02/C, Mode 6 (Refuel-ing) Containment Integrity Verification implement T.S.4.6.1 and T.S.4.9.4.1.
10 CFR 50 Appendix J requires Type C leak testing for containment isolation valves on lines providing direct access from the containment atmIosphere to the outside and requires local leak testing for penetrations opened and rescaled after the Type A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test.
Contrary to the above, during core alterations and subrequent operation in Modes 3 and 4 prior to June 15, 1981, containment integrity r d not exist in that:
Three instrument valves on lines penetrating the uvntainment wall and open a.
on both sides were not verified shut by PT/1/A/4200/03A or PT/1/A/4200/02B.
They were found open.
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b.
These three instrument lines isolation valves were never Type C leak tested.
c.
The ice loading penetration to the ice condenser was not locally leak tested following loading of ice.
Response
1.
Duke Power Company admits to the violation.
2.
This violation was caused by the fact that the penetrations listed above were not included in FSAR table 6.2.4-2.
This table was used by staticn personnel to complete a list of containment penetrations requiring a Type C leak test.
3.
The penetrations listed above were added to PT/1/A/4200/01C, Insulation Valve Leak Rate Test.
Type C leak rate tests were satisfactorily com1 1eted by June 23, 1981. The three instrument valves were also added to the appropriate containment integrity periodic test.
4.
The list of containment penetrations was reviewed to ensure no similiar cases existed.
5.
The station is presently in full compliance.
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