IR 05000369/1980006
| ML19312E960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1980 |
| From: | Donat T, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19312E956 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-80-06, 50-369-80-6, NUDOCS 8006180246 | |
| Download: ML19312E960 (4) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:,,
j
'o, UNITED STATES . ! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , ,, 'v g a
REGION II
[f 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 o, % ATLANTA, G EORGIA 3o3o3 Report No. 50-369/80-06 Licensee: Duke Dower Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-369 License No. CPPR-83 i Inspection at McGuire Station near Charlotte, NC Inspector: Of_.) [ I'['[[O T. J. Donat / Date Signed j Accompanied by: P. C. Ambros, CNEN Approved by: Y)[ a[ I-f-80 R. D. Martid, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on April 23-25, 1980 AREAS INS 5'ECTED This routine, unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Reactor Protection system preoperational test procedure review, completed ESF test package review, plant housekeeping and cleanliness audit, and review of signal separation criteria implementation.
Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
~, 8006180 24/[
. . Y DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- M. D. McIntosh, Plant Manager
- W. M. Sample, Licensing and Projects Engineer
- D. Lampke, Assistant Licensing and Projects Engineer
- T. L. McConnell, Superintendent-Technical Services
- C. Van Vynckt, Staff Engineer D. Simmons, Associate Instrumentation and Control Engineer E. Estep, Associate Licensing and Projects Engineer D. Marquis, Associate Test Engineer G. Montgomery, Instrument Technician M. Pacetti, Test Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included 3 construction craftsmen, 3 technicians and 4 office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 25, 1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following inspector concerns, identified during the inspection, were also presented: (1) the need for significant effort by the licensee to clean and make operational all unit I areas in the auxiliary building involved in hot functional testing, and (2) the need to identify and schedule activity on those THI-2 Short Term Lessons Learned items which will be required by January 1,1981.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Urresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Reactor Protection System Preoperational Test Procedures The inspectors reviewed the status of the preoperational test program for the reactor protection system. Time response of the individual sensors is to be measured using approved procedures IP/0/A/3010/06A for RTD's and /06B for differential pressure transmitters.
This activity is scheduled to commence during the week of April 28, 1980.
< i The test procedure, TP/1/A/1600/03, for measuring the time response of the , Westinghouse Solic State Protection System processor electronics has not
_ -____ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ + .. . -2- . been written. While reviewing the score of the test, the inspectors noted that the licensee's reactor protection system had several trips different from those found at other facilities. Specifically: Only three conditions result in an automatic safety injection: a.
(1) Low Pressurizer Pressure (2/4 less than 1845 psig), (2) Low Steamline Pressure (2/3 in any steam line less than 585 Psig), (.' li Containment Pressure (2/3 greater than 1.1 psig) b.
In addition to the normal reactor plant ueutron flux and primary plant parameter trips there is a low-low steam generator level trip (2/4 less than 12%). The automatic reactor trip on a turbine trip and the automatic turbine c.
trip on a generator trip are not provided.
d.
There is no automatic safety injection for a high steam flow coincident with either low low Tave or low steam pressure condition or for a high steam line differential pressure condition.
The inspectors will review with licensing personnel the acceptability of items e and d and will review the conduct of test procedure TP/1/A/1600/03 during a subsequent inspection (Open Item 80-06-01).
6.
Completed ESF Test Package Review The inspector reviewed the completed test package for preoperational test TP/1/A/1200/03B, Upper Head Injection System Functional Test, for compliance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.68 and FSAR sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.4.
The inspector noted that the test deficiency on the UHI isolation valve dead weight measuring system had been transferred to preoperational test TP/1/A/1200/03F. Further discussions with the licensee revealed that the acceptability of the valve weight method for detecting actuator hydraulic fluid leaks was doubtful and that removal of the equipment was being pursued. The licensee's correspondence with Westinghouse concerning evaluation of the test data, modification of the valve isolation level setpoints, and proposed second series of high pressure blowdown tests was examined.
The inspector also reviewed the completed test procedure, valve lineup enclosures, test deficiency sheets, data sheets, and the test chro-nological log. The inspector had no comment on the conduct or documentation of the test.
7.
Housekeeping Inspection of Unit 1 Auxiliary Building The inspectors toured the Unit I portion of the auxiliary building for housekeeping and general cleanliness. The inspectors found that the general level of dust and debris in the portions of the unit 1 auxiliary building .-_- . _ - ~
_ . .. _ _ _ _. - _ _ _ __.
- - ,.... . -3- . to be used during the hot functional testing program while not sufficient - to present a personnel hazard, was sufficient to present operational problems.
Some specific examples were: Limit switch conduit was found pulled out of receptacles or too short a.
for valves INR-87, INR-83, INR-93, INVLS-6930 and 6931.
b.
A 2-foot section of 1/2 inch copper tubing was wrapped around the top , of valve operator INR-3.
INR-151 remote operator passes through thermal insulation, not certain c.
about binding during HFT.
d.
Remote operator cable for INR-138 rests on top of operator for valve INR-9.
The three inch line from the Boron thermal regeneration demineralizer e.
to the moderating heat exchanger was cut and left uncovered.
f.
Air line to valve INR-83 pressure regulator was loose and leaked air when touched.
g.
Portions of lagging on containment spray pump 1A discharge 120* elbow soaked and dripping water.
h.
ND pump 1B seal leakoff return line swaying 2 to 3 inches due to vibration pickup when pump 1A was running.
i.
Lagging debris found in operator of valve IND-15B.
j.
Containment Spray Train B heat exchanger valves IRN-19 and IRN-237 leaking about 1/4 GPM onto floor.
8.
Verification of Piping Separation for Pressurizer Level Instrumentation The inspectors traced the pressurizer level instrumentation piping from the pressurizer vessel penetrations to the differential pressure transmitters located in the accumulator rooms.
Particular attention was placed on how much separation existed between the lines for the four different channels of level instrumentation. At no location was the spacing between channels less than the 18" minimum spacing specified in FSAR section 7.2.1.
The inspection was clear in this area.
j . . ... _ _ _. - - -. - w' -- }}