IR 05000369/1980022
| ML19337A924 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1980 |
| From: | Donat T, Falconer D, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19337A921 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-80-22, NUDOCS 8010010018 | |
| Download: ML19337A924 (4) | |
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o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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- e REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA sT., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-369/80-22 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Cnarlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Steam Plant Docket No. 50-369 License No. CPPR-83 Inspection at McGuire Plant on Lake Norman Inspectors: Mi w.. t 7/ 7 _'/ 'n VS-T. J L at Date Signed dwm oe/25/z>
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D. Falcyfner Date Si'gned Accompanying Perso el:
E.
trator, CNEN (Bra a l)
Approved by:
A4 ttAl IO
R. D7 Martin, Chief, RONS Branch Da/eSyned SUMMARY Inspection on July 21-25, 1980.
Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 60 inspector-hours on site in the areas of comparison of as-built plant safety systems with the FSAR drawings, witnessing the performance of hot functional preoperational tests, and evaliration of the conduct of the hot functional test program.
Results Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees M. D. McIntosh, Plant Manager
- W. M. Sample, Licensing and Project Engineer
- D. Lampke, Jr.
Licensing and Project Engineer R. White, Assist Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer M. Kitton, Assist test Engineer M. Pacette, Test Engineer I.. Weaver, Performance Engineer
- D. Roens, Maintenance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included operators, a mechanic, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 25, 1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspectors expressed their concern about the hc.usekeeping condition of various rooms of the auxiliary building which hause safey-related equipment.
The licensee concurred that several rooms had not been cleaned but stated all would be cleaned before being released to the steam production department from construction. The need for Duke corporate engineering to perform a review of the reportability of the heating of the pressurizer cubicle was also discussed.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Comparison of As-Built Safety-Related Systems to FSAR Drawings The inspectors examined portions of three safety-related systems to ensure that the system, as installed, is identical with the FSAR drawings. The three systems and drawings were:
Cold Leg Accumulators MC-1562-2.0/2.1 Decay Heat Removal MC-1561-1.0 Containment Spray MC-1563- _
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The inspectim of the Cold Leg Accumulators was performed by tracing the
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installed pipang from the cold leg penetrations to the accumulator volumes and back to the 'irst isolation valve. There were thirteen missing valve l
labd plates,.1d the relief valve discharge piping was missing.
The licuee acknowledged that the drain valve may not be installed and the drawing may need to be revised.
The inspector did not list this as an open item pending a review of addit.ional
systems to determine if this is an isolated itein or a generic problem.
6.
Observation of Hot Functional Testing I
The inspectors monitored the performance of portions of two preoperational tests:
TP/1/A/1150/15, " Pressurizer Pressure and Level and Steam Generator Level Control Test" TP/1/A/1150/16, "PORV Blockvalve Leak Integrity Test" j
The inspectors performed the following actions for each test:
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Verified that the test procedure had been updated with the appropriate permanent and temporary changes and that these changes had been autho-rized and had good engineering basis, b.
Verified that all prerequisites had been signed and independently verified at least half of the items.
Monitored conduct of procedure by the the test engineer, noted log c.
recording and procedure sign-offs.
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Independently reviewed the test data to ensure all available data was recorded and analyzed by the licensee.
The blowdown of PORV valve INC-34 was monitored from the control room and inside containment. Also the timing of valve closure for all three PORV's r
was monitored. It is noted that one of these valves, INC-36 had a closure time of 2.08 see which exceeds the 2.0 sec. max closure time criteria of the test. The licensee has witten a test deficiency report on this problem
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and corporate engineering design was notified.
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Observation of Hot Functional Test Program l
The inspectors attended the licensee's daily plant status meetings on July 22 through July 25th.
These meetings addressed progress in system testing and problem resolution during the preceeding twenty four hours.
l During several of these meetings, the licensee discussed the excessive l
temperatures experienced inside the upper cubicle during the initial portion j
of the HFT-II test sequence. The probleic was discovered when the cubicle upper hatch was removed in an attempt to determine the reason PORV block I
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valve INC-35B would not close.
It was discovered that the motors for the valve actuators on valves INC-33 and INC-35 had been burnt, with the paint being severely discolored. Also inspections within the cubicle identified seven snubbers which had lost all indication of hydraulic fluid, and several
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maximum temperature records which had been completely blackened (offscale
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temperature indication).
The licensee's program to replace the snubbers, on a temporary basis with new hydraulic units, provide temporary insulation, increase ventilation air flow and replace the defective valve actuator motor operators was monitored. The licensee is performing an evaluation of whether the high temperature conditions are reportable in accordance with
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8.
Inspection of Pressurizer Cubicle Hydraulic Seismic Supports Damaged During HFT-II.
The inspectors examined seven damaged Grinnell Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors (snubbers) that were removed from the pressurizer cubicle during a temporary cooldown in the HFT-II sequence. The damage to the snubbers was due to an excessive thermal transient in the pressurizer cubicle during HFT-II as described in paragraph 7.
The excessive tempera-i tures caused the snubber seals to fail resulting in a loss of hydraulic fluid from the snubbers.
The licensee estimates the maximum temperature in the pressurizer cubicle to have reached at least 280 F.
The Grinnell Corporation Hydraulic Shock and Swey Suppressor Manual, PHD-6511-8, rates the snubbers to 200 F normal operation and to 300"F short transient operation.
The hydraulic snubbers where replaced with new hydraulic snubbers as a temporary solution to the hydraulic seal problem. The decision to use mechanical snubbers in the pressurizer cubicle as the permanent solution depends on the analysis and correction of the thermal problem by the licensee's engineering design group. This has been identified as inspector follow-up item (80-22-01).
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